A

ABHAŃGA

1. A traditional prosodic and mould, prevalent in the devotional literature and music of Maharashtra.

AUTHOR: RANADE A. D. Source: *On music and Musicians,* New Delhi, 1984.

2. A Marathi devotional song, a popular Folk song of Maharashtra since 13th Cent. A.D. The composers of these songs tried to propound the philosophy of the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa.* It is composed in *Obi,* a popular metre. There is no limit of the length of the song, and can be sung in any *rāga.* It is perennial *Kīrtana* of God, *Abhańga* literal meaning is a *Kīrtana* without break.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI (thereafter P. S.)

3. **Ābhańga:** A term of Hindu Iconography. Ābhańga is that form of standing attitude in which the centre line from the crown of the head to a point midway between the heels passes slightly to the right of the navel.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI.

ABHAYA- MUDRĀ

Abhaya-Mudrā: Gesture of protection in the Iconography of India. In this *Mudrā* (Hand-pose) the right hand of the deity is shown with palm outward and turned toward the worshipper with the fingers raised. This *Mudrā* has been used in the iconography of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. It is used for Buddha, Tīrthańkara and Viṣṇu, as the protector of the Cosmic system and of *Śiva-Natarāja* in the in the *Ānanda-Tāṇḍava* dance.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI. Source: *Symbols of Art, Religion and Philosophy,* New Delhi, 1990.

ĀBHĀSA

1. From Tāntric point of view, the entire creation is an Ābhāsa. The universe of appearances is the unmanifest nature of the Absolute from which the process of involution emanates which is perceived by the subject as different from itself.

To a tāntric, world is real and is the expression of the *Cit-Śakti* or Free-will of the Lord and is really spiritual in essence like the Lord Himself.(*Tripurā Rahasyaṃ,* Sarasvati-Granthalaya Vol. XV, Varanasi, 1965.)

2. World is real in the same way as an image is real, but it has no existence apart from the medium in which it is manifested.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI.; Source: *Aesthetic theory of India* Vol. II, New Delhi, 1986.

3. This visible universe (*dṛśya viśva*), is regarded as a real to the extent that we perceive its ultimate significance, *Paramārtha.* It empirically expressed God as the creator (*Nirmāṇa-Kāraka*) of the world-picture, *Jagaccitra,* of which the beauty, *ramaṇīyatā* is the same as that which in art is the source of disinterested pleasure. But world-picture is other than the empirical sense, in which god created, is not lovely and unlovely parts, but as seen in contemplation as an aesthetic experience. Unlike an artists, god is without motive and end to be attained. God's art is without means or not really a making or becoming or transfiguring but rather a self-illumined (*Svaprakāśa*), 1.reflected modality (*Ābhāsa*) or Play (*Līlā*); 2. Objectivity (*Viṣayagata*); 3. Counter image (*Pratibimba*) (*Mait.* Up VI. 7); 4. An image, god made man in his own image; 5 R. V. *Sarūpa-Jyoti* or *Bhārūpa;* 6. Śilpa-Śāstras; Painting. **AUTHOR: ACARYA P.K. Source:** *Dictionary of Hindu Architecture,* 1968.

7. Phenomenological (Utpalācārya, *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Kārikā*).

8. According to *Tantra,* the unity of *Śiva* and *Śakti* manifests in creation. When *Śakti* gets manifested, *Śiva* undergoes transformation. He becomes the Universe. *Śiva* is the primary and material-cause of the universe. The world is the manifestation (*Ābhāsa*) of the supreme Reality. It is neither the ultimate reality nor an illusion. The world is the relative truth. The theory of *ābhāsa-vāda* of *Tantra,* is different from the *Pariṇāma- vāda* of the *Sāṁkhya* and *Vivartavāda* of the *Vedānta.* Same *Ābhāsa- vāda* is the theory of creation of the art-forms in *Śaiva-tantra.*

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI.; Source: *Aesthetic theories of India,* Vol. III, New Delhi, 1990.

ĀBHĀSA-VĀDA

1. In the absolute, the entire variety that we find in the objective world, is in a state of perfect unity, exactly as the whole variety of colours that we find in a full-grown peacock is in a state of perfect identity in the yolk of peacock's egg. This analogy, which is very frequently employed in the *Śaiva* literature to explain the absolute unity of all variety in the Ultimate, is technically called *Mayūrāṇḍa-* rasa-*nyāya.* All that emanates from or manifested by the absolute, is called *Ābhāsa.* As it is a manifestation it has limitation and some sort of imperfection. Thus, even the highest category, *Śiva* or Universal being is an *ābhāsa,* because it has limitation, in as much as, it represents a disturbance in the absolute unity of the Absolute. (*IPV* Vol. 1.1). But metaphysical implication of the epistemic technique of *Ābhāsavāda* is that, everything except the Ultimate, is *ābhāsa.* All *ābhāsas* are the manifestation of the Ultimate. Thus, the subject, object, the means of knowledge or knowledge it self is an *Ābhāsa.* The *Ābhāsa* is an isolated manifestation for which, in practical life, a single expression is used. (*IPV* Vol. II. 70-1). An object of action is not an isolated *Ābhāsa.* It is configuration of innumerable *Ābhāsa.* It is made up of as many *Ābhāsas* as may be the words used by different cognisers from different point of views.

The causal efficiency or the use of an object for practical purposes, depends on the unification of some of the constituent *Ābhāsa* of an object into a whole. This whole is called by a word, standing for the most needed or desired *Ābhāsa.*

The constituents of an object are not always the same for every person. They differ with the difference in individual (1) predilection (*ruci*), 2. Purposive attitude (*Arthitva*) and 3. the capacity to known (*Vyutpatti*) (*IPV* Vol. II. 16-7).

The primary activity beings with the movement of the light of the limited Self toward an isolated objective *Ābhāsa.* The light receives the reflection. The *Ābhāsa,* as an object of primary cognitive, is as good as a universal (sāmānyayāmāne Pramāṇa vyāpāraḥ, (*IPV* Vol. III. 10). But object, the configuration of *ābhāsa,* is related to time and space, when it is desired to be made an object of practical utility. Hence, when there is no such desire, it is free from the external time and space.

The *ābhāsavādī* holds that ordinary object of cognition is a collection or configuration of a certain number of *ābhāsas,* each of which requires a separate mental process to cognize. For them, human mind is so constituted that it beings its cognitive activity with apprehension of and reaction to isolated constituents of the presented. Each constituent, as it is apprehended separately, is an *ābhāsa* universal, which marks the farthest limit of cognitive activity. But the practical life is entirely dependent on the unification of *Ābhāsa.* The isolated *ābhāsa* has no practical utility. In order that it may be an object of action, as distinct from that of mere primary cognition, it must be united with some other *ābhāsas,* at least the external time and space. (*IPV* Vol. II. 2). The *ābhāsa* does not change even when it is united with others. It is generic form. From instance, the

ābhāsa, for which the world Jar is used does not imply any matter such as clay or silver of which it may be made. Therefore, even when it is united with other *ābhāsas,* that is, red, earthen, high etc. and appears as distinct from the generic form, because it is looked upon as the substantive of the attributes red etc., it does not change its essential nature of generic form (*IPV* Vol. III. 19).

2. *Ābhāsavāda* has suggested various meanings like transference, the state of identification between subject and object which consist in the unification of self forgetfulness between the two. When the *Ahaṁ* (subjectivity) and *Idaṁ* (objectivity) are lost in one selfhood in the empirical level, Abhinavagupta recognizes that experience to the level of *Īśvara* in its mystic experience. The anesthetic experience thus, at this is nothing but the universalized object by the universalized subject. It is achieved in the fourth spiritual level of the *ābhāsavāda* or transference.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI: *Aesthetic Theories of India,* Vol. III, New Delhi, 1990.

Abbreviation: IPV, *Īśvarapratyābhijñā Vimarśini*

ABHICĀRIKĀ WORSHIP

This worship is performed for the purpose of inflicting defeat and death on the enemies. These *Abhicārikā*-rituals are performed in the forests, mountains, marshy lands, fortresses and other places.

AUTHOR: ROY A. K. & GIDWANI N. N. Source: *A Dictionary of Indology,* Vol. III. New Delhi, 1983, 84, 85.

ABHIDHĀ-VṚTTI (UDBHAṬA)

It was the master critic Ānandavardhana who drew the pointed attention of students of poetics to the supposed implications and potentialities of the *abhidhāvṛtti,* as promulgated in the works of his predecessor Udbhaṭa in its bearing on interpretation of words (*śabda*) and on its role in *kāvyas*. In his characteristic trenchant language. He describe this endeavour of hitting at the track of suggested sense (*dhvanimārga*) which was rather indifferently touched (*manākspṛṣṭa*)[1] through the secondary function of denotation. In a similar manner he has assessed the problem of reaching at the basic excellence in *kāvyas* as was attempted, to be solved in the camp of the *rīti* school in which he emphasised the expressionists' approach as distinct from the impressionists', where he uses the same particle of qualification (*manāksphurita*). Abhinavagupta[2] in his *Locana* in interpreting the former problem refers to the are uttered but is the outcome of an incidental procedure connecting (*āśrita*) with wods as well as their meanings. Pratiharendurāja[7] the commentator on the *Kāv. Al. sār. Sàṅgr.* of Udbhaṭa, as is naturally to be expected from him, voices this view unreservedly and in a long discussion at the end of his commentary, adduces arguments to prove that figures of speech like *paryāyokta* suffice to render null and void the positing of and placing credence on the theory of suggestiveness. Kuntaka, a strick follower of the view of Bhāmaha and as one relying like Bhaṭṭanāyaka of the function refers almost exclusively to the primary aspect of the issue of *abhidhā* and traces all charm in poetry to the indirect way of expression (*vakrokti*)[8] which has many phases, including the *guṇavṛtti* posed by Udbhaṭa. He connects it with the conception of *sāhitya*- the harmonious cooperation of words and their senses, a concept[9] which has been mooted earlier e.g. by Rājaśekhara and has provided an alternative designation for the *śāstra* (*sāhityavidyā*). His contemporary Bhoja took this case, worked on the same lines, utilized and not unoften criticized, as we shall show presumably, the materials provided by Udbhaṭa in the matter of characterization. Amongst later writers of *Alaṁkāraśāstra* influenced by the investigations of Udbhaṭa two-fold aspect of denotation, the primary (*mukhyavṛṭṭi*) and the secondary (*guṇarṭṭi*), an approach which was not peculiar to Udbhaṭṭa alone, but represented the uniform tradition in earlier thought on the subject. Ānanda is inclined to include such views under the class of non-committal or underestimation (*bhākta*). During the transitional period between Udbhaṭa's and Abhinavagupta, writers, including commentators on Udbhaṭa's works who could not divest their minds of the implication of the novel entity *dhvani,* have tried to cover the field opened out either by regarding it as connected with the words themselves (*śabdavyāpāra*) or by relating them to figures of speech attendant on words and on their senses.

To the former category belongs Bhaṭṭa Mukula with whom the *abhidhāvṛtti* stood for the parental function rather akin to the *vṛṭṭis* in dramaturgy formulated by the sage Bharata and described as nurse (*mātṛkā*) for varieties of drama. This was modified in course of time to form the plank for the *dhvani* thought as by *Mammaṭa* in his catechism, the *Śabdavyāpāravicāra* and in the second *ullāsa* of his *Kāvyaprakāśa,* of which the former is apparently an excerpt. Mukula[3] declares that the sense coming direct from words is its primary form and that which has to be modified and arrived at therefrom by proper transformation of that meaning is its secondary one, though a correlated or cognate one. This latter derives its essence from transference (*upacāra*). Mukula is definitely of opinion that this derived sense constitutes the essence of fine literature as well and furnished the *sina quo non* in the way of an analytic approach of its charm. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka while subscribing, in a great measure, to this view relies on the application of the *abhidhā* as the one or unipartite *vṛtti* and draws out as an inevitable corollary the importance of the function[4] or the process in the genus *Kāvya* as its distinguishing characteristic. Mahimabhaṭṭa[5] accepting the *mukhyavṛtti* also reorients this to the marginal issue of literary bias in the one direction viz, the process of inference, which, in his view, would open the key to the apt unfolding of poetic expression and explores particularly the possibilities of the *guṇavṛtti* posed by Udbhaṭa under this head.

The other view of relating poetic essence to figures of poetry is differently conceived, in as much as they aver that beauty[6] of poetic composition is not conterminous with *abhidhā,* as it is not evident at the time the words

may be mentioned. Hemacandra, who however subscribes wholeheartedly to the *dhvani* creed and the logician-poeticist Jayadeva[10] who regards the secondary function, that had in the meanwhile been assigned an independent place in *Alaṁkāraśāatra* in a way discussed in the conception peculiar to *nyāya* philosophy. This reminds us of the manner of Udbhaṭa and the grammarians, a point brought into relief by his erudite commentator Gāgābhaṭṭa.

The term *guṇavṛtti* at least in this form of the word as in Udbhaṭa (and in Ānandavardhana who criticises his view) was not in vogue in earlier literature and was very likely formed on the model of *guṇakarman* (secondary object) which appears in a *vārttika* of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī.* The sense it conveys has been known from early times in the parlance of the *mīmāmsakas* and the grammarians. Śabarsvāmin for example asks-How can one word be used to denote the meaning another?-and- answers: by the denotation (i.e. transference) of its own sense. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa defines the secondary function as comprehension at a word not divorced from its own meaning and rules that no such secondary sense should be allowed which is not associated with the primary meaning of a word. In course of evolution in *Mīmāmsā* theory of interpretation when the

scope of this secondary function was widened, the relation (*sambandha*) with primary sense (*abhidheya*) was sought after, even through such contingencies as contrariety (*vaiparītya*) or association with the same form of predication (*kriyāyoga*). Instances under this head were furnished by Udbhaṭa in the *Bhāmahavivaraṇa* for illustrating the figure *śleṣa,* which has been, throughout its long evolution, related to the primary sense (*abhidhā*). Ancient grammarian like the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* have tacitly recognized this secondary function as a manifestation (*prakāra*) of the primary one and have cited stock-formed thereof. One of the illustrations of *guṇavṛtti*[11] by Udbhaṭa is the famous of the *Rāmāyaṇa-eti jīvantam ānando naram vaṣaśatādapi* which is unintelligible without this secondary sense and is a favourite passage with him and the author of the *Kāśikāvṛtti.* Bhartṛhari, the undisputed authority on the philosophy of word and its meaning is ready to accept this variety of *abhidhā* and extend its application to literature by virtue of relation (*sambandha*) like connection (*samyogādya*) by way of a statement (*kārikā*) which has been the cornerstone of the *dhvani* theories in their later formulations.

The Primer *Kāv.al.sār.samg.* of Udbhaṭa which has long been before the modern reader has recognised[12] the role of *abhidhā* in its bearing on *alaṁkāras* by virtue of its acceptance of the *mukhyavṛtti* thereof through its *Śakti* (in verbal and nominal forms). This is described as *svarūpārtha.* As for the *guṇavṛtti* where the sense is not directly possible to be connected by simple pronunciation of the word (*śruti*) with the inevitable and inseparable sense, the work knows of its operation in the figures *rūpaka* and *samāsokti* where one word is coupled with another (*padena padantaram yujyate*) or denotes another (*arthakathana*). Its definition of the Another uses compound words which involves elimination of case ending, The third is a mixture of both, where certain parts of the sentence are of one type, other parts of the other. Each of these types is illustrated by Rājaśekhara by example which are modeled on Udbhaṭa's pattern as his Bhāmahavivaraṇa. The third type is distinguished from the second in as much as in the relevant sentences there is the bare presentation of a verb with its subject (*kartṛ*) whether used or understood and no other case like *karman* and every other word used is a compound word as in the second. The second reference concerns Udbhaṭa's suggested interpretation of the view of Bhāmaha that *śāstra* and *kāvya* are by their very nature different. Rājaśekhara[16] is of opinion that the upshot of investigation comes to distinction practically without difference that the subjective or the imaginative background is present in both and that it is the appearance or immanence (*pratibhāsa*) that is recorded. Tradition[17] however, recognizes the role of the *abhidhāvṛtti* basis of this distinction between *abhidheya* and *śabda* as in the formal presentation of Udbhaṭa[18] indicating that Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view in the matter is derived from that of the master Udbhaṭa. We have two aspects[18] of this view in Bhāmaha's text (*Kāv.al* l.5 and ll.87). The first bears on *pratibhā* (the genius of the poet) as the *sina qua non* in a *kāvya* as distinguished from his equipment (erudition) and his mechanical application. The second hinges on *vakrokti* as distinguished from *svabhāvokti* as the medium of poetic expression. Both are important issues in the history of *Alaṁkāraśāstra* and it is a pity that comments are not available in own language to us. These two phases which are admirably blended by Bhaṭṭatauta[19] and by Mahimbhaṭṭa[20] have been resorted to by later poeticists. The Śaivadarśana[21] nucleus of the latter's remarks was extended to suit the contingency in another figure *bhāvika,* which was given a new form, with more restricted application than in the earlier views of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.

figure *rasavat* as *spaṣṭaśṛṇgārādi,* (we prefer this reading to *spaṣṭaśṛṇgārādi* which looks like a post-Dhvani emendation of the text indicating that the *rasa* is touched and not directly expressed as is the case with the other reading) is also a pointer. As an adept in the lore of Bharata (*bharatanayanipuṇa-mānasa*), he exhibits here the dramaturgical idea of *rasa,* furnished, as it is, with its representation (*abhinaya*), though he exphasizes no less its emergency through the primary sense (*abhidhā*). He has put forward unambiguously[13] in another work his view of *rasa* as being expressed through five ways, one of which is the name of the relevant *rasa* (*svaśabda*) for which he has been severely criticised by Ānandavardhana and his followers. With the epithet *dvividha*[14] applied to *pada* (words) in his definition of *śleṣa* in the *Kāv.al.sār.saṇg.* as indicative of his partiality for the view of the difference in words as responsible for difference in meaning and his characteristic theory that other figures are aroused by *śleṣa*, particularly with reference to the *mukhya* (primary) aspect thereof, we are introduced to the implications and complications of *abhidhā* as the one *vṛtti* that matters in literary comprehension.

Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāmsā* has referred to two of Udbhaṭa's views which are among the crucial test in determining the inclination of Udbhaṭa. The first[15] couches an illuminating remark on the *abhidhāvṛtti* (he calls it *abhidhāvyāpāra*) of Udbhaṭa. It is almost a certainly that he is utilizing the text of the Bhāmahavivaraṇa. This concerns the phases in the comprehension of the sense of a sentence and is deemed as threefold in its operation. One (the first) variety thereof relies on the case ending, whether appearing as *kārakavibhakti* or as *upapadavibhakti.* Bhoja in two chapters of his *Śr.pr.* (Chs. VII & VIII) treats of *sambandhaśakti* operating in words and sentences in his usual fashion right elaborately and with profuse illustrations. This would roughly correspond to the *guṇavṛtti* aspect of the *abhidhā,* through here and there in his loose and disjoined manner to deals with the *mukhyavṛtti* as well. In Ch. V, which is labelled as *vibhaktyartha-catuṣṭayaprāśa* he discusses the *śakti* or *mukhyavṛtti* of *abhidhā* of words including the controversial topic of the character of the sense-content with special reference to the views of the grammarians and of the *mīmāmsakas.* We find here much that is relevantly brought in by Udbhaṭa in his commentary on the *Kāv. Al.* of Bhāmaha. The threefold process[22] of *abhidhā* (primary) is here unfolded in a clearer, fuller and broader perspective than is the case in Rājaśekhara's *Kāvyamimamsā* where we have the mere formulation broached and succinctly illustrated. Bhoja (*Śr. pr.,* I. pp. 246-248) however, couples there with the introduction of the *vidhi* and *niṣedha* content therein, of either and of neither of them in his treatment regarding the meaning of sentences, where he has been anticipated by Ānandavardhana and followed more puncitiliously by Hemacandra in his *Kāvyānuśāsana.* In his treatment of the *guṇavṛtti* as propounded in Udbhaṭa he use the same illustrations as those of Udbhaṭa, only with this difference that in the case of the verse of the *Kirātanirīkṣya samrambhairasta dhairyam* he amalgamates the mode of treatment of the former (*mukhya*) with that of the latter (*guṇavṛtti*). The extracts from the *Śr. pr.* noted below in the footnotes would show how much Bhoja derived from Udbhaṭa and would serve to restore the lacunae and gaps in the text of the Bhāmahvivaraṇa, for there are definite indication that almost always he used that text and scrupulously followed it through without acknowledgment. It is also worth noting that Bhoja here relies on the authority of the grammarians, as Udbhaṭa does, in treating of this topic in the *Kāv.al.sār.saṇg.* as well as in his commentary on Chap. VI

of Bhāmaha's work as regards the use of correct forms (*śabdaśuddhi*), which was supplemented and revised by Vāmana in his *Kāv.al.sūvṛ.*

Hemacandra in his *Kāv.anu.* and particularly in its commentary *Kāv. Anu- viv.* has amassed a good deal of floating information on many points of interest to the student of Sanskrit poetics. While he drew largely from the 11th century poeticists of Kāshmir, of which he had a valuable collection with him, as we have shown elsewhere, earlier masters like Udbhaṭa and Bhaṭṭanāyaka were not unknown to him. **P. V. Kane's** surmise that his references to Udbhaṭa commentary on Bhāmaha were secondhand and based on Pratihārendurāja's citation in that work is based on a rather careless mention in the printed work of a *Kārikā* of his own in place of the almost similar *kārikā* of Bhāmaha's *Kāv.al.* on which he has commented and is worth refuting. It is not unlikely that the scribes who wrongly scribbled the extract (*svaśabdasthāyisañcārī..*) which do not appear in that form in Bhamaha's text and are almost identical in its characterization of the figure in that work have perpetrated this confusion. We have clear evidence of his first hand acquaintance with that work in at least four cases which are traceable in the fragments which do not appear in any other earlier work. His mention of the *mayūravamskādi samāsa* in the latter part of his exposition of the definition of *rūpaka,* where he has utilised in full the text of the *Laghuvṛtti* which does not notice in derived from Udbhaṭa's *Bhā. viv.* (fr. 22b, *l.*8.). The earlier portion of the exposition there, which we shall have to refer to in a subsequent paragraph presently decides the issue. Besides the comment on the connection with *upamā, anvayanyogo* which by Udbhaṭa has been criticised in the *Dhva. āl.loc.* 40) which is not found in the fragments, is noted by Hemacandra who reproduces with his illustration (*yairdṛṣṭā..*) which appears[23] in the fragments (fr.40a.1.4). His characterization of the *stuti* in Bhāmaha's text (III.28) as a form of *abidhāna*[24] which he introduces in his commentary on the figure *aprastutapraśamsā* labelled as *anyokti* by Hemacandra, a term of wide use in literature, particularly in anthology, is presumably a *verbatim* reproduction from the Bhāmahavivraṇa (fr. 40b. i. 8) as appears from the portion that is preserved of it. Similar is the case with the figure *samāsokti* in the well-known verse *upodharāgeṇa indolalatārakam,* noted as a clear (*spaṣṭa*) example thereof in the *Bhāmahavivaraṇa*[25] and consequently referred to as such in the *Dhv. Al.* the *Locana* on which portion analyses the three conditions, lakṣaṇa (formal definition), *svarūpa* (its real nature) and *nāmanirvacana* (derivative way of content in the designation) in the fashion of a known commentator. Hemcandra supports Udbhaṭa and refutes the view of Kuntaka (*Vakr. Jīv.,* p. 183), whom he has followed now and then, in elimination of figures of speech recognized as much by great masters including Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa.

The publication of the *Bhāmahavivaraṇa,* which eighty years ago, we described as a lost masterpiece in *Al. śātra* and extracts from which we furnished from different sources has been really one of the greatest discoveries in our time and the editor **R. Gnoli**, who has already been known for his well-intentioned effort at fixing the text of the *rasaniṣpatti*-portion of the *Abhinavabhāratī* on the basis of old texts, particularly of that Hemacandra, deserves to be complimented for his strenuous efforts in bringing it into light. In spite of the *lacunae* the text presented for forming an estimate Udbhaṭa's idea about *abhidhāvṛtti* is adequate enough to satisfy the conditions and comply with the characteristic noted thereof from Abhinava's mention in the *Locana* as well as the addition reference or citations entered in the above paragraphs, particularly those by Rājaśekhara and Bhoja. Bhāmaha's text[26] (l. 9a and quite likely l.10) is the source of this theory and the interpretation hinges on the term *abhidhānārtha* in the former verse and *śabdhābhidheye* in the latter. For l.9 as a whole with the reading *kāvyayonayaḥ* in the fourth quarter and its exposition in the *vivaraṇa* as *kāvyopādā [nabhūta]* which appears in the printed edn., a likely and commendable way of interpretation would be to accept it as on a line with the enumeration thereof in the *Kāvyamīṁāmsā*[26a] and the *Kāv. al.* of Rudraṭa *lokā śāstrakāvyādi* in *Kāv.pr.* (*kārikā* 1.2 and its *vṛtti*). The *vivaraṇa* here, it appears has chosen to lay bare the significance of the term *abhidhānārtha.*

Udbhaṭa's exposition of *abhidhā* is easily divisible into two parts (fr. 9a. And b, and fr. 10a), one dealing with the *mukhya vṛtti abhidhā,* and its varieties and the other with *guṇavṛtti* aspect thereof, which fact is explicitly mentioned in lll. 5 of fr. 10a as contradistinguished from the *mukhyavṛtti.* In fr. 9a *I.* 2 appears the mutilated expression *bhidhāvyāpāra,* obviously introducing its threefold nature, as noted by Rājaśekhara, and by Bhoja. The examples *na dānena...namastuṇga,* which appear also in the Śr. pr., are meant to illustrate the *śākta* and *vaibhakta* varieties taken in the sense in which the Śr. pr. following tradition knows them. The third variety is illustrated in fr. 9 ll. 6 and 7 by a verse (*jyotsnārambheti ślokaḥ*), which we have not been able to race, but which certainly is not the second verse, where the word *ārambha* (*trailokyanagarārambha*) appears in another form as is surmised by the editor. The illustrations of the *guṇavṛtti* appears in ll. 5 and 6, fr. 10a, and are the very verses utilized in the Śr. pr. Indeed the ll. 6-8 of fr. 10a are exactly restorable from the Śr. pr. which copies them to the very letter. These two are mentioned as *śabda* and *abhidheya* corresponding respectively to the two item of the first *kārikā* in the *Abhidhaāvṛttimāṭrkā* (vide foot note 3). The word *abhidhānārtha* appearing in 1.3, fr. 10a is the last word of the sentence explaining the *abhidhāvyāpara,* other words of which are missing in the printed end. There is just the possibility of the other aspect (guṇavṛtti) being treated earlier for clear exposition or differentiation. Fr. 10, 11.3-4 would countenance such a supposition and this would involve an arrangement of the leaves in the opposition way, fr. 10 preceding fr. 9, at least two evidences in support of which appear from the fragments as presented. We have noticed such misarrangement in the *Chandoviciti* published recently from West Germany from a very early mss, which presented similar difficulties for its editor. We are, however, not prepared to take the here because fr. 10b which is the obverse of fr. 10a would invalidate it upsetting the exposition in the commentary in the order fixed by the text of the original work. This may solve the difficulty to a certain extent but not entirely. While fr. 10a, 1.1 marks the end of the commentary on 1.8 (*yatna vaditavedyena vidheyaḥ*) and fr. 10b. 1.1 (*nibandhaparyālocanena matānyavagamyā*) is certainly the exposition of *l.* 10 (*śabdādhidheye vijñāya kṛtvā tadvidupāsanām...*), there is no other alternative for us than to accept that what appears in fr. 9a and 9b and that in fr. 10a, 11.3-8 are to be deemed as the exposition of *abhidhānārtha* of l.9 and are its *mukhya* and *guṇavṛtti* aspects respectively. These parts have to be pieced together in a consistent way, but how can one of them appear before *II.* 1-2 of fr. 10a? The entire passage is almost reproduced in the *Śr. pr.* of Bhoja for the reader to form his own opinion in the matter. Any way there is no difficulty for him to be convinced that both the aspects of the *abhidhāvṛtti* are recorded.

It is significant that in this long extract none of the passages cited (as available in the fragmentary commentary) is capable of bearing a sense which the *dhvani* school could

claim as falling within its own purview. Ānandavardhana and his illustrious commentator, both honoured names in the history of the *dhvani* school, however, would ask us to accept the position that Udbhaṭṭa as well as Vāmana were aware of this wing of literary interpretation and opined that the *guṇavṛtti* aspect formulated by him would dispose of *dhvani,* which they as advocates of the *dhvani* school proved to be a wrong position. We have similar case, though in a different setting in the other wing of the *abhidhāvādins,* who, as we have noted in the beginning of this paper, would include such a sense under figures of speech. The advocates of this theory persisted in their endeavour and asserted later that in essence one function[27] which was given the name of *tātparya,* was sufficient. Even in the reactionary orthodox circle of the *dhvani* school there are heard murmurings which seem to support the one-*vṛtti* theory in operation in the field of literature. Western literary criticism in its modern form is insistent on the uniformity of the "meaning and is busy on harping on the meaning of meaning' where symbolism and language in its mechanical aspect are meant to be blended and has declared for example that "meaning is a matter of context'[28]. In literary criticism in the regional languages of India, particularly in Bengali, we have thinkers who have sought to take shelter under an eclectic system[29] where literary appraisement is posed as the product of a unified function which combines diverse entities. Be that as it is, it is rather funny that the precious discovery of the Mss. of this work, which embodies unambiguously the *abhidhāvṛtti* theory of Udbhaṭa, has not been awarded the place which is its due and that scholars like the editor of this work who have been instrumental in bringing it into light are a bit apologetic in their stand. We know with what haste Indian scholars who have made a serious study of the *śāstra* have put forward hypotheses which would not bear scrutiny about works and their alleged authorship. The case of the discovery of Tilaka's commentary on the *Kāv.al.sār.sam.* is too near us to be forgotten. But here we have over-cautiousness, not founded on facts, [or is it the pose of the elephant (*gajanimīlika*)] on the parts of scholar who has made a lifelong study of *Almkāraśāstra* when we find him voicing from a platform of eminence[30] that he has examined all the fragments and finds it not possible to assert that it is Udbhaṭa's we are astounded. The two aspects of the *abhidhāvṛtti* noted by Abhinava, were explicitly mentioned in the extract and the word *guṇavṛtti* appears prominently here and elsewhere (as in fr. 22b). We do not find any sense in the remark that in the *Locana* that Abhinava says that to explain, why Bhāmaha after saying *śabda* first said again *abhidhāna* in *abhidhānārtha* Udbhaṭa interprets the word *abhidhānārtha…* (vide fr. 2 for Abhinava's remark). The sense in *abhidhānārtha* is what is meant for *abhidhāna* (note the alternative reading *abhidhānārtham*). Udbhaṭa unfolds its two fold aspect, that of the *mukhyavṛtti* and the *guṇavṛtti.* Not merely in the broken portion of the leaf but even in its preserved portion[31] these two aspects are named and illustrated. However this is not only criterion which can be applied nor is this the only passage that settles the issue of authorship. In the portion dealing with the definition and the verbal interpretation in the figure *rūpaka* the work displays this *guṇavṛtti* content and Hemacandra[32] has copied it in his commentary, which is noted below and which would serve to restore the present text in full. In a previous paper on Hemacandra[33] we ascribed this passage tentatively to Tilaka, not being then aware of its earlier origin. This passage indicates that two forms of one *vṛtti* were referred to, as differed from the later views on the topic, as in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and later *Alaṁkāra* works. Besides *lakṣaṇa* and *guṇavṛtti* to be premier *guṇavṛtti* are differently conceived, and regarded as different from *abhidhā;* and *rūpaka* was regarded as implying a variety of *lakṣaṇa.* (rather *lākṣaṇika*) and *guṇavṛtti* (rather *guṇamātravṛtti*) are found[35]. In its treatment of *śleṣa* the author explains the text and furnishes his own three illustrations thereof in –the manner of Bhāmaha, (*Kāv. al.* ll. 17)-as pertaining to its three forms *sahokti, upamā* and *hetu*, two of which are certainly restorable. There remains the third which is very likely in *āryā* metre, describing the rise of the moon which we are at present unable to trace. Kuntaka in his *Vakr. Jīvita* objects to the principle of division and substitutes another, for which the clue has been supplied by the *Dhv. āl.* Amongst his illustrations is the first verse in our text and two more which are derived from the *Dhv. āl.*Ch. ll. Udbhaṭa is known as who notes that the figure *śleṣa* gives rise to other figures and is the principle one that shuts out other figures, a doctrine almost peculiar to him in as much as older poeticists declare only that *śleṣa* replenishes (*puṣṇāti*) other figures of speech. The present text embodies that view. The whole passage along Bhāmaha's original is cited in the footnotes to vindicate the claim that the present work is genuinely of Udbhaṭa as well as to supplement the defective reading in the printed edition. There is a parallel remark appearing in the same sentence which brings in another doctrine of the author that difference in meaning is in dicative of difference in the form of words and causes in the sentences itself (*vākyāntareṇa pratibhodpadyate*).

While pointing out the indebtedness of Hemacandra to Udbhaṭa we have referred to the three or four more tests, which, by their illustration and the manner of application, indicate the source to be our present work. Three more criteria, of which two are definitely decisive, which are furnished by the fragments, bear out its ascription to Udbhaṭa. Fr. 8b. which is not very clear, seems to refer to the view of the importance of genius (*pratibhā*) and its predominance in the making of a poet, a view ascribed to him by Samudrabandha in his commentary on the *Al. sarvasva* of Rucaka. The theory of the *upamāna* being *prasiddha* or settled in poetic convention, a point met with in *Vāmana's Kāv. al. sū. vṛ.* and which might have been urged even earlier has been called into question in the *Bhā. Vivaraṇa* (fr. 23a) and the illustration used in the same as in Hemacandra's so much so that of the texts one can be corrected with the help of the other. The *Bhām. vivaraṇa* clearly refers to the three varieties of *punaraktābhāsa.* The *Al. sarvasva* draws a distinction between *yamaka* and the *punaraktābhāsa* a figure first recognised by Udbhaṭa in a manner which is reminiscent of Udbhaṭa's treatment in the *Kāv. al. sar. sam.* This incidentally brings into prominence Udbhaṭa's emphasis on the two fold-aspect of the *abhidhāvṛtti,* a point noted by Pratīhārendurāja in his commentary thereon. One can be certain therefrom that **R. Gnolis** text is the famous commentary on Bhāmaha's *Kāv.al.,* the *Bh. Vivaraṇa,* as named by early writers. We can only hope that in future some other Mss. of the work will be brought to light which will serve to restore the lacunae, alas too many in the
printed edition.

It is a pity that adequate care has not been taken in the matter of editing such a precious gem of *Alamkāraśāstra.* We have no grievance, so far as the matter of the last chapter in the commentary is concerned-for, as it appears from the presented. The Mss. indeed in a hopelessly deranged and dissolved state. But in other places where it would appear that precautions were taken to separate the brittle leaves of the palmleaf Mss., the text with lacunae is procurable the leaves should have been kept in there own forms and not divided into parts and renumbered in the manner shown as in the printed edition. The pell-mell piecing together is inferred from the different number in

reference to leaves in the editor's introduction and in the remark on the work by **V. Raghavan** from what they appear in the text printed. The glaring defect of misarrangement of the right and obverse parts of the leaves appears in more than one instance and there are instances where the right and obverse parts of the leaves contain matter which would never have been so near in the actual text. We have referred in previous paragraphs to the easy restorations from the other authors who have been known to the editor even as having used the work. The deplorable state in which verses cited as extra illustrations by Udbhaṭa appear deformed and distortedly worded in the edition is worth mention. As is well-known, illustrations are copied and pass from one author to another. Udbhaṭa's citations have been used by several well known successors of his, whose works have already been published. To add to this list of omissions and commissions, there is a marked pitchforthing of matter from other works which were presumably preserved together with this commentary in the collection. All this has rendered the use of this edition by students a rather toilsome and difficult job. We have, however, to rest contented with this until a better preserved Mss., is discovered and more carefully edited. We have kept to the subject-matter of this paper as far as possible; and where we have disgressed, we have done it with the object of drawing the attention of the students to the importance of the work so long known only in name and that to informed scholars alone. This is why we have desisted from speaking of the other type of *vṛtti* which is concerned with the verbal figure *anuprāsa* (alliteration) and its three varieties, which appear as a feature in the *Kāv.al.sār.saṇ.* as well as in this commentary and of the *arthavṛtti,* the fifth in the list of the dramaturgical *vṛttis* associated with Udbhaṭa, noted even by later scrupulous compilers on the *śāstra* like Sāradātanaya and refuted by Udbhaṭa's successor Lollaṭa in his commentary on the *Nātyaśāstra.*

AUTHOR: BHATTACHARYA, SHIVA PRASAD.
Source: *Cultural heritage of India.* Vol. X. Part 2, July-Dec. 1962.

Abbreviations:

1. Abh.-bh.: Abhinava-bhāratī.
2. Al.Sar.Vimarśini: Alamkāra Sarvasva Vimarśini.
3. Dhv.al.: Dhvanyāloka.
4. IPV: Īśvarapratyābhijñā-Vimarśini.
5. Kāv.al.sār. samg.: Kāvya-Alṁkāra-Sāra-Saṁgraha.
6. Kāv.anu.Vīv.: Kāvyānuśāsana-Vivaraṇa.
7. Kāv-Kaut.: Kāvya-Kautuka.
8. J.O.I.: Journal of Indology (Baroda).
9. Śṛ. Pr.: Śṛṅgāra-Prakāśa.

Footnotes:

1. *Dhv. āl.* (N.S.2nd edn. pp. 10)
2. *Dhv. āl. loc.* (p. 10)
3. *Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā Kār.* p. 3
4. *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa* cited in the *Abhinavabhāratī* (G.O.S. edn. Vol. ll, p. 298) *Idib.* Cited in the *Al. Sar. Vimarśini* (N. S. 2nd edn. p. 10)
5. *Vyak. Viv.* (p. 21. Ch. S.S. edn.)
6. *Vyak. Viv. Vyākhyāna* (p. 18)
7. Quoted in p. 79-86 (N. S. edn.) (*Alam. Sār. Vimar. P.*9)
8. *Varṇacchāyā'nusāreṇa guṇamārgānuvarttinī vṛttir-vaicitryayukteti saiva* (*vakratā*) *proktā cirantaniḥ* ll *Vak. Jīv.* (2nd ed. p. 27)
9. *Ānvikṣikītrayi vārttādaṇḍanītayaścatasro vidyā iti kauṭilyaḥ I Pañcamī sāhityavidyetiyāyavarīyaḥ I Śabdārthayoryāvat Sahabhāvena vidya sāhitya vidyā I Kāv. Mīm.* pp. 4-5.
10. *Candrāl. IX l Mukhyārthasyāvivakṣāyāṁ pūrvā' vācī ca ruḍhita I Prayojanācca sambandhaṁ vadanti Lakṣaṇā matā II* (cf. *śakyārthasaṁbandha Lakṣṇā*). Gāgābhaṭṭa in his comm. (p. 55) there on say *ldamavadheyaṁ Lākṣaṇikapadaṁ nānu-bhāvikaṃ I Vākyārthānubhava śaktijñānasyaiva hetutvam I na ca sarvāṇi lākṣaṇika padānī tatra katham bodha iti vācyaṁ śākta subvibhaktita ev tadbodhāt I tadābhāve tu na śābdabodhaḥ kintu padārthasmaraṇamātramiti dik II*
11. The *Mbh.* under III, 10 uses this verse to denote the reflexive use of verbs and discusses how it does not come here. The *Kāśikā- vṛtti* (under II. 3.54) uses this verse to justify the use of the second case-ending in Jīvantaṁ in connection with *bhāvavacana śabda* (viz. *Ānanda*).
12. *Ibid* l.8 svarūpārthaviśeṣe pi punaruktiḥ phalāntarāt śabdānām vā padānām vā Lāṭānuprāsa lṣyate ll (of Bhāmaha's defn. ll. 21, guṇa is used in another sense). This is Udbhaṭa's view as reiterated off and on in the *Laghuvṛtti* (vide p. 85) noting the significance of *śabdaśaktirasāspada* appearing in his citation of an earlier view.
13. Vide. our paper on *Catūrūpā bhāvāḥ pañcarūpa rasāḥ* (Cal. Oriental Journal, Vol. VIII) where we put forward the theory that this view occurs very likely in Udbhaṭa's commentary on the *Nāṭaśāstra.* Pratīhārendurāja in his *Laghuvṛtti* does not mention the *Bh. Vivaraṇa* as its source while citing it. This view as we indicated there relies on the *utpattivāda* of *rasa,* held by the ancient masters (*cirantanānāmpakṣaḥ*) where *cirantana* stands not for Daṇḍin alone but also for Udbhaṭa because of the general *rūḍhi* use of the word in Kashmir poetics.
14. *Kav. al. sār. Sam.* Kār. 51 (ch. IV) *Alamkārāntaragatāṁ pratibhām janyat padaiḥ dvividhairratha śabdoktiviśiṣṭam tat pratīyatām II* (cf. Bhām. viv. fr. 39. ll.7 which passage is cited in full in fr. 4b).
15. *Ibid p.* 22. It is however likely that the characterisations of the first two varieties here are not as how Udbhaṭa conceived it (as surmised from fr. 9a and 9b) and what Bhoja's acknowledged conclusion of this view is. (*vide* fn. 27)
16. *Ibid.* p. 44.
17. Rucaka puts the view of Udbhaṭa in the following manner (*Vyak. Viv. vyāk.* P. 18)
18. *Kāv. al.* I.5 and II, 87.
19. *Kāv. kaut.* Cited in the *Abh. Bh.* (vol. I, p. 201. 2nd edn.) and also III in the *Kāv. anu.* of Hemcandra (N.S.2nd edn. p. 316)
20. *Vyak.* Vi. Pp. 390-391
21. Vide. paper on *Kāshmir Śaivadarśana's Impress* on *Alaṁkāra* refer in *Alamkāraśāstra* (J.O.I. Baroda, vol. II, No.3)
22. *Śr. pr.* (pp. 274-76). fr. 9a and 9b. pp. 1.4 d. 1.1 and 9b. 1.1 (quoted in full in fn.3)
23. *Kāv. anu. viv.* (p.256) fr. 40a, 1.4, where there are lacunae and *tvameva te* is read as *sanadhavate* and *hṛdayam* is shown as *daya* with no lacunae marked in the printed edn.
24. *Kāv.* anu. p.256 (a favourite expression with Udbhaṭa in the *Bhā.* viv.)
25. *Kāv.* anu. (p. 274) which latter one is obviously better than the accepted reading.
26. *Kāv. al.* I. 9.

26a. *Kāv. mīm.* p. 35. The latter represents the *vedya* (*viditavedya*) of Bhāmaha I. 8 as distinguished from *Pratibhā.* It is *Kāvyayoni* or *Kāvyopādān* a (the materials of *Kāvya*) or *Kāvya* in *Kāv. al. sūt.* vṛ. (I.3,1) and the vidyās (*Ibid,* I. 3.4) in the language of Vāmana.

27. *Daśarūpaka vṛtti,* under IV. 37 (p.95, N.S. edn.).
28. *Vide*. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richard's The Meaning of Meaning and the latter's *Principles* of Literary Criticism and

the Philosophy of Rhetoric and note such uses as meaning is context. A word or phrase when isolated momentarily from its controlling neighbours is free to develop irrelevant sense which may require though the other words to follow it and such concept as active meaning.
29. The many scattered principles of interpretation in the critical essays of **Rabindranath Tagore's** *Sāhityer Tātparya* in this volume labeled as Sāhitya and the exposition in works like the *Kāvyajijñāsā* of Atul Ch. Gupta of appropriate principles enumerated in Sanskrit poetics, may be noted under this head.
30. Vide pp. 17-18 of the Presidential address by **V. Raghavan** in the All-India Oriental Conference, Srinagar, (1962).
31. *Ibid,* fr. 22b, *II.* 4 -5.
32. *Kāv. anu.* p. 249 (fr. 22b. *II.* 4-6)
33. *Hemacandra* and the Eleventh Century Poeticists of *Kāshmīr.*
34. Nai. X. 115.
35. (Vide the *Naiṣadhacarita* and its *Alaṁkāra* Code P. K. Gode Comm. vol.)
AUTHOR: BHATTACHARYA, SHIVA PRASAD. Source: *Cultural Heritage,* Vol X, Part 2, July-Dec. 1962.

ABHIHITĀNVAYA-VĀDA
A *Nyāya*-theory which, states that words independently express separate meaning which are subsequently combined into a sentence, express one connected idea. Thus, in *Gām ānaya. Gām* means the bovine class in the accusative case and *ānaya* independently means to bring. These two words are combined into the meaning bring the cow.
Naiyāyikas and *Bhaṭṭas* the *Anvitābhidhānavādin,* **Prabhakar**, maintains that there is no necessity of admitting the additional power of words called the *Tāparya- śakti,* admitted by the *Naiyāyikās* and *Bhaṭṭas* and *Dhvani,* as maintained by others. *Abhidhā- śakti* alone serves the purpose of all. Their argument is as follows: Just as the power of an arrow to hit more and more distant objects depends upon the power and the skill of the archer, so the power of the words to signify things not ordinarily indicated, depends upon the skilful use that the writer or speaker makes of them. Just as in the case of the arrow, the assumption of different powers is unnecessary to explain its hitting near and distant objects, so the assumption of more than one power of words is unnecessary to account for their conveying different idea in different contexts. It may be added here that some philosophers, the **Prabhakaras** for instance maintain that the conception of such a power (K. P. Comm, 6-7) of words is unnecessary. Hence they are technically called *Anvitābhidhānavādins* as distinguished from the *Naiyāyikās,* who are called *Abhihitānvayavādins.*
AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI. Source: *Aesthetic Theories of India,* Vol. III, N.D. 1990.
Abbreviations: KP: Kāvya-Prakāśa of Mammaṭa

ABHIJÑĀ
(Pāli-*Abhiñña*) Superior knowledge. There are six such knowledge known collectively as *ṣaḍhijñā.* Sākyamuni acquired these the night before he became Buddha. The six *Abhijñās* are: *Divya-Cakṣus* (divine eye), *Divya- śrotra* (divine ears), *Paracittajñāna,* (Knowledge of the thought of others), *Pūrvanivāsānusmṛti* (recollections of former incarnations), *Ṛddhisākṣātkriyā* (direct experience of magical power), *Āśravakṣaya*, (knowledge of the finality of the stream of life).
Abhijñā has been described as the complete knowledge which comes through insight. It consist of seeing things as they are. It is the just before the final enlightenment about the four Noble-truths-Ā*ryasatyāni.* The first five of these powers as mentioned foretold are also known as *Siddhis* (Miraculous powers) Patañjali also mentions as virtues of meditation.

ABHILĀṢITĀRTHACINTĀMAṆI
It is written by king someśvara of the western calukya dynasty of the 12th century, it has interesting chapter on painting. Painting is described in the context of the decoration of the *Nāṭyamaṇḍapa.* There, he explained the preparation of wall, *bhittisaṁskāra. Vajralepas* for mixing colours in discussed next. The number of colours, the brushes, their variations and other art materials like *tulikā, lekhinī, vartikā* are mentioned.
2. Light and shards (chiarscuro) effects produced by colours and their combinations, application of Gold, burnishing etc. are discussed. The varieties of poses, the preparation of forms of icons, varieties of painting like *rasika-citra, dhūli-citra, Bhāva-citra, viddha-citra* and *Āviddha-citra* are all discussed in the text.
AUTHOR: ROY ASHIM KUMAR AND GIDWANI N. N. Source: *A Dictionary of Indology,* Vol. I. II. III., New Delhi, 1983, 84, 85.

ABHINAVAGUPTA
Abhinavagupta's fame rests chiefly on his philosophical works on Kashmir Śaivaism, but he appears also to have attained a considerable reputation in the realm of Poetics by his two remarkable commentaries on Bharata and on Ānandavardhana, called respectively *Abhinavabhāratī* and *Kāvyāloka-locana.* He also cites in his *Locana* (p. 178, also p. 29) another commentary (vivaraṇa) of his own, now lost, on the *Kāvya-kautuka* (apparently dealing with Alaṁkara) by one of his teachers (*asmad-upādhyāya*) Bhaṭṭa Tauta. Nothing is known of this Bhṭṭa Tauta (also called Bhaṭṭa Tota); but it appears that Abhinava's commentary on Bharata was probably inspired by this teacher, who is cited there very frequently, just as his *Locana* was inspired by his other teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja. The *Kāvya-kautuka* is also referred to in the anonymous commentary on the *Vyakti-viveka* (p. 13); and Hemacandra (p. 316) quotes three verses from Bhaṭṭa Tauta in his test and reproduces (p. 59) in his commentary (appropriating the passage directly from Abhinava on Bharata.) an opinion of this teacher in connection with the theory of *rasa.* Kṣemendra in his *Aucitya-vicāra* (under Śl. 35) attributes to Tauta a fragment of a verse which is given in full but anonymously by Hemcandra (p. 3)[1]. Tauta is also cited by Caṇḍīdāsa in his *Dīpikā* commentary on Mammaṭa. Bhaṭṭa Tauta, together with Bhaṭṭendurāja, who is extravagantly praised in the *Locana* and whose relation to Abhinava we have already discussed, were probably his preceptors in Kāvya and Alṁkāra. His references to his instructors in philosophy, like Sidhicela[2], Lakṣmaṇagupta and others, in his philosophical works possess no interest for us; but it may be noted that Abhinava, in his *Pratyabhijñāvimarśini laghu-vṛtti,* refers to Utpala as his *paramaguru,* the teacher of his teacher. This description of Utpala is repeated in his *Locana* (p. 30), where Abhinava discusses the term *pratyabhijñā,* used in the text (i 8), and refers to what is said on this point by Utpala. This Utpala is well known in the history of Kashmir Śaivaism as the author of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* (on whose *sūtra* and *Vṛtti,* Abhinava wrote a *laghuvṛtti* and a *Bṛhatī vṛtti,* respectively) and is assigned by Bühler (Op. Cit. P.79) to the first half the 10th century. From what Abhinava, himself says in his numerous works of Kashmir Śaivaism, we may indicate the line of spiritual succession (guruparamparā) thus: Somānanda Utpala Laksmaṇagupta Abhinavagupta; Somānanda being probably a pupil of

Vasugupta who is taken as the earliest founder of the Pratyabhijñāśāstra.

In the concluding portion of his *Parātriṁśikavivaraṇa*, Abhinava gives us an interesting personal and genealogical account, in which he tells us that he was the son of Kāśmīraka Cukhala[3] and grandson of Varāhagupta, and had a brother named Manorathagupta. As already stated Abhinava's date is easily gathered from his works dating of some of his works, and may be fixed with certainty at the end of the 10th and the beginning of the 11th century.

Bibliography:

Ānandavardhana Edition: with the kārikā and Locana in kāvyamālā 25, 1890, 1911 translation into German with an introduction by **Hermann Jacobi** in *ZDMG* Ivi-Ivii, 1902-03, (reprinted separately, Leipzing 1903). Our references are to the Kāvyamālā ed. of 1911.

Mss. **Aufrecht** i 273b, iii 59a.

ABHINAVAGUPTA

Editions: (1) Kāvyamālā 25, 1890, 1911 with the text (first three *uddyotas* only) (2) Fourth *uddyota* without the text by the present writer in the *Journal* of the *Department* of Letters, Calcutta Univ. 1923. The full title is *Kāvyāloka-locana.*

Mss. **Aufrecht** i. 273b, ii. 59a, iii. 59a. Burnell 55a probably; contains all the four *uddyota;* also Madras Cat. 12893-94 (the last number containing only the fourth *uddyota,* while the other one all the 4 *uddyotas*). **Auferchts** entry (149) of *ānandavardhanīya-kāvyālaṁkāra-kāmadhenu- ṭīkā* involves a twofold error, due perhaps to Oppert's inaccurate entry for the designation *ānandavardhanīya* is incorrect, and by *kāvyâlaṁkāra-kāmadhenu- ṭīkā* is probably meant the commentary of that name on Vāmana (see p. 84 above), mixed up through a confusion with Abhinava's Locana. Commentaries. (1) *Locana-vyākhyā-kaumudī* by Parameśvarâcārya. Oppert 2694. (2) *Añjana* (?), anonymous. *Madras Cat.* 12895, extract (only on the first *uddyota*). The author erroneously describes Bhaṭṭendurāja as the *parama-guru* of Abhinava.

The *Candrikā* comm.. on Ānandavardhana, referred to by Abhinava and others, is apparently lost.

Abhinava bhāratī on Bharata. The Trivandrum Palace Ms. Contains only ch. 1-6, 9-13 18, 19. The Ms. in the possession of Dr. Gaṅgānāth Jhā of Benares, of which he kindly furnished the present writer with a transcript, contains 1-6,7 (incomplete), 8-31; but there are numerous gaps especially in the last few chapters. It follows in general the Trivandrum Ms. A Ms. has been recently acquired for the Madras Government Oriental Mss. Library which is also incomplete. An edition of chap. Vi and vii (on *rasa* and *bhāva*) is in preparation by the present writer. This voluminous but learned commentary deserves to be published.

No Ms. has been discovered of Abhinava's *Kāvyakautukavivaraṇa,* or of the *Kāvya-kautuka* itself. For citation of poetical and Alṁkāra works by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, see preface to the Kāvyamālā ed., and **Jacob** in JRAS, 1897, pp. 290and297. Only omit the name of Dhanika given by **Jacob** as an author quoted by Abhinava.

DHANAÑJAYA editions:

(1) Bidi. Indica by **Hall**, 1865 (with Avaloka),

(2) by **Jīvānanda** (a mere reprint of the above) Calcutta 1897 (3) by **Parab, N. S. P.**, Bombay 1897, 1917 (with Avaloka). Transi. into English, with introd. and notes, by **Hass** in Indo-iranian Series (Columbia Univ.), New York 1912 (not very reliable, but exhaustive introd. and index). Our references are to **Hall's** edition. On **Hass's** ed. see criticisms of **Jacobi** in Gg*A*, 1913, p. 302f, and **Barnett** in *JRAS,* 1913, P. 190f.

Mss. Aufrecht i 247b, 789b; ii 53b; iii 53b; SCC vii 33, 34; K. *Bod* 484; *Madras Cat.* 12887, 12888-91 (with Avaloka).

DHANIKA Editions. Printed in **Hall's** and **Parab's** editioins, with the text.

Mss. **Aufrecht** i 248a, ii 53b, iii 53b; *SCC* vii 33, 34 (no mańgalâcaraṇa); *Madras Cat* 12888-91 (no *mańgala*-verse).

Dhanika's *Kāvya-niṃava* is probably lost.

Other Commentaries on Dhanañjaja

(1) comm. by Nṛsiṃhabhatta. **Oppert** 2615.

(2) *Tīkā,* by Devapāṇi (cited by Raṇganātha on *Vikrammôrvaśi* ed. N.S.P. 1904, pp. 6, 31; of *AFI* 444 and A Bod 135b). No Mss discovered. This is the author who is wrongly called Pāṇi by **Wilson** (*Select Specimens*) and **Aufercht.** Being anterior to Rańganātha, his date should be earlier than 1656 A. D. Rańganātha also refers to a *Sāhasâńkīya-ṭīkā* in the same context (p 31)

(3) *Paddhati* by Kuravirāma. Ms in Hultzsch 554 (only three pages). Kuravirāma is a modern but fertile South Indian Commentator who lived at the court of Zemindars of Kārvêti nagaram in North Arcot District, and wrote comms. Also on two well-known poems, *Campū-bhārata* of Anatabhaṭṭa and *Viśvaguṇâdarśa* of Veńkaṭa. He mentions in his comm.. on the last named poem a commentary by himself on Appayya's *Kuvalaya* as well on Dhanañ*jaya.* See **Hultzsch** i p. xi.

AUTHOR: DE. S. K. Source: *History of Sanskrit Poetics,* London 1923.

Footnotes:

1. This verse is ascribed, perhaps wrongly, to Māmaha (or Bhāmaha?) in Kāmadhenu on Vāmana, p. 4; ed, Benares.
2. See Pref. to the end of Ch. IV, cited above.
3. Bühlers Ms has *Kāśmīraka viculaka* (op. cit. p. clv) as well as *cukhala* (p. clvii)

ABHINAVGUPTA ON INDIAN AESTHETICS

According to Abhinavagupta, the entire process of Rasa-realization can be summed up in the manner when an ideal spectator (*sahṛdaya*), gifted with emotional maturity and aesthetic sensitivity, witnesses a good play on the stage, enriched by fine acting, music, dance, theatrical decorations, costumes, etc., he grasps the theme of the play not in a particular, but in a general context. The dramatic theme becomes free from, such limitations as are imposed thereon by the stints and beyond of time and place, and the spectator also gets rid of the restrictions, foisted upon him by his individual surroundings and their effects. He relishes the play from a detached angle and with the necessary aesthetic or psychic distance (*tāṭasthya*). It is only then that the real meaning or beauty of the dramatic theme dawns upon him, and he becomes the recipient of the highest aesthetic bliss. Since the latent emotions (*sthāyins*) of all human beings are more or less similar in nature, inherited from previous existences, the response of all spectators to a play is also practically uniform, representing a homogeneous experience, and may be termed as *camatkāra* or delectable. Abhinavagupta also, incidentally, refers to, and dismisses, the *Sāṁkhya* view that the experience of Rasa leads to both pleasure and pain, since he himself believes this experience to be absolutely pleasurable, without the slightest sting and pinch of sorrow.

This, then, is, briefly, Bharata's *Rasa* theory, as understood and interpreted by the various time-honured scholars and dramatic critics. Of the various interpretations mentioned above and discussed in detail in the following pages, that of Abhinavagupta came to be regarded, in the course of centuries, to be perhaps the last word on the *Rasasūtra,*

because of its thorough-going approach and comprehensiveness. He lent it additional weight by basing his theory on the metaphysical foundation of the *Pratyabhijñā* school of Kashmir *Śaivism* (for more details, cf. Abhinavagupta's *An Historical and Philosophical Study,* Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, 1963, *Comparative Aesthetics,* Vol. I, Chowkhambha, 1959, by **K. C. Pandey,** and *Śāntarasa* and *Abhinavaguptas Philosophy of Aesthetics* by **J. L. Masson** and **M. V. Patwardhan** , B. O. R. I., Poona, 1969, pp. 27-33. According to Abhinavagupta, the world of drama is a beautiful creation that is made a many-splendoured thing by the literary excellences of the theme and various theatrical accessories-a creation which is self-sufficient and constitutes a world in itself. By initiating the spectator into a very rich and significant experience, drama transport him to a new realm above the harsh realities of the everyday world, to a new realm of magic, of joy. The everyday world is not negated, but surpassed or transcended, and the world of drama is, in this sense, autonomous being bound by its own laws. Eminent lndologists and art-critics, like **Dr. A. K. Coomaraswamy**, vouchsafe that the theory is capable of considerable extension even to other Indian arts like painting. He observes: 'It is true that this theory is mainly developed in connection with poetry, drama, dancing and music, but it is immediately applicable to art of all kinds, much of its terminology employs the concept of color, and we have evidence that the theory was also in fact applied to painting.[1] The *Viṣṇdharmottara Purāṇa* uses the term *Citrasũtra* to cover all the branches of knowledge pertaining to arts like painting, image-making dramaturgy and poetics. In Section III of this *Purāṇa* (translated into English by **Stella Kramrisch**, Calcutta Univ. Press, 1928, pp. 9-10, etc.) it is observed that it is necessary to acquire the knowledge of Citrasūtra in order to understand the art of image-making; further Citrasūtra itself can be studied only on the basis of the knowledge of the science of dance and dance, for its part, cannot be conceived without musical instruments, while instrumental music itself follows vocal music.[2] Thus, in this view, arts like painting, image-making, drama, dance, poetry and music have something like a common denominator. It has been already remarked that philosophers, like **Susanne Langer**, do not subscribe to this view. In her opinion, it is better to acknowledge frankly that the arts do not have a common basis…. "Such candid study', she states, 'is more rewarding than the usual passionate declaration that all the arts are alike, only their materials differ, their principles are all the same, their techniques all analogous, etc. That is not only unsafe, but untrue.' (*Problems of Art,* p. 14). If anything is common to them it is only their expressiveness., 'Expressiveness, in one definite and appropriate sense, is the same in all art works of any kind. What is created is not the same in any two distinct arts-this is, in fact, what makes them distinct but the principle of creation is the same. And "living form" means the same in all of them.' (*ibid*.)

Suggestion shone fourth in *Rasa, bhāva* and their other varieties being subsumed.[3] It was once again Ānandavardhana who emphatically gave out the poet alone to be the creator of his world, with the world, tuning as he would like it to.[4] Thus Abhinavagupta's emphasis, on these ideas was only an elaboration of what Ānandavardhana has said about them. In fact, Ānandavardhana presented not only the theory of *dhvani* in its proper perspective, but also gave a new fillip to the theory of *Rasa,* which had been almost lost in the maza of dozens of rhetorical categories (*alaṁkāras*), promulgated by poeticians, from Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha to those of Ānandavardhana's own times. In other words, the *Rasa* theory came into its own, only when it was officially amalgamated with the *dhvani* theory.

This theory of Bharata was thus extended from the dramatic to the poetic art, since drama itself was regarded as a form of poetry-visual poetry (*dṛśyakāvya*). At the same time, it was being used for a considerably long period in Indian works on dance and music since the time of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself. Bharata treated dance as an integral part of drama or *nāṭya* only. Out of the four varieties of *abhinaya* or gesticulation, viz, *āṅgika* (based on bodily features), *vācika* (verbal recitation), *āhārya* (pertaining to costumes, drapery, etc.) and *sāttvika* (referring to psycho-somatic states), the *dṅgika abhinaya,* with its three aspects of *śākhā, aṅkura* and *nṛtta* and using a number of major and minor limbs of the body, such as the hands, the feet, the head, the eyes, the neck, etc., is declared by Bharata to be directly connected with the evocation of emotions and sentiments.[5] What is true of *Rasa* in dance is equally true of *Rasa* in the field of music. In chapter XXIX of the *Nāṭyaśāstra,* Bharata gives detailed rules as to which particular *jātis* music should be related and to which *Rasas*.[6]

However, the Rasa theory need not be regarded as being referred to the four arts of drama, poetry or literature. However, even **Larger** agrees that a work of art expresses human feeling, feeling here 'meaning everything that can be felt, from physical sensation, pain and comfort, excitement and repose, to the most complex emotions intellectual tensions, or the steady feeling-tones of a conscious human life' (*Ibid*, P. 15). If this much is agreed upon, then the various Indian arts mentioned above, viz., drama, dance, music, painting, sculpture, and poetry, which mainly concern themselves with the articulation of human emotions, feelings and sentiments, may safely be said to be under the purview of *Rasa* theory, which looks upon art as mainly the emboidiment of human feeling. That the Indian writers like Bharata were conscious of arts other than poetry and drama in their writings, is also the view of Western art critics like **Philip Rawson**, who opines: Perhaps I should mention that the writers were thinking mainly of poetry and drama. But music and visual art were always considered and the code was carefully designed to cover them.[7] perhaps this remark should clinch the issue.

A question naturally arises regarding the validity or relevance of the *Rasa* theory in modern times. It has often been remarked that Bharata's scheme of the eight or nine *Rasas*, their *vibhāvas*, etc., is neither scientific nor comprehensive, and that it cannot hold good even for modern literature. Modern life has become extremely complicated with the growth of the machine the challenging, problems thrown up by the two world wars, the complete upheaval in the field of human values, the stresses and strains, tensions and pulls, in various directions. So it is quite in the fitness of things that modern literature, which seeks to portray these changing circumstances in modern life has become extremely complicated with the growth of the machine the challenging, problems thrown up by the two world wars, the complete upheaval in the field of human values, the stresses and strains, tensions and pulls, in various directions. So it is quite in the fitness of things that modern literature, which seeks to portray these changing circumstances in modern life, cannot be restricted within the narrow steel-frame of the *Rasa* theory of Bharata.

To some extent this is true, as the conditions of life have no doubt vastly changed from what they were in the days of either Bharata or Abhinavagupta. The complexity of human life has certainly increased, and poses a great challenge to the creative writer. But what is equally relevant is that behind the imposing spectacle of machine age and its complexities, human nature has not basically changed. Human emotions are still very much the same all over the world, and the difference lies only in the intensity with

which different human beings in different parts of the world react to the new situations. Love and separation, birth and death, joy and sorrow, are still universal occasions which bring people nearer each other emotionally. The phenomenon of widespread poverty and disease is still able to draw a tear of sympathy from every human eye. Disgust and, contempt towards the base and vulgar things of life are still the same for people of refined taste. What Bharata insists upon is not so much the number of *Rasas* or *vyabhicārins* (this is amply proved by the later additions of *śānta*, *bhakti* etc., to them), but their essential presence in all human being at all times. Human situations may change and they will of course change but mankind's response to them does not *Basically* change, and it is this response to the situation that Bharata terms as *anubhāva*. The feeling of repulsion that we have at the description of Michaelangelo's dissection of dead bodies in Irving Stone's The *Agony* and the *Ecstasy* is not much different qualitatively from the one we experience when we read Mādhava's description of the fiend eating up a human corpse (Mālatīmādhavam, V. 16), though the context is different; both are instance of *bībhatsa.* A certain situation may appeal to our sensitivity more deeply and intensely when it evokes our basic emotions suggestively, artistically, then it becomes a situation of *Rasadhavani* Another situation may call forth only a momentary feeling in our minds with all its paraphernalia; it becomes a situation of *Bhāvadhvani*. The importance lies in the emphasis that is placed on the situation. But as long as human emotions and human feelings continue to be the central theme of literature and art-and they will forever continue to be the validity and relevance of the *Rasa* theory will also be there, though the nomenclature or the technical jargon denoting human feelings may change.

The Rasaūtra in the sixth Adhāya of Bharata's *Nāṭaśāstra*, viz. along with Abhinavagupta commentary, Abhinavabhāratī on it, has been regarded as the classic exposition of the theory of Indian Aesthetics. In the course of this commentary, and to the lesser extent, in the Locana commentary on Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka, Abhinavgupta elaborates not only his own and Bharata's views on the theory of *Rasa* or aesthetic joy, but also those of his predecessors, viz., Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrī Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and the Sāmkhya writers. In fact, whatever earliest reliable information we gather about the views of these theoreticians is exclusively from the *Abhinavabhāratī*. Hence a detailed study of these views and of that Abhinavagupta himself, is indispensable for a complete and comprehensive idea of the Indian theory of aesthetic joy.

Bhaṭṭa Lolaṭa : Thus according to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, the first commentator mentioned by Abhinavagupta, the production, i.e., niṣpatti of *Rasa* (aesthetic delight or relish) takes place from the combination of the *sthāyin* with the vibhāvas, etc., i.e., the *vibhāva*s, the *Anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārins*. The idea is that aesthetic delight results from the operation of (i) the constituents or stimulants of an emotional situation, (ii) the resulting reactions in terms of mental and physical conditions, and (iii) the transient feelings, on the *sthāyin* (*Abhinavabhāratī*). It appears that according to Lollaṭa, the vibhāvas, etc., operate primarly on the sthāyin or the sentiment of the original character enacted in a drama (*anukārya*). Naturally, the resultant aesthetic delight should also belong to the original character. What we see on the stage is primarily the emotion of a character like Rāma or Duṣyanta or Romeo for another character like Sītā or Śakuntalā or Juliet as represented against a particular environment. The emotion becomes relishable in our eyes because of its physical and mental reactions on the character, and also because of the paraphernalia of the associations ideas, feelings, etc., entering the mind of the character in that particular situation. Thus the entire picture of thoughts and feelings, actions and reactions of a character in a significant situation gives us his emotion. The emotion is also produced in the actor because of the strength of his identification with the original character (*Abhinavagupta*). Thus, indirectly Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa also underlines the necessity of the actor's identification with the role, without which his emotional experience is impossible. In addition to this central fact of Rasa arising in the original character, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa also elucidates the exact role of the various factors in an emotional situation. The *vibhāvas* stimulants are, in his opinion, responsible for stirring up or arousing the particular mental state of the nature of *sthāyin* or sentiment. The *sthāyin* is already there in the subconscious mental sphere of the character, and it is called up by a particular significant situation. Further the reactions of the character that are significant in an emotional situation are not those that follow the situation, but those that precede it or lead upto it (*Anubhāvaś ca na rasajanyā atra vivakṣitāḥ teṣām rasakāaṇatvena gaṇanānārthatvāt, api tu bhāvanāmeva ye anubhāvaḥ*). Thus, it is Rāma's reaction on seeing Sītā in the pandal of the *Svayaṁvara* (selection of the bridegroom by the girl herself) ceremony that are important for getting a glimpse of his emotion, and not the reactions after the emotion is produced in his mind. The accompanying transient feeling like joy, eagerness doubt, etc. are also mental states but they are not on the same level as the *sthāyin*, because the *sthyāin* is in the form of subliminal or latent impressions whereas the transient feelings are actually revealed. The situation is parallel to the preparation of a tasty drink prepared from various where some are vital and others are flexible.

Abhinavagupta further remarks that this view of Lollaṭa is also the view held by elderly rhetoricians, and quotes Dandin, who maintains that sthāyibhāvas, like *rati* or *kopa*, reach the state of Rasa *śṛṅgāra* or *raudra* when they are heightened or intensified. The exact position of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa with regard to Rasa boils down to this : (i) Rasa is produced as a result of the combination of the sthāyin with the stimulants of a significant emotional situation, its reactions on character who is focus of the situation and the accompanying mental states or feelings (ii) the Rasa properly belongs to the character in question the *anukārya* and secondly the actor playing the role because of his indentification with the said character. (iii) heightened or accumulated *sthāyin* is Rasa. It has been generally belived that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa does not account for the apprehension of Rasa by the spectator or the aesthete the *sāmājika*; however Mammaṭa, while expounding the view of Lollaṭa, does say that *Rasa* is apprehended in the character and the actor(*atīyamāno rasaḥ iti bhatta lottaṭam ṛtayaḥ kāvyāprakāsā Ullāsa* IV). The question then is : apprehended by whom?' and the implied answer seems to be: 'by the *śāmājika*' What was the authority that Mammaṭa to make this statement? Abhinavgupta certainly does not say so in his discussion of Lottaṭa's view. The position is really intriguing.

Śankuka's Criticism Of Lollaṭa :- Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's account of *Rasa* is severely criticized by Śrī Śaṅkuka, as mentioned by Abhinavagupta. In the first place, says, Śaṅkuka, there are no valid grounds to infer the existence of the *sthāyin* as long as it does not come into contact with the *vibhāvas*, etc. Conjoined with them, the *sthāyin* might turn into the *Rasa*; its existence can be inferred on their basis. But how can the existence of the *sthāyin* be inferred before the conjunction? And further, how can it be known at all, if it cannot be inferred? What cannot be known or apprehended cannot also be subject of any assertion. In simple words, Lollaṭa has to

prove the existence of the *sthāyin* before he can say that it is conjoined with the vibhāvas, etc. That existence cannot obviously be proved. Secondly, if according to Bharata, the sthāyin is transformed into *Rasa* as a result of its conjunction with the various vāibhāvas or mental states like the vaibhāvas, etc., it is more natural to expect Bharata first to discuss the nature of the *bhāvas* and then the nature of *Rasa*, to follow the logical order. But what Bharata has actually done is just the opposite. That is enough to show that in Bharata's opinion what deserves precedence is the *Rasa*, and not the various *bhāvas*, as Lollaṭa seems to suggest. Further, if *sthāyin* is the same as *Rasa* in its latent or unintensified form, as Lollaṭa maintains no purpose would be served by giving a separate definition of *sthāyin* after *Rasa* has been defined. However, this is what Bharata has in fact done. That itself means that *sthāyin* is not the same as *Rasa*.

The remaining four objections of Śańkuka are based on Lollaṭa's theory that *sthāyin* when accumulated or intensified by the *vibhāvas,* etc., becomes *Rasa.* This accumulation must be taking place gradually or by degrees. There may be moments when the accumulation is slow, very slow or extremely slow, or neither slow nor, fast, and so on. In that case even the rise of *Rasa* will have to be held as taking place in respective degrees, which totally goes against the doctrine that *Rasa* is one homogenous entity or process, and does not admit of any division. If, to circumvent this difficulty, *Rasa* is held to be the last stage of the accumulation of the *sthyāin,* the six divisions of *hāsya* that Bharata gives later in this very Adhāya, viz., *smita, hasita, vihasita, upahasita, apahasita and atihasita (*Nāṭyaśtra, VI.52) would be impossible in the very nature of things. All of these divisions cannot certainly be produced at the highest stage of the accumulation of *sthāyin.* Further, the stages of the accumulation of the sthāyin being innumerable, the stage of a *Rasa* like śṛńgārā can be innumerable, culminating in so many particular *Rasas* and *bhāvas*, and not confined to the ten stages mentioned traditionally. Lastly it is a fact of observation that in case of *Rasa* like *karuṇa,* the intensity of emotion actually decreases in course of time, instead of increasing, as Lollaṭa maintains. Simiarly, *sthāyins*, like *krodha,* (anger), utsāha (enthusiasm) and *rati* (love, passion) are actually seen to decrease in the absence of resultant feelings or actions like wrath, stability and service (or attendance) respectively. In the face of all these facts of experience, it is sheer boldness that *Rasa* is the accumulated stage of the *sthāyin.*

Thus, it would appear that Śankuka's criticism of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory centres round three pivotal points namely (i) three is no means to infer the *sthāyin* in the absence of the vibhāvas, etc.; (ii) Bharata's separate treatment of *Rasas* and *bhāvas* militates against the equation of *sthāyin* and *Rasa*; (iii) once we say, that *Rasa* is accumulated *sthāyin*, we enter into the predicament of the stages of the accumulation of the *sthāyin* as well as *Rasa*. However, both Śańkuka and Abhinavagupta have not given any credit for his two very remarkable insights into the nature of Rasa, viz. (i) that it is primarily the emotion of the original character in the story (anukārya) that the actor tries to convey to the spectator, and (ii) that he actor can achieve this only when he merges himself in the personality of the character, viz., in his role. The second insight greatly emphasizes the importance of the actor's training, his skill and equipment, as much as his capacity to allow himself to be overwhelmed by his role, irrespective of personal circumstances, handicaps, etc. Perhaps Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa was the first among the extant commentators of the Nāṭyaśstra to realise the importance of the actor in the process of *Rasa* and its gesticulation, and in the opinion of a number scholars, his view *Rasa* perhaps comes nearer to Bharata's own view than that of any other commentator.

Bhaṭṭa Śankuka : After having thus criticised Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa theory of *Rasa* Śrī Śańkua advances his own view in the matter. Accordingly to him, though the *sthāyin* itself is Rasa, it is not *sthāyin* belonging to the character in the play, Accordingly to him, though the sthāyin itself is *Rasa*, it is not the *sthāyin* belonging to the character in the play, nor does the apprehension or realization of *Rasa* belong to that same character, as Lollaṭa maintains. The *sthāyin* here appears to belong to the actor and it is of the nature of the imitation of the *sthāyin* of the character. Because it is in imitation of character's *sthāyin*, it has been styled with a specific name of *Rasa*.

It is an imitation of the *sthāyin* of Rāma, etc., and not the genuine *sthāyin*. Hence, the propriety of a new designation.

Now the problem is: what are circumstances leading to this fallacious apprehension of *Rasa* based on the actor's imitation of the character's sthāyin? Śańkuka's reply is that normal factors of causation in the world apply here also, but as belonging to the actor, and not as belonging to the character. These factors which are normally known as the causes, the effects and the auxiliaries, are designated here as the vibhāvas, the anubhāvas and the vyabhicārins respectively. In the circumstances or situation of the original person like Rāma, Duṣyanta etc., they are of course natural. But in the case of the actor they are not natural, but acquired. However, a skillful actor displayed them so convincingly that they are felt by the spectator as absolutely natural and not as artifical.

Śańkuka here goes into some interesting details as to the exact way in which a particular emotional situation is enlivened before the eyes of the spectators as a result of the conglomeration of a number of factors. So far as the environment human and non-human (or material), is concerned, the play itself prevides it. The first part of process of *Rasa* apprehension starts with the dramatist's picturesque and powerful description of the stimulants of a particular situation (a heroine like Śakuntalā appearing before Duṣyanta in the background of the sylvan beauty of the forest, watering plants as tender, blooming and youthful as herself whispering innocent mischief's to her girl friends and being teased by them this picture itself is capable of arousing the spectator's attention, and focussing it on the situation). To add to that, there is exquisite skill of the actor, acquired through his long training in the art of gesticulation and exhibited through his intonations, his expressive gestures and perhaps also through his dance and song. The actor is the most crucial factor in this process of *Rasa*. The transitory feelings like doubt, eagerness anxiety, etc., are also enacted by the actor on the strength of his emotional reactions, as acquired. Thus, the whole setting of the significant emotional situation is ready for the spectator, who apprehends it primarily on the strength of the actor's imitation of the character's sentiment.

If the *vibhāvas* etc., are thus to be created from the poem or the, actor's skill, etc., as Śańkuka says, what about the *sthāyin* or the sentiment of the character itself? Is that also provided by the poem or the play? Śańkuka replies that the *sthāyin* is not provided by the play, but it is all the while implied. Words like'love' 'grif" etc., convey the sentiment only directly but fail to suggest it through verbal gesticulation. Now, verbal gesticulation is not simply articulation of words, but what is suggested or conveyed with the help of words, just as bodily gesticulation is not the display of limbs, but what is conveyed in a meaningful manner through bodily gestures Śańkuka illustrates this point with a few instances which show that the direct mention of words showing a sentiment does not exactly

bring out the sentiment itself, which may be brought out even without the explicit mention of words showing a sentiment does not exactly bring out the sentiment itself, which may be brought out even without the explicit mention of it. The art of gesticulation is nothing but this power of suggestion, and it is quite different from the power of expression or direct connotation Hence, it is, Śańkuka affirms, that the word *sthāyin* has not been mentioned in Bharata's Rasasūtra even in a different case. As it is implied in the actor's gesticulation, I and not directly mentioned in words, so it is done in Bharata's formula also. Thus the *sthāyin* of the character being imitated by the actor leads to Rasa, and hence the Rasa, and hence the Rasa, 'love' consists
of the sentiment rati (passion), and results from it.

One may have a doubt here, as to whether the spectator's apprehension of *Rasa* based on this illusion of the actor imitating the character's *sthāyin*, is real or valid apprehension, or is itself an illusion. This presents no diffculty for Śańkuka, who maintains that genuine action can result event from false knowledge or an illusion. Just to give a traditional instance, one may be tempted by the lustre or dazzles of a gem and still find the gem itself, because even the lustre cannot exist in the absence of the gem; yet the illusion or analogue* of the original sentiment may lead to real aesthetic delight. In fact, Śańkuka maintains that the peculiar apprehension that the spectator gets is of the identification of the actor with the character particularly situated, as 'That Rama who is happy is this one.' We do not feel that actor in this particular case is happy, nor that the actor himself is Rāma, nor again, that Rāma is not happy, nor that the actor corresponds to Rāma. Plainly speaking, the cognition of the spectator defies all possible modes of worldly experience through appropriate percepts and concepts. It is peculiar, extraordinary, unique. It is neither doubt nor similarity, nor dissimilarity and nor is it fullfledged conviction of identity, though it is knowledge of indentity. The apprehension that the spectator gets is one unified, coherent experience, and it cannot be challenged by any canons of logic. What Śańkuka maintains can be best illustrated with the maxium of the 'picture horse,' mentioned by Mammaṭa in this connection (*Citraturaganyāya Kāvyaprakāsā Ullāsa* IV), and probably made current by Śańkuka himself, though not mentioned in this place. A picture horse cannot be totally indentified with a real horse, nor can it be denied being similar to the real horse. It is real as a picture, but unreal as a living animal, that is to say, it is neither totally true nor totally false, neither beyond the province of truth nor that of falsity. It is an analogues semblance. In other words, the ontological status of the sentiments depicted in a play has no significance, so far as the spectator's aesthetic delight is concerned.

Bhaṭṭa Tauta : Abhinavagupta's criticism of Śrī Śańkuka's theory is mainly based on its refutation by his own teacher, Bhaṭṭa Tauta, who declares that the theory lacks in a substantial base, and does not stand a critical inquiry. Tauta would like to know whether the theory that '*Rasa* is of the nature of imitation,' is based on the apprehension of the aesthete, or on that of the actor, or on an objective rationalistic approach, or in keeping with the dicta of sage Bharata. In fact he wants to show that all these four alternatives are equally untenable.

The very first alternative, viz., śańkuka's theory has the spectator's apprehension as its central point and is discussed and rejected by Bhaṭṭa Tauta in an exhaustive manner. When, something is called an imitation of anything else, it must first be capable of proof. For instance, we see somebody drinking water, imitating the drinking of liquor, and we say, 'This is how he drinks liquor.' Here the drinking of water is a matter of direct perception.

Now the point is: what is there about the actor that appears as an imitation? Certainly the actor's person (or features), or the bead dress, horripilation, tremor, the movements and tossing of arms, the knitting of the eyebrows glances, etc. belonging to it does not appear to anybody as being the imitation of the sentiment of love of the character, as love is a mental state, and these things are physical, perceived by different senses and as belonging to a different substratum (i.e. actor), and hence entirely different from that love. Further the imitation of an object is apprehended the basis of that the selfsame object, as it obtains in reality. Nobody has previously seen the sentiment of love as belonging to Rāma, and hence even the misconception that the actor imitates Rāma is also automatically disproved.

Bhaṭṭa Tauta now takes up another point suggested by Śańkuka. According to this, an aesthetic emotion or *Rasa* like śṛńgāra would be the mental state of the actor only, being apprehended by the spectator as the imitation of the *sthāyin* of *rati* (love) of the character. In that case, Tauta says, we must find out what the exact nature of the apprehension of the mental state of the actor is. It may be said that, the actor's mental state appears in the same form of apprehension as the normal worldly mental state like love, having the nature of a cause because of stimulants like the presence of young women, etc., the nature of an effect because of resultants like glances, etc. and the nature of an auxiliary because of an ancillary factors like pleasure, etc. serving as indicative causes. In that case, Tauta goes on, it is apprehended as the normal state of the *sthāyin* 'love' only. Where is the propriety of the jugglery of words, manifest in the expression, 'It is the imitation of love'?

Śańkuka might try to explain the matter by saying that vibhāvas, etc., of the character and of the actor are not the same, in as much as they are real in the character, while unreal in the actor. If it is so, and if they are projected as artificial on the strength of the poem, the actor's training etc., without being the causes or the effects or the auxiliaries of the actor's *sthāyin* like 'love', Tauta enquires : are they apprehended by the spectator as artifical or not? If they are apprehended as artifical, how can they lead to the real apprehension of love. To this Śańkuka may reply that because they do not lead to real apprehension of love by themselves, being artificial, they become the cause of the apprehension of the imitation of love. This explanation is also totally rejected by Bhaṭṭa Tauta. It effects arise from various causes, and if a well-informed person knows this, can naturally infer the existence of another cause (*other than usual one)*. However, an ignorent person who does not know the fact (*of many causes)* can naturally infer only the well-known cause (*and not others*). For example, a particular species of scorpions can lead to the inference of cowdung only and not to the inference of another scorpion, which is wrong. Further, Tauta observes that where the knowledge of the indicative cause is wrong, the inference of something possessing a similar appearance also does not stand to reason. To illustrate the point, if vapour is apprehended as smoke, the indicative cause which appears to resemble or imitate it, does not warrant the inference resembling that object (i.e.smoke). Thus if fog is apprehended as resembling smoke, it is not found to lead to the apprehension of the China rose-flower resembling fire. The idea is that imaginary causes cannot give rise to real effects. Smoke may lead to the inference of fire, but fog resembling smoke cannot lead to the inference of the China rose resembling fire. If it is said for the sake of argument that the actor's sentiment of love produces the apprehension of *Rasa* in the spectator, it has at least a point in it. But if it is said that the

actor's imitation of the character's sentiment leads to *Rasa*, it must be said to be a far cry.

Śaṅkuka might further try to save situation by saying that an actor appears as angry, though he is not in fact angry. This is toy virtue of imitation only. Bhaṭṭa Tauta's reply to this is that the actor appears angry in the sense that he appears like one who is angry. Further, the resemblance is conveyed by the knitted eyebrows, etc., just as a bull appears like a *Gavaya* (a peculiar species of ox) because of his mouth, etc. Now this has nothing to do with imitation. Even Śaṅkuka would agree that the spectators do not have the apprehension of the actor's resemblance with the character. On the one hand he maintains that the spectators do not have the apprehension of the actor's sentiment, whereas, on the other, he also asserts that what is apprehended by the spectators is the actor's imitation; the whole argument appears to be hollow.

Śaṅkuka had declared the spectator's apprehension to be of the form 'This is Rāma.' If this has been ascertained at a particular moment of the play, why should it not accepted as the correct apprehensionin the absence of a future or provided there is a sublator, why should it not declared as false knowledge? In fact, it would be case of false knowledge, even if there is no sublator nothing to disprove it. The idea is that there is no justification in Śaṅkuka's assertion that the spectator does not have a contradictory experience of various apprehension. The contradictions do exist. Even the apprehension This is Rāma', takes place with reference to another actor also. Thus, what results is a class-characteristic of 'being Rāma'

In the course of his argument Śaṅkuka had stated that the *vibhāvas* or stimulants are understood from poetry (viz. drama). Tauta declares that this is something which he fails to comprehend, since the actor can never have an apprehension like 'This Sītā somebody to me.' In other words, the *vibhāvas* do not belong to him. If the said availability of the *vibhāvas* mean only that they are made fit to be apprehended as such by the spectators, then, as Tauta suggests, the idea of availability should more properly apply to the sentiment or *sthāyin* rather than to the *vibhāvas,* since it is the *sthāyin* that the spectators mainly apprehend as" This belongs to him' (i.e., to the character). Śaṅkuka had also made a great fuss about what it of the nature of gesticulation and what is non-gesticulation in the drama, saying that words themselves do not exhaust the range of verbal gesticulation, etc. Bhaṭṭa Tauta reserves
the reply to this point for its proper place.

The discussion appears in the Fourteenth Adhyāya of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Thus, Tauta, completely rules out the possibility of *Rasa* being the actor's imitation of the character's sentiment from the point of view of the spectator's apprehension.

Now, Bhaṭṭa Tauta takes up the second possibility in Śaṅkuka's view, viz., that the imitation of the character's *sthāyin* is done from the actor's point of view. In the first place, Tauta points out the actor is not quite conscious that he is imitating Rāma or his mental state. The word 'imitation' (*anukaraṇa)* itself can be understood in two different ways. If it means 'doing, something as another does' then obviously it is not possible in the case of the actor, who has not come across the original character or, if it means, 'doing after somebody else has done,' then such kind of imitation pervades the whole world. Then what is the speciality of the actor's imitation? He is only one of innumerable men who have been doing things which Rāma is supposed to have done. To escape this difficulty that it cannot be Rāma's imitation in either sense, Śaṅkuka may say that the actor does not want to imitate a particular person like Rāma, but he thinks that he is imitating the sentiment of sorrow of some noble person. Here the point to ponder over is : with what does he imitate the noble person's sorrow? Certainly not with his own sorrow, since the actor does not experience sorrow. Nor can the shedding of tears, etc., be said to be the imitation of sorrow, as they have already been stated to be two different things. The only possibility is this, that the actor may think that he is imitating the resultant actions of sorrow proper in the case of a man of noble nature.

Even then the problem still remains: resultants of which man of noble nature? If they are the resultants of anybody's sorrow, how it is possible to have his idea without any particularity? 'Anybody who weeps like this may be the said person' may be the reply. But then even the actor's self may be brought into the picture, and in that case the relation of the imitated and the imitator will be dropped i.e., the actor will be imitating his own *anubhāvas* or resultants, which is ridiculous. The idea of the actor's apprehension is conveyed only in the sense that he operates, displayed the resultant actions on the strength of his training, the memory of his own stimulants or *vibhāvas,* and because of the harmony of his heart through the generalization or universalization of his mental state, and reciting the poem with the proper accompaniments of correct intonation, etc., not that he conveys the idea of imitation. Bhāṭṭa Tauta further stresses the fact the imitation of Rāma's behaviour is not an external fact like the imitation of the lover's dress something which has already been shown in the First Adhāya of the *Nāṭaśāstra.* The third possibility of imitation according to Śaṅkuka was the rationalistic or philosophical approach, that which distinguishes between the object as it is and as it appears. Here Abhinavagupta briefly points out that what is not cognized cannot be called as the objective fact. The sentiment of the original character being something which is beyond the ken of our direct apprehension or cognition, the imitation of that sentiment is still more improbable. As to what the objective fact or the philosophical position, regarding the apprehension of the character's sentiment is, will be made clear later on. Here Abhinavagupta perhaps hints at his own exposition of *Rasa* and *sthāyin* which follows later.

The fourth possibility regarding Śaṅkuka's imitation theory was that it had the sanction of Bharata's own authority. Tauta firmly rejects the existence of any utterance of Bharata to this effect that *Rasa* is the imitation of the *sthāyin* or of the character's sentiment. Nor is there, he says, any positive indication in Bharata's text to warrant this kind of inference. On the contrary, as it will be discussed at the end of the Chapter on the divisions of the *sandhis* (Adhyāya XIX of the Nāṭyaśāsytra), Bharata's discussion of *dhruvāgāna*, the various *tālas* and the subordinate varieties of *lāsya* are a definite indication of the fact that *Rasa* is not imitation. But then Saṅkuka may ask, 'what about the statement "This drama will imitate the seven islands? Tauta's reply is that the word 'imitate' there can be explained in a different way also (e.g. in the sense of representation, sādṛśya). And in cases of imitation, like the imitation of the lover's dress gait, etc., do we really come across a different name of the process? In case of the imitation of *sthāyin*, the process comes to be known by a different name, viz. *Rasa*. This does not happen for all imitations.

Lastly, Tauta touches upon the proverbial analogy of 'the picture horse.' It was said that various paints like yellow pigments, etc., give rise to product called 'the bull.' Now if the idea 'the bull is produced' means that the bull is displayed, it is wrong. Red lead and other paints do reveal a real bull, as it is revealed, for example, by lamps, etc., but they give rise to a particular configuration resembling the bull. It is these red lead and other paints that become the

object of our apprehension 'This is like the bull,' when they are arranged in a special manner, resembling the actual arrangement of the features of the bull. Now the conglomeration of the *vibhāvas anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārins* does not give rise to an equal apprehension 'This is like the sentiment of love.' In other words, we are not conscious of the resemblance of difference of the *Rasa* and the *sthāyin* or sentiment. They are just one, and not one resembling the other. There, Tauta concludes, Śańkuka's contention that *Rasas* are the imitation of the character's sentiment or *sthāyin* is false.

Bhaṭṭa Tauta's criticism of Śańkuka's theory of imitation is no doubt very thorough and exhaustive. There is hardly any point in Śańkuka's view which he left untouched and unrefuted, and very probably, Abhinavagupta wholeheartedly approves of Tauta's criticism' since at no stage has he expressed his divergence from it. The salient points of Bhaṭṭa Tauta's criticism of Śańkuka's theory can be briefly enumerated in this manner:

i) The actor's features (or expressions), his make-up,
his gestures, such as movements of arms, knitting of eyebrows, etc., cannot be said to be the imitation of the original character's mental state like love, because these things are insentient, apprehended by different sense organs, and belonging to a substratum other than the character.

(ii) Imitation presupposes an original: nobody has seen Rāma's love which is to be imitated.

(iii) If it is said that the spectator apprehends the actor's mental state which he imitates, it only boils down to be mental state only, and the question of imitation does not arise.

(iv) It cannot be said that the stimulants, etc., are real in the case of the character, and unreal (or artificial) in the case of the actor (and thus different). The point is: are they apprehended by the spectators as artifical or not? If they are, they cannot lead to the knowledge of the character's sentiment of love. A well trained spectator can infer the character's real sentiment on the basis of the actor's artificial stimulants, etc., but not an untrained one.

(v) The appearance of the actor as angry, etc., does not *mean imitation;* if only means *resemblance Spectators* do not have impression of resemblance in the actor.

(vi) The spectator's apprehension, such as, 'this is Rāma,' does not disappear till the end of the performance. It persists to the end. Hence Śańkuka is not justified in saying that the spectator's apprehension is neither real nor illusory, etc.

(vii) The actor does not obtain the knowledge of stimulants from the poem, since he cannot relate Sītā to himself. We should rather say that they are meant to help the spectator to apprehend the sentiments of the character.

(viii) The actor has no definite felling that he is imitating Rāma or his mental state. *Anukaraṇa* (imitation) may means either 'doing as another does,' or 'doing after another does' if it means the first, it requires an original, which is not available. If it means the second, it is only a common wordly occurrence. If the actor is taken to imitate some ideal character's behavior, that may include his imitating himself. *What the actor does is to convey the apprehsion of the character, and not to convey his imitation.*

(ix) Bharata nowhere states that *Rasa* is the imitation of *sthāyin.* On the contrary, his discussion of *dhruvagāna,* rhythms, dance, etc., proves that *it is just the opposite of bare, prosaic imitation of the sentiment.*

(x) The combination of various pigments does not produce the apprehension of a real bull (or horse). It only gives rise to a particular configuration, producing the resemblance of the bull. But stimulants, etc., produce the real apprehension of love, and not the resemblance of love. Hence *Rasa* is not the imitation of the character's sentiment or *sthāyin.*

It has been pointed out by some modern critics that Bhaṭṭa Tauta's criticism of Śańkuka's theory is not completely valid. For example, Tauta's point that the actor's features, gestures, etc., cannot convey the character's sentiment, has been answered by saying that it forms a part of the general objection regarding Psychological observation and analysis. The concept of acting or gesticulation itself involves a reference to something beyond, which is left to the spectator's imagination. The actor and his gestures at all times point of Rāma and his gestures. Secondly, Bhaṭṭa Tauta had observed that there is no justification to believe that the actor imitates Rāma, since he has never seen Rāma, or his behaviour. To this the reply has seen given that historical or mythological characters, though actually observed or not, already deeply embedded in the popular mind; and hence, their imitation does follow a particular set or agreed pattern. Where all the details have not been provided by the author, the actor can fill in the gaps on the strength of his imagination. It is here that the connect of universalization steps in, especially in connection with imaginary characters (See *Saundaryamīmāṃsā* in Marathi by **R.B. Patankar**, 1st ed., pp. 262-9). **Prof. Patankar** also complains that Śańkuka's theory, which is almost a complete development of the concept of 'seeing a play' has been rather ignored. But the point is,: if Śańkuka's theory of imitation almost borders on universalization, in what way has it an advantage over Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's or Abhinavagupta's theory (See *infra*)? If Śańkuka does not set much store by the ontological status of the dramatic characters, which are so to speak, only symbolic, once again he approximates to the transcendtalist view of Abhinavagupta. Again Bhaṭṭa Tauta's criticism that there is an essential distinction between the picture and the actor's gesticulation does score a point. The configuration in the picture at best produces a resemblance of the real horse, while the stimulants in a drama, enacted by the actor, produce a real apprehension of the character's feelings, and not just their resemblance. Further, Śańkuka's technical jargon of logical terminology, like the use of words, *linga, anumāna, mithyājñāna,* etc., drags the spectator's experience nearer to a logical process of inference, rather than a common sense view of the apprehension of the character's feelings. At the same time, Śańkuka deserves special credit for a number of dramatically significant observations. His emphasis on the actor's training, equipment and his skill in gesticulation is quite apt and opposite. His vivid analogue of the painted horse which taken us beyond the physical existance of the dramatic object, and his clear cut distinction between the verbal expression of sentiment and its dramatic representation on the state, are also things which have a considerable validity in the analysis of dramatic experience. *When he says that the actor imitates the character's sentiment, what he perhaps means is that the actor tries his best to convey the sentiment as convincingly and vividly as possible, which for the spectator, obliterates the distinction between the original and the actor.*

The Samkhya's View: The third view about *Rasa* that Abhinavagupta mentions is that Sāṁkhya philosophers, though it is not dealt with exhaustively. According to this view, *Rasa* is of the nature of pleasure and pain. The objective world that possesses the potency of causing pleasure and pain is itself external. The *vibhāvas* or stimulants occupy here the position of petals or external surroundings. The *anubhāvas* or resultants and the *vyabhicārins* or transient feelings replenish the physical objects. However, the *sthāyins* or sentiments (of characters), produced by these physical objects are internal and of the nature of pleasure and pain i.e., of a mixed nature. In other

words, since the wordly experiences of an even aesthetic experience based on these is bound to be a mixed one. They do not much distinguish between a *sthāyin* and a *Rasa.* However, Abhinavagupta does not see to eye with them. The Sāṁkhya philosopher has himself noticed his contradiction with Bharata's teachings that the *sthāyin* and the *Rasa* are two different concepts, and that the *sthāyins* are to be developed into *Rasa*. Hence it is that he interprets Bharata's statement to this effect figuratively, and not literally. Abhinavagupta thanks the sāṁkhya protagonist wholeheartedly for sparing him, a man who believes in direct testimony from the pains of exposing the sāṁkhya absurdity in a detailed manner. However, Abhinavagupta cannot restrain himself from pointing out one more defect inherent in the Sāmkhya theory, and that defect refers to the disparity in the apprehension of *Rasa*. Though Abhinavagupta is not very explicit as to the exact nature of the disparity. The next view that Abhinavagupta takes up for criticism is that of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and combines the elements of both Mīṁāmsā and Sāṁkhya doctrines. It appears that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka hovered between Anandvardhana and Abhinavagupta, since Abhinavagupta shows Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka here as refuting the doctrine of *vyañjanā* or *dhavni* (poetic suggestion) advocated by Anandavardhana. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, *Rasa* or aesthetic emotion in drama or poetry is neither directly apprehened, nor produced, nor again suggested. If we believe *Rasa* is apprehended, then according to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, it can be apprehended only in two ways: either as belonging to the spectator himself, or as belonging to someone else, Now if we believe that *Rasa* is apprehended by the spectator as belonging to himself, it may even lead to an experience of sorrow in case of an emotion like pathos. A spectator who witnesses a performance just to derive a kind of innocent delight would not like to make himself unhappy or miserable by witnessing a pathetic episode or situation in perceived piece. But in the light of this alternative, apprehension of *Rasa* would certainly involve an experience of joy as well as sorrow, depending on the situation Nor would such apprehension of *Rasa* be appropriate or desirable in the case of the spectator, since characters like Sītā cannot act as the stimulants in his case. It is not very likely that his own beloved in real life would be the stimulant, since she does not belong to the sphere of the play. Further, the universalisation or generalization of sentiments like love which operates at the human level cannot operate at the divine level in the case of characters like Sītā. And lastly, there are some stimulants which are only possible at a divine or superhuman level, for instance, the crossing of the ocean by Rāma, and like events, which can never be generalized. For all these four reasons, the apprehension of *Rasa* with reference to the spectator himself is impossible.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka further shows that the spectator cannot have this apprehension of *Rasa* in any other way also. It cannot be, for instance, an object of remembrance of Rāma, possessing the sentiment of love, since remembrance always requires an original object like Rāma, which is the ground of knowledge and which is absent here. If we regard the apprehension as based on some mean of proof like verbal testimony or inference, it would be devoid of human interest. On the contrary, if we apprehend a loving couple as in reality, the spectators may be lost in a variety of mental states like shame, disgust, longing , etc., in keeping with their own different temperaments. In that case we cannot even think of human interest, as the reaction will be only a matter of personal feeling. Thus, the apprehension of *Rasa* cannot be properly said to take the form of direct experience, remembrance etc., To escape these complications, we may say that the spectator apprehends the *Rasa* as belonging to someone else. In that case, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka states that the danger may be that the spectator will be totally indifferent to another person's emotion. The same defect occurs also in the case of production of *Rasa*. Even if we regard *Rasa* as being originally latent in the form of a power and then being revealed or suggested, as the advocates of *dhvani* maintain, the difficulty would still arise regarding the disparity of apprehending the object suggested. To add to that, there will arise the same old difficulties as to whether the *Rasa* will be apprehended with reference to the spectator himself with reference to someone else.

Thus, after having explained in details how *Rasa* cannot be apprehended, produced or suggested as according to the earlier views, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's own position regarding *Rasa* is set out by Abhinavagupta in a quite terse sentence, which itself demands detailed explanation. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, *Rasa* or aesthetic emotion in drama and poetry goes through two stages: that of manifestation, and that of being relished. It is brought into being by a special process or function known as *bhāvakata* (idealization or generalization). In poetry this process is characterized by the absence of flaws and the positive abundance of merits and figures; in drama it takes the form of fourfold gesticulation. The process consists of generalization (or idealization) of the emotional apparatus used by the poet, such as stimulants, consequence, etc. It is quite different from the process of abhidhā or primary denotation, and it dispels the entire delusion of the spectator's mind. After this process of idealization, the Rasa is relished by another of delection is quite different from the usual means of knowledge like direct experience, resemblance, etc. On account of the variety of the persistence of elements of *rajas* and *tamas* (delusion and stupefaction) in human nature, it is of the nature of flux of fluidity, expansion and dilution. Further the delectation is also characterised by perfect repose in the spectators own consciousness, and the nature of this consciousness is that of the joy of illumination due to the preponderance of the element of *sattva* (purity). Lastly the delection approximates the relish of the bliss of Supreme Brahman.

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S CRITICISM OF BHAṬṬA NĀYAKA

This viewpoint of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is refuted by Abhinavagupta in two different stages. In the first stage, he criticizes Bhaṭṭa Nāyakas's contention that *Rasa* is neither apprehended nor produced, nor revealed (or suggested), by pointing out on that any detailed refutation of it is just unwarranted, since it only represents Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa view, already refuted by Śaṅkuka. One fails to understand, Abhinavagupta says what kind of enjoyment of *Rasa* can be possible in the world, which cannot be apprehended, produced or revealed. If it is the same and relish of *Rasa*, can be possible in the world, which cannot be apprehended, produced or revealed. If it is the same as the relish of *Rasa*, that is again an apprehension only, and it would only acquire a different name because of the difference in its means, just as one and the same process of apprehension is known as by various names, as direct perception inference, verbal testimony, analogy (or comparison), intuition, etc., owing to the variety of means adopted. So there can be no relish or *Rasa* without apprehension. If the other two alternatives of the production and manifestation of *Rasa* are also rejected, there is no third course, left, but to assume that either *Rasa* is eternal or that it simply does not exist. And further, a

thing which is not an object of apprehension cannot also be an object of practical dealings.

Turning to the second part of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's argument viz., his thesis that the nature of the apprehension of *Rasa* is its enjoyment or delectation and it is of the nature of fluidity, expansion and dilation, Abhinavagupta remarks that even granting for argument's sake that it is so, it is n simply that much, but something more. This is so because the apprehensions of *Rasas*, consisting of the delectability or enjoyability, are at least as many as the *Rasas* or the emotions themselves. And so far as the three states of mind, i.e. fluidity, expansion and dilation corresponding to the three *guṇas,* viz., *sattva rajas* and *tamas* are concerned, Abhinavagupta points out that they are almost endless, depending upon their position of importance or subordination, and in that case, why should restrict the number of the states of mind to three only?

Lastly, Abhinavagupta tires to show that the process of *bhāvanā* which is posited by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, only amounts to *vyañjanā* or suggestion, which even includes the process of *bhoga* or delectation. Thus when Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka states that the *Rasas* like *śṛñgāra* are made the objects of *bhāvanā* by poetry, Abhinavagupta is prepared to accept it, provided this bhāvanā means 'making the object of the apprehension which possesses the nature relish produced by the stimulants, consequents etc.' This process is nothing but *vyañjanā* or *dhavni* itself, which leads to the generalization of the *vibhāvas*, etc. However, Abhinavagupta makes it clear that in Bhaṭṭa Nāyakas statement, that *Rasa* is the poetic content revealed by the process of saṁvedana (knowledge), being the object of supreme consciousness and consisting of the experience of relish', the word *vyaṅgya* refers to the process of being suggested, that is to say, to *vyañjanā* only, and the word *anubhava*
(experience) refers to the object of that suggestion.

There is no doubt that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, through his theory of *bhāvanā*, emphasised one of the most important factors of aesthetic appeal. The contents of poetry of drama, though dealings with personal experience or situation, must have a generalized or universalized aspect (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*), in order to be made worthy of the sympathetic apprehension and apprehension of an aesthete. The objective elements in Individual experience, thought and feeling, must be objectified impersonalized (or depersonalized), so that they are relished on a general plane. The dramatist of the poet must possess the capacity to approach the universal through the particular. Secondly, the term *bhāvanā*, with its roots in Mīṁāmsā philosophy, also emphasised the quality of the poetic or dramatic content to be relishable (*rasanā*), as well as the necessity of the reader's or spectator's repeated meditation or contemplation over the poetic content (*carvaṇā*), which yields a renewed pleasure every time. It is a usual experience of every mature reader that the repeated reading of a classic brings every time a fresh delight. Abhinavagupta suggests that both these processes, of generalization of the dramatic(or poetic) content through the dramatist's skilful representation, and of the relishability or delectability of the emotion are achieved through *vyañjanā* or suggestion only, and hence it is not necessary to assume two separate processes, to witness, *bhāvanā* and *bhoga*, as Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka has done. However, the very fact that Abhinavagupta endavours to include these processes under *vyañjanā* or *dhvani*, is itself a concrete proof that he could not afford to ignore them completely, as he had done in the case of Śaṅkuka's theory of inference. Further, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's contention that the apprehension of *Rasa* is an extraordinary process, quite distinct from the normal processes of apprehension, and also that this apprehension reaches an ecstatic or transcendental level, is admitted by Abhinavagupta in a rather modified form in the course of his own exposition of *Rasa*.

ABINAVA ON RASAS:

After clearly expounding in this manner the views of earlier commentators, on *Rasa*, Abhinavagupta sets out in exhaustive details his own theory of *Rasa.* At the outset, he declares that his object in giving a new interpretation in the matter is not mechanical repetition of what is obvious. In fact, he gives full credit to the pioneering work of scholars who have prepared a kind of staircase on which the fresh intellect can climb high up, and then, untiringly, view the truth or essence of things. The first enumeration of a doctrine is like a picture without a prop. But once the correct route has been found, even the construction of bridges of founding of cities is not surprising. Hence what Abhinavagupta now does is improving upon the views of earlier scholars, and not demolishing or craping at them. People say that the reinforcement of the original doctrine follows upon the proper synthesis of earlier views. Thus, Abhinavagupta is inspired by the urge to reach the maximum perfection in understanding the implications of Bharat's doctrine, and not by a desire to obliterate or obscure the works of earlier commentators. It will be clear in the course of his exposition that has made a very judicious use of whatever grains of truth he found in the earlier views.

In fact, the final truth in the matter of *Rasa* has been enunciated by Bharata himself in the Seventh Adhyāya, while defining the *bhāvas*, and Abhinavagupta is not expounding anything brand new. There Bharata says that the bhāvas make the poetic contents or meaning a matter of apprehension, or contemplation. Now Abhinavagupta comments that this poetic content itself is *Rasa*, after it has been contemplated by the reader or sepectator.

To illustrate how the poetic matter or content becomes an object of the delightful contemplation of the reader or spectator, Abhinavagupta gives an analogy from the science or ritual. The performer of a sacrifice, eligible for, and intent upon, it, hears statements pertaining to earlier sacrifices, as 'the gods performed a sacrificial session,' Prajāpati offered the marrow into fire,' etc. Now this simple apprehension on his part, which arises in the beginning and which interests him, is soon transformed into an additional apprehension, i.e., a desire such as 'I shall myself perform a sacrifice,' I shall offer an oblation,' etc. In the case of this additional apprehension the idea of the past tense is completely discarded, and the apprehension is known as various names, such as poetic inspiration (*pratibhā*) intent desire (*bhāvanā*), injunction (*vidhi*) and activity (udyoga), depending on the various provinces of knowledge. Similar is the additional apprehension arising in the case of a competent or qualified reader from words in a poem.

This competent or qualified reader (*adhikārin*) is defined by Abhinavagupta as one whose heart is illumined by the flash of bright and pure inspiration. When he reads a fine verse *like 'Grīrābhaṅgābhirāmaṁ,'* etc., in the drama Ābhijñānama dhyaśobhi … (1.7), vivdly describing the fright of the running deer being chased by Duşyanta; or like '*Umāpi nīlālakamala dhyaśobhi …*', etc., or like 'Harastu kiṁcit pariluptadhairyaḥ', etc., in the poetic work *Kumārasambhavaṁ* (111. 62, 67) depicting Pārvatī's nervous salutation to Śiva and Śiva's consequent loss of equanimity, he initially apprehends the meaning of the words of the stanza. Then there arises in him an apprehension of the nature of mental visualization, completely divorced from the distinctions of time, space, etc., entailed by that particular sentence, etc. In that

apprehension the young deer(like similar other entities) that figures has absolutely no special form, and even the idea of being 'frigthened' has no real source of terror. Thus, what causes the 'emotion of fearful' is fear only, untained by space, time, etc. Hence, it is distinct from normal apprehensions like 'I am afraid,' 'he is afraid' 'he is an enemy', 'he is a friend', or 'he is neutral,' so on and so forth apprehensions which are beset with obstacles because of the inevitable occurrence of other ideas, like, abandoning, receiving etc., caused by sorrow, unhappiness and the like. This fear is apprehended without any obstruction, as if it directly enters the heart, or as if, it moves before our very eyes. In such a kind of fear the self of the reader is neither totally obliterated, nor particularly involved. The same thing is true of others also. Hence, the generalization of the apprehension is not limited, but extended or widened, just like the knowledge of the concomitance of smoke and fire, or of fear and tremor.

This vivid realization of *Rasa* is reinforced by the dramatic accessories like actors, their speeches costumes, etc. By virtue of these accessories, the restricting conditions like space, time, the knowner, etc., in the real world as well as in poetry, cancel each other and totally disappear, paving the way for the generalization or universalisation of the emotion which considerably increases. Hence, it is that the homogeneity of the apprehension of all spectators leads to the highest nourishment or heightening of the emotion all of them possessing minds coloured or variegated by beginningless subliminal impressions, and hence their harmony. This apprehension of *Rasa*, free from all obstructions, is itself the relish or delectation, the *camatkāra*. Even the physical manifestation of that relish, such as tremor, horripilation, the swelling of the body, etc., is styled as *camatkāra*. The analogy of this thrilling delectation that Abhinavagupta gives is that of the great surprise of Lord Viṣṇu's mind that the tender limbs of Lakşmī, resembling the delicate digits of the orb of the moon, were nor pounded by Mount Mandāra in the process of churning the ocean something which causes a thrill not only at the moment of actual experience, but even in its contemplation.

This delectation, this *camatkāra*, is further described by Abhinavagupta as an uninterrupted, ceaseless enjoyment, bereft of all feeling of insatiety. He explains the term *camatkāra* itself as the process which posits an enjoyer an apprehender who is infused with the throbbing, the pulsating of a mysterious, marvellous kind of enjoyment. If a further explanation is necessary, it may be described as having the nature of a mental apprehension, resembling vivid realization of the self, or contemplation, or memory not operating in its usual form, viz., requiring a prior experience. The famous verse in the *Abhhijñānaśkuntalam* (V. 2) brings out the nature of this memory as that even a happily situated being who becomes restless on seeing beautiful objects and hearing sweet sounds, and remembers, mentally and in an unconscious manner, the friendships of other (i.e. previous) existences, embedded in the form of feelings. This apprehension of emotion is wholly of the nature of relish, wherein we have joy or delight, pure and simple. Hence, it is enjoyable, being untainted by any particularities (of place, time, etc.). It is neither an ordinary worldly apprehension, nor a false one, nor indefinable, nor resembling a wordly apprehension, nor anything superimposed upon that, in other words, quite unique. If at all, it has to be aligned with the perception of other schools, Abhinavagupta concedes that it may be said to be of the nature of intensification as Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa says, but without the constraints of place, time, etc. It may even be said to be of the nature of imitation, as Śaṅkuka considers it in as much as it follows in the wake of the *bhāvas*. It may even be stated to be phenomenal as the Sāṁkhyaites believe, provided we have recourse to the idealist theory. On the whole, *Rasa* or aesthetic emotion is nothing but the *bhāva* itself, consisting entirely of relish or delectation, and is the object of an apprehension totally free from obstructions. The above elucidation of the apprehension of emotional experience given by Abhinavagupta highlights some of the most perceptive of his insights into the nature of *Rasa*. At the outset he points out how a poetic or dramatic content completely envelopes the mind of the appreciative reader or spectator, and becomes an object of his deep contemplation. This apprehension is soon stripped of its pecular conditions of space and time, and takes on the form of a general, universal apprehension. When such an appreciative reader or spectator comes across a good piece of emotional delineation, the emotion itself, freed from its limiting adjuncts, takes possession of him. He relishes it purely in his own, self. The dramatic accessories as well as the poetic descriptions help him in this matter by removing the obstacles embodied by the particularity of time and space, and by presenting the emotion in a generalized form. Since the minds of all spectators possess a uniform residue of subliminal impressions, all of them are capable of experiencing a harmonious apprehension, and this harmonious, homogenous apprehension, itself is *camatkāra* delectation and ceaseless enjoyment. It is a unique kind of experience, quite unlike any worldly experience or apprehension that we can imagine.

Seven Fold Psychic Obstacles : Having thus explained his own thesis regarding the exact nature and apprehension of *Rasa*, Abhinavagupta stats that the *vibhāvas* and other accessories in drama are instrumental in removing the obstacles in the apprehension of Rasa, and that the spectator's consciousness itself, freed from all shackles, is designated in the world by various names, such as *camatkāra*, *nirveśa*, *rasanā āsvādana, bhoga, samāpatti, laya, viśrānti,* etc., all of which are just mutual synonyms. The obstacles to this consciousness are seven fold, viz., the in capacity for apprehension termed as the absence of imagination; attachment to, or overabsorption in a particular place and time as belonging to oneself or to another person; the state of being affected by one's personal happiness, etc.; the fallibility of the means of apprehension; their absence of clarity or distinctness; the absence of prominence of the *sthāyin*; and the rise of doubt.

Abhinavagupta explains the nature of these obstacles in details. Thus he states that the first obstacle, viz., the spectator's incapacity for apprehension or absence of imagination consists in this that the spectator who cannot imagine the object of apprehension or consciousness is not able even to sustain his consciousness in the object of apprehension; then how can his consciousness experience repose there? The idea here seems to refer to the delineation of emotions, feelings, etc., which are beyond the scope of the average reader's imagination or sensibility. For removing this obstacle, Abhinavagupta suggests two remedies. One remedy is that the spectator should try to attune or harmonize his own heart to the ordinary things of the world, that is to say, he should widen the horizon of his observation and sensibility, which would give him a broader perspective of things and greater sympathy. The other remedy rests with the dramatist. While describing extraordinary accomplishments, he should have recourse to famous names like that of Rāma, etc., which would help people's belief in them, born as a result their uninterrupted fame that lies deeply imbedded in people's minds. Hence it is that in plays whose purpose is the tendering of advice regarding extraordinary excellence and also wisdom, a well-

known theme and the like will be prescribed as a rule; this is not so in a farce or any other sort of burlesque. Abhinavagupta states that he will enlarge upon this idea in the proper place, viz., in the course of the discussion of the ten forms of drama in Adhyāya XVIII of the Nāṭaśāstra, entitled '*Daśarūpanirūpaṇa.*'

The second obstacle to the apprehension of *Rasa* that Abhinavagupta mentions is the absence of what is known as the proper aesthetic or psychic distance between the dramatic situation and the spectator (for the concept of aesthetic distance see *Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed.* **Alex Preminger,** Princeton, 1972, pp. 5-6). The obstacle may arise from the fact that the spectator indentifies the various dramatic feelings with himself and relishes them accordingly, or with some person. In both cases the result is equally undesirable. If he relishes the feelings only as referring to himself, they will give rise to a very great hindrance in the apprehension of *Rasa*, by producing other kinds of reflex or corresponding feelings, because of the spectator's fear of their disappearance, or of his concern for their protection (or preservation), or his desire for acquiring something resembling them, or desire for avoiding them, or for making them known to others, or for concealing them, or in any other manner possible. Even if he experiences the dramatic feelings as referring necessarily to another person, the obstacle is inevitable, as they are likely to give rise to other corresponding feelings in his own heart, such as happiness,sorrow, delusion, indifference, etc. Bharata's solution to this problem of maintaining aesthetic distance is, Abhinavagupta states, the disguising or camouflaging the actor's personality with devices like
head-dress etc. For this purpose he has already established the actor's personality as actor, different from that as an individual, by not allowing the dramatic preliminaries to be covered up, with the advice that have should not be too much of dance and song (Adhyāya V of the *Nātyaśāstra*) and by its being observed in the *Prastāvanā* or Exposition. The device is accompanied by dramatic conventions like the extraordinary or unusual variety of language, etc., the various divisions of *lāsya* or delicate dance, the stage, the divisions of the auditiorium, etc. With this device there is no apprehension that the happiness or sorrow is of this particular actor, or of this particular time or place, since the original personality of the actor as actor is concealed, as the other character superimposed upon him as a particular character, does not find its repose in itself, as a result of defective rest in the spectator's consciousness, and ultimately only ends in concealing his real personality as an actor. To elucidate: the varieties of *lāsya*, like *āsīnapāṭhya, puṣpagandhikā*, etc., are not usually seen in the world, nor are they totally absent since their possibility always exists. All this subject has been undertaken by Bharata, as it subserves the purpose of relish of *Rasa* through generalisation, and will be clarified at its proper place, dispensing with its treatment at this moment. This finishes the explanation of the way of removing the obstacle in *Rasa*, when the consciousness is confined to oneself or to another person.

The third obstacle in the matter of the relish of *Rasa* refers to the spectator's overabsorption with his own personal feelings like happiness, sorrow etc. Though such a spectator enters the theatre for a social entertainment, he is so much lost in his private world that he cannot come out of it. The consequence is that he is not able to place his consciousness in another matter, which, in this case, is the object of representation where it should find repose, and hance is not able to relish the *Rasa*. Abhinavagupta states that with a view to removing this obstacle, various to removing this obstacle, various means of entertainment are employed, such as musical instruments, songs, various kinds of circular movements, accomplished courtesans, etc., things which refer to a particular objects or persons, but are capable of being enjoyed by all by virtue of generalisation, consisting of sense objects like sound, etc. Because of these means, even a person lacking aesthetis sensibility is turned into an aesthete, as he obtains clarity (or purity) of heart. Hence it has been said in *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Adhyāya I, that the nature entertainment, requested of Lord Brahman by the sages, should be both visible and Audible.

The fourth and fifth obstacles in the apprehension of *Rasa*, viz., defect in the means of apprehension and the absence clarity respectively are discussed by Abhinavagupta simultaneously, since their nature is more or less the same. He urges that in the absence of the proper means of apprehension, the apprehension cannot inspite of the presence of verbal testimony and inference, if they cause indistinct apprehension, since repose demands an apprehension which is an conformity with direct or visual perception of the nature of clear apprehension. As it has been said, 'All this knowledge depends on perception,' since what has been directly seen by oneself leads to the knowledge of that thing only and of nothing else, in spite of hundreds of scriptural proofs and inferences. In the case of a fire brand the dismissial of its wrong knowledge takes place only through another and powerful (or compelling) knowledge. This is the order of the world even in case of an illusion. Hence, for the purpose of removing both these obstacles, gesticulation, reinforced by worldly conventions, modes of behaviour and propensities, is made conspicuous. Abhinavagupta also promises to prove later on conclusively that gesticulation is quite distinct from the process of verbal testimony and inference, and is at par with the process of direct perception. In other words, it creates a vivid impression on the minds of the audience with only a real event can, and it guarantees the apprehension of *Rasa.*

The sixth obstacle in the apprehension of *Rasa* is the absence of prominence given to the *sthāyin*, in a play. A playwright must make a judicious discrimination between the *sthāyin*, on the one hand, and the set of *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārins*, on the other and should not commit the fatal blunder of making the latter prominent in any way. Abhinavagupta explains this point by asking a pertinent question: 'Whose consciousness can find repose in an insignificant matter?' since the apprehension of this matter will itself run to another which is really conspicuous and thus will not find response in itself. Thus, this is quite possible in the case of the group of the *vibhāvas* and the *anubhāvas* which are insentient, and also in the case o the cluster of *vyabhicārins* which, as a rule, turn to another, viz., the *sthāyin*, in spite of their possessing the nature of consciousness, and hence the *sthāyin* itself, distinct from them, is the abode of relish. Among these *sthāyins* again, some states are more prominent, as they are based on the goals of human existence. Thus the *sthāyin* of love is based on passion and religious conduct and wealth following in its wake; the *sthāyin* of anger is based on wealth (or material acquisition), though terminating in passion and religious conduct; the *sthāyin* of enthusiasm or energy terminates in all four goals like religious conduct; while the *sthāyin* of self restraint, consisting mainly of dejection born of the knowledge of truth, is a means to salvation. Hence their prominence. Though these have the position of subordination with reference to one another, each one of them is prominent in variety of drama based on it as important, and thus the prominence of all of them is noticed in the matter of varieties of drama. Even if we restrict our view to a narrow range, in the same variety of drama the prominence of the *sthāyin* keeps varying.

Abhinavagupta further observes that all these *sthāyins* are of the nature of happiness or joy, since the light which is of the nature of the relish of one's own consciousness, and quite homogenous, has joy or delight as its essence. Thus it is found in the world that the hearts of women folk (known for their tenderness and sensitivity) find repose even in the relish of their consciousness which consists of sorrow pure and simple, because the nature of that relish is repose itself, free from any obstacles. What constitutes sorrow is the absence of repose itself. For this reason only, the followers of Kapila, the founder of Sāṁkhya philosophy, have proclaimed evanescence as the very soul of sorrow by declaring that sorrow is the quality of *rajas* (delusion). Thus it stands to reason that all the aesthetic emotions or *Rasas* are of the nature of joy. However, some of them are occasionally tinged with bitterness, with regard to the objects of diverson as in the case of the heroic emotion. That emotion has as its very life or essence the endurance of torment, etc. This is the nature of the prominence of *sthāyins* like love, anger, enthusiasm and self restraint. 'However no prominence has been attatched to *sthāyins*, such as, laughter, grief, fear, disgust and wonder, as they have abundant scope as means of diversion, possessing the stimuli easily available to the whole world. Hence, it is that *sthāyins* like laughter are mostly found in the case of men of low character. All lowly persons laugh, lament, fear, indulge in ridiculing others, and feel surprises even at a wise utterance of little consequence. Of course, they may be useful as serving the goals of human existence, by being subordinate to *sthāyins* like love. **Abhinavagupta** promises that he will himself later on explain the varieties of ten kinds of plays (cited in *Nātyaśāstra*, Adhyāya XVIII), based on the relative subordination and prominence of these *sthāyins.*

In **Abhinavagupta's** opinion, these are the only *sthāyins* properly so called, since the moment a being is born, he is surrounded by these many states of consciousness. Thus, in keeping with the maxim, 'each being hates contact with sorrow and is intent on the relish of happiness,' each being is pervaded by the desire to enjoy love; laughs at others by arrogating excellence to himself; is tormented by separation from desired objects, falls a victim to anger towards the causes of that separation or is frightened of them in the event of his incapacity to fight them out; though desiring to conquer objects, he is overcome by indifference towards the objects conquered, regarding some of the things as not desirable; and he is full of surprise at the sight of various duties and desires to abandon something. There is no being devoid of the impressions of these mental states. Only somebody has some particular mental state in excess, and some other state or states to a lesser degree; somebody's mental state is controlled by proper objects, while some other's is otherwise. Thus, only some particular mental state is conducive to a goal of human existence, and hence commendable. It is the distinction between these states that leads to the usage of men possessing noble nature and so on.

Abhinavagupta now explains why the *vyabhicārins* do not deserve prominence as the *sthāyins* do. Peculiar mental states, he states, like *glāni* (weakness), *śaṅkā* (alarm, apprehension), etc., do not occur even in the whole life, in the absence of their proper *vibhāvas* or stimuli. Thus, in the case of a person consuming an invigorating drink, *glāni ālasya* (sloth), *śrama* (fatigue), etc., do not arise. Even if they do occur in somebody's case on the strength of the stimuli, they are weakened on the loss of disappearance of the cause, and certainly do not constitute a continuum of mental impressions. However, *sthāyins* like *utsāha* (enthusiasm, energy), though they become almost non-existent or weak by reason of fulfilling their target, do not cross the stage of remaining behind in the form of mental, impressions, since the moods like enthusiasm, etc., which have some other target or deed as their objects, remains, uninterrupted or constant. This can, as *Patañjali* observes, be described thus: 'When Caitra is enamnoured of the woman, it is not that he is completely disinterested in others,' and so on. Hence, it is **Abhinavagupta** says that the *vyabhicārins* get that particular designation. In very elaborate metaphor, he points out how they are interwoven in the thread of mental states which are of the nature of *sthāyins.* They partake of millions of variegated forms of rise and disappearance. They are likely beads made of crystal, glass, mica, ruby, emerald, blue sapphire, etc., woven in threads which are red, blue, etc., in colour and capable of thousands of varieties because of their being thinly woven. Like these beads they do not lend their own variegated impressions to the thread of the *sthāyin*, but on the contrary, possess the blend of the help of the thread. They themselves possess a variegated nature, and lend variety to the thread of the *sthāyin*. Off and on, they allow the thread of *sthāyin*, though pure, to shine and at the same time, constitute the blending of the various shades of jewels in the form of earlier and later *vyabhicārins* also themselves glittering.

To illustrate how the *vyabhicārins* have only an evanescent and never a lasting existence, **Abhinavagupta** states, that when there is a statement, 'He is weak' (or exhausted)', the very question 'Owing to what?' leading to a cause, suggests the evanescent nature of the *vyabhicārin glāni.* However, nobody asks such a question about the cause in the statement, ascertained on the strength of the *anubhāvas*, *vibhāvas* and *vyabhicārins*, since they are not separately earmarked or restricted for any particular *sthāyin*. This is because we find *anubhāvas* like tears occasioned by joy as well as by an eye disease, *vibhāvas* like a tiger become the causes of anger, fear etc., and *vyabhicārins* like fatigue, anxiety, etc., are seen to be the auxiliaries of many *sthāyins* like enthusiasm, fear etc. However, their assemblage does not give rise to a doubt in the matter of the *sthāyin*. Thus, where we have a *vibhāva* like the loss of a relative, an *anubhāva* like lamentation, shedding of tears, etc., and *vyabhicārins* like anxiety (or concern), misery, etc., the *sthāyin* is certainly *śoka* (or grief). Thus, in the case of the rise to a doubt, the assembly of all the three factors has been laid down for the removal of the obstacle of the nature of a doubt.

It can be very easily seen that the thorough discussion of the seven obstacles and of the means of their removal proves beyond doubt **Abhinavagupta's** penetrating insight into all dramatic aspects leading to the realisation of *Rasa* on behalf of the spectator. Here he gives detailed instructions as to how each of the three human agencies involved in the process of *Rasa* the dramatist, the actor and the spectator or *sāmājika* should try to rise to the best of his skill and ability, how all their individual efforts should converge towards the apprehension of *Rasa*, the collective experience of human emotion in the theatre.

Abhinavagupta now brings out very clearly his own view of *Rasa* in this manner. Appreciative spectators of the drama do possess the necessary proficiency to infer the mental states of other people having abiding sentiments (*sthāyin*), 'Rāma is endowed with the power of enthusiasm.' Hence, only the *vibhāvas,* pointing to the *sthāyin,* lend it variety because of their own nature, and only bring out the propriety or impropriety of *sthāyins* like *rati, utsāha,* etc. However, the *sthāyins* do not totally cease to exist in the absence of the *vyabhicārins*, since it has already been said that all beings are endowed with them in the form of subliminal impressions. The *vyabhicārins*, however, do not exist so much as in name in the absence of the *sthāyins*.

Abhinavagupta promises to illustrate this point still further in his commentary as the occasion demands. This is how he sums up, sage Bharata has removed the obstacle of the lack of prominence given to the *sthāyin* with its elucidation- "we shall carry the *sthāyin* to the state of *Rasa*', based on a special definition of the *Rasa*, evolving out of its general definition.

The seventh and the last obstacle in the apprehension of *Rasa* that Abhinavagupta mentions, is the rise of a doubt uncertainty as to the exact nature of the *sthāyin* in an emotional situation. The *sthāyin* cannot be indentified or on the basis of their own observation, in daily life, of the inference of effects, causes and auxiliaries of things. Now the same subjects like gardens, glances, etc., which were ordinary causes, transcend the plane of empirical causality, when depicted on the stage and their sole essence consists in manifesting, corroborating and nourishing the *sthāyin*. Hence, it is that they are entitled as 'extra worldly' *vibhāvas*. Yet they are still designeated as *vibhāvas* also, to convey their essential dependence on the mental impressions taking the form of earlier causes, effects, etc. Thus, they are *vibhāvas* with a distinction. Their exact nature and distinction will be explained by Bharata in **Adhyāya** VII of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. In keeping with their greater or lesser prominence they enter into a proper relationship or unity or harmony with the minds of the spectators, and the object that they bring to a state of relish which is extra worldly in character, and partakes of the nature of consciousness devoid of all obstacles, that object is *Rasa* or aesthetic emotion. The essence of this object, *Rasa*, consists entirely in relish though it has no accomplished nature. It has a temporary existence, and has no reference to a time other than that of relish, and it is totally distinct from the *sthāyin*.

Since in **Abhinavagupta's** opinion the Rasa is totally distinct from the *sthāyin*, he naturally does not agree with the view of Śańkuka and other scholars that the *sthāyin* itself is designated as *Rasa* because of its being relished, after it is made the object of apprehension by the *vibhāvas* etc. If the *sthāyin* itself can become *Rasa*, why not accept *Rasa* even in the case of daily life? If relish can take place in the case of the *vibhāvas*, etc., which do not really exist, why should it not occur in the case of things which do really exist? Thus the apprehension of the *sthāyin* which is obtained in the form of an inference, as Śańkuka explains it, is not *Rasa*. Hence, it is **Abhijnavagupta** states, that word '*sthāyin*' has not been included in Bharata's aphorism of Rasa. On the contrary, if included, it would be injurious like an arrow. It is only a matter of propriety that the *sthāyin* is said to become the *Rasa*. And the propriety lies in this, that the objects that were previously well known as the causes of the *sthāyin*, now take the form of the *vibhāvas*, etc., as being helpful to relish. For how can there be any relish in the inference of the mental state which is worldly, and hence ordinary? Thus, **Abhinavagupta** affirms that the relish of *Rasa*, which solely consists of a super worldly delight, is quite distinct from the normal means of knowledge like memory, inference, worldly self-consciousness, etc.

SUPERMUNDANE BLISS

After bringing out this distinction of *Rasa* from the *sthāyin*, **Abhinavagupta,** distinguishes further the nature of the relish or apprehension *Rasa*, on the one hand, from the ordinary means of knowledge like perception, and on the other hand, from the extraordinary perception of a *Yogin* in the process of spiritual perfection, and of a *Yogin* who has achieved perfection respectively. Thus he states that a spectator who has obtained refinement by the use of ordinary inference does not approach the young women, etc., in the drama with absolute detachment, but as the very essence of the relish which is proper to his becoming one (viz., indentification) with the situation, and as the very sprout of the relish of *Rasa* which obtains fulfillment on the strength of his sensibility of the nature of the harmony or attunement of his heart, even without climbing the usual stairs of inference, memory, etc. Again, that relish of *Rasa* does not arise from any other earlier means of proof, so that it would result in its memory or reminiscence. Nor is here found the operation of any other means of knowledge or proof like ordinary perception, but this' relish of *Rasa* is produced or effected on the strength of the assembly of the *vibhāvas* etc., which are other worldly. The relish is quite distinct from the apprehension of love, etc., produced by ordinary means of knowledge like perception, inference, scriptural testimony, analogy, etc., and also from the knowledge of others consciousness, born of perception ditched in the case of a *Yogin*, and further from the homogenous experience or apprehension in the case of a supreme or perfected *Yogin*, consisting solely of his inner joy of the self and devoid of any tinge of senseual attachment. The Distinction lies in the fact that these three kinds of knowledge are devoid of charm because of the rise of other obstacles like the acquisition of the object because of the absence of clarity or precision resulting from detachment (of the *Yogin*) and because of the helplessness (of the perfected *Yogin*) on account of his attachment to his own objects of contemplation, respectively. However, as Abhinavagupta has stated time and again, in the case of relish of *Rasa* there is no helplessness resulting from attachment to objects of sense because of their improbability of exclusively referring to the spectator's own self, there is no absence of precision resulting from detachment because of the absence of the objects referring necessarily and exclusively to another person on account of the spectator's inclusion in the situation, and no likelihood of other obstacles due to the spectator's inclusion in the situation, and no likelihood of other obstacles due to the spectator's attachment to his own subliminal impressions of love, etc., which are quite appropriate, and produced as a result of the generalization of the *Vibhāvas,* etc. Expatitating further on the alaukikatva or the supramundane nature of the *Vibhāvas* in the drama, Abhinavagupta emphasizes that they are neither the material cause of the production of *Rasa*, as Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa maintains, nor are they its indicative cause as Śańkuka holds, leading to its inference. If they were to be the material cause of *Rasa*, there would arise the contingency of *Rasa* arising even in the absence or disappearance of their cognition, as the effect can exist even after the destruction of the cause. This does not happen in the case of the relish etc., last. Nor are the *vibhāvas,* etc., the indicative cause of *Rasa* which would be equivalent to the means of proof, since *rasa* is not accomplished fact which is an object of knowledge or cognition. Then, it may be asked, what are indeed the *vibhāvas*, etc? Abhinavagupta replies that the operation of the *vibhāvas*, etc., is quite super worldly and conducing to relish. And if somebody asks, 'But has it any parallel anywhere?' Abhinavagupta asserts that this absence of a parallel or this uniqueness of the process itself speaks volumes for the superworldly nature of the *vibhāvas*, etc. And in fact the parallel does exist. When we prepare a drink like *pānaka,* is its taste seen in the individual components like molassess, black pepper, etc? Thus if *Rasa* is not object of cognition, should it be regarded as incomprehensible? Abhinavagupta accepts this position, since the nature of *Rasa* consists solely in its relishability and not in its comprehensibility, and so on. Then it may, be further asked, 'why does the word "prdocution' (niśpatti) occur in Bharata's aphorism on *Rasa*?' Abhinavagutpa's reply is that the so called "production' is not *Rasa*, but of its relish. And if *Rasa* is said to be figuratively 'Produced'

because of the production of its relish, on which its existence solely depends, Abhinavagupta does not find anything wrong about it. He further affirms that this relish of *Rasa* is not cognized by any means of proof, nor is it effected by any ordinary causes, though it is self evident and a matter of direct experience. The relish is undoubtedly of the nature of cognition, though it is quite distinct from all other cognitions, since the *vibhāvas*, etc., which are the means of its apprehension, are themselves totally different from the worldly means. Thus the substance of Bharata's aphorism on *Rasa* is this, that since the relish is produced because of the assembly assembly of the *vibhāvas* etc., *Rasa* is the extraworldly object, subject to that kind of peculiar relish.

This discussion of Abhinavagupta regarding the extra worldy, nature of the relish of *Rasa* and its inherent distinction from all other kinds of ordinary cognitions as well as from *Yogic* cognition, is perhaps the epitome of his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśastra*. It establishes the doctrine of *Rasa* on a sound philosophical basis, and emphasizes the unique nature of dramatic experience vis-a-vis all worldly experience.

Abhinavagupta briefly explains the nature of the generalization or universalation of dramatic experience like this' Our consciousness of the actor as actor is enveloped owing to the dramatic devices like a crown, head dress, etc. Even Our belief in him as Rāma does not prevail or rest, though it is induced by the persuasive power of poetic appeal, on account of the deep earlier impressions of our consciousness. Thus, the elements of space and time drop off both regarding Rāma and the actor, that is to say, we become quite oblivious of the former's being a mythological or historical figure of the heavy past and also of the actual time of the play. Even the *anubhāvas* of the actor like horripilation and so on, which are observed in daily life as causing the apprehension of love, convey the same emotion of love regardless of space and time, when they are observed in the actor. Even the spectator's consciousness participates in this emotion of love because of its subliminal impressions present in him. Hence it is that the emotion of love is not apprehened by him in a detached manner. Nor is it apprehended as belonging exclusively to himself, as in that case there is the probability of personal feelings like the desire for acquisition, attachment, etc. The apprehension of love does not take place even as referring exclusively to another person, since in that case there will arise feelings like sorrow, hatred, etc. Thus, the sentiment of love that is transformed into the aesthetic emotion of *śṛṅgāra* is generalized, and becomes the object of one and the same consciousness which is of an abiding or unified nature. Further, the generalization of the emotion takes place due to the *vibhāvas*, the *anubhāvas* and the *vyabhicārins*.

Degree Of Prominence Of Elements

To illustrate how the generalization of *vibhāvas*, etc. helps the delineation of a dramatic emotion, Abhinavagupta cites three examples. 'kelīkandalitasya'… illustrates how the prominence of the vibhāva and the subordination of the *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicārins* does this job. The principal thing in this verse is the charm which is constituted by the *vibhāva* or stimulant, viz., the young lady. In consequents on the strength of the words, *kelī* (sport), *vibharma* (graces) *bhaṅgura* (quivering), and narma (sportive), and the group of *vyabhicārins* on the strength of words like *bhaṅgī* (manner), *karma* (way), vikāra (instability), etc. Thus, in this instance of the dramatic emotion of *śṛṅgāra* which consists in the relish of the sentiment of *rati* or *love*, no doubt need be entertained regarding the absence of clarity. The charm of the emotion is mainly due to the prominence of the *vibhāva*.

As an instance of the prominence of the *anubhāvas*, Abhinavagupta cities a verse from (Bhaṭṭa) Indurāja, his own teacher, whom he incidentally describes as the best of the twice-born, viz., the moon who swells the ocean of literature and who swells the ocean of literature and who has been sanctified by the pure flow of literature. The verse, '*Yad viśramya…*describes the lovelorn condition of ladies because of Lord Kṛṣṇa. Here the group of *vyabhicārins,* mentioned by the words, *viśramya* (haltingly), bahuśaḥ (frequently) and *pratidinam* (daily), and the *vibhāva* mentioned by words like Kṛṣṇa and yūṇi (young) appear as subordinate. The assembly of *anubhāvas* shines prominently, such as paralysis characterized by halting, fickeness of glances, the fluctuation in the slimness of the figure, horripilation, paleness, etc. However, Abhinavagupta, emphasizes that the prominence of the *vyabhicārins*, results from that of their *vibhāvas*, and *anubhāvas*, and not because of the *vyabhicārins* themselves. As an instance of this, he quotes a stanza attributed to the great, poet, Kālidāsa, viz., *Attamāttam adhikāntam ukṣitum..* etc., Here Abhinavagupta remarks that the prominence of the *vyabhicārins* like doubt, alarm, fear, etc., which in fact lend charm to delicate young ladies like the heroine here, is due to the prominence of their *vibhāvas* like the lover, the occasion of the watersport, etc., and this prominence of the *vibhāvas* itself is reinforced by their extraordinary beauty. The group of *anubhāvas* like the throwing of water, suggested by words like *āttamāttam* (taken up again and again) is subservient to these *vibhāvas*. Abhinavagutpa further remarks that illustrations can easily be given where we have the prominence of two out of these three. However, he also emphasises the fact that the highest relish of *Rasa* is possible only when there is an equal prominence of all the three constituents, as is chiefly the case in the ten varieties of drama only. Hence, it is that Vāmana observes in his *Kāvyālamkārasūtra* (I.3), 'Of all compositions, the best is drama with its ten varieties. It is full of varied beauty like a scroll of pictures because of its comprehensivesness.' This is so because a compositon or sustained narrative derives its from on account of the consideration of the propriety of language, costume, actions etc. This happens even in a short piece or a stray verse, as it depends on the sustained composition. Abhinavagupta is illustrating here how even poetry, which may not contain any element of drama, enables the reader to relish the emotion. In such compositions, he asserts, the appreciative readers themselves imagine the suitable context as to what happens before and after, by saying, 'On this occasion this kind of speaker is speaking this,' and so on. Thus, in the case of such readers who are quite sensitive by virtue of their study of poetry and previous merit, the poetic content or theme flashes before them very distinctly just like the actual visualization, though the *vibhāvas*, etc., are depicted in a limited manner. Hence, it is that even poetry, without any element of drama in it, leads to pleasure and wisdom in their case. But in their case drama produces extreme clarity of mind and vision in accordance with the saying, 'The moon's rays, fallen over a clean objects shine all the more.' In the case of those who are not that sensitive, the self-same drama produces the necessary clarity or purity, since therein the songs, the musical instruments, the courtesans, etc., that are apprehended, are the instruments or parts of drama, and hence do not become the cause of personal attachment. Here Abhinavagupta's comments on the advantage that drama possesses over pure poetry are undoubtedly illuminating. It is only the very appreciative readers, endowed with maturity and considerable aesthetic susceptivity that can visualize the whole emotional set-up or situation depicted in a poem with the obvious limitations of the poem with the obvious

limitations of the poet. As opposed to this, readers less equipped with these gifts may not able to relish the poetic emotion fully. However, drama acts equally effectively on both the types of spectators, sensitive and otherwise. For sensitive spectators it acts as a means producing the highest purification or cleaning of their minds, while for spectators lacking this sensitivity it produces the necessary purification of mind, with the help of the usual theatrical accessories like song, instruments, music, women, etc.

Image And Reality

Abhinavagupta concludes his exhaustive gloss on the *Rasasūtra* of *Bharata* with a few remarks on the nature of the spectator's apprehension of the actor. The actor, is he postulates, the object of the deep contemplation of the spectator just like an image of a god like Vāsudeva in the case of his contemplators. In the case of the god's image the devotees or contemplators do not have the apprehension that it is the image itself pasted with red lead etc., to be mediated upon as Lord Vāsudeva, but they apprehend it as god Vāsudeva himself, who becomes the object of a very clear conception through the means of image, who is a peculiar deity and confers the reward upon the meditators. In other words, they do not make any virtual distinction between the image and the deity. In a similar manner, the dramatic content, which is the object of a very clear apprehension arising from the actor's process of acting and which is not touched by specific consideration like space time, etc., imparts instruction to the spectators in an emphatic manner, as 'this is the reward' of the contemplation . In the case of this instruction there does not arise a sublating or counteracting factor regarding other dramatic conventions or the necessary mental state. The instruction that results is comprehensive and complete. Thus, the spectator's apprehension is of nature of 'Rāma' and not' This (actor) is Rāma' Abhinavagupta also promises to make this point more clear subsequently.

Biography Of Abhinavagupta

He was the son of Narasimhagupta, alias Cukhula, was born in Kashmir during the second half of the 10^{th} cent from a illustrious brahmin family. He is one of the chief representatives of the religious speculation, thought and rhetoric the mediaeval India. His most important work in these fields are: 1. 1.*Tantrāloka* a vast Encyclopaedia written in verses dealing with the religious concepts and the rites of the aiva Schools.

2. *Lvarapratyabhijñavivṛtivimarini,* a commentry to the Ṭīkā Uatpalācārya on his Kārikā, *Abhinava-bhāratī*, *Dhvanyāloka locana*. His chief gurus were ambhunātha in Tāntrism, Lakşmaṇagupta in philosophy and Bhaṭṭendurāja in Rhetoric.

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Footnotes:-

1. *Transformation of Nature in Art,* chap, I, *The Theory of Art in Asia,'* p. 46, Dover, 1956.

2. *Citrasūtraṁ na jānāti yastu samyag narādhip. Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṅa III 2.2. Pratimālakṣaṇaṁ vettum na akyam tena karhicitta ibid III 2. Vinā tu Nṛpyatta āstreṇa citra sūtram sudurvidam* Ibid. III. 2.5 *Atodyena vinā nṛtyaṁ vidyate na kaṫhaṁcana II na gītena vīnā àkyam vidyate na kathaṁcana II na gītena vinā àkyam jñātu mā tādyemapyut II Gīta āstra vidhānayñaḥ Sarvaetti yathāvidhi. Ibid.* III. 2.7

3. Rasabhāvatadāsatatdamaāntyādiraktamaḥ I Dhvanerātmārgibhāvena bhāsa mano vyavasthitaḥi Cf. *Dhvanyāloka* II.3.

4. *Apāre kāvyasaṁsāre kavirekaḥ Prajāpatiḥ* I *yathasmai rocate vivaṁ tathedaṁ parivartate* II Cf. ibid, III.

5. *Vibhāyati yasmācca nānārtāhi Ayogataḥ I ākhāṅgopāṅga samyuktast asmāda bhinayaḥ smṛtaḥ (and) mukhajebhinaye vidmā nānābhāvarasā àye I kānta bhyānakā hāsyā karuṇā cādbhutā tathā I Raudrī vīrā ca vibhastā vijñeyā rasāṣṭyaḥ II Cf. Nāṭyaāstra,* VIII. *7., ibid* VIII *16 ab.,* VIII *38.* Also cf. VIII. 39, 43, 84 etc.

6. *Ibid*, XXIX. 1-15.

7. *An Exaclted Theory of ornament in Aesthetics in the Modern world*, Ed. Harold Osborne, Thames and Hudson, London 1968 pp. 223-4.

ABHINAYA

1. **Acting**: A mode of conveyance of theatrical pleasure to the spectator. It stands for 'Histrionic art' in Sanskrit. The term *Abhinaya* is constituted of the prefix *abhi,* meaning representing (carrying) a play to (toward) the spectators. That representation is called the imitation or visualization of the conditions, physical and mental, of the characters in a drama. The aesthetic significance of imitation and the object of plays, namely, the evoking of *Rasa* (sentiment) in the spectators are always taken into consideration. So *Abhinaya* has been defined as movements for suggesting sentiment (*Rasa*) and state (*Bhāva*). Hence, it can be said that the word *Abhinaya* is the means for disclosing to the spectators the beauty or manifold pleasureable aspects of play which can not be adequately appreciated by simply reading its text. To sum up, *Abhinaya* is the suggestive imitation of the various moods and emotional states of characters in play. (Ed. Ps.)

2. The Nāṭya āstra of Bharata rules out the real chariot running through the stage. Besides, in the
Days of *Kalidāsa* they did not use painted scenes in dramatics. Therefore, the dramatist wrote: 'The king performs the act of riding the chariot'. That means, the actor who will perform Dushyanta, will have to show by gesture the riding of an imaginary chariot and his driver shall have to emulate the driving act.

The old Sanskrit dramas include this type of performances. The BNŚ of Bharata mentions two types of acting, one, *Lokadharmī* (realistic) and two, *Nāṭyadharmī* (conventional), pertaining to the Stage and the dramatic advantage of both.

There are seven kinds of Abhinayas, in a drama as the BNŚ Propounded (XXII.61). They are direct (*Pratyakṣa*), indirect (*Parokṣa*), three kinds belong to the time, present, Past, and future, (*Kālakṛāstrayaḥ*) the sixth is in 'one's self,'(Atmastha) and seventh is 'in the other' (*Parāstha*). The king or object which brings about the experience of a self is known as Amastha, (Ibid, 93). Where there is the description of a thing other than the self, that is called Parāstha (Ibid,94). The speech which belongs to one's intellect and heart is the acceptable as Atmastha (Ibid, XXV.88cd) Example: Laughing on oneself is Atmastha and laughing on others is Parāstha. (Ibid, VI, page313.)

There are four types of dramatic representations (*Abhinaya*) which can be enumerated in the Direct or *Pratyakṣa* category of the seven kinds.

1. That which uses the body of the actor is Aṅgika, 2. that where actor uses his speech on the stage is *Vācika* acting or dramatic representation; 3. the costumes which are used by an actor to differentiate himself from other actors or vice-versa is called *Ahārya*, 4. and what
where involuntary sentiments are shown on the stage is *Sāttvika* . (*Aṅgika BNŚ Ch. VIII, Vācika Ibid,* Ch. XV, Ahārya, Ibid XIII and *Sāttvika* ibid, XXV.)

Aṅgika abhinaya is the art of physical expression. The entire human body has been analyzed in the *BNŚ* as *Aṅgas* (major limbs), *Pratyaṅgas (*minor limbs), while later poeticians added another class of *Upāṅgas* (subsidiary limbs) which turned into the divisions of face and those of other limbs of the body. Exercises from head to foot are prescribed for each limb, based on kinetic principles. An actor is expected to master these individual exercised and proceeds to practise the combination of movements of various limbs. There exercised proceeds to practise the combination of movements of various limbs. These exercised are meaningfully utilised to convey ideas and feeling. It is the essence of *Aṅgika Abhinaya*. It is two types: *Padārtha* and *Vākyārtha Abhinayas. Padārtha abhinaya* means the expression of word to word meaning, while *Vākyārtha* is a communication of the general idea of a sentence or even of the mood. For actual practice in the drama how to execute these two *Aṅgika abhinayas* the process id divided into three: *Śākhā*, *Aṅkura* and *Nṛtta.*

Śākhā: It indicates the availability of an entire system of gesticulation (Full branch of gesticulation) through the hands which has been handed down by the generatiuon of actor-artistes. These hand gestures are of two kinds: 1.Group of *Abhinaya Hastas* 2. *Set of Nṛtta Hastas* (Limbs for mime). Representational limbs are again subdivided into Asaṁyuta, single hand and ńńńSaṁyuta, combined hand gestures. The *Abhinaya Hastas* (representational limbs) are used to bring out the *Padārtha-abhinaya* or words by word meaning. This practical application of the given set of *Abhinaya Hastas* is called sprouting of the branch of acting or Aṅkura. The second group of gestures is called the *Nṛtta hastas* which are used in the mime part (*Nṛtta*) of the drama (*Nāṭya*). These may be used in the art of *Vākyārtha*. This division is done by the commentator of the *BNŚ* Abhinavagupta. But in the third stage, that is *Nṛtta* in the *Abhinaya-darpaṇa* Nandīkeśvara, *Abhinaya-hastas* are described as the art of hand-gestures in the expression of *Aṅgika Abhinaya.* Nandīkeśvara has defined *Nṛtya* as representational and *Nṛtta* as non-reprsentational. Our predecessor scholars have analyzed the body of an actor into different divisions and sub-divisions like Aṅga (such as head, hands, chest sides, flanks, waist, feet and neck) and *Pratyaṅgas* (Shoulder-blades, arms, back, belly, shanks, elbows and knees), and *Upāṅgas* (eyes, tongue, chin, face etc). Our authors were fully aware of when, how and where to use these physical parts in the dramatic performance. Further, the list of *Mudrās* (hand-gestures) Aṅghāras (expressions through arms), *cārī* (expressions through feet) and *Karaṇas* (expressions through the whole body) They have discussed all possible expressions and transformations in minute details. Add to that there are nine *Bhāvas* or *sthāyī Abhinayas* (mental state of a man). These *sthāyī-bhāvas* are sub divided into *vibhāva* (according to casuality) and *Anubhāva* (according to physical transformation or change). The transitory mental states have been classified into 33 sub-divisions called different *Sañcārī bhāvas* belong to different *Sthāyī bhāvas* accordingly. Furthermore (eight) *sāttvika bhāvas* are added and the whole drama is placed

before the audience to create the aesthetic effect which is the resultant climax of the drama, that is *Rasa.* In day to day life we experience all or some of these.

Authors in our country have treated the dramas visual and audio Epics. Since there is no record of using the scenes or stage-crafts in the past, it is quite obvious that the dramatists in the ancient times emphasised the audio visual effect according to the realistic and conventional norms and canons that can be potrayed ad far as possible on a plateform or venue. Modern mime also follows the realistic and conventional modes and the mimist creates the effect of his inner mind, state of environment, symbolising, imaginary objects and events and situation. Excepting verbal expression, modern mime uses all the other three aspects physical, *svastika* costumes and gadgets. But in modern times, it is seen that the people at large hardly understand the meaning of the intricate gestures and their symbols in classical dances and drama. Therefore, mime has been developed as an exclusive art medium, adopting day to day events in our life as its subjects. The Indian mime is therefore, a mixture of both the ancient and modern concepts. If we look at modern Indian Mime is therefore, a mixture of both the ancient and modern concepts. If we look at modern Indian Mime from this angle, we will know that it is also a native art-form. The acstasy of Indian mime in its true sense will be revealed to us only then.

AUTHOR: GOSWAMI NIRANJANA, **Source**: *SNA* No.59, New Delhi, April-June 1991.

Abbreviations: 1) *BNŚ: Bharata-Nāṭya Śāstra*
2) *SNA: Sangīta Nāṭaka Academy*

1. **Abhinaya in Nṛtya**: An integral part of classical dance in India is *abhinaya*. It does not recognise barriers of language or region, not even of styles, call it Bharatnāṭyam, *Kathak* or *Odissī.* It is the universal language of India, even if its currency be limited to the elite. In this respect, it is the counterpart of Sanskrit. *Abhinaya literally means 'to bring before the eyes, as it face to face with the spectator'.* This is where the eyes, the face and the hands are used not freely but in a stylised manner that is calculated to evoke in the spectator the same feeling that attended upon the creation of the poem that is being represented. In other words, the purpose of *abhinaya* is to recreate the poem or lyric in all its intensity and subtlety. This concept is underlined in the famous dictum of Bharata on *bhāva*. Thus let it be recognised that *abhinaya* takes its origin in poetry.

Now, *bhāva* may be interpreted as 'causing something to be' (from root bhū), the sense in which all the aids in *Abhinaya* (sets, costume) are employed so as to create the impression of something other than what is seen. But the finer sense of the word implies 'affecting the viwer' the way the artist wants for his purpose. This aesthetic transmission, if one may call it so, is what Abhinavagupta seems to imply when he cites the analogy of the musk and the clothes where communication (of fragrance) occurs even without contact, through the medium of air. In this sense, *bhāva* pervades the mind of the spectator, as it emanates from the poet *via* the dancer's *abhinaya*.

A powerful device which aids the dancer in this effort is what is known as *sādhāraṇikaraṇa*. This can be interpreted as universalisation through depersonalization. It is this removal of the elements of time, space and personal indentity that turns it all into an experience that viewers can share, *each according to his own light.* (This, by the way, accounts for the differing levels of aesthetic relish in audience.)

Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa takes place on the stage all the time. Visually, it is the costume that depersonalizes an actor, to turn him into the character he portrays; the sets transform the stage into a garden or palace. What we are concerned with here is the depersonalization by which the dancer turns herself into a *nāyikā* in order that emotional content of the lyrical statement emerges aesthetically as it is transmitted through *abhinaya*. Even though the emotion is intense and personal, it is not personalised; there is seldom a name mentioned, or if mentioned at all, it is universal, like *Kṛṣṇa*. The outcome of all this is that anybody can share the experience; it is the *rasa* that calls for immediate cognition.

Besides, it is this aspect of universalisation that keeps a *rasa* from descending into emotional outburst, even in the dancer. The moment she is swayed by the emotion which she seeks to represent, stylistically, *rasa* slips away. Her purpose is or, should be at all times to recreate before the audience a vibrant form of the lyrical poetry.

This is where, it seems to me, dance stands apart from drama; whereas an actor's aim is to step into the role he seeks to play, the dancer does not. For, her forte is the ability to relate emotions of subtlest shades, impersonally.

While the drama stage employs *sādhāraṇikaraṇa* in relation to *āhārya*, *vāchika* and *āṅgika* it is in the field of *sāttvika abhinaya* that the dance-stage applies *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (though *āṅgika* would also be involved, to a small extent). Thus it is that dancer is able to render *abhinaya* while seated (without body movement) and without any props like costumes or make up. She is, in a sense, a lyrical narrator employing the face and hands to communicate, in the language of *abhinaya.*

If the validity of this trend of thought is recognised, it is easy to perceive what abhinaya is not, viz. monoacting, which occurs when a dancer acts out different roles, switching places on the stage. When a dancer employs gestures and poses to denote the numerous characters on the stage (as in a coronation scene) or acts out the role of the many princes who came.

AUTHOR: RAGHUNATHAN SUDHA, *SNA Journal* No. 75, New Delhi, April-June **Source:** Abhinaya Darpana, *Mirror of Gestures*, a book on the histrionic art (*Abhinaya)* by Nandīkeśvara.

ABHINAYA AHARYA

(Dressing and make up)

In dramatic productions the appearance of characters and the stage setting are likely to attract a spectator's attention first. Among the four kinds *abhinaya* the *āhārya nepathyaja* may, therefore, be considered at the beginning. This includes make-up, costumes, jewelry, garlands or flowers, and such accessories as go with a personality, and create the direct visual impact of character-Impersonation. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* provides minute and elaborate instructions in the regard. They are aimed at producing a realistic impression, and yet they are not divorced from symbolic and suggestive presentation.

The costumes and dresses of the dramatic characters are intended particularly to be realistic in keeping with the established custom. In case of characters drawn from different levels of society the costume and appearance are supposed to be absolutely consistent with their social status, the locality and region of their origin residence, their profession and religion or religious creed. The appearance of a *parivrājaka* or an ascetic with matted hair piled on the head, flowing beard, and a garment of reddish brown (*kāṣāya*) colour, is an illustrative case. The shaved heads of sanyāsins, jain and Buddhist monks, is another illustration. It is expected, therefore, that the facial and body make-up of a dramatic character would be consistent with the role he is supposed to play.

However, there is a touch of symbolism in the instructions which Bharata gives. For example, the make-up of different

characters[1] is done by using different colours. Gods or celestial characters are painted yellowish red (gaura), Samudra, Himavat and Gańgā have a white make-up; Nara, Nārāyaṇa and Vāsuki have blue; and demons of all kinds are shown in dark colour. Similarly, kings and happy mortals are shown to have yellowish red complexion; crooked and low caste characters are dark; Brahmins and kşatriyas are *gaura*; while vaiśyas and śūdras have a bluish complexion. Such distinctive the characters and suggest the world to which they belong and their social status. The ideas may have been derived from some conventions or tradition generally established among the people.

Suitable beards[2] have to be provided for male characters as part of their make-up. Generally celestial characters, royal personages, king's officers etc. will appear with clean faces and shavan cheeks; and in case beard is to be used, it will have to be properly trimmed with razor and a pair of scissors. The hair used for sticking a beard may be coloured to suggest a particular mental condition, like blue hair for distressed persons, those in calamity or in penance.

Such suggestive symbolism is seen in the use of garments and ornaments also.[3] For example, white garments are to be used for ritual and auspicious worship, in religious observances and in marriage ceremony. Divine and semi-divine characters will use a
picturesque and multi-coloured costume.

Brahmins, royal priest, ministers and royal officers, as
well as the men of the three castes will generally wear clean and white garments. Ascetics will have a dress of barks and skins, wandering ascetics' reddish brown garments. Mad or intoxicated persons, travelers and men in calamity will be shown in soiled (*malina*) garments. Kings will generally use picturesque and many coloured costume; in the context of war, fight etc. they will wear an armour and carry appropriate weapons.

Bharata's instruction in regard to the use of ornaments, hair-styles are on similar lines, partly realistic, partly symbolic and suggestive. Celestial men and women will have hair piled on head (*śikhaṇḍaka*) and use pearls. Consorts of gods will use green garments and the same coloured jewelry; Yakşa women and apsaras will use jewels; gandharva women will use reddish garments, rubies, and carry a lute. *Rākşasis* will have black garments, white teeth and blue gems. *Muni kanyā* will appear with hair in a single plait (*ekaveṇī*), no jewels, and dress appropriate for forest-dwelling. The hair-style for the Vidūşaka will be that the hair will be arranged on the head like crow's feet (*kākapada*) or he and a ceţa may have three tufts of hair on the head (*triśikhā*) or a shavan head.[4]

Bharata's mention of *pratiśira* or *Pratiśīrşaka* refers, on the one hand, to crowns and head-dresses and, on the other hand, to masks. The masks were prepared with ash or chaff, possibly also soft clay, using an earthen jar as a foundation. Cloth was fixed on the shape with *bliva* pulp and oil. When dried up in sun holes for eyes, nose, mouth and ears were made with a sharp instrument; facial features were properly formed, and the whole thing was beautifully painted. The masks were worn with crown or head-dress. It may be presumed that the masks were used for symbolic representation, to represent certain gods or demons, like the ten-headed *Rāvaṇa*, and also animals and birds. Thus, the deer and the lion cub in the *Śākuntala* could be presented by a small boy wearing an appropriate mask and acting with correct gestures and movements. In other cases, however, animals and birds would be represented by the dance technique, the dancer using *āńgika abhinaya* mode, symbolic gestures and movements to convey the suggestive impression. The use of crowns and head-dresses is natural. Bharata recommends a full crown for the king, and half crown for the prince and other dignitaries.

Bharata's idea of *nepathya* includes four things:[6] *puşţa* or model work; *alaṁkāra* or decoration; *aṅgaracanā* or painting of the limbs and make-up; and *sajjīva* or *sañjīva,* meaning use of living things like animals and birds in the course of dramatic production. The *puşţa* or model work is effected in three ways: by joining together leaves or barks of trees, pieces of bamboo, skins or cloth; this is called *sandhima.* A property may be contrived or operated by some mechanical device, like pulling a string; this is called *vyājima*. A model may be prepared by wrapping, that is, by overlain layers of wax or lac; this is called *veşţita*. Obviously, the models are intended as stage property during the performance of a play. They will include several different things, like mansions, houses, temples terraces, vehicles like chariot and aerial car, various kinds of weapons and armour, and immovable objects like a pleasure-hill; and also animals and birds. In fashioning such stage property light material only was used. The objective is to combine realism with the ease and convenience of stage business. Let us presume that some such stage property, which could be easily installed or carried personally by the actor, was used in play production whenever possible.

Yet the limitations of the ancient stage are obvious, as we have seen. The decorations on the walls, ceiling and of pillars connected with the stage were fixed, and could not be related to the scene of action of a particular play in production, Stage property and props could be used only on a limited scale, and not for every performance. There was no drop curtain; and apart from the paţa which covered the greenroom doors and the *yavanikā* or *tirasakariṇī* used as a temporary screen, there were no curtains to aid the presentation of dramatic action or to convey the impression of an appropriate scenic background for it. These effects had to left, therefore, to the imagination of the audience, or conveyed through the spoken word in the script. One more alternative was to produce these effects by established conventions and mimetic acting. And this is the sphere mainly of *āńgika abhinaya*.

If the 'forest of Arden', which is the scene of action in Shakespeare's *As You Like It,* was shown, as authorities tell us, by putting a twig or sappling in a corner of the stage, leaving the rest to the imagination of the audience, in the sixteenth century English theatre, there is no reason to question or doubt that the ancient and early Sanskrit theatre produced the scenic effects and represented certain happenings and actions with the help of the poetic descriptions given by the playwrights and by mimetic acting done by the actors. Incidentally, such a technique explains why the Sanskrit drama (like Shakespearean plays) is full of verses and passages which describe places, scenery, timings of day or night, seasons and atmosphere. What was not possible to be visually conveyed was naturally carried to the audience by the spoken word in the dramatic dialogue.

ABHINAYA ANGIKA

(Using different limbs of the body or different symbolical gestures)

The *āńgika abhinaya* has a very wide range. In a total dramatic performance an actor will have to use his whole body. He will be required to present the content of the drama by the *abhinaya* of the major limbs like head, chest, waist, sides hands, and feet, and the major limbs like eyes, eyebrows, lower lip, cheeks and chin. Bharata's Nāţyaśāstra provides elaborate precepts in this regard, and chapters 8 to 12 are taken up by the description of *āńgika abhinaya.* A student of *Bharata Nāţyam*, the dance form, has to master this portion thoroughly. It will be seen that the *āńgika*

abhinaya in both the art forms, nāṭya and *nṛtya,* is the same, with this difference that *nāṭya* may not make use of several aspects of the *āṅgika* mode as it has in addition the written script to carry the content of the drama to the audience, which the *nṛtya* form does not have. It is this sphere that drama and dance come close together in the ancient tradition.

The *āṅgika abhinaya* comprises the following: 13 different movements of the head; 36 glances; contraction or flaring of nostrils and cheeks and different movements of the lower lip drawing in, pouting, quivering or biting; drooping of the chin, touching it with tongue, its agitation in gnashing of teeth, hand gestures which include 24positions of a single hand, 13 of joined hands, and 64 dance gestures; 5 movements each of the chest, sides and legs; the different poses of postures (technically called *sthāna*). It may not be difficult to understand that the hand poses movements of the leg and foot are not singly used in dramatic performance but are combined with movements of other limbs and are co-ordinated with other aspects of *āṅgika* and *vācika abhinaya.* Similarly, there are special foot movements, technically *cārī* and *maṇḍala*, which have a particular relevance and use in representing dramatic action.[7]

The natural and realistic aspects of the *āṅgika abhinaya* are easy to imagine and understand. The suggestive or symbolic employment of *āṅgika abhinaya* which leads to dramatic conventions and mime will, however, need an explanation. In an attempt to background of some dramatic event or action, for instance, stationary objects like the sky, time of the day or night, clouds, forest region, expanse of water, directions etc., may be indicated by raised hands in the *patākā* and *svastika* gestures, head raised up and eyes looking upwards; appropriate movements of eyes and glances will naturally accompany this *abhinaya*. With similar gestures of hand and head but with eyes looking down one may indicate objects resting on the ground. Sunrise or sunset may be indicated by appropriate gestures of hand, by eye-movement and the acting mode appropriate to wonder; mid day sun by up-turned and half closed eyes.[8] This is, indeed a representation which involves the use of several limbs of the body and comes in the category which Bharata describes as *citrābhinaya*.

The sensation of fire or smoke may be represented by withdrawing the body and covering oneself with cloth, as the feeling of cold may be shown by contraction of limbs and shivering.

To indicate certain actions and movements Bharata recommends the technique of mime and dance movements of hands and feet. For example, picking flowers from a creeper in a garden can be shown by an appropriate stance (*sthāna*), foot movement (*gati*) and action of the hand and fingers.[9]

Climbing a staircase to reach terrace can be similarly acted by the raised movement of each leg one after the other and keeping the eyes turned upwards. Duṣyanta's pursuit of the deer in his chariot will be shown similarly by mimetic acting, varying the steps, moving round or across the stage, and gesticulating with hands and the body the movement of chariot riding. Urvaśi coming down from heaven by the aerial path to meet Purūravas is a somewhat complex action; but it is to be shown by the actor starting from the green room door and moving forward with slow rhythmic steps, eyes turned down, arms held a little apart from the body, and the palms held downwards and in horizontal position, gesticulating the downward flying movement. Long distance is to be indicated by quick and hurried steps, accompanied by hard breathing and appropriate facial expression of fatigue. It appears that such technique was particularly used in playing scences of fight and combat and in rendering their descriptive report. For example, Bhāsa describes, in the interlude to his *Ūrubhaṅga*, the mace fight between Bhīma and Duryodhana. It is reported by three soliders who are on the battlefield witness the fight. The fighters are said to move in a circle (*cārī*), dwarf the body (*vāmanīkṛta tanu*), go down in an attack and so on. The terms used in the text of the drama are related to the dance technique of *āṅgika abhinaya,* and suggest that the spectacle, if presented, will be shown or acted with controlled and graceful movements, as otherwise a bloody fight cannot be realistically shown on a theatre stage. The same technique must naturally have been used to represent the fight between **Lava** and **Candraketu** in Bhavabhūti's *Uttara rāma carita* before Rāma intervened and stopped it. The finest and unmistakable example of the use of dance and mimetic technique is to be found, perhaps, in Kālidāsa's *Vikramorvaśīya*, act IV, the scene of Purūrava's search for the vanished Urvaśī. Here Kālidāsa's script provides the necessary stage directions for the dance steps of Purūravas and for the songs and music that accompany his movements. The various objects, like swan for instance, whom Prurūravas meets are not to be shown by cut scenery or painted models; they are to be represented by dancers who will dance the particular swan or peacock dance; and Purūravas will approach them with dance steps to put his query. This lengthy monologue of Purūravas which fills nearly two thirds of this act is, thus, to be played as a *ballet* scene, accompanied by song, music and dance movement. A part of this special mode of *āṅgika abhinaya* is natural and realistic; but the other part is based on symbolic and suggestive technique of dance and mime.

Absence of scenic devices to indicate or suggest the place of the dramatic action on the stage necessitates another kind of technique which Bharata describes by zonal arrangement of the stage, known technically as *kakṣyā vidhāna.*[10] The Sanskrit drama could hardly use the principle of 'unity of place' for the action of an act; and the principle of 'unity of time' was used only in a general way so as to ensure that the action in an act would normally cover a single day. Students of Sanskrit drama are aware that the dramatic action within an act happens sometimes at different places, adjacent or near each other, or sometimes far removed from each other. It will not be surprising if a scene is laid the heavenly regions or the top of a mountain, and is immediately followed by another scene within the same act which takes place on the earth. Even when such sharp difference in localities is absent, an act of Sanskrit drama may show simultaneous scenes played at different localities or at different parts of the locale. Such scenes may develop independently and the dramatic action may or may not connect them before an act closes.

For playing such scenes Bharata mentions the technique of *Kakṣyā,* according to which a producer-director will divide the stage into different portions, and use them strictly and carefully to enact the different scenes. This is *kakṣyā* or zonal division. One may presume that the back and front stage, as well as the *mattavāraṇi* area on either side of the stage, would thus be earmarked for a particular play production, and used to indicate different locales. Further, if the *raṅgaśīrṣa* or the back-stage area could be slightly more raised than the front-stage area in a vikṛṣṭa or oblong theatre, as *Abhinava* interprets the text, it is equally possible to presume different *levels* on the Sanskrit, stage, which could be used to play different scenes. With such zonal arrangement and possibly levels dramatic action could be performed by using familiar conventions and mimetic acting.

For example, Bharata suggests that the characters who have entered the stage first are to be regarded as being *inside;*

those who enter afterwards will be *outside* people; they are to use one particular door for making their appearance on the stage and the stage and the same door for exit when they finish their dramatic business and depart. In this one of the two doors will be marked for the entrance and exit of inside characters and another for the outside characters.

A change of scene or movement from one place to another is indicated by the simple device of *parikramaṇa,* a character or characters walking round the stage in a circular or elliptical movement with measured steps. The distance involved in such a change of place, whether near, at a reasonable distance or far away, is to be indicated by the number of *parikramaṇas* and the pace of the steps taken. This is a dramatic convention which the classical dramatists continuously and consistently use in their dramatic scripts in the form of a stage direction. This *abhinaya* technique will apply not only for indicating change between two places on the same level, but it may also be used when the change is from one place to another which is on a different level, like the story or terrace, or earth and heaven; only additional *āṅgika abhinaya* will have to be combined with it to suggest the movement or journey. The stage zones or the imaginatively determined stage areas are particularly useful for playing scenes in which there is simultaneous action at two adjacent or different places, like, for example, inside and outside the houses as in the *Mudrārākṣasa,* or in a garden on the ground floor and balcony of the upper floor as in the *Mṛcchakaṭika.* The *Aśoka-dohada* scene in the third act of the *Mālavikāgnimitra,* which developes into a tri-focal scene, can be played by placing *Mālavikā* and *Bakulāvalikā* in the center of the stage where the *Aśoka* is supposed to stand, the king and the *Vidūṣaka* in one of the *mattavāraṇīs,* and *Irāvatī* and her maid in the other. The actors will perform within the marked areas which will represent different parts or locales. Since the green-room doors leading to the stage are situated in the back wall, the movement for entrance and exit will naturally be from the back to the front and *vice versa.* A modification or local variation is always possible if, for example, there were additional two side doors for the stage, as we have seen. Normally the characters would enter the stage by holding the cloth curtain (*paṭa*) on the green-room door back; to indicate emergency or mental turmoil the convention was to *toss* the curtain (*apaṭīkṣepa*) and enter. In the absence of a drop curtain the close of an act is indicated by all the characters leaving the stage and going into the green room.[11] This is another convention which is corroborated by the dramatic scripts and is valid in practice.

AUTHOR: GUPTA RAJESH; Source: *Psychological Studies in Rasa,* Allahabad, 1950.

Footnotes:

1. BNŚ. XXI. 95-113.
2. BNŚ. XXI. 114-120.
3. Ibid. XXI. 55-90; 121-138.
4. Ibid. XXI. 155. The first two may refer to peculiar head-dress also; see *Vidūṣaka.*
5. Ibid. XXI. 139-156; 188-195; 210-211.
6. Ibid. XXI. 5-53; 161-164. *Cf.* also, XI.94-95; XXV. 68 -70.
7. Ibid. VIII. 13-14;18-39;41-55, 57;96-100, 102, 104; 105ff.; 118ff.; 130-135; 136-140; 141-146; 170-176; IX. 18-280; X.3-6, 23, 30, 34, 52-70; 90-94; XII. 12-20, 43ff. 91-103, 137-142; 167-175; etc.
8. Ibid. XXV. 1-10.
9. For *sthānas,* see NS.X.51ff., gatis, XII. See *Bharata Nāṭya-Mañjari,* of the author: Introduction p. xcvi, and the photographic pictures.
10. For this and the following see NS.XIII19. See also *Bharata-Nāṭya-Mañjarī,* Introduction, p.xcvii ff.

Kakṣyā Vibhāgo nirdeśyo Raṅgapīṭha-parikrat|
Pari Krameṇa raṅgasya hyanyā kakṣyā bhavediha||
Kakṣyā Vibhāge jñeyāni gṛhāṇi ca|
Udyānārāmasaritastvāśramā Aṭavī tathā ||
Pṛthivī Sāgarāścaiva trailokyaṁ Sacarācaraṃ |
ṅagare vā vane vāpi varṣe vā parvate' pi
Yatra vārtā pravarteta tatra Kakṣyāṁ prayojayet
11. Raṅgaṅi tu ye praviṣṭāh sarveṣāṁ bhavati tatra ṅiṣkāmaḥ |
Bījārdhayuktiyuktaṁ Kṛtva yatartharasaṃ ||

ABHINAYA OR ACTING THROUGH SPEECH (VĀCIKA)

Vācika abhinaya[1] is used for delivering dramatic speeches. These are not to be merely learnt by heart and recited. An actor has to use proper intonation, *kāku* or voice-modulation, rise and fall of voice-pitch, fast or slow tempo, broken words etc. These are the devices which are used not only to carry the meaning of the words but also to register the mood and emotion behind the words. This has to be done in all drama productions, and the director is expected to train the actors in speech delivery by continuous rehearsals. This is the principal mode for conveying the content of the drama to the audience; and since the speeches have to be a correct reflection of different mental states, to which dramatists often invite attention by stage directions intended for the actor, one would naturally expect that this aspect of *abhinaya* is *lokadharmī* or realistic.

But there are some special kinds of speeches in a drama which have to be delivered with a special technique. For example, the *svagata* or *ātmagata* speeches and *kaṇe.* The former is what a character says to himself and is not meant to be heard by any other dramatic character; it is a revelation of a character's inner thoughts and feelings; it is a *nāṭyadharmī* aspect, but it is used in all older plays. *Karṇe* are words whispered in the listener's ear by a character; this is done to share a confidence with another character or to avoid an unnecessary repetition. While theses devices are found in all old plays of all countries, the peculiarity of Sanskrit drama is seen in *ākāśabhāṣita* and in *janātika* and *apavāritaka* speeches. The *ākāśabhāṣita* is a dramatic conversation conducted by a character present on the stage with another character who does not appear on the stage but is supposed to be present somewhere 'in the airy space'. The character on the stage starts a conversation asking questions, and the answers he is supposed to receive from the absent character are reproduced by him, prefaced by kim *bravīṣi,* 'what do you say'? This is purely a dramatic mode, and must have been used to save the needless appearance of a character for a small part of few words, and to supply the required connecting link between dramatic happenings. Such *ākāśabhāṣita* has to be conducted according to the fixed convention and with enough realism to make it convincing. In the *bhāṇa* type of drama, however, which is usually a one-act and played entirely by one actor, the *ākāśabhāṣita* acquires a special importance. It is here a total verbal expression of acts, incidents, happenings, thoughts and feelings of all the characters involved in the dramatic story, and which are supposed to be 'off the stage'. Along with the usual interrogation and gestures of receiving replies and statements the *ākāśabhāṣita* in a *bhāṇa* has, therefore, to be accompanied by mimetic acting and appropriate aspects of *āṅgika abhinaya* demanded by the dramatic context. The actor in the *bhāṇa* has to 'act' out the monologue in order to convey the visual impression of all that is supposed to be happening off the stage; otherwise the *bhāṇa* will be only a long lecture delivered with make-up and costume, and not a drama.

Janātika is an aside, a private conversation between two characters from which all other characters present on the stage are excluded. The *apavāritaka* is a confidential revelation which a character shares with the audience; it is a secret which is guarded from all dramatic characters for the time being; and is a device used to create suspense. Both represent a *nāṭyadharmī* mode, because some or all characters present on the stage are supposed not to hear such a speech although it must be delivered sufficiently loudly to be heard by all the spectators. Bharata states the mode of *tripatāka* hand-gesture (thumb and the second finger near the small finger bent, other three fingers stretched and held erect, palm held over one shoulder to suggest warding off) for delivering these speeches. Later theorists suggest that the *apavāritaka* is to be delivered by the character turning round. Keeping the characters on the stage at the back and facing or leaning towards the spectators. Bharata's direction would suggest that *tri-patāka hasta* was used to convey both kinds of speeches, and the *apavāritaka* used the additional gesture of turning round.

Bharata provides directions for dream-talk, talk on death-bed, and for speeches to be delivered by old men, children etc. It appears that these speeches are rendered realistically. The dream speech (*svapnāyita*), for example, does not use any gestures of hand; it is delivered in a low tone of voice, the delivery is slow, words are uttered distinctly and indistinctly, there is repetition of words and full pauses, as if to suggest that the dreamer is struggling to remember.[2]

There is another aspect of *vācika abhinaya* which deserves to be considered. This concerns the long prose passages and narrations of which the Sanskrit drama is generally full, and which are apt to puzzle a modern reader and a producer of drama. Happenings which are narrated to provide connecting links between events of dramatic acts are, if possible, confined to short linking and indicatory scenes, technically called *praveśaka* and *viṣkambhaka*[3] which are prefixed to a dramatic act. The dramatic theory also distinguishes between what can be merely hinted (*sūcya*) and what should be actually shown on the stage (*a-sūcya* or *dṛśya*): and Bharata and other theorists following him give detailed instructions in regard to this division. And yet there are happenings and actions which are a vital part of the dramatic story and which cannot be shown on account of the natural limitations of theatre stage or for reasons of social propriety and moral decorum (*aucitya*). Many scenes of such type, like serious deliberations, siege, war, fighting, journey, outbreak of fire, rain-storm and shipwreck, are described in Sanskrit dramas in florid and lengthy narration. The rendering of such speeches in a stage performance is governed, I believed, by the technique of what Bharata calls *lāsya aṅgas,*[4] which uses graceful and picturesque mode of presentation combined with mimetic acting and dance gestures. For example, some speech may be delivered by the actor sitting down, making no gesture of hand or movement of foot, as in an experience of anxiety or sorrow (*āsīnapāṭhya*). Sometimes a woman character, deeply tortured by love, may recite a speech in a natural manner but with intense emotion (*sthitapāṭhya*). Sometimes she may sit down and sing a wordless melody accompanied by the tunes of a lute and the rhythm beats of a percussion instrument (*geyapada*). In moments of joy a woman may envision the image of her lover in water during water sport, in a glass of wine on a festive occasion or in a mirror while she is performing her toilette; she may then burst out in a delightful cackle of words (*pracchedaka*). Or she may actually start singing a meaningful song gesticulating with dance steps and movements for the benefit of her lover; or she may don male garments, use Sanskrit, and sing and dance before her female companions for their amusement and delight (*puṣpagaṇḍikā*). A specially constructed Prākṛt play or a dance drama will use special language, and the delivery of speeches will often be accompanied by music (*saindhavaka*). Similarly, a man faced with two women, one his new love and the heroine, the other his wife, will use soft and delicate words, even verses, while speaking to them (*trimūḍhaka*). Two heroes or two heroines may be confronted in a situation; they may try to walk away from each other, use speeches to divert attention from one to another subject, or use emotional language (*dvimuḍhaka*). Sometimes the conversation may gradually rise in emotional pitch so that the entire piece is presented in verse and delivered with appropriate movements of the body and graceful gestures (*uttamottamaka*). In a different situation, a love quarrel for example, the exchange of words may be hot, quick, full of assertions and rejoinders; and to heighten the effect of emotional tension a dialogue of this kind may be set to suitable music (*uktapratyuta*).[5] These are, of course, dramatic modes of rendering speeches. Their use depends on the nature of the play and the scene. But if used, such modes will lend colour, variety and depth to the dialogue and enhance the enjoyment and pleasure of the spectators. Bharata calls them *lāsya aṅgas;* and *lāsya* is a delicate, charming dance mode appropriate to a woman.

It is such a special technique of presenting dramatic speeches that has to be used in rendering long, descriptive passages in the scenes of the drama. One must recognize that such passages cannot be merely recited; they have to be 'acted' in a dramatic performance. The actor while going through the words uses the entire repertoire of *vācika, āṅgika* and *sāttvika abhinaya,* playing and acting the happenings he is reporting though the speech. He uses movements, gestures and mime so that he makes the whole scene come alive, as if what he is reporting or narrating were taking place actually on the stage before the eyes of the audience. This technique changes the entire form and complexion of reportage and narration. It is in this manner the long reports of the spies of *Cāṇakya* and *Rākṣasa* in the *Mudrārākṣasa,* the long passages in Bhavabhūti's plays, Sundaraka's description of the progress of war in the *Veṇīsmhāra,* the narration of the bandit's attack in the *Mālavikāgnimitra,* and such other scenes in Sanskrit dramas have to be played. Bhāsa's *Dūtavākya,* where one character Duryodhana plays the whole Kaurava assembly, would afford an interesting example of the use of this production technique which combines *abhinaya* and mime with the delivery of a speech. Fights described in the Sanskrit plays, the search of Purūravas for the lost Urvaśī, and the special mode of *bhāṇa* are examples of similar technique, which have been mentioned earlier.

AUTHOR: GUPTA RAJESH; Source: *Psychological Studies in Rasa.*

Footnotes:

1. BNŚ.XIV. For the art of delivering dramatic speeches see NS. XVII.113-114, 130 (prose passage), and abhinava's commentary on the portion.
2. Ibid. see XXV.85-94; 95-101. Svapnāyita is described in vv. 95-96.
3. *Viṣkambhaka* is explained at NS. XIX. 111-112, *Praveśaka* at XIX, 114; See also NS.XVIII. 26-30, 33-37. Things not to be shown on the stage are indicated in XVIII. 38-40, XXII. 240-300. Post-Bharata dramatic theory is quite clear on these matters. See author's *Nāṭya-Mañjarī-Saurabha*
4. Ibid. XIX. 117-135. See also *Bhāvaprakāśa* GOS. ed., pp. 245-246.
5. See *Bharata-Nāṭya-Mañjarī* of the author Introduction, pp. xcix-c.

ABHINAYA-SĀTTVIKA
Emotive-Acting

The precise meaning of *sattva* in the *sāttvika abhinaya,* which is an important aspect of histrionic representation, can be gathered from two different statement of Bharata. In the section on *abhinaya* Bharata says that *sattva* is, in essence, human body. *Bhāva* or emotional states arise from *sattva,* that is, due to the association of human mind with body. The emotional states find an adequate expression through the body. A simple and natural expression of an emotional state is called *hāva*. When the expression, through gesture, flourish or movement, acquires a delicate and charming quality, it is called *helā*. *Helā, hāva* and *bhāva* are, thus, mutually connected and all of them represent aspects of *sattva;* they belong to the body and rest in the physical nature of man. The mental state is called *bhāva,* because when it is represented through *sattva* or physical manifestations it produces an awareness (*bhāvayatī*) of its existence, and of the poet's inmost feeling and intent.[1]

The close connection between *sattva* and *bhāva* leads to the second meaning of the word. In its own nature *sattva* is something invisible; but it is the foundation of emotional states (*bhāvasamśraya*). So, in the context of *sāttvika bhāvas,* Bharata says that *sattva* originates in mind. It denotes the equipoised state of mind. When the mind attains perfect concentration *sattva* is produced.[2]

Combining the two senses, mind and physical manifestation, *sāttvika abhinaya* means the mode of psycho-physical or psycho-somatic representation. It denotes that mode, and an ability on the part of an actor whereby he concentrates his mind fully on the mental state to be represented and renders it with convincing facial expression and physical manifestation, as if the state is his own as in real life.

The importance of *sattva* for the business of drama cannot be over-emphasised. Our own emotional states, and the physical expression they naturally find, are a real and valid experience for us. If drama is to imitate human life and character, how can it ignore emotional states and their physical manifestation? A responsible and true actor, whatever the real condition of his mind may be, must acquire the ability to show sorrow or joy if the dramatic situation demands such a showing; he must produce appropriate physical reactions, facial expression, voice-intonation and symptoms of tears or jubilation, in order to carry a convincing impression to the spectators of sorrow or happiness as the case may be. Such a piece of acting cannot be thoroughly realistic and convincing unless an actor has learnt to *live* the role, and not merely *play* it. This cannot be possible without full concentration of mind and the actor's ability to identify himself with the emotional state. This is *sāttva*;[3] and the *abhinaya* in which *sattva* is present is rightly called by Bharata to be supreme acting.[4]

In the category of *abhinaya sāttvika* is mentioned as the fourth kind. But it is easy to see that it must underlie the *vācika* and *āṅgika abhinaya* as well. Otherwise the delivery of dramatic speeches and the gestures and the movements of the body would be mechanical. A concentrated mind must work behind every kind of *abhinaya* in order that a dramatic production becomes a living experience for the moment to the audience, demanding and drawing full emotional response from them.

It is likely that, in course of time, some conventions may have come into operation for expressing emotions in theatrical performances. They would help an actor to carry the emotion to the audience and the audience too would find it easy to grasp the familiar symbol in order to understand and appreciate the emotion rendered before them. Such conventions for expressing emotions are always found to be existing, and they become established devices for histrionic representation in dramatic or dance performances. Apart from theatre tradition which is at their back, we are willing to accept them without objection because such art devices are rooted in real-life experiences. A typical case is the fainting of Rāma in *Uttara-rāma-carita.* A modern reader or spectator may think that Rāma's fainting umpteen times and getting up after a few moments to resume his dialogue is absurd, if not laughable; and he is quite likely to find fault with the dramatic art of Bhavabhūti. What is necessary to remember here is *mūcchā* or swooning is a symptom of acute agony and unbearable sorrow. The dramatist uses it as a symbol and the actor is directed to use it as a conventional and familiar mode for the expression of profound sorrow.[5] The fainting, thus, has nothing to do with the literary art of play-construction; it is a theatric mode established on the stage, and the dramatist and the actor use it as a convenient device. With such a perspective it should be possible, I think, to view the static, conventional and stylised mode of Sanskrit drama production in a different light.

AUTHOR; Source: *Ibid*

Footnotes:-

1. See BNŚ. XXII. 3, 6-8:
2. BNS. VII. Prose passage following v.93:
3. Ibid.
4. Cf. NS. XXII. 1-2:
5. *Uttara-rāma-carita,* act III. See author's edition, Introduction. Bharata describes *moha* (VII. 52-53) as one of the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* and suggests its acting by unconscious state, aimless wandering, collapsing, shaking the head, loss of perception etc.

ABHIŞEKA-MUDRA

1. Hand-pose of sprinkling, a *Mudra* seen in Buddhist Iconography. In it, two palms are held together with fingers crossed as it to hold water for sprinkling.
2. *Abhişekacitra śālā*: Art gallery near bathroom.

AUTHOR: GORILAL; Source: *Mirror of Gestures,* Allahabad, 1955.

Abhivyakti-vāda: It is a view expressed by Abhinavagupta in Indian poetics according to which *rasa* (Mood) is revealed or created by *Vyañjanā* (suggestion). It is the view of *Dhvani-Sampradāya.* (Abhinavagupta, **Source:** *An Historical and Philiosophical Study,* 1935, Banaras.)

Abhoga: The fourth or last portion of *Prabhudha-Samgīta* or *Dhrupada* (Classical Music of North India).

According to some, it should contain the name of the poet, who composed it.

AUTHOR: GOSWAMI O.; Source: *A story of Indian Music,* 1957, Four Metropolitan City.

ABRAHAM JOEL
(New York based Art-Restorer)

Protected for long in the shell of charity auctions, Indian art is slowly stepping out into the arena of market forces where collectors often buy art for investment's sake. It's only a matter of time before the need for professional conservation of art is felt. **Abraham Joel,** a New York based conservationist, who has his own restoration studio, was in Bombay last week primarily in connection with exhibition of Indian art in New York scheduled for later this month, but he used the opportunity to study the feasibility of setting up a restoration studio here.

The Indian art scene is no unknown landscape for the Bombay-born **Joel,** who emigrated to the West at the age of 16 in 1960 and visits the country two or three times every year.

After schooling in Bombay and London, **Joel** graduated in biochemistry from Montreal, Canada, and then studied

restoration in New York's Institute of Art. His career in art conservation began in the Detroit museum, "the fifth best museum in the US", where he helped set up the restoration studio. After a seven year stint there he went to New York to start up on his own.

A specialist in the conservation and restoration of contemporary paintings, old masters, miniatures and works on paper, **Joel** has restored the works of **Picasso, Chagall, Dali, Manet, Renoir** and **Warhol**. His client list includes Sotheby's, the United Nations, American Express, the New York Public Library, the Museum of American Folk Art and the *New York* Museum.

When he visited Bombay's Pundole Art Gallery, he was asked by collectors about the longevity of water colours on paper. It depends on the paper and the materials used, he says, "Numerous Indian miniatures from the 13th century, drawings from the 15th and 14th centuries and old Japanese drawings have survived. The question is how you treat them." Water colours, being sensitive to light, have to be held away from direct light, he points out. "In India where there's so much light, you have to keep it in a room with the shades all drawn, may be with some artificial light kept low."

Colleges made from newspaper clippings, perhaps symbolic of the staying power of the written word, can be restored more easily, **Joel** observes. He has restored collages by **Picasso** and **Braque**, and recently, a newspaper collage from the '50s by **De Kooning.** "Newspapers brown, but they will remain good provided the temperature and humidity are moderate," he stresses. "The humidity has to be under 60 percent. That's where the expense comes in."

This does not mean that it will be difficult to preserve a paper collage in India, he clarifies, for the climate here is similar to that on the east coast of America. As for the cost, he remarks, "I am glad to find that even here they are setting up museums with climate controlled conditions." He is referring to the new museum of modern art coming up at the C.J. Hall.

Joel's first prospective customer in Bombay may well be the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research which celebrated its 50th anniversary. "They have a fine collection of paintings, from the '60s and' 70s, most of which are in good condition. Except a few with flaking surfaces," he says. The problem, according to him, was fluctuating temperature and humidity caused by the door to the lobby being frequently opened, and too much light streaming in.

While museums in Lucknow, Delhi and Calcutta have restoration studios, and National Gallery of Modern Art, Delhi, has a university attached to it where Ph.D programmes in museology, art history and conservation are offered, **Joel** is surprised that Bombay does not have a restoration studio.

The art collections at the Prince of Wales Museum in Bombay, especially the miniatures, need to be better cared for, he thinks. It wasn't likely to be on his list, though. "Even in the US, it is very difficult to get a restoration contract from museums," he explains. "They are generally reluctant to send pieces out of their premises for restoration work." But it is possible to train their staff in maintenance and restoration, he says.

Also, from discussions with Sadashiv Gorakshkar, the museum director, it seemed to him that there wasn't enough space in the museum for the facility, nor the funds since "the roof of the museum building has just been repaired, which must have been quite an expense."

He was gladdened, therefore, by the restoration work being done at the Madras museum where funds have also been set aside for air-conditioning. "I once saw a restorer doing a perfect job of removing patina and other infestations from bronze statues without touching the fragile surface. Somebody must have directed him."

Joel found that in India, especially in Madras, restorers in the past used to coat bronzes with resin. "We advised them against it and they have since stopped the practice."

Speaking about what may be called "bad art practices", **Joel** cites the instance of old Indian painters, such as **Raja Ravi Verma,** who would add varnish to oils to give a glaze to the paint and then apply it thinly over the canvas. "As the painting ages, the varnish begins to become discoloured. When you try to clean or remove the vanish, the paint itself begins to peel off. It's nightmarish situation," he says.

In order to restore a painting closest to the original, it is advisable to study the artist's methods and styles, he says. "For example, **Al Held,** a large collection of whose works I restored recently, was very poor when he began to paint. He used to add wax to the paint to increase its volume. Such a piece of information helps a lot in restoration."

Ironically, while works of art are restored to make them saleable, "the greater the amount of restoration done, the lesser the price it will command," says **Joel.** While work on old masters is unavoidable, contemporary works that have been touched up are not in demand. "In the West, art dealers have ultra violet lights which will show clearly if a painting has been restored, whether just consolidated or in painting, he says.

Recently, an installation by a Pakistani artist caused alarm in London gallery when some bottles of iodine used in it broke, emitting poisonous fumes. Were there any safety regulations on the sort of materials artists used?

Well, I knew a German painter who used animal blood in his paints. There would be an elaborate ceremony and sacrifice before he began his work. I once even helped restore a painting where blood was used" it smelled.

AUTHOR: DESIKAN T.D.; Source: *TOI Sunday Times,* Bombay, September3, 1995

ABSTRACT ART AND EXPRESSIONIST, IMPRESSIONIST AND REALIST

Abstraction appears in art with the desire to do away with traditional subject matter and liberate painting from its themes. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, subjects tended to dominate art and were read by the spectator, often coming between him and the impact of the work as a visual object. Titles had a romantic message and even when they had no obvious meaning as in still-lifes and landscapes, the viewer tended to appreciate the work by criteria such as faithfulness to nature. Art was less individualistic than it is today. There was a consensus of ideas about what constituted art. Beauty in nature and beauty in art were related by verisimilitude. Thus, when in the last years of the 19th century, the artist tried to create a new reality different from life, he was generally misunderstood. But with the work of the Impressionists, Post-Impressionists, *Fauves* and finally Cubists, we find certain new values being stressed, which had nothing to do with the subject. *Cubism* may be considered the first major abstract phase; it was brought about through distortion, the splitting of images and a rejection of the old content which was replaced by forms and values which were the new pictorial ends.

Abstraction in India developed comparatively late; it owes its inspiration at least in part to the early European path-finders such as **Klee** and **Kandinsky** rather than to contemporaneous artists like the Abstract Expressionists. The growth of abstraction in India was stimulated and confirmed by parallel movements in the West, but was not an imitation of them. The slow emergence of abstraction in India is perhaps one proof of its independence and

authenticity. It was the exhaustion of the lyrical and sentimental styles of the half of the century that led artists to search for something more rational and pure; more unconnected with nationalist sentiment and literary connections. Abstractions arrived because it was different, because its goals satisfied a change of aims.

Though abstraction as a language came into its own here in the post-independence era, we do have forerunners creating abstract compositions in the period 1900-47. These men can be considered as daring innovators, because in their time, artistic vision was still bound by fairly rigid figurative conventions. The earliest artist to paintings without a specific or clear subject matter was probably **Gaganendranath Tagore** whose strange black and white compositions were precursors of the art of today. Another important herald of the new tendencies was **Rebindranath Tagore,** who not only painted large numbers of works of abstract pattern but also wrote in defence of a non-imitative art. In fact the experiments or pointed out by these artists were not appreciated or followed in their day. It is often such artists on the periphery, who do not belong to the mainstream of any tradition, who are comparatively untutored and free from economic pressure, who are able to innovate or suggest new directions.

An artists of a later generation who chose to paint abstract compositions in the 1930's and 40's was **Ramkinker**. Today, **Ramkinker** in remembered mostly for his expressionistic sculpture but he was in fact a versatile genius whose work in painting has been insufficiently noticed. **Ramkinker** painted a large number of abstract canvases, only a few of which survive. He is also the first sculptor to design abstract works emphasising sculptural values. His *Deep Stambha* in Santiniketan is one of his early outdoor works which is well-known. Another contemporary, **Binod Behari Mukherjee**, though not obviously an abstract painter, certainly stresses abstract values; his sketches and especially munals show most clearly that his work is predominantly an arrangement of forms, colours and textures the subject matter can be considered more or less subsidiary.

Though abstract values in art can be traced in a tenuous way in many of the artists working during the period of transition, some among them pushed forward the abstract tendency. In the early 1950's **Husain's** work functioned as a catalyst breaking up images and giving us a new pictorial language. Though not strictly non-figurative, the natural images are no longer the focus of interest. The motits are broken up, stylised and attenuated and are part of the totality of the composition. Slabs of colour are arbitrarily applied creating a rough texture; lines and colour do not necessarily delineate form but create an independent pattern. From this point, it was the continuation of the same process, that is, the disintegration of the subject, and its re-constitution as a new non-subject in terms of pictorial elements that create the work of art. In the 1950's we see the works of **Bendre, Gaitonde** or **Ram Kumar** showing a tendency towards the break-up and the new elements taking over. In certain artists, the process of abstracting takes place gradually and the artist feels his way towards it by slow degrees. In the paintings of Biren **Dr. K.G. Subramanyan** or **Ram Kumar**, the early works though abstract in pattern, still have a figurative content. In time these are reduced, metamorphosed and finally eliminated, the meaning of the painting coming to reside entirely in its visual effects. In this decade, a number of important painters and sculptors grew into abstraction either partially or wholly, for instance, **K.S. Kulkarni, K.K. Hebbar, Bimal Das Gupta, K.C.S. Paniker, Dinkar Kowshik, Chintamoni Kar, Sankho Chaudhari** and others. Most of them were teachers and therefore, influential in disseminating a new set of values which their students or followers recognised.

By about the 1960's abstraction had won general acceptance. It is in this decade that we notice the consolidation of abstract art and its proliferation into different subsidiary groups each emphasising or exploring a particular tendency. In formulating a personal style, the painter or sculptor through he has a certain heritage is also open to the influences of hit times. He further strives to bring to his work a personal flavour. In general, the abstract painters as a whole can be said to be careful and even conservative craftsmen. Their work depends for its effects on fine nuances and modulations, on balance and asymmetry in composition, on movement, light and texture; on tensions and depths which are more felt and perhaps more difficult to attain than in works using conventional imagery. Each artist sets himself his own rules and operates in a way that is sometimes precise and at others spontaneous or exploratory; his work is an art for those who see rather than read. It aims to be kind of visual music.

Within the abstract fold, a major category can be called 'planar abstraction'. We may consider as examples the work of **Ram Kumar** and **Surya Prakash**, both of whom work in distinct ways. **Ram Kumar's** work evolved from earlier figurative painting. His abstract tendencies were an extension of and liberation from landscapes. His early abstractions, especially those done in Varanasi, are based on a huddle of tumbledown houses on the Ganges or on the crooked streets. These works have an intricate construction and the net of forms is tighter than in his recent works, the colour schemes being very somber. In his recent work, the planar qualities are more evident. Large areas slide or rest or are linked to one another in an engagement. There is more spatial play and movement. The lines are important than the planes. The colours though still restrained have a greater range and consist especially of browns, blues, ochres and umber. The textures are rough and little accidental and edges preserved as details. The style has a certain dignity and the richness of unpolished craftsmanship. The compositions of **Ram Kumar** are related to earth shapes and movements, and are architectonic in their feeling. **Surya Prakash** is a young artist but his work is influential in projecting a kind of planar abstraction which appears to be derived from metal planes which are contorted and twisted into specific shapes, like the junk sculpture of Chamberlain (no connection is intended). The forms are therefore more related to the machine than to nature. He paints these formations in a palette of strong, clear glazes, in a way which emphasises the metallic feel. In fact, this type of smoothly graded, highly finished, rather slick treatment has become one of the most favoured methods of paint application in recent times. It is the opposite of action painting because the artist does not tell how he has painted his canvas.

In contrast to this planar type, one may consider the work of **Gaitonde** or **Nareennath** which is a variation on color field abstraction. The whole composition is more or less one colour in which the gentle gradations from a liquid matrix in which small and more solid outcrops of form appear to float. The style itself is reticent saying or suggesting only the least that needs to be stated. The colours too are limited and quiet and often consist of hues of the same colour. The whole painting has certain expansiveness because the composition is open and can be thought of as part of a larger reality. There is a certain sense of mystery in these paintings. They affect the feelings of the spectator.

A few artists practise what might be termed a kind of gestural abstraction. The artist here paints in an expressionist way. His bold and frenzied application of colour builds up dynamic images or shapes. **Paritosh Sen** is

an example. His enormous canvases are alive and pulsating with the rhythm of his brush. We do not find this style being consistently developed by younger painters although the work of **Vijay Mohite** or **S.R.Nagarajan** is related. Perhaps the only exponent who practises a kind of calligraphic abstraction with free brush-work is **R.K.Bhatnagar. Mansaram** who was doing a kind of gestural abstraction is now more or less committed to college. Another artist whose work is derived from the figure but is more or less abstract is **Veena Bhargava**. Different in style the work of **Bansi Parimoo** and **Kishori Kaul** might also be mentioned. Both are colourists. The former uses a rich palette and textural effects while the style of **Kishori** is lighter and more lyrical.

The geometricising styles derive from a certain austerity where the artists reject natural organic forms in favour of the organisation of severely restricted pictorial elements; generally flat colours and lines to build a new reality. The planar surface of the canvas is established as the base for a composition which in spite of its apparent impersonality is in fact a personal statement by the artist. Large numbers of artists have been forerunners of the geometricising style in the West where the young artist espousing the style seem to search for the difficult rather than the novel. Indeed a strain of geometry, hard edge, minimal art with emphasis on openness and clarity was contemporaneous with the work of the Abstract Expressionists. The point to be made here is that the Indian artists working in a related manner are comparatively lonely individualists who have chosen the style or evolved it from a stylisation and reduction of their own previous art. Their work is in no sense a repetition of their foreign counter-parts. Rather these works have a purity and complexity which is pleasing since the style has not been pushed to its extreme limits. **Sukanta Basu's** work is clearly a simple and logical refinement of his early compositions where a large gestural sign in calligraphic strokes and with textural interest occupied his canvases. The shapes are now reduced to cones and wedges, planes and flat areas which may also function as depths. The colour is not altogether matt but is laid on in careful and subtle variations, resulting in art which is essentially measured and becomes a study in proportions.

Om Prakash's works are concerned with tonal effects and inner lights though the composition is geomtricising. The quality of his paintings depends on the use of transparent and non-transparent glazes which seem to be arranged for the light colours of filter through. Many of his works have also a monumentality and richness. Their architecture is one of relations, clean edges and colour chords. **Umesh Varma's** works can be described as kaleidoscopic. In his Altar series, the basic division of the canvas is embellished with little units of strong color clinging to the grid of the 'altar'. So, we see that even within what might appear to be the rigid limits of the geometricising style, we have room for personal choice and self-expression.

As opposed to the geometricising style, we have compositions that are basically organic. The abstract forms here seem to be reminiscent of those in nature even though there is no likeness to specific objects. A typical example would be **Ambadas** who over the years has evolved a personal idiom of broad undulating lines which wander in knots and contortions on the canvas. The web of his design involves and transports the spectator into a world of ceaseless movement. "A painting by **Ambadas** is a world in itself, a true microcosm, conceived in his own scale, but reflecting the order and disorder of the infinitely vaster universe". **Ambadas** was never a representational painter and his compositions have a kind of innovative or improvising quality. Another painter of organic abstraction is **Bimal Das Gupta**. His shapes are ovoid, tubular or spreading; they are related to one another by tensions and fibres sometimes flowering into small delicate shapes. His color is especially outstanding. The thin glazes have a melting lyricism that is sophisticated and elegant, nowhere jarring and equally not hackneyed. Sometimes the forms and colours remind one of underwater scenes. Among the younger artists the most notable in this group is **Manu Parekh**. His work is perhaps more explicitly organic and sensuous. Its tensions and shapes are closely related to those of anatomy. Manu Parekh's style is sharp and incisive but the paintings have a brooding quality. Among artists, whose style is organic but seem to be returning to a decorative imagery may be mentioned **S.G. Vasudev** and **Khemraj**. The former has a more tightly knit style and is now using Indian motifs while in the latter the pattern of vegetal shapes is comparatively open and clear.

Lastly some styles like that of **K.G. Subramanyan** span both the type of abstraction we have been discussing that is, the organic and the geometric. Further many of his compositions are divided into small units or squares. For example, those in his Window series the square itself is repeated though the formal contents vary. The colors are also limited and most often flat and reminiscent of textile patterns. This repetition reminds one of the processes of the machine. Repetition is seen also in the work of many Western artists though Subramanyan has adopted the matter for his own purposes and varies the organic contents to be studies in space and mass, overlapping projections and movement. The art of Dinkar Kowshik though devoted to lines and color spaces builds up into very exploratory and spontaneous webs of pattern. One feels here the closeness to music and the musical improvisation of *ragas.*

These few styles of abstract art do not course exhaust the range or the possibilities. Many artists work in mixed media. The resultant work is mostly abstract and many more use a certain degree of stylisation which makes their images ambiguous and tentative. Today, we in fact judge even frankly realistic works on criteria which are abstract and not for their resemblance to reality. The emphasis on painterly or sculptural values revealed by abstraction has served to open our eyes to the real and more lasting qualities in works of art and to this extent the role of abstraction has been very beneficial. But on the other hand it has introduced an element of impressionality, providing what might be described as a facade behind which the emotions of the artist may be hidden.

In conclusion, the works of the present generation appear to stretch from those which are mechanistic or technology influenced to those which are organic, spontaneous and fantastic. The former would seem to acknowledge or celebrate the dominance of reason, man's environment and the machine; while the latter link art to nature, and to areas which are unintellectual intuitive, and romantic. Perhaps these polarities are the echoes of those ancient and complementary principles classicism (based on objectivity) and romanticism (based on introspection) for the spirit of man is never satisfied with one alone.

Source: "*Lalit Kala Contemporary* 19 and 20". *Published by the Secretary, Lalit Kala Academy, Rabindra Bhavan,* New Delhi-110 001.

AUTHOR: APPA SAMY JAYA; Source: *cf. VKP* Vol. 4, *Part I,* February 1982, Madras.

Abbreviation:

VKP, Vivekananda Kendriya Patrikā

ABUL KALAM AZAD ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, a veteran freedom fighter, eminent international scholar and first Education Minister of

independent India, expired on 22nd February, 1958. **Shri Jawaharlal Nehru,** the first Prime Minister of independent India initiated a move to establish a research institute for perpetuating the memory of Moulana Saheb. At his instance **Dr. Zakir Hussain, Nawab Mehdi Nawaz Jung, Dr. Akbar Ali Khan, Dr. Gopal Reddy, Dr. Mohuddin Qadri, Dr. Tara Chand, Shri Kripalani, Shri L.N. Gupta, Shri M.A. Abbasi, Dr. Mahendranath Saxena, Prof. Humayun Kabir** and **Shri B. Krishna Rao** established this institute and started a library from scratch. The Institute was inaugurated on 11th July, 1959 by Prof. Humayun Kabir, the then Union Minister for Science and Cultural Affairs.

2. Research Work

The Institute became a rapidly growing centre of culture and research activities, mostly on Oriental subjects with emphasis on India. The programme of the Institute includes provision of facilities for research as well as development of well-equipped library and other equipment. Originally, the research work was undertaken by qualified researchers under competent supervisors. Subsequently, the work is being conducted through scholars who have already obtained their doctorate degrees or are eminent in their field.

3. Publications

The Institute has been guiding research in several fields of knowledge, particularly in those disciplines which were dear to Maulana Azad and are of considerable national interest. This Institute has got about 65 publications to its credit, related to various disciplines. Some of them relate to history, Indian languages, cultural advancement, social science, mysticism, Sufism, theosophy and ethics. Lives of eminent persons who have contributed to the building of modern India have been published. Three important projects deserve special mention:

It may be mentioned that nearly recognized Indian languages have at least two encyclopaedias mostly financed by the Central and State Governments. Unfortunately, Urdu language did not have an Urdu Encyclopaedia. It is a matter of great interest to note that Moulana Saheb as far back as 1904 published an article in a journal *Lisan-al-Sidq* emphasising the necessity of compiling Urdu Encyclopaedia. After his initiative **Moulana Shibli, Moulana Abdul Rehman** and several other scholars have emphasised the necessity. Somewhere about 1939, **Dr. Mohd. Mohiuddin Quadri Zore** tried his best to undertake this tremendous job, but he could not get any support. In 1963, this Institute strongly and persistently moved the State Government and the Central Government to approve the finance for this project. **Shri G.S. Pathak,** the then Vice-President of India in his address in 1968 delivered in the Institute also stressed the necessity and it was after ten years of persistent and enthusiastic efforts and subsequent reminders that Government of India approved the project in 1973.

The Institute formed an Executive Board consisting of eminent persons and started the work on all India basis securing the support and help of eminent scholars in various disciplines. It was resolved that the work should be carried out in this Institute. A Board of Advisers on all India basis was constituted. **Mr. Fazlur Rehman,** Retd. Pro-Vice-Chancellor. Aligarh Muslim University was appointed Chief Editor and myself as Editor-cum-Secretary. Subsequently, **Mr. Ashfaq Hussain, Dr. Mehdi Ali, Mr.M. Safiullah** were also appointed as Editors. **Mr. Ashfaq Hussain** died after a few months of his appointment. Dr. Mehdi Ali had serious attack of paralysis; Mr. Safiullah resigned. Help was taken in their places from Dr. Shah Mohd, Dr. Abdul Rehman, Mr. Jaleeli and Mr. S.M. Murtuza Quadri. The arduous work of Urdu Encyclopaedia was completed in April 1983.

Shri. S.B. Chauhan, the then Education Minister, Govt. of India, kindly came down to Hyderabad to address the Institute. He and his colleagues expressed their appreciation of the work done and the manuscript was handed over to him. He had very kindly promised to get the typescript published by the Govt. of India as early as possible. He was also pleased to make a gift of the furniture and books acquired for the encyclopaedia to the Institute. The Institute is highly grateful to him. In spite of several reminders and promises we do not as yet know the stage at which the printing of the encyclopaedia is.

DECCAN HISTORY

The contribution of the Deccan to the development of Indian culture had not been properly acknowledged. In about 1940, the then Hyderabad Government had decided to bring out in three parts Deccan history two volumes each on Ancient Period, Medieval Period and Modern Period. The Ancient Period volumes were brought out in 1959; the total cost of the first volume was borne by the Hyderabad Government. The second part was brought out in 1973 and Andhra Pradesh Government bore all the cost. Since 1963, this Institute was requesting the Andhra Pradesh Government to approve and provide fund for the preparation of typed manuscript of Modern Period of Deccan History. Nawab Ali Yavar Jung had kindly agreed to be the Chief Editor, but unfortunately he expired in 1978. Therefore, the work suffered considerably. It was in 1980 that Government of Andhra Pradesh approved the scheme and issued first two installments of Rs. 36,000 each. An Executive Committee of the office bearers of the Institute was formed. Eminent scholars were requested to collaborate as editors and contributors. The work has started in real earnest and most of the material for the whole of first and second volumes was collected. Eminent scholars were requested to contribute articles on various aspects on payment basis. As the government grant has not been received after 1983, in spite of the Utilization Certificate submitted, the work has suffered enormously and the Institute is facing great difficulties and embarrassments.

Shrirańga Mañjari

Saint Akbar Shah, s/o Saint Shah Raju preceptor of Abdul Hassan Tana Shah, the last Qutub Shahi King of Golconda, had composed a book named *Shriranga Manjari* in Telugu verse. Saint Akbar Shah himself had translated the book into Sanskrit. As secretary and in capacity as Director of Archaeology in 1950, I got the Sanskrit manuscript copied from Tanjavur Saraswati Mahal Library and got it edited by Dr. Raghuvan and published it in 1950. It was very well received by scholars. During the time of Saint Akbar Shah, a Hindi poet of Deccan translated it into Hindi. After the publication of Sanskrit manuscript, a scholar from U.P. published the Hindi translation. The Institute approached the Chief Minister, Shri N.T. Rama Rao, to order the search of the original Telugu manuscript and also to get the tomb of Saint Akbar Shah properly preserved. It is earnestly hoped that early and suitable action will be taken in this regard.

4. Seminars, Conferences, LECTURES

The Institute conducted and organised the following seminars and celebrations:

1. Gandhiji and Moulana Azad's Relations
2. Seminars on Hazrat Syed Muhammad Gaysudaras
3. His Holiness Hazrat Iman Bokhari, the greatest traditionalist and Hazrat Busairi
4. Arya Bhatta and Al-Biruni (Millenary of Beruni)
5. Seventh Centenary of Ameer Khusro
6. Moulana Mohd. Ali Jauhar's (the great freedom fighter) Birth Centenary

7. Silver Jubilee Celebrations of the Institute (1984)
8. Seminar on Hazrat Khwaja Mouinuddin Chisti
9. Birth Centenary of Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad (1988).

The Institute arranges on an average, three lectures a month on topics of cultural and academic importance by eminent scholars and about three or four seminars every year. It has arranged throughout the year 1989, the Birth Centenary Celebrations year, every month a lecture by an eminent person.

5. Library

The Library of the Institute which was started from scratch in 1959 has been well developed. Nearly on all aspects of Indian culture there are about 911, 114 volumes. Great pains have been taken to collect Proceedings of Indian History Congress, All India Oriental Congress, Numismatic Society of India and other important proceedings and journals. The Institute has exchange relations with Indian and foreign institutions. Facilities are being provided to scholars visiting the Institute for research work. Two guest rooms have been provided for their stay. A list of major publications of the Institute is given in Appendix A.

Appendix A

List of Publications

1. Kabir, Humayun, ed. *Kitab Tazkira: Abdul Kalam Azad Memorial Volume,* translated by Mir Waliuddin. 289p (In Urdu).
2. Kabir, Humayun, ed. *Kitab Tazkira: Abdul Kalam Azad Memorial Volume,* translated by D. Venkat Avadhani. 361p (In Telugu).
3. Jaffer, Sayyida, ed. *Master Ramchander.* 214p (In Urdu).
4. Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam. *Soore Fatheha,* translated by T.H. Peeran Nizami. 279p (In Telugu).
5. Jaffer, Sayyida. *Man Samjhawan.* 218p (In Urdu).
6. Vasumati, Shrumati. *Telugu Literature under Qutb Shahi Period.* 281p.
7. Siddiqui, Murtuza. *Religious Thoughts of Abdul Kalam Azad.* 81p.
8. Sherwani, Haroon Khan. ed. *Dr. Gulam Yazdani Commemoration Volume.* 256p. contains original articles on Indology by eminent archaeologists.
9. Khan, Ahmed Husain. *Hazrat Banda Nawaz's Contribution to Sufism.* 228p (In Urdu).
10. Murthy, Ram. *Social and Cultural Life of the Eastern Chalukyas of Vengi.* 96p.
11. Lakshmi, Champaka. *Economic conditions of the Peasentary in Deccan During the Ninteenth Century.* 234p.
12. Subramania Iyer, R. *The Role of Maulana Azad in Indian Politics.* 239p.
13. *Seminar on Gandhiji with emphasis on his Relation with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Hyderabad,* 12-13 *July* 1969: *Report of Seminar and Papers.* 33p.
14. Pandey, Raj Kishore and Siddiqui, Akberuddin, eds. *Chander Badanva-Mahyar* (In Hindi).
15. Hussain, Zakir. *Zikre Husain,* translated by Shri Peeran Nizami (In Telugu).
16. Ahuja, Santosh and Siddiqui, M.A., eds. *Panchi Bacha* (In Hindi).
17. Akbar, Syed Ali and Jaffer, Sayyida, eds. *Mehdi Zawaz Jung Memorial Volume* (In English and Urdu).
18. Sinha, S.K. *Ancient Deccan.*
19. *Saints of Telengana: Report of the Seminar.*
20. Siddiqui, Maqbool Ahmed *Maualan Azad's Contribution to Urdu Literature.*
21. Zore, Syed Mohiuddin Qadri, ed. *Kulliyat Sultan Mohammed Quli Qutub Shah.* 1060p.

Includes poetic works (contains 50,000 couplets) of Mohd Quli Qutub Shah 973/1566-1020/1612, including introduction and also deals with his life and works.

22. Serwazi, Abdul Qadir, ed. *Qisa-e-Benazir.* 104p.(In Urdu).

It is poetic work of Sananti, a contemporary of Md. Adil Shah of Bijapur. It is an epic poem woven round the figure of Hazrat Tamim Ansari text.

23. Rizvi, Mir Sadat Ali, ed. *Tuti Nama.* 290p (In Urdu).

It is poetic work of Ghawwasi poet laureate of Abdullah Qutb Shah.

24. Rizvi, Mir Sadat Ali, ed. *Kalamul-Muluk.* 112p (In Urdu).

It is a collection of poetic work of Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi kings.

25. Rizvi, Mir Sadat Ali, ed. *Masnavi Saiful muluk-wa-badi-jamal.* 179p.

It is a poetical work of Ghawwasi, poet laureate of Abdullah Qutub Shah. He was sent as an envoy to Bijapur.

26. Muhammed, Syed, ed. *Gulshan-e-Ishq.*

It is a poetic work of Mulla Nusrati poet laureate of Ali Adil Shah 11, 1067/1657-1083/1672.

27. Siddiqui, Abdul Majeed, ed. *Ali Nama* (In Urdu).

It is a poetic account of the events of the period of Ali Adil Shah II. The author was a court poet of the Adil Shah. It contains an introduction by the editor.

28. Muhammad, Syed, ed. *Masnawi Rizwan Shah-wa-Rooh Afza.* 161p (In Urdu).

It is the only available work of Faizia, contemporary of Abul Hassan Tanashah of Golkonda. The story of Rizwan Shah and Rooh was in Persian prose, is reproduced. At the end there is a glossary.

29. Siddiqui, Mohd Akbarruddin. *Masnawi Chandra Badan-Va-Mahayar.* 120p (In Urdu).

The story of Chandra Babau wa Mahayar, well known lover of the Deccan has been versified in Urdu by Mirza Mir Muqimi of Bijapur.

30. Hmeeduddin, Khwaja ed. *Masnawi Tasveer Jana.* 69p.

It is a work of Lakshmi Narayan Shafique of Aurangabad. The poet flourished during the time of Nizam Ali Khan Safa Asaf Jah II.

31. Muhammed, Syed, ed. *Panchibacha.*

It is a composition of Wajhi in Deccani Urdu. It is a free translation of Shaikh Fariduddin, well known Manthnavi Mantiq-al-Tair.

32. Hussain, Akther. *Qutub Shahi Daur Ka Farsi Adab.*
33. Mirza, Mohd Azeez. *Sanskrit Drama* (In Urdu).
34. Vehim, Vaisrai. *Gyan Deepak* (In Hindi).
35. *Hazrat Amir Khusraw: Seventh Century Volume.*
36. *Phool Ban* (In Urdu).
37. Razvi, Sadat Ali. *Adil Shahi Marseeya.*
38. Bhatt. *Wallabha Chari.*
39. *Kulliyat Abdullah Qutub Shah.*
40. Kwaja Md. Ahmed, ed. *Maulana Md Ali Centenary Volume.*
41. Adeeb, Sajida. *Iqbal as a Philosopher.*
42. Sharma, Shriram. *Sanskrit Works in Persian: A Descriptive Bibliography.*
43. Khan, Akbar Ali. *Bacons of Light IIIuminatos: Sayings of the Prophet.*
44. All India Institute of Sufism. *Conference on Interreligions Understanding,* 10th *March 1980: Proceedings.*
45. *Ali Yavar Jung Commemoration Volume.*
46. Khan, Akbar Ali. *Masail Hizbul Hirman.*
47. Khwaja Md. Ahmad, ed. *Amir Khurso Hafat Sala Jashan,* 10-13th *February* 1972: *Proceedings of the Seminar.*
48. Sinha, S.K. *Ancient Deccan.*
49. Mudiraj, C.E. *Quran Ki Azmat* (In Urdu)
50. Azad, Maulana. *Sufi Sarmad* (In Urdu)
51. Ravindra Kumar, *Maulana Azad.*
52. *Ershad Nama.*

53. Zore, Syed Mohiuddin. *Introduction to Ershad Nama* (Deccani Urdu).
54. *Masail-e-Taswoof* (Deccani Urdu).
55. Khan, Akbar Ali. *Quest for Man.*
56. Naseeruddin, S.K. 40 *Sayings of Prophet Mohd* (PBOH) *and* 40 *Ashlok from Bhagwad Geeta and* 40 *Ahadis.*
57. Seminarou. *Sri Aurobindo Life and Works,* 14th *June* 1987: *Proceedings.*
58. Shiv Mohan Lal. *Sri Ramana Maharishi* (In Urdu).
59. Khan, Akbar Ali. *Majmooa Akhame Qurani* (*Quranic Commandments*) with English translation by Akbar Ali Khan.
60. Khan, Akbar Ali. *Muslim Personal Law.*
61. *All India National Congress, Dawn of Second Centenary Proceedings.*
Writer: Ahmed K.Md, *Secretary Director, Public Garden,* Hyderabad 500 004 A.P.
Editor: Gupta B.M., Source: *HLA, IC Vol IX* (*Handbook of Library, Archive and Inḟormation Centres*), New Delhi 1991.

ĀBŪ

Situated in the South-West Rajasthana which is 1200 metres high. It is celebrated for the marble temples built there. Of these temples, two are famous. One is built in 11th Cent. A.D. by Vimala, an officer of the Cālukya king Bhima I of Gujarat. This temple is known as Vimala Vasahi is dedicated to Adinātha, the first *Tīrthaṅkara* of the Jainas. The other known as Lunavasahī, is dedicated to Neminātha, the 22nd *Tīrthaṅkara* of the Jainas.

This temple was built in the 13th Cent. A.D. by a banker temple named Tejapāla (He was the brother of Vastupāla, who built the triple-shrined jaina temple at Girnar in Saurāṣṭra.

These temples are not large. Their fame is due to their aesthetic carved atuary and ornamentation. The crisp, thin, translucent shell-like treatment of the marble surpasses anything seen elsewhere and some of the designs are veritable dream of beauty. It is difficult to see how much delicate carving could be produced by ordinary chiseling. There is a tradition that they were produced by scrapping and polishing the marble, the payment to the sculptors being made by the weight of the Marble-dust so removed.

Compiler: PADMA SUDHI; Source: *Ministry of Tourism,* 1992, New Delhi.

ACĀRYA

1) A spiritual guide or teacher. The *Manusmṛti*, II 140-142, distinguishes between the three terms: *Acārya, Upādhyāya and Guru*. *Acārya* imitates a pupil and teachers him the complete Veda. A *Upādhyāya* teaches Veda for his livelihood. The *Guru* performs the Vedic rites such as *Garbhadhāna* etc.

2) The term Ācārya also denotes a class of Tamil *Vaiṣṇava* teachers who regarded the Aḻvāṟās as worthy of worship. The first *Acarya* was *Nathamuni* (9th cent A.D.)

3) In Southern Buddhism *Ācariya* (*Pali* term) is the one who trains a pupil in good conduct and ethical behaviour. *Acariya* in these countries is an important member of the close-knit Buddhist organsation. The concept of *Ācariya* did not develop much in *Mahayana* Buddhism, except so far as the **Bodhisattva Maitreya** is concerned who is regarded as teaching *Acariya.*

4) *Guru-paddhati* has created many a cults of India of which is famous as kabīra pantha and Sikh dharma.

Ācārya Sańkara

5) One of the series of articles describing the life of Acārya Sańkara was endowed with extraordinary powers from his childhood and when he want to Govindapāda, a renowned Yogī of his time, at Oṁkāranāth, he mastered three yogas in a short span of time. At the age of eleven, he attained perfection that showed promise of his greatness on the spiritual field. After the death of his *guru* Govindanada, he went to Kāśī, the holy city he actually 'discovered' where he had experience indescribable upsurge of spiritual ecstasy. His pilgrimage to Varanasi marked the beginning of his life as a great spiritual Teacher because it was here that large number of aspirants owing allegiance to different religious sect came in his contact and were converted to his philosophy of life.

AUTHOR: SWAMI APURVANANDA; Source: *VK (Vedanta Kesari),* Lv. No. 9, 1969.

ACHALA - MOULIK

She has been **Angela Morrel** for Mills and Boon readers and she is also the chief executive officer and additional director-general of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI). **Achala Moulik**, India's very Indian answer to M.M. Kaye, clearly has a passion for history.

Not surprising, because as much as she is contemporary, Moulik is firmly rooted in the past. Her father**, Moni Moulik**, who was an associate of painter **Rathindranath Tagore**, covered Europe for seven publications, among them "Hindustan Standard" and "Desh." Her mother, Leena, who accompanied him on his travels, maintained a journal, which says her adoring daughter, was both "private and domestic." Her mother died at 53 and her father followed 16 years later, living in Santiniketan as long as he could. Moulik is working on their biography.

Her husband, also an IAS officer, is also from the Karnataka cadre. Her son, a doctor, is as far away from writing as possible. "Naturally, he tells my sister, if you start your day with **William Jones**, you don't want anything to do with either literature or the government."

William Jones, in fact, was the inspiration for her current novel, "The Conqueror", a 692-page saga that details the love and war between the Ruthvens and Chowdhurys, beginning with the Battle of Plassey and ending in 1858. Her characters are colourful and her language quite picturesque. Moulik who wrote the Mills and Boon in 1985 after a friend challenged her to try her hand at something less serious, is now ready to publish "Kings, Queens and Lovers: From Diana to Cleopatra." Dressed gracefully in a white Dhakai Sari, with graying hair and carefully delineated sindoor, Moulik is a woman who has lived a charm life. Born in Calcutta, she was educated in Washington, New York, London and Rome. She graduated from London University in 1963. "It was a time of great change in Europe, very cosmopolitan and eclectic," she says. But at her father's insistence, she went back to "serve India."

Obviously, writing (she spends two hours on her work table every day between 10 and 12 in the night) runs in the family, because her younger brother, an information scientist based in the US, is also a published poet. **Moulik** is currently refining the final draft of "Meeting by the Mandovi," a story that begins in Granada and ends in Goa, taking in the Spanish unication and the Portuguese conquest of Goa.

She agrees the research in painstaking, but clearly enjoys every minute of the labour. She spent six years writing "The Conquerors", starting in 1986 and ending in 1992. Her admiration for Tolstoy is clearly understandable.

But her real guru is the 'Gurudev' **Rabindranath Tagore**, she says. "Even now, so many of the stories he wrote, say "Ghare Baire," are so contemporary. Imagine, he was walking in the Meiji Gardens in Tokyo in 1917 and said

Japan will be a great nation one day." Her dream project is to write his biography, along with her brother.

"I hope to do that when I retire", she says, leaning back in her office chair. Between monsoons spent in Santiniketan and summers in her husband's village on Kanyakumari, she hopes to recharge her batteries.

AUTHOR: BAMZAI, **KAVEREE; Source:** *IE*, June 16, 1996, Poona.

ACINTYA BHEDABHEDA

Acintya bhedābheda is the technical term applied to the philosophy of the Caitanya School of Vaiṣṇavism, of which Jīva Goswami and Baladeva Vidyabhusana are the chief exponents.

The word *acintya* means the fact which is beyond the grasp of our reason. It is a well admitted fact that sugar is sweet and quinine bitter but no amount of reasoning can explain why sugar is always sweet and quinine always bitter and not the *vice versa*, such knowledge regarding the 'sweetness' and the 'bitterness' of the substance is called in conceivable knowledge.[1]

Sridhara Swami explains the notion of inconceivability in two different ways. Firstly, the knowledge which inevitably has to be accepted for explaining all the facts but which cannot stand the scrutiny of argumentation is called inconceivable.[2] Secondly, that which cannot be conceived of either as different or as non different is called inconceivable and can be known only through *Arthapatti* (implication).[3] Thus inconceivability means the truth which is only implied and cannot logically be proved.

According to Jīva Goswāmi inconceivability consists in accomplishing that which is otherwise impossible to be accomplished.[4] while the notion of inconceivable difference non difference as such as is based upon the inseparable connection of the powers and the one who is possessed of the powers. The concept of Absolute as viewed in relation to the powers is a fundamental one in the Vaiṣṇava philosophy. The powers of the Lord are manifold and natural to Him.[5] In fact there is no difference between the Lord and his powers. The same principle manifests both as power designated Mahālaxmī as well as the possessor of power designated Bhagavān or Śri Kṛṣṇa, when viewed from the standpoints of the power and the substratum of the powers respectively.[6]

So the power and the one possessed of power are inseperably connected with each other. It is not possible to think of them in isolation. The thing is substance (*viśeṣya*) and the power its quality (*Viśeṣaṇa*). The substance and the quality are related in permanent inseperable relation. In the case of Lord the Supreme Bliss is the substance and the qualities are the powers while the Lord is one qualified with these two.[7]

This may further be explained by the analogies of musk and its scent[8]or the coil and the serpent.[9] Musk and its scent cannot be separated from one another, yet the scent can be felt even at a distance from where the musk is kept and therefore they appear as two different things. Similarly coil is identical with the serpent, yet it is only an attribute of serpent. So are the powers and the one possessed of powers. From this it follows that the power and the substance which inheres it are indentical. The entity itself, when on the way to produce effect, is called power. The same principle which is the substance is also the power.[10]

So the relation between the power and its possessors is a very peculiar one. It is neither one of absolute difference nor that of absolute non-difference. It is in a way one of difference non-difference, because both the difference and the non-difference simultaneously appear to exist in Him. Take for instance the light or the rays of the sun and the sun the substratum of that light. Both being luminous entities it appears as though they are not different from each other but both of them being obviously two different entities really differ from one another. So they are simultaneously different as well as not different. The same is true is of the power and the possessor of the power.[11]

By reasoning we can prove neither absolute difference nor absolute non difference, because the postulation of either of the views involves a number of fallacies. Thus, as an example, may be quoted the text from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* which states that Brahman is Vijñāna (consciousness) and *Ananda* (bliss). *Vijñāna* means the negation of unconsciousness and *Ananda* means the freedom from any kind of miseries. So the text apparently signifies that *Brahman* is pure consciousness and absolute bliss. These two attributes of Him are due to the activity of His essential power (*Svarūpa-Śakti*). Considering these two attributes in the above mentioned sense there is obviously a scope for the internal difference (*Svagata-bheda)* in the Ultimate Reality because two different attributes belong to one Ultimate Principle. But the Ultimate Reality according to this school is purely destitute of any kind of difference whether Homogenous (*Sajātīya*), Heterogeneous (*Vijātīya*) or internal (*Svagata*). To avoid this fallacy the two terms *Vijñāna Ananda* may be taken in identical sense. But in that case too, the fallacy of redundance will arise which is not allowed in the same text.[12] Therefore, it is extremely diffcult to postulate either pure disrinction or pure identity. Power and their possessor appear to be indentical entities because it is not possible to think of them in lsolation, but at the same time we cannot also assert that they are identical entities because in many instances the power of the entities is found to have been made stunned by the spell of incantations etc. Thus between power and its possessor exists a simultaneous difference non difference which is inconceivable.[13]

Both difference as well as non-difference co exist in the Ultimate Reality but how they co exist is simply inexplicable. No amount of arguments can deduce any faultless doctrine. We have to face one difficulty or the other in either of the cases. Therefore, in establishing the doctrine of difference non difference, on account of the incapability of solving the problem we have to admit the inexplicability itself as its only solution. Hence, the philosophy receives designation 'Acintya bhedābheda'[14]

Although the fact of the incomprehensible and inconceivable nature of the powers was recognised even in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa,[15] still the theory of inconceivable difference non difference as such was propounded by jīva Goswāmi himself in the sixteenth century in his philosophical treatise the ṣaṭ- Samdarbha and as in his effect the author himself makes an explicit statement in his *Sarva-Samvādinī.*[16]

This doctrine of 'inconcevable-difference-non-difference[17] of jīva Goswāmi is very wide in its application. It explain not only the relation which exists between the power and its possesser but also of Brahman and the individual self and all other existing entities. Beginning from the transcendental world, i.e., Lord's abode etc. down to the things belonging to this phenomenal universe, everything is related to the Lord in the relation of inconceivable difference-non-difference. But because the individual self is the manifested form of Lord's *Tatasṭhā-Śakti*, the universe etc. that of *Bahiraṅgā-Śakti* and *Vaikuṇṭha* etc. that of Svarūpa-Śakti, every relation may broadly be explained in terms of the relation between the powers and the possessor of the powers.

Moreover, the theory is based upon the normal experience of all. It is free from all fallacies. The most distinguishing feature of this theory is that it shows an equal and impartial regards towards all the *Śruti*-texts. *Śruti* abounds in

statements which propounds both difference and non difference. Unless and until the resort be taken to the incomprehensibility of the powers the mutually contradictory statement cannot be reconciled.

Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa's concept of *Acintya bhedābheda.*-Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa also agrees with Jīva Goswāmi in regarding the nature of the Lord's powers as inconceivable and mysterious.[17] He also like Jīva Goswāmi recoginsed that there is an essential difference between the Lord and the individual self or universe etc. but at the same time he holds that they are not different from the Lord because they are effect of the Lord and effect can never be different from the cause.[18]

In his *Prameya Rathāvalī* he devotes whole of the fourth preposition to establish difference. He quotes various texts from *Śvetāśvatara*, *Muṇḍaka* and *Kaṭha Upaniṣads* in order to prove the difference but, at the same time, he never forgets that the Lord is non different in His true nature. Although essentially one, He can manifest Himself simultaneously at different places and different forms by virtue of His inconceivable powers which are nothing but His indentical essence.[19]

But besides this doctrine of inconceivable-difference-non-difference Baladeva recognised the concept of Viśeṣa also. He admits that although there is no real distinction between the Lord and His attributes yet they are spoken of separately like the water and the wave. Such a distinction is found due to the function of *Viśeṣa.* The distinction between the Lord and His attributes has to be accepted for the conventional purposes, because the conventional distinction alone can account for all such statements as the 'Time always exists', 'the Being exist'and so on. In the absence of conventional distinction the question of relationship itself does not arise.[20] Thus even in undifferenced Reality Viśeṣa can account for some difference.[21] But ultimately in his *Siddhānta Ratna* he explains Viśeṣa itself in terms of inconceivability. He states that although consciousness and bliss are of the same nature as the Lord Himself yet he is designated as qualified by them due to inconceivable nature of Viśeṣa.[22] Thus although he accepts he concept of *Viśeṣa* to reconcile contradictions, yet his philosophy is mainly termed as the philosophy of *Acintya Bhedābheda*.

In this connection it may be said that Baladeva borrowed the concept of Viśeṣa from Madhvācārya, who introduced it in his philosophy in order to reconcile monism and pluralism. Madhvācārya's influence on Baladeva is quite obvious as Baladeva himself expressly mentions it in his Prameya Ratnāvalī.[23] Probably this fact only led **Mr. S.N. Dasgupta** to think that the origin of *Acintya-bhedābhedavāda'* is the concept of Viśeṣa of Mādhvācārya.[24] But there is no doubt that '*Acintya bhedābheda'* was introduced originally by jīva Gosvāmī.

In the conclusion of this article, brief comparison of this theory of *Acintya bhedābheda* to other allied theories of Bhedābheda will be given.

Rāmānuja and jīva Goswāmī: According to Rāmānuja the ultimate reality is possessed of or qualified by an infinity of auspicious qualities but although the qualities and the Lord are two different entities yet the qualities are ultimately contained in the essential nature of the Lord. Rāmānuja lays a greater emphasis on the principle of identity. Rāmānuja explained that this doctrine of *bhedābheda* is utenable. He cannot account for a simultaneous untenable. He cannot account for a simultaneous difference non difference. [25] Thus so far as attributes of the Lord are concerned both agree with one another, but as regard their relation, *jīva* considers both difference as well as non difference as true, and on account of the incapability of sloving the problem, he gives it up as inconceivable. Rāmānuja admits the internal difference in the Lord which jīva Gosvāmi absolutely denied.[26]

Bhāskara agrees, though with the theory of jīva Gosvāmī but his *Bhedābheda* is technically called Aupāadhika.[27]

Bhāskara termed his *Brahman* as *Bhinnābhinna-rūpa*. *Abhinna-rupa* which is also called as *Kāraṇa-rūpa* is the real and natural form of the Lord while *Bhinna rūpa* also known as *kārya rūpa* is due to *upādhi* or limited adjunet.[28]

Jīva Gosvāmī recognizes no such sharp distinction between the two aspects of the Lord. *Kāryā rūpa* is also as real as His *Kāraṇa rūpa*. He explains His *Kārya rūpa* on the ground of the incomprehensible nature of His powers.

Nimbārka and jīva Gosvāmī: Nimbārka's doctrine of the relationship between the Lord and the individual self and universe is also that of difference no difference. The Lord is different from the soul and the universe, in the sense that they are His effect and as such cannot be purely identical.[29] The Lord is whole, the individual self His part and there can be no absolute identity between the whole and the part.[30] Simialrly, universe is unconscious and gross entity while the Lord is pure consciousness, non material, transcendent supreme Entity.[31] Therefore, there is a marked difference between the Lord and the individual soul and the universe. This difference is real and unavoidable. But at the same time, Nimbārka, holds that the non difference is also equally real and unavoidable. Universe and the individual soul are not different from the Lord in the sense that they are solely dependent upon the Lord for their existence. They don't have any independent existence apart from the Lord. They being the effect of the Lord cannot exist without Him the cause.[32]

Thus, according non difference[11] (*Svabhāvika bhedābheda*). While according to jīva Gosvāmī the difference as well as non difference, both are inconceivable and therefore, his philosophy is rightly termed as inconceivable difference non difference (*Acintya bhedābheda).*

Footnotes:

1) **Radhā Govinda Nāth**, The Acintya Bhedābheda School, *The Cultural Heritage of India,* vol. III, p.381.

2) *acintyaṁ trakāsahaṁ yajjñānā kāryānyathā nupapattiparamāṇakaṃ* jiva Goswāmi *Bhagavat* Saṁdarbha, pp. 63-64, ed. **Śyām Lāl Goswāmi**, Calcutta.

3*) acintyā bhinnābhinnatvādikalpaiścintayituma-śakyāḥ kevelamarthāpattijñānagoarāḥ sasnti Ibid*, p.64

4) *aghaṭana ghaṭana paṭīyasī. Ibid*, p.65.

5) *Parāsya śaktivividhaiva śrūyate, svābhāvikī jñāna bala kriyā ca. Śvetā Up*. 6.4.

6) *athaikameva svārupam śaktitvena śaktimattvena ca virājati. yasya śakteḥ svarūpabhūatvaṁ nirūpitam tacchaktimatvaprādhānyena virājamānaṁ bhagavat samjñāmāpnoti, tadeva ca śaktivaprādhānyena virājamānaṁ lakṣmīsamjiñāmāonoti* Jīva Goswāmi, *Bhagavat Samdarbha*, p.188.

7) *evañcānandamātram viśeṣyam samastāḥ śaktyaḥ viśeṣaṇāi viśiṣṭo bhagavānityāyātam ibid*., p. 50.

8) Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja, *Caitanya Caitrāmṛta*, 1, 4.84.

9) Baladeva Vidyābhūṣṇa, *Govinda bhāṣya*, *Ved*. *Sū*, 3.2.2.8.

10) *ataḥ svarūpasya kāryonmukhatvenaiva śaktitvam na svasta ityāyātam tataśca viśeṣyarūpam tadeva svayam śaktimadviśaṇarūpam karyonmukhatvam tu śaktiḥ* Jīva Goswāmi, *Sarva Samvadinī*, p.36, ed. **Rasikamohana Vidyābhūṣaṇa**, Calcutta.

11) *athavā prakāśāśrayavadetat pratipattvyam yathā prakāśaḥ savitrastadāśrayaḥ savitā ca nātyantabhinnau ubhayorapi tejastvāviśeṣāt atha ca bhedavyapadeśabhājau bhavata evamihāpīti*. *Ibid*., p.34.

12) *kimiha vijñānānandaśsbdāvekārthau bhinnārthu vā? nādyaḥ paunaruktyāt. antyaścet vijñānatvamānandatvañca tatraikasminneveti tādṛśavagatabhedāpattiḥ* **Jīva Goswāmi** , *Sarva Samvādinī*, p.38.

13*) tasmāt svarūpādahinnatvena cintayitumaśakśakyat vādhbedaḥbnnatvena cintayitumśakyyatvādbhedaḥbhinnatvenaśca cintayitumaśakyatvādabhedaśca pratīyata iti śaktiśaktimatorbhedāvevāṅgīkṛtau tau cācintyau iti ibid*., pp. 36-37.

14) *apare tu 'tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt' (Ved. Sū. 1.2.11) bhede' pyabhede' pinirmaryādadoṣantatidarśanena bhinnatayā cintayitumśakyatvād bhedamapi sadhayanto' cintyabhedābhedavādam svīkurvanti Sarva samvādinī*- 149.

15) *śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvanāmacintyajñāagocarāḥ Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 1.3.2.

16) *svamate tu acintyabhedābhedāveva acintyaśaktimayatvāt. Sarva Samvādinī*, p. 149.

17) **Baladeva vidyābhūṣaṇa**, Govinda bhāṣya, *Ved*. Sū, 1.27; 1.2.3.2.

18) *Ibid*., 2.1.14-20.

19) *ekameva svarūpamacintyaśaktyā yugapat sarvatrāvabhāyekopisan ; sthānāni bhagavadāvirbhā vāspadāni tadvividhalilāśrayabhūtāni vividhabhāva vanto bhaktāśca*.

Baladeva Vidyābūṣaṇa, Govinda bhāṣya, *Ved*. Sū. 3.2.11.

20)*Ibid*., 3.2.31.

21) *na bhinnā dharmmiṇo dharmmā bhedabhānam viśeṣataḥ yasmāt kālaḥ saravadāstiyādirdhīrvidu ṣāmapi.*

Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *Prameya Ratnāvalī* Sacred Books of the Hindus, vol.5, AppendixII, p.12,

22) **S.N. Dasgupta**, *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. IV,p.19,

23) **Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa**, *Prameya Ratnāvalī* p.52.

24) Rāmānuja, *Śri bhāsya, Ved*. Sū. 1.1.1, **S.N. Dasgupta,** *History of Indian*

25) *Bhāskara Bhāṣya Ved*. Sū. 1.4.25; 2.1.14-30; 2.2.2; 2.4.4.

26) **P.N. Shrinivāsachārī**, *The Philosophy of Bhedābheda Introduction*.

27) Bhāskara Bhāṣya *Ved, Sūt.* 1.1.4.

28) *Ibid*. 2.3.43. *Philosophy*. Vol. IV p.12.

29) Nimbārka, *Vedānta Pārigata Saurabha* 2.1.13.

30) *Ibid.2.3.42*.

31) *Ibid.3.3.33*.

32) *Ibid.2.1.16*.

AUTHOR: CHAUDHARI ROMA; **Source**: *The Nimbārka School of Vedānta cf the Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III*, p.310. Calcutta, 1941.

ACINTYA BHEDABHEDA

Unthinkable whether different (or) indentical a philosophical theory developed by **jīva, Baladeva** and other later followers of Caitanya. The term bhedābheda was formulated for the causal doctrine of the Mādhva school to say that the effect (saying) is in some ways identical with the cause (Earth) and in other ways different. The word "unthinkable' (*acintya*) means that it is difficult to assert whether power is indentical with the substance or different form of it: on the one hand, power can not be regarded as something extraneous to the substance, and on the other it is mere indentical with it, there would could be no change, no movement, no effect.

COMPILER: PADMA SUDHI; **Source**: *Aesthetic Theories of India*, Vol. III New Delhi 1988.

ACTION AND EMOTION IN THE FIRST EPIC OF INDIA

The morality and goodness of Sun-dynasty is exposed in the Rāmāyaṇa by Vālmīki with subtle sensitivity of his poetic talents. Rāma was an Aryan. He was the idol moulded by the subtle chisel of Aryan's characteristics.[1] According to the Rāmāyaṇa, a *Kṣatriya* performs worthy actions and gives up the unworthy ones. He follows the authority of norms and his tradition. His life becomes synonym of propriety. Propriety has the spirit of pleasure with the sense of humanity (treat the object as oneself). Morality gives expression to propriety. Ethics combines with its activities.[2] It expresses itself within and without in the form of emotional feelings and volitional feelings respectively. As consciousness is all pervading, pertaining to consciousness, all emotions are also universal. Emotions make free the bound volitional activities and make them introvert, that is, activites unperformed take the shape of emotions themselves and then are geneeralised. Thus he becomes free from limiting conditions whose activities are liberated by his emotional set up. This sense of liberation diffuses the differences and he feels a great equality in all.[3] just as a ball if iis thrown with the force on the earth, it would be bounced with the equal force, similarly, the force of actions would elevate the emotions accordingly. Ethical beauty does not give pleasure only to the mind but it makes man healthy and beautiful with its norm of goodness. This body of five elements gets the reflection of affluenced inner self.[3] Freedom is the nature of the soul. Freedom embraces the dimension of pervasiveness without being conditioned in subject and object as such. Rāma of Vālmīki touches the pervasivenss in his ethical values. This value is the inner-self of Rāma which is shining externally with its perfect outer image. The depth of the ocean, the firmness of Himālaya, the ferocity of the cremation fire, the forgiveness of the earth, if individually are seen, we may feel no impact of it, but if all these qualities we see in a person in their aggregation we would be fascinated by this new combination to see again and again with the newer sense of appreciation. The insentient beauty of ocean, mountains or the earth is only perceptory through our senses. Sensual pleasure makes a man tried of its objects. While spritiual pleasure where consciousness displays itself in each arrangement of the object of pleasure, becomes newer and newer as we discover it from one layer to another. Though had a physical existence of five elements, Rāma was beyond them. The depth of ocean, presented in the character of Rāma, infatuated the whole world. This depth was not sensual but sublime where our senses fail to describe because of their own incapabilties. Rāma is of forgiving nature to humanize the animal (*vānara)* and demon kingdom (*Asura*). Even the ferocity of fire in its propriety is worth of possession.[4] The forest fire, uncontrolled by its nature, ruins the beauty of the whole forest but the fire of the lamp does not destroy but serves the purpose of illumination only. Though fire spreads on the mountains, it does not shake firmness of the mountains, but destroys only the forest's wild life. The anger and firm quality of Rāmā give the abnormal combination of pleasure. Beauty touches the dimension of reality of the consciousness of the self which is reflected itself on physical body also.[5] So goodness is shown not by the truth, and the pleasure of truth but also in the physical beauty of the cupid.[6] This ethical relevancy is seen even by Rāvaṇa, who assumed the form of Rāms by his *Yogic* accomplishment to take Sītā on faith. This credulity deceived Rāvaṇa. As soon he assumed the form of Rāma, his desire for female pleasure vanished.[7] Only imitating the physical beauty of Rāma, If Rāvaṇa experienced the transcendental aesthetic delight how beautiful form it could be in its real sense?

Footnotes:

1) Rām Bāl IV. 8-9 Pāṭhye geye ca madhuraṁ Pramāṇaistribhiranvitaṁ rasaiḥ śṛñgārakaruṇahāsyaraudrabhayānakaiḥ vīrādibhī rasairyuktaṁ kāvyametadagāyatāṁ /
2) *Ram Ayodhyā* CVI 18-38. Rām Bāl 1.16 aryaḥ sarvasamaścaiva sadaiva priyadarśanaḥ
3) *Ibid*, I 17-18 samudra iva gāmbhīrye dhairyeṇa himavāniva /
4) *Ibid* Sundra XXXIV.31. sthānakrodhaḥ prahatrā ca śresṭho loke mahārathaḥ /
5) *Ibid* XXXIX. 29 vijayī svapurīm yāyāattasya sadṛśaṁ bhavet.
6) Ibid., XXXIV.30. rūpavān subhagaḥ śrīmān kandarpa iva mūrtimān /
7) *Mahānātaka*. Kartuṁ cetasi ramarūpamamalam dūvadala śyāmalaṁ
tuccham brahmapadam param paravadhusaṅ ga prasaṇgaḥ kutaḥ/
AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI; **Source**: *Aesthetic Theories of India*, Vol I, BORI Poona, 1983.

ADBHUTA
'Marvellous is a *rasa* or sentiment in Indian poetics. It is created by wonder (*Vismaya)* which is permanent emotion (*bhāva*) in the human subconsciousness. Wonder when aesthetically excited, produces in our mind this *rasa*. The *adbhuta rasa* is created by supernatural things as its determinant (uddipana-vibhāva); it has as its conseqents (*Anubhāva*) exclamation of surprise, weeping, trembling etc; the transitory states accompanying it are generally joy, agitation and contentment.
Dhanañjaya, *Daśa rūpaka*, IV. 79-80

ADBHUTA PUṢPA
Poetry may be like a flower in its delicacy, but one reason Abhinaya calls it an *adbhuta puṣpa*, as it can never be faded. (A.Bh lp.36)

ADBHUTA RAMAYAṆA
It is work contains 27 cantos, attributed to Vālmīki. It describes as a sequel to the Rāmāyaṇa the earliest part of the story and the real nature of Sītā. Sītā assuming the form of *Kālī* is stated to have killed Rāvaṇa. This work actually is quite a later one, is favoured by the Kāshmirian *śāktas*.
AUTHOR: ROY A.K. & GIDIVAMI N.N.; Source: *A Dictionary of Indology,* New Delhi 1987.

ADBHUTA SAGARA
Ocean of wonders is a comprehensive work on omens and portents their effects and means of averting them. The work was began by King Ballāla of Bengal in 1168, but he could not complete it. It was completed by his son Lakṣaṇa Sena. *Ibid.*

ADĀVANTECETINYĀYAḤ
If any thing has a beginning it must have an end; and if must have an end; and if it has a beginning and an end, it has a middle also. Ibid.

ADHIKARAṆA
It is a complete argument treating of one subject. According to the followers of the Mīmāmsā system, a complete adhikaraṇa consists of five members; Viṣaya (the statement under examination); *viṣya Pūrvapakṣa* (doubt, the opposing view), *uttara* (the supporting view) and *nirṇaya* (final conclusion).
Ibid.
1) **ADHYĀSA**
False attribution, imposition by the mind of the nature and characteristic of one thing on something else, that is, shell is mistaken for silver or imposition of the characteristics of phenomenal reality of *Brahman.* The term *Adhyāsa* in the sense of illusion occurs in the *Śanikara* school of Vedānta.
Ibid.
2) **ADHYĀSA**: Disscussion by four prominent *Paṇḍitas* Chattopadhyaya considers his own interpretation of Śankara's *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* to be indisputable interpretation and last word on Śaṅkara's views. He objects to Miśra's use of cetain terms as alien, while he himself quite confidently appropriates them. Miśra wants to find out the key concepts and categories used in a particular system of thought or by particular thinker and see whether those concepts and categories can admit appropriately and thoroughly an alternative interpretation in terms of the concepts and categories so very current in his age. He does not claim any finality for his interpretation. The whole debate between Miśra and Chattopadhyaya seems to veer round: 1. Whether the account of the concept of *adhyāsa* which Śaṅkara gives is logical or psychological. 2. Whether philosophy is concerned with analysis of language or explanation of fact? Whether Śabda as a pramāṇa or source of knowledge signifies critique of language or scriptural revelation. The author has dilated upon the above points. He has not tried to place the thesis of Miśra beyond discussion and dispute that would be dispelling one dogma and developing another. Discussion on his thesis can be carried on in at least two ways-1. about the stand point itself as to whether it is defended convincingly by the interpreter; he would discredit himself if he is vacillating between more than one standpoints, and 2.Whether the interpreter is able to apply the avowed standpoint consistently to all the areas to which it is directed. Chattopadhyaya does not examine Miśra's thesis in either of the above two ways but rejects it without giving it a hearing that it deserves. He does not, therefore, succeed in establishing his overbold pronouncement that the linguistic thesis of Miśra on *adhyāsa* has absolutely no basis in Śaṅkara's text?
PARTICIPANTS: S.K.CHATTERJEE, D. CHATTOPADHYAYA, G. MISRA DAS, GANESH PRASAD; **Source**: *IPQP IV. No.* 4, 1977, Pune.
Abbreviation:
1. IPQP Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Pune.

ĀDHYĀTMA
1) The 'Supreme Soul', the imperishable Brahman, the supreme. Its dwelling in the human body is called adhyātma. (BG. VIII.3)
2) There are three means of valid knowledge in drama. They are *Loka, Veda* and *Adhyātma* (BNś XXV. 120). Three means of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) in drama are *Loka*, *Veda*, *and Adhyātma.* 1) Loka: Human life and its experience in general. 2) *Vedaḥ* formulated knowledge or any branch of knowledge (śastra). 3) *Adhyātma* Experience in or of the self.
3) *Adhyātma tu samsthaṃ* (*svasaṃ*) *vedanaṃ Adhyātma* means self knowledge.
AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI; **Source**: *Abhi Bhārati, Kane, PV Dharmaśastras*, *Vols*. *I, II, III, IV, V*, *Vol,* I and II *have two part*, Pune 1990.
ADI GRANTHA
"Original Book", the scripture of Sikhism. It consists of 6,000 hymns. It is also known as *Guru- Grantha-Sahib*. As 10th Guru, **Guru Gobind Singh** has declared that after him the line of living Gurus would come to an end and then the Grantha itself should be considered as their Guru by the *Sikhs*. The scriptures were first complied in an authoritative

edition by the fifth Guru Arjan Dev. Later, it was expanded and given the final shape by **Guru Govind singh** ji who included the hymns of Arjan, and of Govind's father the ninth **Guru Tegh Bhadadur** in the Grantha. The Gurus represented in the Guru Grantha Saheb are: **Nānaka** 974 hymns including japagī, the morning prayer of the Sikhs; Aṅgad 62 hymns, Amardas 907hymns, Arjan 2,218 hymns and **Tegh Bahadur** 115 hymns. Other contributes were so called Bhagats and included **Nāmadeva**, 61hymns; **Ravidāsa**, 31 hymns; and **Kabir** 226hymns.

Some poems of Punjābī Muslim Mystic Farid (13th cent. A.D.) are also included. The *Adi-Grantha* is arranged in 31 sections corresponding to the *rāgas* in which are the hymns to be sung.

AUTHOR: ROY A.K. & GIDWANI N.N.; Source: *Dictionary of Indology,* 3 Vols. 1983, 84, 85, New Delhi.

ADI - ŚLOKA

'First Verse', Vālmīki the traditional author of the Rāmāyaṇa is said to have discovered poetry when he uttered this first verse on seeing the bereaved female of a pair of Krauñca (curlews) whose male had been shot dead by a hunter. Metre is *Śloka Rām* 1.2.15.

Ibid.

ADI TALA:

Three beat time in Karnatak **COMPILER: PADMA Music. SUDHI; AUTHOR: DESHPANDE VRH; TRANSLATOR: DESHPANDE S.H., DEVADHARA V.C; SOURCE**: *Indian Musical Tradition*, Bombay1987.

ADITYA

Descendant of *Aditi*, a group of gods known from the early Vedic times. The ṚgVeda (II. 27.1) names six *Adityās* viz. *Mitra Aryamā Bhaga*, *Varuṇa*, *Dakṣa* and *Amśa*. Of these gods, Varuṇa was the chief. Consequently, he was the *Aditya.* In later times, the name *Aditya* was used for Sun - god. Their number was increased to twelve and each *Āditya* was associated with a month.

According to one version, the *Āditya* which rises in a month is as below:

Māgha= Aruṇa śrāvaṇa = Gabhasti
Phālguṇa = Sūrya Bhādra= Yama
Caitra = Vedajña Aśvina= Hiraṇyaretaḥ
Vaiśākha =Tapana Kārtika = Divākara
Jyaiṣtha=Indra Agrahāyanṇa =Citra (Mitra)
Aṣāḍha =Ravi Pauṣa= Viṣṇu

The names of *Āditya* are variously given by other authorities (Vp. 1.15.130-132) but many of them are the names of Sun**.** Viṣṇu appears to be the chief among these Ādityas, for Kṛṣṇa says in the *BG* (X.21) among the Adityas, I am Viṣṇu.

AUTHOR: PS.

Abbreviation: V.P. Viṣṇu Purāṇa.

ADVAITA -VEDANTA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

In the conventional Vedānta theory of perception, the modification of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) or mind in the form of object is fundamental mediating factor in all direct experience. Just as water from a tank flows out of a hole to the field and assumes its form, similarly the mind, which is lustrous by nature, flows through the eyes and reaching the space covered by the object jar, etc., assumes the form of the object. Hence, in the case direct perception 'this is jar', mental modificiation in the form of jar being in contact with the jar, the consciousness having jar its limiting adjunct being non different from the consciousness delimited by its mental modification, there is directness or immediacy in the knowledge of jar.

But this view is cumbrous with unconvincing suppositions (of modification of the mind, its flow to the object and assuming its form). Moreover, if sense organs are to serve as a passage for the mind's modification, then one organ is as good as the other. It is not so. Ear cannot perceive colour, again Vedāntic concept of *antaḥkaraṇa* assimilates the two distinct notions of mind and intellect (*buddhi*) to single hypothetical faculty and it is allowed to run right up to the object performing both internal and external functions.

In the modified version of Vedānta theory of perception, however, the antaḥkaraṇa is not required to run to the object. It is replaced by the notion of the series of mediating factors, every term of the series receives light from the preceding term and transmits it to the nearest subsidiary medium, whilt itself to remains stationary. Its advantage is that *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* understood as operations of a series of mediating factors, becomes a clearly measureable phenomenon. It becomes possible not only to show the perception of pleasure and differs from the perception of a jar, but also to measure factors in the respective series.

AUTHOR: CHATURVEDI G.L.; Source: (*ṚM*), *VIII* Nos.1-2 1975-76 Lucknow.

Abbrevations

ṚM Ṛtam journal of Akhil Bhāratīya Sańskrit Pariṣad

Adi Buddha

He expressed first himself in Nepal in the form of a flame of fire and then *Mañjuśrī* erected a temple over it, which is known as *Svayaṁbhū Caitya*.

AUTHOR: ROY A.K. & GIDWANI N.N.; Source: *A Dictionary of Indology,* 3 vols, 1983, 84, 85, New Delhi.

ADIIVASI LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Four racio - linguistic groups have met and flourished in India from time immemorial. These are known as the

'the Sino - Tibetan (or Mongoloid), the Austric, the Dravidian and the Aryan.[1] Compared with the Aryan and Dravidian languages, those of the Sino Tibetan (excepting Manipuri) and Austric groups prevalent in India were in a backward state for a long time, as the speakers of these were in a sort of primitive condition in their way of life. They had, however, a kind of village of folk culture. A slight modicum of folk literature of songs, tales, legends, and traditions developed in these languages. But these were never written down as the languages lacked any system of writing, which the Aryan and Dravidian possessed from very early times.

A serious study of the backward sino Tibetan and Austric languages began only during the middle of the nineteenth century when European scholars took up the job in right earnest. European Christian missionaries of various denominations also began to study these languages and take in hand the preparation of a Christian literature (both of translations form the *Bible* and other sacred Christian literature, and of original compositions to a small extent) for the purpose of proselytization. These non developed languages without any old literature, however, are now fast growing as the languages of groups of people who are becoming self-conscious. As a result, we have during the twentieth century the beginnings of a kind literature in some of the more important Sino Tibetan and Austric languages which so long had no literature to boast of. The purpose of this article is to boast of. The purpose of this article is to present a brief survey of the literatures in the Sino-Tibetan and Austric languages of India as well as a short account of the Dravidian *ādivāsī* languages of this country.[2]

Sino - Tibetan Family

The Sino - Tibetan or Monogoloid speech family extends over a very wide field in Central, Southern, and Eastern

Asia. The area of the spread of Sino Tibetan speeches in India is also considerably vast. Covering the Himalayan slopes, it stretches all over the sub Himalayan slopes, it stretches all over the sub Himalayan tracts (particularly including North Bihar, North Bengal, parts of East Bengal, and Assam reaching up to its southernmost portions) and the north eastern frontiers of the country. Speakers of the Sino-Tibetan languages of Mongoloid origin are considered to have penetrated the Indian frontiers before the advent of the Aryans into India. They have been referred to in the oldest Sanskrit literature as Kirātas. The original Sino-Tibetan speech had as its *nidus,* are of characterization, the head waters of the Hwang-Ho or Yellow River to the north east of the China. Here the original Sino - Tibetan speech, the ultimate source of Chinese (Ancient Chinese and various modern forms), Tibetan, and Burmese, and possibly also Siamese, had taken its form at least 3,000 years before Christ.[3] The languages, namely, Chinese, Burmese, Siamese, and Tibetan have advances literatures. The first three definitely do not belong to India. Nor does Tibetan, strictly speaking. But a number of important numerically strong dialects of Tibetan like Den jong ke or Sikkimese, Lho-ke or Bhutanese (also Bhutani or Bhotia), Balti, Sherpa, Lahuli and Loach are current within the boundries of India. Although these dialects are recent arrivals in India, they are none the less counted as languages of country. There is however, not much original literature in them (including even Den-jong-ke and Lho-ke, the most important of the group). The people speaking these dialects generally study Tibetan, particularly the classical form of it. The large number of Tibetan refugees who have come over to India after the Chinese take over of Tibet also speak and study Tibetan. Although the influence of Buddhism in the evolution of Tibetan literature is quite properly within the purview of Indian studies, Tibetan literature as such cannot be considered as part of Indian literature. The Sino Tibetan family of languages is broadly divided into two main branches, Siamese Chinese and Tibeto Burman. With the exception of *Ahom* (now entirely extinct) and *Khamti* (represented by a very meager number of speakers) of the *Tai* (or *Thai*) group of speeches belonging to the Simese Chinese sub family, all the languages spoken Sino Tibetans in India belong to the Tibeto Burman branch. *Ahom* was current in Assam in the past. It used to be spoken by the Ahom conquerors of Assam. But by the beginning of the nineteenth century it had died out. The Ahoms have finally become Hindus, but some of the priests of their old religion have kept up some traces of the old pre Hindu Ahom religion. The Ahoms brought their own system of writing from North Burma. This writing was ultimately of Indian origin, and there are manuscripts in the Ahom language in this alphabet. Old Ahom coins of Assam have legends in the Ahom languagein this script. The Ahom people had a great historical sense. The Modern Assamese word for 'history' is *burañjī* which is an Ahom word the Sanskrit word *itihāsa* is nt current. Some of the Ahom *burañjs* have been published by the British Government, and one may particularly mention an important Ahom history of Assam printed in the Ahom character with an English transalation by Rai Bhadur Golap Chandra Barua, published in 1903. Sicne the Ahom speech is now extinct, only some old men here and there keeping up a smattering knowledge of a few Ahom words and phrases, it has ceased to have any literary development.

Tibeto Burman languages of India have been broadly divided into the following four groups, viz. Tibetan, Himalayan, North East Frontier, and Assam Burmese. The Tibetan group has already been discussed. In the 1961 Census, however, 'Bhotia' was preferred as a more acceptable nomenclature for the group of these speeches within Indian broders, as Tibetan refers more pointly to the territory outside India. Speeches of the Himalayan group are spoken along the tracts to the south of the Himalayas from Himachal Pradesh in the west to the western borders of Bhutan in the east. They are further divided into two sub groups, Pronominalized and non Pronominalized. The speeches of the Pronominalized sub group have shown evidence of Austric contact and influence in their present structure. Most of the speeches of the Himalayan group are represented by very small number of speakers within the Indian borders. Kanauri and Limbu belonging to the Pronominalized sub group are numerically the more dominant languages of the Himalayan group. The North-East Frontier group (known also as the North Assasm group) includes a number of languages prevalent in the north eastern frontiers of the country. Some important languages of the group are Abor (Adi), Miri, Aka, Dafla, and Mishmi. The Assam Burmese group is the most important of the four Tibeto Burman groups of speeches of India, numerically as wellas culturally. It has four main sub groups, viz. kuki Chin, Mikir, Bodo, and Naga. Besides these, there are a few more found within the Indian borders, the speakers of which are, however, very small in number. They are, for instance, Singhpho of Assam and Mogh of Tripura. The former belongs to the Kachin group of the Tibeto Burman sub family, a greater of which is found in Burma, and the latter is grouped under Arakanese included in the Burma group of Tibeto Burman sub family. Except Manipuri, which belongs to the kuki Chin sub group, none out of the quite large number of dialects of the Tibeto Burman group has important literature. The other languages, until recently, possessed no written literature. They had only some songs and poems, religious and otherwise, and some folk tales, stories, and legends in prose, all current orally. The modern literature which had started under European and Christian inspiration is not as yet of any value. Beyond the boundaries of India, Newari of Nepal, however, presents an important Himalayan (Pure or non Pronominalized) form of the Tibeto Burman family of speeches. It shows a fairly old tradition of high literary development. Although primarily a spoken language of Nepal, a very meagre number of its speakers are also found in India in Sikkim, West Bengal, Mahārāṣṭra, and Bihar. Let us now discuss a few important languages of the Tibeto Burman sub family current in India.

Kuki Chin Group: Manipuri (Meithei)

Manipuri of Meithei is the official language of the State of Manipur. It is, according to the 1971 Cenus, spoken by more than seven lakh people. Manipuri is the most important of the Tibeto Burman langugages, and in literature certainly of much greater importance than Newari of Nepal. For quite a long time it has been recognised by the University of Calcutta and was given a place in the curriculum of the university from the Matriculation of the Degree level, Pass and Honours. The same recognition has been given to it by the University of Gauhati. This testifies to the important status of Manipuri as a language of study and culture. Manipuri is now written in the Bengali Assamese script. It is virtually the Bengali script, with one letter recently taken over from Assamese the letter for w. Manipuri has quite a separate alphabet of its own, which is found in old manuscripts, and it has also been put in type. But books are no longer printed in this old Manipuri script, the study of which has become specialized subject for scholars and experts. From the time King **Gahrib Newaz Singh** (1709-48) of Manipur, the Manipuri people, through the influence of the Bengali Vaiṣṇavas of the Caitanya school from Navadvīpa and Sylhet, accepted for their language (c. 1740) the Bengali script which has now become fully established. This has enabled Manipuri to come in intimate touch with

Bengali as well as Sanskrit literatures. There is an attempt on the part of a small number of Manipuri patriots to revive the use of the old Manipuri script. But as it is a rather complicated system of writing, it does not seem to receive much support from the people.

Early Manipuri Literature

The Manipuris, a Meithei people, became Hindus at least 2,000 years ago; and in Manipur chronicles, which are mostly preserved in the Old Manipuri language and in older script, we have a fairly detailed history of the Manipuri kings and their Hindu background. But early Manipuri literature prior to the middle of the eighteenth century is more or less a sealed book to the Manipuri public. Only Manipuri scholars who specialize in the language know about this speech, the vocabulary of which is now quite archaic and different from Modern Manipuri. There are books like *Numit kāppā*, narrating some old Manipuri legends, and there is a rich literature of chronicles as well as works on the movements of the tribes in Manipuri which are preserved in the old Manipuri language.[4] The beginning of this Old Manipuri literature may go back to 1,500 years or even 2,000 years from now. The late **Yumajao Singh** thought the *Poiretion Khunthok,* a prose work describing the settlement of some Meithei tribes, is the oldest work in Manipuri going back to the third century A.D. It is said that there is a copper-plate inscription of Kind Khoṅgṭekcā, invoking Śrī Hari (i.e.Viṣṇu with Lakṣmī Śiva and Devī, dating from c. A.D. 790. But that is problematical, as the king is said to have ruled the Meitheis from A.D. 763 to 773. A rich literary tradition is said to have existed during the closing centuries of the first millennium of the Christian era. *Ceithārol Kumbābā* is one of the oldest Manipuri court chronicles (*Kumbābā kum* means 'year,' now obsolete, and *bābā* or *pābā* means 'accounts') This gives a traditional history of Manipur from the second century A.D. onwards.

This early Manipuri literature, although fairly extensive, has not yet been scientifically studied, and we are not sure about the dates when the individual works, as available now, were first written or compiled.[5] But we know that the sixteenth century was a great period for the development of Manipuri prose literature of histories and chronicles. *Nugbān Pombī Luvāobā* narrates the legendary history of the hero, after whom the book is named, and of his beloved wife koubru Namīno. This legend relates the story of the restoration of life of Koubru, the gods being moved by the love of the husband for his departed wife. Leithak Leikhāron gives an account of Manipuri story of Creation. This book deals with the history of the Meithei gods and goddesses, and the songs and dances connected with them. Certain portions of this distinctive work contain lists of the Pathan kings of Bengal, which show that it is rather late in origin. *Kāinarol* gives us a collection of some romantic and heroic stories of ancient Manipur. The 'National Romantic Legend of Manipur,' the great love story of Prince Khambā and Princess Thoibī, which after a happy union of two lovers, ended in a tragedy, began to be treated in Old Meithei ballads from the middle of the twelfth century. The lovers lived about A.D. 1130 during the rule of king Loyāmba. These ballads used to be sung by wandering minstrels to the accompaniment of the one stringed fiddle called *penā*, and this old body of romantic ballads was later treated into the great epic romance, *Khambā Thoibī Śeieṅg*, 34,000 lines by a modern **Meithei** poet, Hijom **Anganghal Singh**, about 1940. *Niṅgthauron Lambubā* is a historical work giving an account of the milltary expansions of the kings of Manipur. It is in a way a book which supplements *Ceithārol Kumbābā*. A most interesting work is the romantic tale of prince Noṃpokniṅgthau and Princess **Pānthoibī**, daughter of king **Cing Niṅgthau**. They felt violently in love with each other, and although Pānthoibī was later on married to a chief named Khābā, her husband was frightened of her, and never dared approach her. The lovers met, but their career was cut short. This story has been sublimated as a religious myth. The hero was considered to be an incarnation of Śiva, and Pānthoibī was Pārvatī incarnate, and it was case of *parakīyā* love as between kṛṣṇa and Rādha which is a very vital mystico philosophical doctrine with the **Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism** of Navadvīpa, which again is the accepted form of Vaiṣṇavism in Manipur. This work of Old Manipuri, of unknown date, has been published with translation in Modern Manipuri. There are similar other books in Manipuri which mostly go back to the times before the beginning of the **Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava** influence from Bengal and the influence from North India through the Rāmānanī sādhu missionaries, from the early eighteenth century.

A new period began in the history of Manipur as well as of Manipuri literature from the region of **Gharib Newaz** when the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the most popular, and in way the most important texts of Hinduism, began to be rendered into Manipuri. Manipuri adopted a version of the *Rāmāyaṇa* from the Bengali work of Kṛttivāsa. Portions of the *Mahābhārata Adi*, *Virāṭa, and Aśvamedhika parvans* were also rendered into Manipuri. The older literary tradition suffered a set back owing to an ill conceived action of a Rāmānandī missionary, Śāntadāsa Gosāiñ, whose vandalism in getting together and burining a number of Old Manipuri manuscripts appears to have received the support of Gharib Newaz; and this continued during the eighteenth century. But a few books in the old style were still written. One of these is a book known as *Lāṅgan*. It is of the nature of Nīti literature in Sanskrit and has been recently published. King **Bhāgyacandra Singh** of Manipur (*c*. A.D. 1780) brought in a great Vaiṣṇava revival. One might say that the confluence of the Early and Modern periods of Manipuri literature took place during the second half of the eighteenth century. There were books in a new *genre* or style like travel books (e.g. the work describing the pilgrimage of King **Bhāgyacandara**), and genealogical works also came into being. King **Bhāgyacandra** with the help of his daughter **śija Lāioibī,** who was a great devotee of Kṛṣṇa (she has been called the **'Mīrābāī'** of Manipur), raised, the Manipuri folk dance *laihārāobā*, a dance of Creation, to an emotional and religious level and added to it an aspect of high artistic and spiritual beauty and merit. Treatises on Manipuri dance and music were complied in both Sanskrit and Manipuri. There are also Old Manipuri texts on medicine and medicinal herbs of Manipur as well as Tāntric works on the cure of diseases, besides works on astrology. These all show Brāhmaṇical inspiration and influence. There is a sort of a national archive for the most exalted families of Manipur, which is preserved in the court of the Maharaja of Manipur, **Śaṅgāi Phamāṅg**. This is regularly brought up to date. It is of great historical value for Manipur.

Modern Manipuri Literature

The Modern period of Manipuri really came into existence with the beginning of the nineteenth century after English education had found a place among the after English education had found a place among the Manipuri people. European officials and missionaries, who came to Manipur and Bengali teachers helped the Manipuris to build a new literature in their language. **Rev. W. Pettigrew, Wince, Babu Ramsunder Roy,** and educated Manipuris like **Makar Singh, Munal Singh, Jatiswar Singh,** and **Haodijam Chaitanya Singh** came forward. Maharaja **Churachand Singh** (1891-1941) patronized this movement for facilitating the development of Manipuri literature. The first Manipuri book to be printed was a history of Manipur, entitled *Maṇipurer lithāsa*, which came out in 1980 in the

Bengali script, and at first the new literature in Manipur consisted only of textbooks in different subjects. Then, with the growth of a school educated class, other types of literature came in A special aspect of modern Manipuri literature is its wealth of translations, particularly from Sanskrit, Bengali, and English. The *Manipuri Sahitya Parishad* has published a list of Manipuri books printed from 1891 to 1969; the total number of titles comes to 1,078. It has been claimed that the list is yet incomplete and the actual number can easily come to 2,000 Apart from translations, there are numerous works in modern Manipuri literature on various important subjects which include history, geography, Hindu religion and philosophy, social sciences, grammar and linguistics, history of literature, and the art of dance and music. The creative branches of literature, like poetry fiction, biography, and literary criticism are also well represented in Manipuri. In discussing modern Manipuri literature one should first take into account the contributions of the great translators. It was they who transformed the mind and spirit of Manipuris by extending the horizon of their literary experience, and made them familiar with some of the greatest things in Indian literature, ancient and modern. They brought the Manipuris in line with the rest of advanced India in their thought ideas, and aspirations. The greatest name in the history of modern Manipuri literature, particularly in this line, is that of **Panditaraja Phurailatpam Atomobapu Sarma Sahityaratna** (1878-1963). An outstanding scholar, he made translations into Manipuri of such religious texts in Sanskrit as the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa,* the Bhagavad Gītā, the Gītagovinda, the *Gopāla sahasranāma*, and the Caṇḍī He translated portions of the *Ṛg-Veda* and the entire *Sārasvata* grammer of Sanskrit (with a Meithei commentary), besides rendering into Manipuri other religious and ritualistic texts. He also brought out interpretative editions of Old Manipuri texts on history, literature, and Manipuri culture. A religious teacher, educationist, and political leader, he led his people to the path of freedom from both Britilsh interference and Manipuri medievalism. His illustrious example was followed by other scholars like **Chingangbam Kalachand Singh** who brought out a Manipuri translation of the entire sanskrit *Mahābhārata* (together with the sanskrit text) in twenty one volumes. His other works, included *Vāsudevacarita,* a long poem 12,000 lines on the life of Kṛṣṇa. **Haobam Iboyaima Singh** translated all the writing of Bengali poet **Michael Madhusudan Dutt**, besides some of works of Sarat Chandra Chatterjee, and a good many Sanskrit works. Apart from these three names, there are dozens of other scholars who made the most important Sanskrit and Bengali literary works available in Manipuri. One can read in Manipuri the Bengali philosophical classic of Vaiṣṇavism, Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja's *Caitanya caritā ṃṛta*, as well as most of the novels of **Bankim Chandra Chatterjee** and a good many of those by **Sarat Chandra Chatterjee** and other famous writers of Bengali. **Shakespeare** and **Ibsen**, **Tolstoy** and **Prem Chand, Vivekananda,** and **Gandhi**, **Rabindranath** and Kālidāsa can, at least in some of their important works, be read in Manipuri. It may be mentioned in this connexion that a fine translation, by a number of scholars and poet, of a representative selection of poems, songs, dramas, and stories from **Rabindranath Tagore**, *Ravīndra Nācom*, has recently been published by the Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi.

An important figure in the field of creative literature of the Modern period is **Lamabam Kamal Singh** whose romantic realistic social novel *Mādhavī* is a pioneering effort in this direction. It was published in the thirties of the present century. **Hijom Anganghal Singh** (1894-1940) wrote some fine novels, one of which, *Fāherā*, depicts a story of love between a Manipuri Hindu young man and a Muslim girl. He has also written a number of dramas of which *ibemmā* deserves special mention. But he was particularly famous as a poet. Besides *Khambā Thoibi Śeireṅg* (already referred to), he has several other volumes of poetry of his credit **R.K. Shitaljit Singh** wrote some novels with a moral and religious purpose. His works include *Thādokpā, Imā, and Rohiṇī* **Khwairakpam Chaoba Singh** is the author of the popular historical novel, *Lavaṅgalatā,* which deals with the period 1597-1952. Among other fiction writers, the most notable are: **Jijom Guno Singh** (author of four popular novels), **Takhellabam Thoibi Devi** (*Rādhā),* **K. Elengbam Rajanikanta Singh** (*Marup Ani),* **Sansenbam Nadiyachand Singh,** and **Khumantham Ibohal Singh.**

The drama is a literary form particularly clear to the heart of the Manipuris. In Imphal city there are half a dozen regular playhouses where plays in Manipuri (original dramas, or translations or adaptations from Bengali and English) are regularly staged. The first plays were adapted from Bengali; and it was only in 1905 that the first original Manipuri drama, Pāgālini, by a Bengali school teacher was staged. Afterwards Manipuri has witnessed a host of eminent playwrights by whose efforts Manipuri drams has been established on a solid ground. Chief among them are: **Sorokhaibam Lalit Singh, Mayanglambam Birmangal Singh** (author of over a dozen plays including *pidonnu*), **Tongbram Gitchandra Singh** (author of over dozen plays including some translations from **Shakespeare, Bernard Shaw,** and **Ibsen), Maibam Rasmcharan Singh** (author of about twenty plays), **Haobam Tomba Singh, Lairenmayum Ibungohal Singh,** and **Rajkumri Binodini Devi** The Manipuri drama is quite a convincing example of the high quality and attractiveness of the culture of Manipur.

In pure poetry, in literary and other essays, in historical studies, and in all other domains of literature, Manipuri has quite a rich harvest of books to show. Recently, **Rajkumer Sri Surendrajit Singh** brought out a very comprehensive work in Manipuri on prosody and metre (1969). It is only unfortunate that so far no English translations (or translations in other Indian languages) of a least some of the outstanding classics in Manipuri are available, although Manipuri scholars are not lagging behind in writing helpful books in English on the history and literature of their local culture. Manipuri literature is undoubtfully quite an advanced modern Indian literature, and cannot be described as a backward literature of the so called *ādivasi* or primitive people. The Manipuri writers are already in the front line of modern Indian writing and translation. The **Kuki - Chin** group, to which Manipuri belongs, consists of a number of other speeches also. Of them, Lushai (Mizo), Thado, Hmar, Paite, Lakher, Pawi, Halam, Kom, and Vaiphei are the more numerically strong languages Lushai (Mizo) is recorded to possess a strength or more than two lakh speakers.

Bodo Group

At one time Bodo or Bodo group of speeches were current throughout the entire valley of the Brahmaputra, in North Bengal up to northern Bihar, and in East and South-East Bengal. This very extensive Bodo bloc is, however, broken up due to the intrusion of the Aryan Assamese and Bengali. The Assam-Bengal Bodo speeches are the Bodo, the Rajbangsi, the Koch, the Mech, the Rabha, the Dimasa, the Kachari, the Chutiya, the Garo, the Haijong, and the Tipra (or Tripuri) dialects. These are very close to each other, and are largely mutually intelligible. But, barring some folk-tales and songs, the native literature in these Bodo dialects has been very meager so far. The Bodo speakers of Assam are now falling in line with the Assamese-speaking Hindus of the Brahmaputra Valley, but are nevertheless trying to rehabilitate their language and create a literature in it. A

half-yearly journal called the *Alari* or 'Divine Light', printed in the Assamese alphabet, is coming out from 1959 from the Bodo Literary and Cultural Society, Gauhati, with serious articles of the type found in Assamese and Bengali journals of repute. Scholar and ethnologist, musician and folklorist, poet and writer, the late Bishnu Rabha was a great exponent of Bodo culture. Assamese scholars of Bodo are also helping, and Bodo writers are coming up. But not much advance has so far been made, although Bodo (Kachari) is being taught in the primary schools in Assam.

The State of Tripura is seeking to create a literature in the Tipra form of Bodo, and Broadcasts in Tipra are on the air several times a week. The ruling house of Tripura, Bodo (Tipra)-speaking to start with, became oriented towards Bengali and Sanskrit from the end of the fifteenth century, and eventually Bengali was made the official language of the State. Tipra is now spoken by a small minority, and it is split up into several dialects. Garo, another Bodo speech, has acquired some status as the language of a part of the new Meghalaya State, and has interesting folktales as well as a Christain literature (though not very extensive) to boast of. Mikir, on grounds of strong Bodo affinities, is considered closer to the Bodo group. Current in the Mikir Hills in Nowgong and Sibsagar districts of Assam, it is represented by about two lakh speakers. Mikir has no literature as such, but has some folk-tales. The tale of a young man who had a god's daughter as his bride is beautiful.

Naga Group

Unlike the languages of the Bodo group, those of the Naga group are well known for their mutual unintelligibility. Chief among the languages included in the group are: Angami, Sema, Ao, Lotha, Mao, Konyak, Kabui, and Lepcha. 'Lately', writers R.C. Nigam, formerly Assistant Registrar General of India (Languages), '…since larger tracts of Nagaland were brought under administration, more information of Naga languages has been reported; but pending actual investigations and studies, these reports can be considered only tentetive'.[6]

Among the languages of the Naga group, Lepcha deserves some special reference. The Lepcha dialect is current in the State of Sikkim and Darjeeling District of West Bengal. Till recently, the immediate affinities of Lepcha were not definitely known, and it was believed to be speech belonging to the Himalayan group of the Tibet-Burman sub-family. But now it has been connected by Robert Shafer, a great American authority on the Sino-Tibetan languages, with the Naga group of the Tibeto-Burman sub-family. Lepcha had developed an alphabet of its own which is now falling ints disuse. It is evidently inspired by the Tibetan script, but it is rather different from it. King Chakdor Namgye of Sikkim, born in 1686, is said to have created this alphabet out of a partriotic Lepcha feeling. The Lepchas were mainly Buddhists, although many of them have now become Christians. The Lepcha monks, in the Tibetan tradition, have a small but distinctive literature of Buddhist religious texts and law books. The Christian missionaries have also translated portions of the *Bible,* and they have sought to create a literature of Christian hymns, side by side with Buddhist hymns. In spite of the strong surrounding influences of either the Indo-Aryan Nepali or the Sino-Tibetan Sikkimese, the Lepchas preserved their speech surprisingly intact. But the language is now dying out as its speakers are on the decline. They are merging with the Hindu Nepalis as well as other neighbouring peoples, and their literary life is at a standstill.

AUSTRIC FAMILY

Like the Sino-Tibetan, the Austric speech family also occupies quite a vast terrain spreading over substantial portions of South and South-Eastern Asia and extending right up to the eastern, northern, and southern extremities of the Pacific. It is also found in Madagascar on the African coast. The Austric family of languages falls into two main branches: Austro-Asiatic and Austro-nesian. The Austric languages of India are included in the Austro-Asiatic sub-family, which are represented by the languages of the Munda or Kol (Kolian) group confined to the central, eastern, and north-eastern India and Khasi and Nicobarese of the Mon-Khmer group, spoken in Meghalaya and the Nicobar Islands respectively. The Austric speakers of India, erstwhile backward, are now very rapidly being integrated with the general mass of the Indian people and attaining to the same or similar cultural status with the rest of the people. The Austric languages were spoken in India in very ancient times, much earlier than the arrival of the Aryans. There are references to them in the oldest Sanskrit literature. The Austric people were spread all over the riverain plains of India, particularly the Gangetic and possibly also the Indus basins, and they built up the basic agricultural civilization of India. Many of their religious ideas, rituals, and ceremonies have continued down to our times, having been absorbed in a composite. Aryan-non-Aryan culture which is the basis of Hinduism. They were known in ancient Sanskrit as Niṣādas. Some of their tribes were also called Bhillas and Kollas (modern Indian Bhills and Kols), besides Pulindas, Mātaṅgas (modern Indian Mangs), Sāmanapalas (modern Indian Saontals or Santals), Muṅḍās (modern Indian Mundaris) and Puṇḍras (modern Indian Punds), etc. Their languages did not evolve any high literature, but remained in a rather primitive state, although a good many words from the Niṣāda or Austric languages have found a place in Old and Middle Indo-Aryan, Sanskrit and the various Prakrits, as well as Dravidian and the present-day New Indo-Aryan speeches. Apart from these words, which are sometimes very difficult to identity because of their mutilation in form through the ages, we do not have any records of these Niṣāda languages. When the Aryans came, the Niṣāda-speakers living in the riverain plains of North India appear to have gradually merged into the general mass of the Aryan-speaking people and given up their ancient dialects, allied both to the present-day Kol (or Munda) and the Mon-Khmer speeches, in favour of the speech of a new and energetic *Herrenvolk,* the Aryans. In some areas they have become Dravidian-speakers also, and in the Himalayan regions as they came within the orbit of the Mongoloids, they took up Mongoloid dialects to a limited extent. But more primitive groups among the Austrics, who lived mostly in out-of-the-way areas in the hills and jungles of central and eastern India, or who retired to these places before the Dravidians and the Aryans, have so far preserved their traditional languages. Present-day Austric languages in India are represented by them.

Ādivāsī languages, both Austric and Mongoloid, began to be studied, as already mentioned, only during the nineteenth century when European scholars and Christian missionaries became interested in them. The objective of the Christain missionaries was, however, to render their scriptures and literature in these languages with a view to converting the primitive *ādivāsīs* to the Christian faith. But they did a great service in introducing a proper scientific study of those languages. At first, it was thought that the Austric languages and the Dravidian speeches belonged to the same family. But by 1860, Max Müller and others established their separate identity. All the Austric tribes in India had just a little oral literature, handed down from generation to generation, consisting of their mythological and semi-historical legends and traditions, and some folk-poetry, party relating to their religious ceremonies, but mainly with regard

to the life they used to live. This poetry as well as their oral legends have a unique literary value. A good deal of their mythology and ritual has been transformed and passed into the mass of Hindu Purāṇa legends. But the matter requires deeper and more detailed investigation. The recording of all this oral literature started from the fourth quarter of the last century. Earlier, the various Christian missionary bodies had tried to give to the Austric tribes some Christian literature-translations of the Gospels and other portions of the *Bible,* and some Christian hymns and other works. Although the Austric speakers in India represent only a small fraction of the total Indian population, their languages are of great interest to the students of linguistics and human culture. We may now discuss some of the important Austric (Austro-Asiatic) speeches of India, namely, Santali and Mundari of the Munda group and Khasi of the Mon-Khmer group.

Sāntali

Among the Austric languages of the present day, the most important is Santali. Spoken by about four million people, it represents the largest group in India speaking an *ādivāsī* language. The original home of Santali was in the Chota Nagpur plateau in the Santāl Parganas area and the surrounding contiguous tracts in Bihar, West Bengal, and North Orissa. They have also been taken as indentured labourers to the teagardens of Assam and North Bengal, where they now form a settled population, very slowly getting merged with the local Assamese and Bengali speakers. In Bengal, there is a sizable Santāl population following its own traditional religion, which is in away akin to Purāṇic Hinduism. Being within the orbit of Brahmaṇism, the Santals have been very largely influenced by Hindu notions. Although they have retained their language, culturally and intellectually (and even spiritually) they are becoming just like other Bengali-speaking Hindus, adopting Bengali Hindu personal names, but retaining their Santāl surnames. The same can be said to a lesser extent of the Santāls in Bhihar and Orissa.

The Santāls never had a script of their own, and Santali was first written in the Bengali script, and to a small extent in the Oriya and Nāgarī scripts also in Orissa and Bihar respectively. Then through Christian missionary initiative, the Roman alphabet was adopted for Santāli, and a rich literature of mythological tales, traditions, folk-tales as well as folk-songs came to be collected and published in the Roman script through both missionary and non-missionary enterprises. Some Bengali scholars also have taken an active interest in this.

Santāli literature may be classified into two main types: (i) the earlier primitive literature based on oral tradition and (ii) the modern literature which is being created by educated Santāls on the model of the literature in the Aryan languages, particularly Bengali and Oriya, and to some extent Hindi. The second type of literature does not have any special Santāli character about it. Nevertheless, it is in the field now and is making good progress.

There are two great works in Santāli containing collections of old traditions and legends. The first is *Hor-ko-ren Mare Hapram-ko-reak' Kathā* or 'The Traditions of the Ancestors of the Hor or Santal People'. The traditions contained in this work were given out a Santāl *guru* or preacher named Kolean (Kalyan). Rev. A.S. Skrefrsud, a Scandinavian missionary belonging to the Santāl Mission from the Northern Churches at Benagaria near Dumka in the Santal Parganas, collected this oral narration and published it in the Roman script as a book in 1887. This book was never translated into English, although it was used by many scholars. Only recently, about 1965, it was translated into Bengali by Baidyanath Hansdak under the auspices of the Government of India Census Commission. It is a great compilation of Santāl stoires and legends in their earlier forms. The second work is *Kherwal-vaṁśa Dharam-puthi* or 'The Sacred Book of the Kherwal Race' (*kherwal* being an old name for the Santāls and other allied Kol people). It is compilation as well as composition, but much more extensive in its content, made by Ramdas Majhi Tudu of Ghatsila Singhbhum District (Bihar), who was very well informed about the traditions of his people and its religious and social culture. This book was published by him in the Bengali script from Calcutta about A.D. 1902 with a number of woodcut illustrations designed by him relating to Santali myths and social life.[7] These two books are very important as they form a sort of source-material for Kol or Munda legends and antiquities as they have been preserved in Santāli.

Next to these myths and religious traditions and usages, there is a long series of Santāli folk-tales dealing mostly Santālī belief in the *bongas* or gods and godlings, and giving a very picture of the primitive life of the Santal people in their jungle villages. The best collections of such stories were made by the Scandinavian missionaries, particularly by **P. O. Bodding**, who was one of the greatest authorities on Santal folklore and tradition. The British missionary **A. Campbell** also made a collection. P.O. Bodding's collection of Santal folk-tales have been published in very convenient editions by the Institute for Comparative Folklore in Oslo (Norway), and also from Copenhagen, giving the Santali text in Roman script on one page and an English translation on the page opposite. **C.O. Bompas** made an English translation of some of these folk-tales in which we have quite a good nucleus of a native Santali prose literature of great value. The Christian missionaries made a translation of both the Old and the New Testament of the *Bible* and published also the translations of some Christain religious classics like *The Pilgrim's Progress* of **John Bunyan**. Besides these folk-tales in prose, there is a rich mass of Santali lyrics generally in couplets and sometimes in more than four to six lines. In these lyrics, we find thumb-nail sketches of Santali life. They have a beauty of their own. Collections of these have been made also by Bengali lovers of Santali lore. Special mention may be made of a fine collection of Santālī poems published from Patna by the Government of Bihar in the Roman script under the editorship of **W.G. Archer** in 1935. **Rabindranath Tagore** also appreciated the poetic beauty of these Santali songs. So long there was no literature of a modern type in Santali. Lately, however, genuine modern literature in Santali has been coming into existence through the creative efforts of educated Santāls, particularly in Bengal. This hardly forty years old. Already there are some Santāl writers who have brought out volumes of short stories and general essays, published in the Bengali script or in the Roman. There are also poems on life and religion in the usual modern Indian style, which follow more or less the same pattern as Bengali literature. Some Santālī translations from **Tagore** have appeared, and are regularly appearing. Versions of the Hindu Purāṇa tales also occasionally come out. A translation of the *īśa Upaniṣad* has been published. Literary journals have also made their advent. Mention may be made of the *Ebhen* ('Light'), a quarterly literary journal, and *Hariyar Sakam* ('Green Leaf'), a weekly. These are printed in Bengali characters. Already some educated Santals, with whom Bengali is almost their second mother-tongue, are writing good poetry in Santali. Among Santali writers of recent times, the following outstanding names may be mentioned: **Naeke Mangal Chandra Soren, Sarada Prasad Kisku, Balkishor Baske, Aditya Mitra Saontali, Babulal Murmu, Bhagavat Murmu, 'Tade Sutam', Raghunath Murmu, Rupnarayan Hembrom, Sridhar**

Kumar Murmu, Gomasta Prasad Soren, Chandranath Murmu, and Kaliram Soren.[8] **Jugaldas Mandi, Ramchandra Murmu, Mandal Herbrom, Durgacharan Hembrom, Hopon Chandra Baske, Birlita Hembrom, Rabilal Mandi,** and **Stephen Murmu** are mainly poets and essayists. Among the Santālī writers of the previous generation, who are no more alive, mention may be made of **Sadhu Ramchand Murmu Thakur** (religious reformer and teacher of Santāl philosophy of religion), **Ramdas Majhi** Tudu (author of *Kherwal-vaṁśa Dharam-puthi,* as already mentioned), and **Charu Chandra Sinha Soren** (prose writer). There is a very great interest among the educated Santals in the development of their language and literature. On the basis of old Santali religious notions, and inspired by Hindu philosophy, a Santal philosophy of religion and life is also developing, as conceived by **Ramdas Majhi Tudu** and **Sadhu Ramchand Murmu Thakur.** These are among the very hopeful signs of the development of Santali literature and thought during the present age.

The Santālī language, as said before, started to be written in the Bengali script, and then the Roman was adopted and established for it. Sandals are now, however, required to know more than one script. In West Bengal, they must know the Bengali script; in Orissa, the Oriya script; in Bihar, the *Nāgarī* script, and in Assam, the Assamese script (which is the same as Bengali). For inter-State purposes, the Roman alphabet is admirably suitable. By far the largest and most significant mass of Santali literature has already been published in the Roman script, thanks mainly to the Scandinavian missionaries. Recently, a Santali gentleman came forward with a newly-created alphabet of his own, called the Ol script. This is conceived in the same script as the Roman, each vowel and consonant sound having a separate letter. But the shapes of the letters are very complicated, compared with the Roman. Some Santals are, however, advocating the use of this script for their language.

Mundari

Next in importance to Santālī is the Mundari language spoken by nearly a million of *Mundas,* who, like the Santals, are spread over the four States of Bihar (Chota Nagpur), Orissa, Assam, and to some extent West Bengal. The literary life of the Mundas runs parallel to that of the Santals. Through Christian (Roman Catholic) missionary efforts mainly, Mundari myths and legends as well as folk-tales have been collected and published in the Roman script. Mundas living in the Chota Nagpur have generally to learn the Nāgarī script which is used side by side with the Roman in writing Mundari. The late **Sarat Chandra Roy** made a very detailed study of Munda life and culture, and collected some beautiful Mundari songs or poems. **W.G. Archer** is also responsible for a very good collection of Mundari poems (*Munda Durang*), published by the Government of Bihar. The total output of literature in Mundari, both the native oral literature as well as modern writing, is not as extensive as in Santālī. But Mundari songs, which are frequently longer than Santālī songs, are quite distinctive, and here they have a better output than Santali. A Christian literature in the shape of translations of the *Bible* and some Christian texts has also grown up in Mundari.

The other Kol or Munda languages are not so very important, numerically or otherwise. They generally follow the pattern of Santālī and Mundari. There is still more restricted literary endeavour in languages like *Ho* (or *Larka-Kol*), *Bhumiji, Asuri, Gadaba* (or *Patua*), and Savara (or Sora) which is the southernmost Munda language spoken in Orissa and the Telugu country, besides Korku in the Berar tract in Madhya Pradesh. These languages do not have any literature worth mentioning, except for some songs and folk-tales which are current orally.

Khasi

Khasi is an important Austric language spoken in the Khasi and Jayantia Hills of the New Hill State of Meghalaya in north-eastern India. The Khasi people number about four lakh and have two main groups the Khasis proper in the west, and the Syntengs or Jaintias (or Jayantiyas) in the east. They are racially Mongoloids, but in very early times adopted-when and how nobody knows-the Austric Khasi language. They had their own religion and social life and customs, and their own distinctive socio-political organizations. They came under Hindu influence from Bengal through the Jayantiyas (ancestors of the present-day Syntengs) in the south and from the Assamese Hindus in the north and a good number of them became Hindus. But through the efforts of the **Welsh Methodist** missionaries, a very large percentage of the Khasis have now become Methodist Christians. Formerly, the Khasi language was written in the Bengali script. But now they have accepted the Roman script with **Welsh** values for some of the Roman letters. Barring a few traditional stories and folk-tales, and some songs, the Khasis did not have any literature worth mentioning. Though their contact with Christianity, a little literature of Christian inspiration has, however, grown up among them. Contact with Hinduism is, however, helping the Khasis to take a greater interest in their own traditional religion, culture, and institutions, and some cultured Khasis, who are not in all cases Christians, have written in Khasis as well as in English on various aspects of their culture and social usages. The work of the Khasis scholars like **U Rabon Singh, Sib Charan Roy, U Jeebon Roy, B.K. Sarma Roy, Ondro Muney,** and **H. Lyngdoh** has provided substantial material for building up a modern literature in the language. Two Salesian (Italian) missionaries, **J. Bacchiarello** and **G. Costa,** have also made some remarkable contributions in this line. There is a small series of illustrated books in Khasi published from Shillong by **Theodore Cajee** and others, giving short accounts of the present-day Khasi life and ways. Among the modern Khasi writers, **Soso Tham,** known as 'the Khasi Wordsworth', is an outstanding poet and prosateur who has been quite an innovator in the Khasi language. Essentially a writer on humanity as a whole, he is nevertheless a great admirer of the old life and ways of his people. **P. Gatphoh, B. Thangkhien,** and **Victor Bareh** are the most distinguished among the poets and song-writers in Khasi in recent times. **Victor Baresh** is also the author of a notable patriotic drama (1956) on the life of **U Tirot Singh,** a great Khasi freedom fighter who died in the English prison at Dacca. Mention may be made of **F.M. Pugh's** Khasi translation of Shakespeare's *As You Life It,* which is really a noteworthy work. Khasi literature shows striking record of progress in essays as well as journalism. From 1895 onwards, Khasi magazines began to come out. **J.J.M. Nichols Roy's** political and socio-economic writings, **B.M. Pugh's** books on agriculture, **S. Blah's** pamphlets on the flora of the hills, and **Hamlet Bareh's** book on the Freedom movement in the Jaintia Hills are important additions to modern Khasi literature. The Khasis, as an intelligent and advanced people have got a number of highly cultivated educationists and men in public life, and there is great possibility of further development of Khasi literature.

Dravidian Ādivāsī Languages

The *ādivāsī* or primitive languages of India belong mainly to the Sino-Tibetan and Austric families. But there are several uncultivated Dravidian dialects spoken by various groups of backward tribes in central and eastern India. They are, to mention a few, Gondi scattered in Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Mahārāṣṭra; Oraon or Kurukh in Bihar, Orissa and West Bengali; Mal-Pahariya in the Rajmahal

Hills between Bihar and West Bengal; and Khond (or Kondh or Kandh) and Parji in Orissa.

At one time, the Gonds had a little kingdom of their own, with its in Chanda in Madhya Pradesh. They had Gond kings, and a sort of Gond art (sculpture in stone) of their own which was quite distinctive. But they are now scattered and broken up, and live among various Aryan-speaking people as well as among Telugus who have penetrated into, and settled within, the Goṇḍ territory. They do not cultivate their language (i.e. Goṇḍī) to any appreciable extent. It looks as if they would merge with their Aryan or Telugu neighbours surrounding them. The Gondi language is now broken up into a number of dialects which are sometimes mutually unintelligible. The Oraon or Kurukh people mainly live in Chota Nagpur in the Santal Parganas. Their economic, social, and cultural life is just like that of their close Austric neighbours, the Santals and the Mundas. Thousands of them have settled in Assam as well as in Orissa and West Bengal, and are slowly merging with the local Assamese, Oriyas, and Bengalis. Their language, Oraon, is quite distinctive. It is an independent Dravidian language, and there is just a little oral literature in it. A good collection of Oraon poems and songs made by **W.G. Archer** has been published in the Nāgarī script by the Government of Bihar from Patna. *The Blue Grove,* a fine book giving an English version of a series of beautiful traditional poems in Oraon, with notes and commentaries, was published by W.G. Archer from London in 1940. The Malers or Mal-Pahariyas are a small tribe of Dravidians. Their language very much resembles Oraon. But they are small insignificant group, and do not have any literature worth mentioning-barring, naturally, a few songs and folk-tales. The Khond people in Orissa, who are also known as Kui or Kuvi, are fast becoming assimilated with the Oriyas. Parji current among the Parjis in Orissa has its own place in the Dravidian family. But there is not much literature in it excepting, as usual, some folk-tales. There is neither any literary cultivation of this language. The same may be said of a few other tribes speaking Dravidian in Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar, Mahārāṣṭra, and Madhya Pradesh.

Footnotes:

1. It has been suggested by some that over and above these four groups, there might have been one or two more-there seems to be some evidence from linguistics for this idea. But nothing definitely has yet been established, and we are quite content to look upon these groups as the basic ones in the Indian scene.
2. The literatures in the major Indian languages which developed through Aryan and Dravidian speeches have been dealt with in the three preceding parts of this volume.
3. At present there is some diversity of opinion regarding the place of Siamese within this family. Some modern scholars think that Siamese is not really a member of this family, but a language of another family of speeches known as the Kadai (this now includes a few insignificant dialects of South China and Hainan Island as well as Indo-China, and it appears to be connected with the Malayo-Polynesian speeches of the Austric family) which has been most profoundly influenced by the Sino-Tibetan.
4. The Manipuri Sahitya Parishad and some individual scholars are doing very valuable work in bringing out editions of these books in the current Bengali-Assamese script with translations or notes in Modern Manipuri.
5. As a preliminary step, however, full lists of these books of early Manipuri are being prepared and published by Manipuri scholars.
6. *Language Handbook on Mother Tongues in Census* (office of the Registrar General of India, New Delhi, 1972), p. xxxix.
7. The original book has now become entirely out of print. However a reprint was made under the auspices of the Manager of the Dhalbhum Raj State at Ghatsila, the late **Bankim Chandra Chakrabarti**, with a long introduction in Bengali by the present author. This book has been brought out in a third reprint by **Suhrid Kumar Bhaumik** in 1971. A Bengali translation with introduction has also been prepared.
8. Kaliram Soren's drama *Sindhu Kānu* on a Santal patriot has been staged, and is very popular.

AUTHOR: SUNITI KUMAR CHATTERJEE; Source: *The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. V, RK Institute of Culture,* Calcutta 1953.

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Note of the Editor:
Aesthetics is understood by the Artists and connoisseurs. The most of the Advisors of ICCR are not connoisseurs of art forms but they are managers with political colours of only Congress-Party. So Art in India was empowered with Political Critics. Art is a Fashion in Modern India and artistes are the members of Fashion-Parades. [PADMA SUDHI]

AESTHETICS

Before, we go far beyond to the realm of emotion and intellect as such, let's limit ourself within the boundary of our subject, the Indian aesthetics. The very word Aesthetics is denoted according to '*Oxford English Dictionary*' as 'belonging to the appreciation of the beautiful'. According to *Penguin English Dictionary,* it implies the meaning of the study of beauty and ugliness. But the word, 'aesthetics' is derived etymologically from the Greek word 'alòveávoual', means "to feel or sensibility, whereas art or beauty are matters of the intellect, quite as much as of feeling.
Compiler: PADMA SUDHI: *Aesthetic Theory of India,* Vol. II, 1986, New Delhi.

AESTHETIC OF ĀNANDA COOMĀRA SWĀMĪ

ANANDA COOMARASWAMY calls himself a traditionalist. He identifies the traditionalists with the primitives who saw life 'whole' and with the Christian and Eastern Mediaevalists who not only reduced all arts to theology but also regarded knowledge as the only sure basis of all the arts (*arts sine scientia nihil*). They believe that a true philosophy of art should have 'authority' and 'consistency'. They believe further that 'the interdependence of faith and understanding [applies] as much to the theory of art as to any other doctrine'.[1] **Coomaraswamy** does not have aesthetic theories of his own, except that he has made his own the theories and practice of the perennial tradition (Philosophia perennis) which believes in building up a culture based on responsible work. His main source of inspiration was **Plato** and the Platonized Christianity of Mediaeval Christain mystics.

Coomaraswamy says that according to the traditional theory of art, the first and the last cause that moves an artist to produce a work of art is a 'need' or an 'indigence'. Needs casn be either physical or spiritual. But since the traditional aestheticians believe that man is a substantial union of matter and spirit, of body and soul, art must necessarily serve the needs of the whole man. That is to say, art must have a 'functional' or 'utilitarian' value in as much as man lives by bread. But in as much as he does not live by 'bread alone' but 'by every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God', it must also have a spiritual significance. The 'functional' and the 'significant' aspects of a work of art should not be separated. 'To separate… the functional from the significant art, applied from a so called fine art, is to require of the vast majority of men to live by the merely functional art, a 'bread alone' that is nothing but the 'husks that the swine did eat'.[2] In other words, whatever be the functional value of a work of art, it has always a spiritual significance, a meaning that the function itself expresses adequately by analogy'.[3] Indeed, function and meaning cannot be forced apart because they are the intrinsic components of a work of art just as soul and body are the intrinsic components of man.

The traditional position may be summed up by saying that they hold with **Plato** and **Aristotle** that the general end of the arts is the good of man. The criterion for judging what 'good' or 'bad' is for man, they hold, cannot be anything but human nature itself. And we have already seen that human nature is a substantial union of body and soul. That is to day, matter alone is not the man, nor is he the spirit alone. Consequently, they hold 'that the human value of anything made is determined by the coincidence in it of beauty and utility, significance and aptitude'.[3a]

Coomaraswamy identifies the 'functional' with the pragmatic or the utilitarian. The 'base mechanical arts' of **Plato** that provide only for the needs of the body is pejoratively termed 'aesthetic' by **Coomaraswamy Plato**, he argues further, admitted to his ideal state only those wholesome arts which provided at the same time for the soul and bodies of the citizens.

According to **Coomaraswamy**, an art that is purely 'aesthetic' is 'sentimental' and 'material'. The aesthetes are the children of Renaissance which ushered in an era of individualism characterized by free and personal thinking. Since to think *for* oneself is to think of oneself and since one is always a sentimentalist with regard to oneself, the Renaissance individualism soon turned out to be a sort of sentimental outburst of one's pent up emotions. Unbridled emotions and unchecked passions became the supreme values of life and feeling became the supreme arbiter in matters of aesthetic judgement. Art thus became a matter of pleasure and sensuality.

Coomaraswamy tells us that a purely aesthetic work of art reduces us to the sub-human level of intellectual irresponsibility. Such an art relies on 'instinctive expression' rather than on formal beauty intellectually comprehended. Now **Coomaraswamy** argues that instinctive reactions to what is pleasant and unpleasant are not the basis of aesthetic judgment because whereas art is a proper activity of man, instinctive reactions are not. A peculiarly human action is one that is intellectually contemplated and consciously controlled by the will. In other words, what is peculiarly human should be sought in his intellectual nature because it is rationality that differentiates him from other animals.

Etymologically, the word aesthetic means sensation or reaction to external stimuli. In plants it is presents in the form of 'irritability' and in animals in the form of sensation and passions. Now, **Coomarswamy's** objection to the aesthetes is not that they are hedonists but that 'pleasure' considered in itself is not a proper human action. They have experiences to which human beings are subjected. That is to say, 'they are not acts on our part, but things done to us'.[4]

The perfection of a being is revealed not through its passivity but through its activity. Hence we can surely say that passions and feelings are 'irrational' in as much as we share them with animals. Consequently, a 'disinterested aesthetic contemplation' is a contradiction in terms. That does not mean that **Coomaraswamy** denounces pleasure as an evil altogether to be avoided. He says that there can be no good use without art: that is, no good use if things are not properly made. The artist is producing a utility, some-things to be used. Mere pleasure is not a use from this point of view…'[5] In other words, the end of art is the advancement of life not the seeking after of pleasure. But when actions are properly done, and when a work of art is produced according to its formality, it does give pleasure. In this sense, says **Coomaraswamy**, pleasure is said to 'perfect the operation'.[6] That is to say, the traditionalists hold that 'there can be no good use without art, and that all good uses involve the corresponding pleasure'.[7]

Theologically considered, the tendency to regard pleasure as the basis of art is the result of our having separated art 'from the active and Contemplative life'.[8] In order to judge a work of art, says **Coomaraswamy,** we must know the artist who made it. Works of art cannot be understood 'in terms of our own psychology and our aesthetics,… We shall not have understood these arts until we can think about them as their authors did'.[9] By knowing the artist is not meant, the knowing of his biographical details. In fact, traditional artists want to remain anonymous because it is not the 'Who Said'? that matters but what is said.

To know the artist is same as knowing his metaphysical nature and the theories of art that he upheld. The artist, says **Coomaraswamy,** has a psychophysical ego and an eternal immutable *Atman* or Self. The aim of art is not to give expression to the fleeting feelings of the psychophysical ego. In fact, artist should avoid all its insignificant eccentricities. As a matter of fact, the psychic self is a delusion; the active Self, capable of contemplation alone is the Higher Self. Through Contemplation artists conceive the intelligible forms of things existing in a suprasensual world. To be able to contemplate, an artist must sublimate his lower self and let his Higher Self soar into the divine mysteries. The degree of the artist's success in giving expression to the intellectually intuited forms depends upon his capacity to sublimate his psychic self. Contemplation is essential because it alone reveals the inner identity of the knower and the known. 'The whole purpose of life has been that the man should realise himself in this other and essential form, in which alone the form of divinity can be thought of as adequately reflected'.[10]

From this it follows that works of art should have a certain gravity (gravitas). 'The imitation of anything and everything is despicable; it is the actions of Gods and Heroes, not the artist's feelings or the natures of men who are all too human like himself, that are the legitimate themes of art. If a poet cannot imitate the eternal realities, but only the vagaries of human character, there can be no place for him in an ideal society…'[11] says Coomaraswamy.

In a typal art, i.e., art that is inherited from ancestors, the romantic element is still essentially epical. The essence of epic is a myth. In myths and epics, the hero exhibits universal qualities, without individual peculiarities or limitation. Consequently the romantic or epic hero becomes a pattern imitable by every man alike in accordance with his own possibilities. As **Coomaraswamy** puts it: 'In the last analysis the hero is always God, Whose only idiosyncrasy is being, and to whom it would be absurd to attribute individual Characteristics'.[12] This presupposes an adequate knowledge of theology and cosmology because the actual shapes and structures of work of art are determined by their content.

Humanism is, thus, a perversion of humanity just as aestheticism is a perversion of art. Humanists and aesthetes have come to think of the artist as a mysterious personality endowed with the super human power of *genius* which not only 'inspires' him but also enables him to him to give expression to his powerful feelings spontaneously felt. All this, says Coomaraswamy, is the fruit of the mistaken notion of the nature and function of art. 'Whereas it was once the highest purpose of life to achieve freedom from oneself, it is now our will secure the greatest possible measure of freedom for oneself,'[13] bemoans **Coomaraswamy.**

Coomaraswamy tells us that artists are not peculiar people with peculiar endowments. All men are *geniuses* on their own right. Inspiration can be nothing more than the working of a certain spiritual power within us. This power is the power of imagination which **Blake** identified with the Holy Ghost. To be properly expressed, a thing must proceed from within. What proceeds from within is what exists there in the Mount, i.e., in the essence of God. In trying to give expression to their private feelings, relying on personal and private symbolism which are based not 'on any natural correspondences of things to principles, but rather on private associations of ideas',[14] modern art has neither 'content' nor 'communicability' nor 'recognizability', says Coomaraswamy. All that the artist contributes to a work of art, all that is peculiar to a work of art in terms of the peculiar personality of the artist, is the manner or the style. But the manner of style peculiar to a work of art is merely accidental to it, says Coomaraswamy. As he puts it: 'The *what* of art is far more important than the *how*; it should, indeed, be the what that determines the how, as form determines the shape'.[15]

The *what* of a work of art is determined by the intention of the artist. Plato used the word intention (*boulesis*) to cover the whole meaning of art: its truth, beauty or perfection and its efficacy or utility. But intention again depends on the end

in view because values are present only in the end to which the work is directed. As **St. Thomas** would say, the artist's intention should be to give his work the best possible arrangement, not indefinitely, but with respect to a given end. (Cfr. *Sum*. *Theol*. I. 91.3). To say that the artist does not know what it is that he wants to do until he has finally succeeded in doing what he wants to do would render the production of all works of art mechanical and rob them of their intellectual content. Hence, as Aristotle says, it is the end that determines the procedure. Consequently, says Coomaraswamy, works of art should be judged 'in terms of the ratio intention/result, which I should also state as that of concept/product or forma/figura or art in the artist/artefact'.[16]

So, then, the normal view of art regards the artist as a normal person, a metaphysician who reasons 'by analogy' or by means of an 'adequate symbolism'. As a person he also 'knows the immortal through mortal things'.[17] All men are artists in some field or the other. Every man with a vocation is an artist. A man without a vocation is an idler and he has no right to live in society. 'The kind of artist that a man should be, carpenter, painter, lawyer, farmer or priest, is determined by this nativity… NO man has a right to any social status who is not an artist,'[17a] says

Coomaraswamy.

Traditional aestheticians believe that each man has a proper vocation (*curam propriam diligentiae suae*) and **Coomaraswamy** quotes from *Bhagavad Gita* (XVIII. 1.45-46) to the effect that 'the man devoted to his own vocation finds perfection… That man whose prayer and praise of God are in the doing of his own work perfect himself'. Considered in this manner, work as an art is not only the production of utilities but also the best education possible for man.

Traditional art, therefore, is not a decorative art. Just as upholstery is not essence of furniture, so also decoration is not the essence of art. Indeed, traditional craftsmen make no distinction of fine or useless arts from utilitarian craftsmanship. The art that makes a carpenter to be carpenter, an agriculturist to be an agriculturist, a painter to be a painter, an orator to be an orator or a poet to be a poet is always the same. As Plato says in *Symposium* (205 C), 'The productions of all arts are kinds of poetry and their craftsmen are all poets.' In the words of *Rig Veda* (IX.112) the work of all these men are a kind of ritual operations or rites. The only possible distinction is the 'distinction of things, well and truly made from things not so made and of what is beautiful from what is ugly in terms of formality and informality'.[18]

In saying this **Coomarswamy** does not deny that certain things serve the spirit (or the intellect) more than the others. His position if that is a question is raised as to which is nobler, a symphony or a bomb, his answer would be that the world 'nobler' has no place in aesthetic judgement and that if the bomb fulfils the function for which it was made adequately then it must be a good work of art.

The distinction implied here is the one between the aesthetic and the ethical. The 'aesthetic' is independent of the ethical, says **Coomaraswamy,** because art 'is not an act but a kind of knowledge or power by which things can be well made, whether for good or evil use: the art by which utilities are produced cannot be judged morally, because it is not a kind of willing but a kind of knowing'.[19] That there is a distinction between the artistic and the ethical is for no one to dispute. But that does mean that an artist can act irresponsibly. An artist is a social being. He has responsibilities not only towards himself but also towards his fellowmen. Further the vocational approach to art makes him responsible for what he does, his vocation being in the words of **Coomaraswamy,** determined by his temperament and 'heredity'.

However, the distinction between art (*recta ratis factibilium*) and prudence (*recta ratio agibliium*) which deals with moral judgments is only logical, says **Coomaraswamy**, because the man as a whole is one person. And since the artist works by art and willingly (*per artem et ex voluntate*), he must avoid not only the artistic sins but also the moral sins. In short, as **Coomaraswamy** says, "We cannot absolve the artist from his moral responsibility…'[20]

The vocational approach to art has also a very important cultural implication. **Coomaraswamy** claims with Eric Gill that aestheticism has its root in the modern tendency to separate work from pleasure. At the source of this new tendency was the scientific revolution which tried to make human life free from the scourge of physical labour. It was taught that physical labour is a degradation of human personality and that it is a thing to be shunned because it is an evil in itself. Modern industrialists tell us to work like machines, without being responsible for what we do, and then seek for pleasure elsewhere.

Coomaraswamy detests altogether this false angelism of the industrialists which is based wrongly on the Manicheean theory that matter is evil. In this respect, he closely resembles **Ruskin** who categorically asserted that 'Industry without art is brutality'. The same idea is expressed by **Eric Gill** when he says, '…through science and the industries to which science has been rigorously applied we approach rather the works of the brutes than man'.[21]

The grand climax of industrialism is the Leisure State which, says **Eric Gill**, 'is founded upon a false angelism, a false notion of the fitness of men to enjoy themselves without the direct responsibility of each one to earn a living.'[22]

In his book *Art and Swadeshi,* **Coomaraswamy** deals with the cultural aspect of art considered as a vocation and its relation to Indian Nationalism. He warns us that industrialization has already destroyed the creative spring of the Western artists. So much so, the West is now convinced that it must receive its creative impulse once again from the East.

Under the impact of the unholy industrialism, we have gone 'so far as to divorce work culture, and think of culture as something to be acquired in hours of leisure; but there can be only a hot-house and unreal culture where work itself is not its means; if culture does not show itself in all we make are not cultured.'[23]

Culture is not a material idea and a purely material idea will never make a nation such as ours enduring. Civilization consists not in multiplying our material wants but in refining their quality. He admonishes Indian artists not to imitate the West in her externals. In this respect, he says that our use of kerosene tins for water jars and galvanized zinc for tiles, our living in proverbial seaside lodgings, with glass chandeliers and artificial flowers 'are the outward and damning proof of some mighty evil in our souls.'[24]

So far we have seen the dangers regarding works of art, merely from the stand point of pleasure and feeling. We have seen that such an approach to life and art reduces us to the subhuman level of intellectual irresponsibility. What then is the normal view of art?

We have seen earlier that according to **Coomaraswamy** a 'need' is the cause of a work of art. Causes can be divided into *intrinsic* and *extrinstic* causes. According to **Coomaraswamy**, the intrinsic causes of a work of art are the *form* and *matter*. Since a 'need' cannot be the inner constituent of a work of art, it has to be an extrinsic cause only. Extrinsic causes are divided into efficient cause (*cause efficiens*) and final cause (*Cause finalis*). Since the efficient

cause of a work of art is the artist, 'need' has to be a final cause only.

From the speculative point of view, it is said that all agents act for some end (*omne agens agit propterfincm*). The 'end' is a good for the attainment of which an agent acts (*bonum propter quod operatio fit*). By 'good' is meant that which is either desirable or lovable in itself and which by reason of its perfection is able to satisfy certain appetite. Appetite is the tendency of an imperfect creature, either personal or impersonal, which moves towards a good, the attainment of which will perfect itself.

Now what is the good for the attainment of which works of art are produced? The traditional position in this regard is that since art is proper human activity, the end of art and the end of man should coincide. The end of man according to **St. Thomas**, is the intellectual contemplation of God, which is known as 'Beatific vision'. As **Coomaraswamy** puts it: 'Conceptual images and works alike, art and prudence equally, mean that they must not be mistaken for ends; the end is one of beatific contemplation, not requiring any operation.'[25] Thus the purpose of *Divine Comedy,* says Dante 'is to remove those who are living in this life from the state of wretchedness and to lead them to the state of blessednedd.'[26] and Asvaghosa wrote his *Saudarnanda* 'not for the sake giving pleasure, but for the sake of giving peace.'[27] In the words of Shankaracharya, 'Those who sing here sing God.' And *Vishnu Purana* adds, 'All songs are a part of Him, who wears a form of sound.'[28] The Indian singer 'receives an intimation of that redemption' in the 'ecstasies of love and art.'[29] His song 'is a ritual, a sacred ceremony.'[30]

A work of art, then, has a spiritual significance. Where in shall we find this meaning? Before 'answering this question we shall analyse the inner constituents of a work of art.

First of all, all works of art are 'imitative'. As such, they 'express' something, i.e., all works of art are 'significant' of a thesis. If a work of art fails to express a thesis, it becomes 'insignificant'. But when it express a thesis, it becomes rhetorical, says **Coomaraswamy**. Rhetoric, says **Coomaraswamy**, 'implies… a theory of art as the effective expression of theses.'[31] The word 'rhetoric' should not be confused with either sophistry or the art of flattery in which one strives consciously after some 'effect'. Rhetoric is a way of giving effectiveness to truth. As **Quintilian** would say, it is *ars bene dicendi screntia*. What is it that works of art are so eloquent about? Why does **Coomaraswamy** say that art is not an aesthetic activity but a rhetorical activity? The answer can be found in **Eric Gill's** essays, *Art*. **Eric Gill** says that the incarnation of God is the greatest of all rhetorical acts and therefore the greatest of all works of art.'[32] It is only as a work of art, not as a historical fact or religious truth, that it 'has saving power, power to persuade, power to heal, power to rescue, power to redeem.'[33] We known God through *all* His works. As **Coomaraswamy** would say, 'The unmanifested can be known by analogy; his silence by his utterance. That 'the invisible things of Him' can be seen through 'the things which are made' will apply not only to God's works but also to things made by hands…'[34]

In other words, God's creation is not God Himself but it is His word, not the Word but *His* word which we may hear. Just as creation, beautiful as it is, proclaims the glory of God, works of art should also proclaim His eternal presence. That is to say, works of art evangelical by nature; 'they have for their object: their final cause, their end, the winning of beatitude; for each man his own beatitude and for each man the beatitude of his friends and neighbours; my own greatest happiness and enjoyment, yes; the greatest happiness of the greatest number yes; to be happy with Him eternally.'[35]

These are not empty rhetorics. Yet **Coomaraswamy's** position is going to meet with serious onslaught especially from those self-styled critics who go about proclaiming the death of God. **Coomaraswamy** would not bother about them. To understand **Coomaraswamy** one should be humble, and be something of a mystic. Here shall we find religion,philosophy, politics and art, all in one because it has been the aim of traditional thinkers to persent a consistent view of life which could function as guide. Hence **Coomaraswamy's** categoric and sure remark: 'Let us tell them the painful truth, that most of these works of art are about God, whom wenever metion in polite society.'[36]

Having dealt with the rhetorical aspect of works of art, we shall now turn to the meaning of imitation according to **Coomaraswamy**. He says that according to the catholic (universal and traditional) view of art *imitation, expression* and *participation* are three predications of the essential nature of art.'[37]

By imitation is meant the representation or likeness of a model. The beauty of a work of art is 'proportionate' to its integrity and accuracy. Imitation of a model imlies 'likeness' but not 'verisimilitude' because the imitation of external nature would render it not only 'naturalistic' and rob it of its spiritual significance but alos it would be an imitation of things as effect. By 'likeness' is meant not a 'copy' but an image equal to its model. Likeness (*similitudo*), says **Coomaraswamy,** may be of three kinds: (i) absolute sameness amounting indentity; (2) imitative or analogical likeness. This says **Coomaraswmy**, is 'judged by comparison, e.g. the likeness of a man in stone.'[38] (3) 'expressive likeness, in which the imitation is neither identical with, nor comparable to the original but is an adequate symbol and reminder of that which it represents.'[39]

This classification is based on **St. Bonaventura** who does not think of the imitative and the expressive as mutually exclusive. In fact, **Coomaraswamy** warns us that Bonaventura's 'expressive likeness' is not to be confused with the *modern* theory of expressionism. What Bonaventura means to say is that the artist gives 'expression to some idea that he has entertained and made his own so that it can come forth from within him originally.'[40]

Art is then imitative and expressive of a theme, an idea, or a thesis. In fact, imagination is nothing more than the conception of the idea in an imitable form. **Coomaraswamy**'s conception of the gestation of a work of art is rather trinitarian. That is to say, in the beginning there was the word (*logos or verbum)* and the Word was with God and the Word was God. Thus, God the Father conceived God the Son and the Love existing between them is God the Holy Ghost. In like manner, a work of art is a filial incarnation of an idea existing in the mind. As **Coomaraswamy** puts it, it is in the first place by a 'word' conceived'in intellect that the aritist, whether human or divine, works. In fact, art is an intellectual virtue and beauty has to do with knowledge and goodness, says **Coomaraswamy**.

In other words, **Coomaraswamy** conceives art as something intangible. A painting or a statue is not an art.They are artifacts, i.e.'the thing made is a work *of* art,made by art, but not itself art; the art remains in the artist and is knowledge by which thing are made. What is made according to the art is correct…'[41]

According to the hylemorphic theory, thing are made of matter and form. But that which makes a horse to be horse or tree to be a tree or a man to be a man is the 'form' because all specification are the works of the 'form'. That is why **Coomaraswamy** says that in the traditional philosophy 'form' does not mean tangible shape, but is

sysnonymous with idea and even with soul; the soul for example, is called the form of the body.'[42]

From this it follows that it is not the function of the artist to imitate this or that man. Art should imitate man *sub specie aeternitatis* because 'the work of art,… is a mind-made thing and aims at the mind…'[43] From this it is clear that the resemblance of art to external nature is superficial. Things are what they are not by their looks or shapes but by their ideas. He who does not see more than the mortal eye can see cannot ever hope to be a creative artist. Artist should be abale to make things according to the patterns existing in the Godhead. Imitation is the representation of the divine form.

Thus, when we say that art imitates nature, the word 'nature' has to be properly understood. By nature is meant that principle by which a thing is what it is. It is the imitation of nature not as an effect but as a principle of causation. All the specific operations of a being procced from its form. That is why **Coomaraswamy** quotes St. Thomas Aquinas who has said that art imitates nature in the manner of her operation. As **Coomaraswamy** puts it more explicity, 'The traditional Nature is Mother Nature, that principle by which things are 'natured', by which, for example, a horse is horsy and by which a man is human. Art is an imitation of the nature of things, not of their appearances.'[44] The 'nature' that art creates is *nature naturans, creatrix*, Universails, Deus. Imitation becomes mere 'copying' if it is a representation of already existing things. Such a work of art would be mechanical and the artist servile.

As a matter of fact, for the production of a work of art two acts are necessary; the contemplative and operative or free and servile. If the artist is to represent eternal realities he must known them through an act of imagination in which the idea to be represented is clothed in imitable form. The ideas or work of God which the artist imitates are those principles that can be expressed whether verbally or visually by art. But the invisible things of God are known through the things that are made by God. A work of art is free because of its form. It is the freely invented formal cause that shapes the pattern of things to be made because 'similitude' is with respect to form.

'Invention' is therefore nothing more than the mere entertainment of ideas. It is the intuition of things on a higher plane of reality. In fact, **Coomaraswamy** says that terms like 'intuition', 'conception', and 'generation' are almost synonymous. Intuition is generally associated with **Bergasonion** metaphysics. But **Coomaraswamy** uses it in the sense in which St. **Augustine** used it, that is, 'an intellection extending beyond the range of dialectic to that of the eternal reasons…a contemplation… rather than a thinking.'[45]Hence the aim of an artist is not to be original but it should be the good of the work to be done. And to be a judge of a work of art, a critic must known its *essence*, i.e., its intention, and the real thing of which it is an image. That means, he must first known the archetype and than tell us 'whether the thing under consideration has been both truly and well made.'[46] It is only the aesthetes who separate the beautiful from the just.

So, then, there are two types of judgments: (1) a judgment by art and (2) a judgment by value. Judgment by art 'establishes the existence of the object as a true work of art not a falsification of its archetype.'[47] Only when we are sure that the artist has succeeded in reminding us of the paradigm, can we proceed to ask whether or not the work has a value for us.'[48]

Traditional philosophers never take value to mean something exclusively spiritual or exclusively physical. It is not good for man to separate the two, making some things sacred and others profane. Wisdom, they say, is the fruit of knowledge. It implies a combination of the contemplative with the active life. And a work of should serve as an aid to contemplation. And by contemplation is meant our capacity 'to raise our level of reference from the empirical to the ideal, from observation to vision, from any auditory sensation to audition.'[49]

Thus if an artist succeeds in giving to his work of art perfect accuracy, beauty, perfection and truth, it becomes a 'reminder' or a support to 'contemplation'. In others words, a work of art is a 'natural and adequate symbol of a referent.'[50] That does not mean that they are such as to be able to tell us what the models are like. Adequate symbolism is defined by **Coomaraswamy** 'as the representation of a reality on a certain level of reference by a corresponding reality on another.'[51]

In short, literary symbolism presupposes the existence of two plans of reality. Unless the two planes of reality are real, all literary works of art will lose their referential quality. It is because **Coomaraswamy** thinks of these two worlds as real that he says; 'Art is an imitation of that perfect spontaneity-the identity of intuition and expression in those who are of the kingdom of heaven, which is within us .'[52] Thus, works of art are adequate symbols of a spiritual reality. The spiritual reality in this case is God himself. Since no artist can give a perfect expression to God's beauty, the beauty of a work of art is merely analogous. As **Coomaraswamy** puts it, 'Beauty absolutely is the equation, that is the single form of all things; which are themselves beautiful to the extent that they participate in the simplicity of their source.'

That the artist and the archetype are identical is made manifest beyond dispute in the Dance of *Shiva*. Shiva is Nataraja, the Lord of Dancers and King of Actors. Whether it be the evening dance in the Himalayas which the Lord danced with a divine chorus, or the *Taṇḍava* dance which is performed in cemeteries and burning ground, or the *Nadanta* dance before the assembly (sabha) in the golden hall of Chidambaram, the center of the Universe - they all take place in our own heart. And **Coomaraswamy** tells us that the Lord's dance 'represents His five activities(*pancakritya*), viz.: *shrishti* (overlooking , creation, evolution),sthiti (preservation, support), *Samhara* (destruction, evolution), *Tirobhava* (veiling,embodiment,illusion,and also,giving rest), *Anugraha* (release, salutation, grace). These, separately
considered, are the activities of the deities Brahma, Vishnu, Rudra, Maheshvara and Sadashiva.'[53]

Thus, Shiva dances in the burning ground of the heart of His lovers. He destroys the ego and burns away illusion; His dance is the source of all movements within the cosmos and it is a dance that releases countless souls of men from the snare of illusion, says **Coomaraswamy**.

Coomaraswamy is open to criticism here. If the artist is none other than the eternal. Self, why should he follows rules and regulations when production works of arts? In his essay on 'Indian Music', **Coomaraswamy** gives the same reply which *Shiva* Himself had given to Bharata, the author of the famous *Natya Shastra.* He declares that 'human art must be subject to law, because in man the inner and outer life are still in conflict. Man has not yet found Himself…'[54]

The truth is that man has not yet found his inner harmony. He is at conflict within himself. He does not known how to Love and yet remain disinterested. It was **Augustine** who said *ama et fac quod vis*, love and do what you will. Love has that healing power, that salvific strength which is expected of all works of art. Only a lover can realize the inner identity of spirit and matter, subject and object, the knower and the known; only love can bring about a reunion or marriage of Heaven and Hell. A lover cannot distinguish between sacred or profane, spiritual or sensual because he sees in everything the presence of his beloved who is God.

This aspect of love and art is dealt with extensively by **Coomaraswamy** in his essay 'Sahaja'.

We now turn to **Coomaraswamy**'s theory of beauty. The traditional theory of beauty regards it as both 'formal' and 'formative'. A thing is said to be beautiful to the extent it is what it purports to be. A work of art is beautiful in terms of perfection, or truth and aptitude. When a thing is well and truly made, it becomes beautiful in kind. Since in a work of art, beauty and perfection coincide, we may safely say that an artist's 'operation always tends to the production of a beautiful work'.[55] However, it is not the aim of the artist 'to discover and communicate beauty.'[56] As a matter of fact, claims **Coomaraswamy**, beauty is not the 'final cause of the work to be done, but an inevitable accident.'[57] Beauty can at best be only an indeterminate end.

Since things can be beautiful only 'in kind', the beauty of things are unique. As **Coomaraswamy** puts it… the beauties of a living man and of a statue or stone-man are different in kind and not interchangeable; the more we try to make the status look like a man, the more we denature the stone and caricature the man. It is the form of a man in a nature of flesh that constitutes the beauty of this man; the form of a man in a nature of stone the beauty of the status; and these two beauties are incompatible.'[58]

This should be enough to discourage artists from striving after exact or minute photographic reproduction of external nature.

Coomaraswamy also identifies beauty with truth. In this he was indeed very much influenced by the Scholastic philosophers who regard beauty, truth, goodness and one as transcendental concepts convertible with the notion of being. That is, a being is good or beautiful or true in as much as it is. As **Coomaraswamy** says, beauty is perfection apprehended as an attractive power, an aspect of truth that moves the will. 'But if beauty is not synonymous with truth, neither can it be isolated from the truth: the distinction is only logical, but there is coincidence *in re*.'[59]

In like manner, the distinction between beauty and goodness is only logical. Basing himself on the authority of **Ulrich Engberti** and **St. Thomas Aquinas, Coomaraswamy** says that it is the ' form' of a thing that is responsible for its beauty and goodness. In fact, another word for the beautiful is said to be the 'specific'. When a material thing is 'informed' by its form it becomes proportioned, and thus the material beauty exists in a harmony of proportion. That is the reason why Dionysius defined beauty as harmony (*Consonantia*) and illumination (*claritas*). Thus, when 'form' is regarded as the perfection of a thing, it becomes the 'goodness' of that thing; but if 'form is regarded' as possessing in itself the formal and intellectual light, and shining on the material, or on anything that being apt to the reception of form'[60] it becomes the beautiful aspect of that thing. Thus, **Coomaraswamy** regards beauty as a formal cause. As a formal cause it is very much related to cognition because form (*forma substantialis*) is responsible for the intelligility of the thing and as **st. Bonaventura** says in *de reduction atrium ad theologiam*, 'it is knowledge that make the work beautiful' (13). Hence, as Ulrich of Strassburg explains, a beautiful thing has to be intelligible: 'brilliance of expression being unthinkable apart from perspicacity. Vagueness of any sort, as being a privation of due form is necessarily a defect of beauty,'[61] says **Coomaraswamy** .

Beauty, says **Coomaraswamy**, requires also the proportion of matter to form. This proportion is said to exist in things as a fourfold harmony: (1) 'in the harmony of predisposition to receive form' because prime matter (*materia prima*) being a purely passive or potential principle becomes perfect only by receiving the form; (2) 'in a harmony of mass to natural form'; (3) 'in the harmony of the number of the parts of the material with the number of the potentialities' in the form; and (4) 'in the harmony of the parts as measured amongst themselves and according to the whole.'[62]

It follows from this, says **Coomaraswamy**, that beauty is not an exclusive property of works of art. It is a quality or value manifested in everything that exists. Beauty could be present in material and spiritual substances. Material things includes both natural objects and works of art. Works of art are beautiful to the extent the artist succeeds in shaping the object according to the mentally contemplated form.

Coomaraswamy, however, claims that there 'are no degrees of perfection.'[63] A frog is not 'any more or less beautiful than a man.'[64] Although **Coomaraswamy** is known as a Medieavalist, the position unheld here is just the opposite of what **St.Augustine** or **St.Thomas Aquinas** would say. For instance **Augustine** in his *De Natura boni contra Manicheos,* c.22, says that 'In the form of a man, beauty is greater, in comparison wherewith the beauty of a monkey is called a deformity.'[65] **Coomaraswamy's** objection to Augustine is that the latter implies 'that monkey and man have something in common, both being animals; and further, that the monkey is a would-be man being taken to be the most perfect animal, and all things tending to their ultimate perfection.'[66]

I think **Coomaraswamy's** criticism of Augustine is based on wrong understanding of the scholastic theory of anology.'[67] The comparison between man and monkey- it could have been made with equal validity between man and a stone – is made not because they are both animals, in which case the similarity is obvious, but because they are both beings. According to the Scholastic philosophers concept such as being, truth, goodness, and beauty are analogical. This is a position with which **Coomaraswamy** also readily aggress. But whereas with **Coomaraswamy**, analogy implies identity, with the schoolmen, it implies participation. Further, **Coomaraswamy** would think of being, truth beauty and goodness as equivocal concept so that the knowledge of one does not lead us to the knowledge of the other. If this be so, I am not sure, how a work of art is going to be rhetorical in the sense in which we have discussed the term.

The Scholastic theory of analogy implies that all being do not have equal perfection: some beings are more perfect than the other. They therefore arrange being in a hierarchy of perfection. At the bottom of the scale we have material beings and at the top is God. But **Coomaraswamy** says that 'There are perfection or beauties of different kind of thing or in different contexts, but we cannot arrange these beautiful in a hierarchy, as we can the things themselves: we can no more say that a cathedral as such is 'better' than a barn as such than we can say that a rose as such is 'better' than a skunk cabbage as such; each is beautiful to the extent that it is what it purports to be and in the same proportion good.' [68]

The amusing thing about the above position is that **Coomaraswamy who** could find no hierarchy of perfection between a frog and a man (both have the same degree of perfection) found a hierarchy of perfection between a man considered as a Sudra and as a Brahmin. As a matter of fact, **Coomaraswamy** divides socity into (1) the mob whom he identifies with **Blakes** 'Devourers' and Nietzsche's 'slaves' (2) the thoughtful and good men who are guided by their sense of duty and (3) the Heroes, Saviours, Saints and Avatars, that is to say, men who have attained 'peace' and, an 'unmistakable vision of life as a whole.' **Coomaraswamy** indentifies these people with **Blake's** 'Prolific' and **Nietzsche's**' Masters'. They are the Brahmins who partake of the Superman and the Bodhisattva. From this analysis of society, of an unanimous society as envisaged by

plato, **Coomaraswamy** is led to the conclusion that there is a 'natural hierarchy of human society.[69]

Coomaraswamy claims that his conception of beauty as a kind makes it something objective, 'residing in the artefact and not in the spectator, who may or may not be qualified to recognize it.'[70]

Implied in this theory is the denial of progress in art. The primitive works of art are as beautiful as modern works of art. Any progress in art is towards decadence and cynicism.

In conclusion it may be stated that **Coomaraswamy** wanted to reduce art to theology. His is perhaps one of the most consistent and virulent attacks ever made on the school of art for art's sake. He is so obsessed with absurdity of aestheticism that not a single page in all his writing fails to reflect his abhorrence towards it. He tells us that when artists strive to transform nature into art, it is done not with the intention of pleasing us but with the implicit aim of leading us towards the shoreless sea of life. Work of art, is a kind of player, a sacrifice and a message – a message that proclaims the presence of God in the lilies of the field. He is often regarded as a mediaevalist or traditionalist in aesthetics. That he evidently was. But he was also a mystic and a sage. He was a philosopher in the sense in which that term was used by plato and Aristotle- a wise msn and a lover of wisdom.he accepted truth wherever it is found. He wrote almost on all branches of human knowledge. but whatever he wrote, he wrote with the intention of enriching humanity with a spiritual message, a message that will echo and re-echo in the heart of humanity as long as it lasts.

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AESTHETIC OF ANCIENT INDIAN DRAMA

In the realm of philosophy in particular the philosophy of the beautiful, it is Drama that has provided the clue or set the pattern for ancient Indian thought. Discussing the nature of Reality, the well-known thinkers of the monistic school have described it as 'indeterminable' (*anirvacaniya*), in so far as on the substratum of an absolute reality (*the Brahman*) the phenomenal world appears as an empirical experience. To elucidate this the illustration of the stage, along with some others, is pressed into service. The actor and the character he calls up through a dress, speech and acting are clearly not realities of the same order; the roles no doubt deeply affect us so long as they are being played but they are really the creation of the gifted artist. Even so is the greater creation, the play (*lila)* of the Supreme Spirit, says the Vedanta; and the most common imagery in which god is described is the 'Person behind this mysterious drama,' i.e., life (*Kapatanataka-sutradhara).*

The analogy of play and drama resolves the knotty problem of understanding the tragedy and evil of life; pain as well as

pleasure form legitimate ingredients of drama, equally relishable to the spectator who is equanimous. If only man succeeds in gaining for himself the 'disinterested' spectator's perspective, he then beings to see it all before him as the play (*lila)* of the Supreme Artist. The Lord as Supreme Dancer (*Nataraja*) is in his ceaseless cosmic dance in the ebb and flow of whose rhythms universes appear and disappear, the curtain drops and lifts and man is now bound and now blessed.

The Godhead is conceived as the archetype or fountainhead of the true, the good and the beautiful, *Satyam, Sivam, Sundaram.* All expression of beauty, all that is beautiful in art in its manifold media-poetry, drama, song - is but an aspect or gives a glimmer of the beauty of Godhead. The pursuit of art is thus an aid (*sadhana)* to concentration, contemplation and absorption in the divine essence, the ineffable bliss of serenity, the poise of peace. Vedanta calls this inner essence of enlightenment and bliss, *ananda* and art, *rasa*. Man is beset with his mundane distractions and preoccupations which form an encrustation obscuring the inner light; art breaks these walls in which the spirit is imprisoned and sets it free to shine in its own innate nature, which is of the form of unsublated reality, unobjectivised consciousness and unalloyed bliss.

The object of Drama, according to Indian aesthetics, is thus not to add to man's confusion by posing fresh problems but to help him transcend the turmoil and attain composure. Accordingly, the ideal of the Indian dramatist shifts from a mere character-study to the evocation of a *rasa*. Rasa is a key-word of Indian culture; from taste to supreme beatitude, it conveys a world of significance. The concept of *rasa* has three phases; first, it refers to the emotional states figuring in the themes of plays; second, it is the aesthetic response in the attuned heart of the spectator, and finally it is that same second state becoming one of complete absorption when inner spirit is 'discovered'. Whatever the particular emotion underlying a play or a part of it, be it love, anger or pathos, when it strikes a corresponding chord in the spectator's heart and latter becomes full with the emotion roused, it gives rise to 'relish' or 'delectation' (*asvada*) or a repose of the heart (*visranti*) in which the emotion that occasioned this state of the heart loses its name and there is just a blissful condition; the 'enjoyer', if he may be so called, does not 'enjoy' it, as he would a normal mundane event of happiness like the access of a fortune; there is no worldly reference in it and the ascendance to this state of aesthetic relish is therefore called non-worldly or sublime (*alaukika*). This condition of aesthetic delectation is the realization of beauty and it is therefore a transcendent value. One thus goes out of the theatre with an impression of quite harmony rather than with a disturbed mind. When **T.S.Eliot** therefore says that the ultimate function of art is 'to bring us to a condition of serenity, stillness and reconciliation', he is voicing the Indian view.

This ideal of effecting a emotional impression is also responsible for the Indian dramatist eschewing incongruities, discrepancies or idiosyncracies, in an individual character and trying all the time to do what is styled as the developing of the *rasa.* For this reason, too, the character as such is not the thing for him but the character as the vehicle of *rasa*. The bringing together of incompatible *rasas* is also to be avoided. Characters, story or plot take a secondary place; in fact, the story is in place not as a story but as a medium of *rasa*. Consequently, each play should have an emotional unity; the unities of time and place are of minor importance; indeed, in the sweep from the earth to heaven and over long passages of time that the Indian imagination takes, these two unities are left far behind.

This does not, however, mean that the plot, within its limits, is not properly treated and organized; in Sanskrit dramaturgy, it is insisted that an action should be analysed into its five constituent elements, five stages and five junctures: the seed, the continuity, the helpful episodes, major and minor, and the purpose are the five elements; the beginning, the effort, the hope ,the assurance, and the success are the five stages; in the appropriate processing of the former through the latter, five junctures of the course of the action of the play are seen; the pause and the conclusion. All this mechanics of plot- construction should subserve the end of the emotional factor, the *rasa* in the interests of which some of these elements may be left out. As in character, so in plot, those episodes in the original story which are incongruent are to be eschewed, so that the *rasa* may have a harmonious unflodment. Even in well-known epic themes, imaginative poets like **Kalidasa,** keeping themselves within bounds, do effect congenial innovations to improve somewhat upon their source material.

The same ideal of achieving a harmony out of chaos, of producing a restfulness out of disturbance, is also responsible for the avoidance of tragedy in the Sanskrit theatre. The tragic element and its poignant portrayal do, indeed, form part of Sanskrit drama but there is no 'tragedy' in Sanskrit in the Western sense of the term. The Indian attitude to life, of which drama is born, considers life as but one act in a long series through which man is gradually evolving towards perfection: death is not the end, nor evil: realization and happiness are the real end. The higher purpose of Sanskrit drama but there is no 'tragedy' in Sanskrit in the Western sense of the term. The Indian attitude to life, of which drama is born, considers life as but one act in a long series through which man is gradually evolving towards perfection: death is the end, nor evil: realization and happiness are is no doubt the realization of the aesthetic bliss of rasa ; but this dos not preclude the subordinate purpose of promoting in the spectator the moral consciousness. The brief dictum declares that a *Ramayana* play*,* for instance should inculcate the lesson that one suould emulate the hero, Rama, not the villain, Ravana. The spectacle of virtue defeated and evil triumph ant, which frustrates the soul and makes it callous, should never be held up. Nor should the last curtain fall on corpses and the audience depart from the hall as from a cemetery.

It is the example of a heroic character overcoming evil, of character triumphing over degradation, that Sanskrit drama sets as the most befitting theme for this art. The ancient Indian theatre was no doubt rich in varieties of drama - social plays, monologues, farces, operatic and dance compositions - but among all this, the pride of place was given the heroic type of drama, the Nataka, in which an exemplary epic hero and his exploits in the defence of a righteous cause against its opposing demoniac forces are portrayed; in short, imitation of divinity is the highest dramatic activity. The theory speaks of four types of heroes, the sublime, the lmpetuous, the Gallant and the quiet, who figure in the different types of Sanskrit drama; of these the first who is to be featured in the heroic type of play described above, the *Nataka* , is the most exalted type; he is indeed the ideal human character held up as the model.

Along with these epic themes of heroism are the stories of grat loves in which also the same heroic characters figure; and in the portrayal of that love, too Sanskrit drama, as exemplified by the practice of poets like **Kalidasa** , has its own ideals and standards of refinement and canons of portrayal. Of the two phases of love, union and separation, Sanskrit drama prefers to dwell more on separation, for it is the intensity of mutual longing in separation that welds the

two hearts together, moreover, in the fire of suffering the physical aspect is transcended and love attains a true spiritual quality. A high sense of taste and refinement also characterize the portrayal of the phase of union. Sanskrit canons prohibit such crudities- so dear to the modern drama (particularly the screen) in the west- as scenes of toilet, dressing or rather undressing, getting on a bed, and above all osculation. Similarly, activities like sleeping or eating on the stage are also discountenanced; tedious long portions of the story have to be briefly communicated in interludes and the actual action should concentrate on the portrayal of the theme thatwhich are charged with emotional possibilities. To quote the of bharata, the author of the first available treatise on the first available treatise on the theatre- arts, what is to be seen actually should be pleasing, elevated and full of feeling: *drsyas tumadhurodara- rasa-bhava-nirantarah.* That which is merely spectacular is of inferior attraction, a battle or quarrel a burning scene,- all these for which modern stage- craft may build an elaborate machinery , may produce an impression on children and the less developed minds. In one of the earliest plays, the svapnavasavadatta, the story starts with a conflagration in which the heroine is taken to have perished, but the action of the play beings, not with the burning scene, but with the consequences of that event on the minds and hearts of the king, his ministers and others.

The ideal and technique of the Sanskrit drama in this respect cannot be better described than in the words of **Tolstoywho** says in his what is Art?, chs . v and xi: to evoke in oneself a feeling one has experienced and having evoked it in oneself, then by movements, linses, colours, sounds and forms expressed in words so as to transmit that feeling that other may experience the same feeling- this is the activity of art….

….such for instance, *as Hannele,* in which play the auther wishes to transmit to transmit to the spectators pity for a persecuted girl. To evoke this feeling in the audience by means of art, the author should either make one of the characters express this pity in such a way as to infect everyone, or he should describe the girl's feeling correctly. But he cannot, or will not do this and chooses another way, more complicated in stage- management but easier for the author. He makes the girl die on the stage and still futher to increase the psychological effect on the spectators, he extinguishes the lights the theatre leaving, leaving the audience in the dark…. But there is nothing aesthetic in such excitement, for there is infecting of man by man….

This ideal of refinement extends to the technique of stage production and action. The Indian stage does not aim at impossible realism, but wisely explores the possibilities of expressing the idea through symbolism and convention. Elaborate scenic effect and stage paraphernalia which fill the stage- storeroom now were dispensed with. Several years ago it was reported in Indian papers that the Sanskrit play, sakuntala was prouced at melbourn and for the opening scene of the play introducing the hero going in hunt, a most resplendent golden- hued chariot was actually put on the stage. Bharata never envisaged anything like this. However resplendent the vehicle and however large the stage, the skill of stage- engineers cannot duplicate Nature or avoid the sense of illusion on which all stage-effect is based. At the Paris Opera a huge metal vault goes up and down providing a natural sky for the scenes, and an actual boat sails in! But is the spectacular effect of much artistic value from the point of view of drama as a piece of effective acting or subtle portrayal of fine feelings? However, Bharata thought otherwise and attached little value to such spectacular effects, trusting more the imaginative technique to interpret the theme on his stage.

The emphasis here is, as elsewhere in the Indian approach, on oneself, on the intrinsic rather than the external, the spiritual as against the material and mechanical. A park or a hill was imagined as a part of the blank stage and it was to be understood that as a character came round, he or she had come to a certain scenic background; there were several indications in the dialogue, songs and action which left no room for the scenic background to be missed; the effect of Nature in that scenic background, whether a forest or a hill or a river-side breeze, on the character concerned not only served to draw the attention of the audience of the scenic setting but helped in that unique integration of Nature and man for which Sanskrit drama, such as those of **Kalidasa**, are famous. This integration of the scene and the action or dialogue removed the need for those paragraphs of detailed stage-directions in *italic* which one reads in modern plays like those of **Shaw.** Indeed in higher reaches, this integration made some aspects of Nature even part of the *dramastis personae*. Personification is the very pith and marrow of Indian mythology and cultural milieu. In action, too, the art of interpretation by poses and gestures was elaborated and set forth in great detail with the help of which an innate artistic process rather than a material external accessory was requisitioned for depicting an action, say, riding a horse or a chariot. The actor's pose and the motions of his body as it would have swayed had he been on actual moving horse and the movement of his hands and arms as they would have been if he was holding the reins – these constitute action and drama and not the bringing on the stage, however commodities it may be, of a horse, real or dummy. The actor trained in Bharata's technique will get down or get up the steps on the level ground of the stage, throw flowers or pick them with empty hands and portray every idea and action with an effect the perfection and the full possibilities of which could be realized if one watches closely any authentic survival this technique in the Kerala Kathakali, Balinese dance and drama, or the Peking Opera.

The idealized and imaginative technique is not confined to the stage and action alone. It comprehends the verbal sphere, the actual field where the poet and dramatist, the composer and the musicians operate. The stage of attunement of heart in which the spectator is readily affected by the play is not a thing to be taken for granted. As the gifted commentator Abhinavagupta points out, there are several obstacles to the spectator becoming responsive and one of the effective aids to prepare his hearts is the preliminary music; music was thus employed not only for its initial value, but all through the drama; both song and instrumental background were effectively harnessed to set off the emotional situation. There were songs to usher in characters, to take them out, to bring on a new situation or to reinforce one. As characters walked or engaged themselves in some action, there was the accompaniment of instrument to underline their gait and make the action and dialogue an inevitable blossoming forth from the stream of melody and rhythm.

Sanskrit poets were never bothered with controversies about prose dramas and poetic dramas; in fact, when considering the question of literary appeal, the Sanskrit drama is in a mixed style, prose and verse alternating, the latter appearing like the upsurges of the former whenever a higher pointedness is reached in dialogue or feeling. The text tends to be highly lyrical. When I was a student, a well-known Indian playwright-*cum*-actor who went about as one of the apposite of Indian art renascence, used to make in his lecturer a stock-joke about the old type Indian actor singing and dying! But if a sensible modern or Western actor can die in blank or rhymed verse or even in a rhetorical prose declamation, how is the Indian dying in song less realistic?

In all this, the Indian, in fact the whole Far-East and South-East Asian theatre, was very different from the new realistic theatre of the West, under whose impact, the old indigenous has all but diapered; however, there are still forms of the indigenous theatre still surviving in parts of India, which when collated with Greater Indian theatre may yet help to salvage materials necessary for the reconstruction of our own native stage tradition and techniques.

AUTHOR: RAGHAVAN V; Source: *IL VOI. I NO. 2, Sahitya Akademy April*-September 1958, New Delhi.

Abbreviation: IL, Indian Literature.

AESTHETIC BEYOND REASON

Nobody would question the value of for man; but it is only one of his facilities, among several other. The whole world of art and aesthetics falls outside its scope. Great discoveries have come to scientists in flashes of intuition; mathematics and reason have only established their proof. **Kari Popper,** the great philosopher of science, said; "science must being with myth and with the critism of myth", and myth is not reason.

Kurt Godel's incompleteness theorems tell us that rational thought can never penetrate to final, ultimate truth. Godel was one of the undisputed mathematical geniuses of this century and his theorms are pure mathematical, the ultimate precision in reason. All conflicts in social sciences, political and economics ideologies, even mathematical models of the latter, are locked up in rational arguments and counter-arguments, more often than not baffling solution. On the other hand, love, compassion, brotherhood, altruism and such other qualities which spring from the deeper realms of the human psyche often bring tolerance and understanding of each other's position

Recovery of Faith

Mr. Iqbal khan has subtitled his article as "Primacy of Reason Over Faith" Radhakrishnan said; "Sensitive and informed minds believe that the fundamental need of the world, far deeper than any social, political or economic readjustments, is a spiritual reawakening, a recovery of faith." Faith is holding the muslim community together the world over. Its fundamentalist dominance no doubt exploits the masses for power and holds back their progress; but it is not the essential of faith so also the *Hindutva* movement wrongly asserted that the location of Rama's birthplace is a matter of faith, not of archaeology or other rational judgement. This is political use of faith, not its spiritual glory.

The question of religion of has ultimately to deal with the nature of the human psyche. The rational, antireligious Freudian psychology, based on the pathology of regional cultural traits, has now expanded into humanistic psychology, developed by **Abraham Maslow** and the human potential movement, exploring the reality of self-actualization for man. **Stanislav Grof** has brought unquestionable empirical proof from thousands of psychedelic experiments that spiritual realms do abide in the deeper in the recesses of psyche. Along with others, he has developed what is now called transpersonal psychology, dwelling on the recognition, understanding, and realization of transpersonal states of consciousness. But the **Freudian** concepts of religion being an illusion holds us captive still. Fundamentalist faith, in the grab of reason.

Lends Meaning:

So humanism no longer conflicts with religion; rather, it lends meaning, purpose and enrichment to humanism. Without religion humanism leaves man in doubts of his humanity. To turn to lslam; the Prophet also reckoned the battle with oneself to win over passions to be the greatest struggle of man. How does **Mr. Khan** say that religion is based on discrimination between man and man, when fraternity and equality are enshrined in lslam?

Nor does science conflict with religion; rather it now substantiates it. As prof**. Paul Davies** says; "…. although science may explain the world, we still have to explain the science. The laws (of science) which enable the universe to come into reality spontaneously seem themselves to be the product of exceedingly ingenious design." He belive that science can now offer a surer path to God than religion.

In the middle ages, lsalm carried the whole scientific endeavour of the time in mathematics, chemistry, navigation astronomy and medicine, forming the body of knowledge and the tools for experiments which the scholars of the renaissance were to develop later. The scientific work done in the monasteries of different religions is too well- known to bear repetition. Faith and reason constitute a complementarity; their relationship could be symbiotic, not necessarily of conflict, or of supremacy of one over the other.

AUTHOR: BANERJEE B. K.; Source: *Indian Express*, February 20th, 1994, Pune.

AESTHETIC OF CINEMA

A close glance at any art, the cinema art, for example, enables us to realize that there is no such thing as an art exclusively of the present times. It always implies a continuous process from yesterday towards tomorrow. For properly assessing the artistic value of films today, therefore, it is necessary for historians to have a knowledge of cinema, about its origin, growth and development.

In the history of art, developing art particular, there are *periods* when old formulae established earlier are accepted but there are times when the established rules- the trodden path are questioned and disrupted. In fact, there is the 'need of disruption' as *Herbert read* calls it. This need becomes evident to filmmakers who are tormented between two ends. On the hand they are keen and eager to say something new, something original which nobody has ever said before and on the hand they want their work to be accepted and, therefore understood, for this acceptance the filmmakers should follow some established formulae lest their works may not be understood. The example of **The Battleship Potemkin** is revealing in this regard. When this film was made by **Eisenstein** in 1925 and was shown for the first time in the official screening at the opera house in Moscow, it was rejected by the audience. Another film **Pushkin** and **Czar Nicholas** I made by **Ivanovsky** in the same year, was welcomed by the audience. Today, this film is only referred to by Soviet film historian and is only rarely mentioned by the others. It took many years before the artistic revolution introduced by *The Battleship Potemkin* was properly understood and accepted.

The study of aesthetic of cinema involves the knowledge of the limitations inherent in any history of cinema. It is interesting to note that history of cinema or even history in general is different in different books. **Peter Geyl**, a famous Dutch historian in his book *Debates* with *Historians* admits, 'We have always tried to state the past reality in terms of certainty but all we are able to do is to render our own impression of it." Absolute objectivity is not possible in history, for, everything in history is written from the perspective of a historian and a historian gives his own impression of the events or situation. While describing the events in the past he cannot isolate himself from the present times. His term of reference, comparisons or ideas belong to the present times only.

Considering the fact that cinema is evolved from of a moving image, it would be proper to speak of History of Cinema as history of moving image. The moving image was

initially silent, and then it appeared with sound recorded on it by chemical process in various formats like 35 mm, 16 mm, etc. Moving images on TV screen and Video cassettes are the developed forms of this moving image. It would, therefore, be erroneous to concentrate only on the history of cinema without taking due cognizance of television which belongs to the same family of the moving image. The co-existence of cinema and television affects both these media.

Historians of cinema have a tendency to write history of cinema keeping in view only the entertainment aspects as the only function of the moving image. And they neglect the recording and communication functions of cinema. The fact is that from its very origin cinema has functioned as a recording medium of what was happening around us, in the world. In 1898, just two years after the birth of cinema with the films of the **Lumiere** Brothers, the Polish photographer, **Boleslav Matuszevski**, wrote a booklet titled *A New Source of History* - in which he claimed that the greatest merit of cinema lies in recording not only what is happening in royal courts but also in the life of ordinary people. The second function of the Moving Image is as a medium of communication for the purpose of information and education. The third function of the moving image is as art- the most powerful art. These functions are, of course, something overlapping. A newsreel which is meant to be a historical document or an instrument of information can also simultaneously be a work of art. The base of historical studies is uncertain fact. It is the duty of the historian to first ascertain the facts that existed. Then comes the process of selecting the facts and finally comes the process of arranging the selected facts on a certain logical basis. Even then the facts are ascertained, the selection of facts is completely made according to the historian's subjective viewpoint. The facts in this case are films or videocassettes on which TV programmes are recorded. The second area of study of facts is that of filmmakers themselves. The term 'Filmmaker' in this case includes not only Direction but all the Craftsmen who are involved in the production of films or TV programmes. The third area of study is the audience –the people who are responsive to these products- and the description and analysis of these products. It is totally wrong to write the history of cinema taking into consideration only the film classics. The box-office formulae are equally important. On the list of box-office champions there are some titles which are there for many many years. They are the reality of the moving image and they are reality of cinema. One can possibly disapprove of them but one cannot ignore them. It is worthwhile to study how widely these box-office hits were popular and what were the reasons for their popularity. It is not enough and proper to superficially attribute the popularity of gone with Wind to its being an adaptation of a popular, well-written novel and made with talented actors like **Clark Gable Leslie Howard** and **Vivien Leigh.** An effort should be made to go deeper and attribute it to the fact that the film shows something which is extremely important in the life of an average American who can never forget the American Civil War, the rebellion of the south, the question of slavery of Negroes and everything that happened in the history of the United Status. The future historians writing about science fiction film would study many reasons why **Star War** and **Close Encounters of a Third Kind** are so popular at present.

The views of a film historian are conditioned by his own philosophy and approach. The philosophy underlying this presentation of film history is governed by two principles. The first is the conviction that moving image is the image of reality. The photographic origin of the cinema makes it possible for cinema to act as an instrument to record the external reality. But external reality is only a part of reality. There is inner reality – the reality of thoughts, feelings, dreams, ambitions etc. The realistic cinema attempts to give truthful picture of reality, showing the reality as closely as possible.

The reality is sometimes consciously distorted particularly in commercial films (Hindi films, for example) when the filmmakers try to beautify life. Sometimes, the reality is distorted to suit the directives of producers or exhibitors. Filmmakers on their own choice can reject the reality and create a world of fantasy in order to escape the harsh reality. The attitude of the filmmaker towards reality decides how he deals with reality whether he confirms it, analyses it, or escapes from it or rebels against it. Every work of art in moving image reflects the attitude of the maker towards reality. The reality is the source, therefore, of inspiration and the reason that motivates all artists for creative work. One of the earliest – Marxist philosophers, **Plekhanov** analyses the process of creation. The process consists of three stages- (i) Origion of the urge to create. This urge is the outcome of reality. (ii) The thinking process. (iii) The presentation of thoughts.

The second principle in thus philosophy is that every work in the moving image is a dialogue between the creators i.e. filmmakers and recipients. This dialogue is extremely important. This dialogue is the result of the response of the audience sometimes immediate, sometimes totally negative and sometimes enthusiastically positive. The response of the audience inspires filmmakers to do something new. The history of cinema is replete with such examples when a film was not accepted by the audience when it was created breaking away from the trodden path or when some work got immediate approval but was again rejected after two or three years. It also happens that it is a dialogue with deaf people – who are not able to understand what the filmmaker wants to say. The dialogue, however, is essential. All the creators want to speak to the world, to the people. Sometimes they fail. Sometimes they claim that they create only for themselves, for their own pleasures. Even the elusive and hermetic kind of filmmakers of so-called alternative or underground cinema are very much interested in showing their films to others though they say they do not care at all. The artist is not living in his own world. This dialogue is much more essential in the art of cinema than it is in the art of literature or painting where one can have closed circles and artists can experiment for a long time. The feature of immediately is more important in films than in any other art.

The history of cinema or moving image is in fact, the history of culture of the modern world. This is the only art which originated in modern times. It was described though not consciously in the beginning as something 'New' which had a form of a new art.

The eighty years of existence of cinema cover many important phases of the world like that of Czars, Kings and Princes before 1914, then the period of this world's changing civilization between 1918 and 1939 and then the period up to the Second World War.

As **Peter Geyl** says history is formed of infinite complexity, irreducible variety of the life of mankind. These very elements of the human life make the study of history difficult but exciting, interesting and certainly worthwhile. **Peter Geyl** has made this statement about history, general history but film history is very close to general history for, there are many interlinks between various areas of human life and activity. **Jacob Christopher Burckhardt** who wrote his book *Civilization of Renaissance in Italy* said that it is the function of the historian not to make us wise for the next time but to make us wise for ever. 'The future professionals of film and television should not forget that

what is happening today has its roots in yesterday and will be fully developed tomorrow. History will certainly help them to learn from the past experience, avoid mistakes, perhaps repeat some experiments which were too early abandoned and make them aware, before they are aware of current events, of the past events not only in the past of moving images but in the past of the world.

The moving images appeared more or less in their definite from in 1896 when the **Lumiere Brothers** showed them in Paris. This new invention which undoubtedly changed the face of the world, was the most important invention for mankind next to the invention of printing. It was the creation of a new medium of communication, the new visual or audio- visual language. It is not suprising that for many centuries before this invention became a reality, people had dreamt about it and had hoped for something similar.

The invention of the cinema and the introduction of Nadar's moving images was the fulfillment of two very ancient dreams. One dream was to create an instrument which would produce the exact image of reality, the external reality of course. The second dream was to catch the image of reality not in a static state but in motion. In the prehistory of the cinema, for many centuries. this dream was the source of inspiration for technicians, scientists and producers in the entertainment area. Their experiments though unsuccessful were steps towards the exact reproduction of reality in motion.

There are two elements involved in these two dreams. The first is that is was always thought that this instrument giving the exact image of reality in motion should be accessible to many people. In other words, the element of future projection of film emerged here and, therefore, the second factor and perhaps the more important one was that it filled the gap, the vacuum which was felt in the 19th century almost all over the world, viz. the lack of popular spectacle.

The theater in ancient India was very important but after the Muslim invasion in North and during the Mughal regime it lost its importance. It was, however, not totally destroyed. The folk representations of different spectacles: dances, songs and dramas exited all over the world. Probably in India and other Asian countries, this tradition was stronger than in many of the European countries. But, the fact remains that a popular kinds of spectacle cheap and, therefore, easily accessible to masses almost perished in the western world at the end of the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century. This was due to economic, political and social reasons. The court theatre in England i.e. Elizabethan theatre was more accessible to the people than the theater in the regime of **Charles II** or the Hanovarian kings when the court theater was certainly important but not accessible to the average man in the street to use a little anachronistic expression. Later on, the bourgeois theater in France and Germany-the theater of the well-to-do, rich people and better educated middle classes completely absorbed the theater of the masses. So, there was a vacuum and this vacuum was easily filled by the cinema. The fact that cinema in the initial stages was called the 'theater of the poor' bears testimony to this.

Before studying the various elements which helped the creation of moving images-viz. cinema and later on TV, it is worthwhile to note that there was a great change in the appearance of cinema and the whole concept of art in the Western world. This was visible in the eastern world too. In 1934, a German art historian, philosopher and writer **Walter Benjamin**, wrote an essay is of immense value and present some facts which were very often seen but were never really spoken or written about before. This essay was under the titled *The work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.* Mechanical reproduction came into existence in a large scale with the Printing Press when manuscripts were replaced by printing books, and the realm of literature which was the privilege of very few, like convents, cloisters became the property of literate people. Consequently, as the number of literate people started increasing, mechanical reproduction of the written text became an important factor in the life of many people and many countries.

Then came the invention of lithography. It was an extremely important invention; because it made the reproduction of drawings and paintings possible. Then came photography which is still a step further in the process of mechanical reproduction and lastly came the cinema, the moving images. The mechanical reproduction brought in important changes in role and functions of art. **Walter Benjamin** has written about these changes.

The main change which is most important is the loss of the notion of the 'Original' of the cinema is the negative of the film which remains in a box and is not visible. It is a technical 'Original' of the film and nothing more. The film then exists only in the number of prints which are shown all over the world. So, for all practical purpose there is no 'Original' of film as there is an 'Original' of the Indian Temple or there is an 'Original' of Mona Lisa in Paris. There is an original of the original text even of some old manuscript but there is no 'Original' of the film – original as a product as something tangible which one can see. Such 'Original' does not exist and yet the 'Original' exist only in the innumerable copies which replace the 'Original'.

This consequence seen in cinema does exist due to the mechanical reproduction in this area. The example of Mona Lisa of Leonardo da Vinci can be quoted here. Probably, Mona Lisa as an image is known to millions because it was reproduced several times. It was used even for advertising but how many out of this million who are familiar with the image of Mona Lisa known the name of the painter who painted it. Perhaps only some thousands and how many of these thousands know the place where the original of Mona Lisa exists, that it is Louvre in Paris. Then, the proportion again diminishes. So, the whole notion of the unique nature of work of art ceased to exist due to the possibility of multiplication and mechanical reproduction. The toss of the uniqueness of a work of art changed the attitude of the people towards art.

In olden days before the possibilities of the mechanical reproduction, art, in a sense was sacrosanct. There were piligrims who wanted to seethe works of art, who wanted to see the works of art, who wanted to go to the threatre to see Talma in France (or the Queen in England) because it was original. While actors like **Clerk Gable** of today are multiple. They exist everywhere and nobody makes a piligrimage just to see them. One can make piligrimages to see the paintings. There are some people who even when they are in Paris go the the Louvre to see **Mona Lisa**. But, the proportion of tourists going there to see painting is very very small.

Another example can be quoted of a tourist who sees temples in an ancient city but ultimately gives gives up the idea of seeing each and every temple saying that he can be these in a book. He thus becomes though not a cynic, in any case practical and in a sense, less respect about the work of art and this because of possibilities of mechanical reproduction that are increasing day by day.

Cable television in the United States today covers almost the whole territory. Initially, cable television was only meant for places where the reception of television was difficult. With the facility of forty channels available on cable television, one wonders about the reception of art by recipients. It will certainly not generate the proper kind of attitude towards art.

There were about thrity three people who paid one franc in Paris to see the first show of films of **Lumiere Brothers**. In the next few days, it was already a sensation of the city. Everybody wanted to see the film, everybody was raving about it and writing about it. 'Here at last we see life as it is, the life in movement.' People of the natural size of the people on the street were seen on the screen. It is the characteristic that only one newspaper (and there were only two newspapers at that time) wrote about the first showing of film and discovered another value of cinema. This critic in '*Le Republician'* wrote, 'cinema gains a new notion of immortality.' To write this in December 1896 only shortly after the show of few short films of **Lumiere Brothers** speaks of the critic's perception in assessing correctly this new invention.

Cinema gave immorality to event and to persons like **John Kennedy**, **Pandit Nehru** and many others not to speak actors who are always with us. One can see them, one can see them moving, speaking, smiling. They are immortal as they were never before. The actors in the theatre were only the actors about whom much was written and very few people had seen them. Sometimes, in the early days of cinema when it was clumsy kind of instrument, there were great deceptions. **Sarah Bernhardt** was the topmost French actress and her popularity in the United States of America, France and many other countries was enormous. Her greatest asset was her voice and the first films in which she acted were silent films. So one could not judge her seeing her as a mute person on the screen. But this immortality of cinema is probably today one of greatest assets of all kinds of moving images. The asset is not only a source of history but a means of having continous pleasure of seeing the past in a complete form not relying on a written text but being able to judge, to be the writness of an event that happened in the past. After the cinema was invented, many factors helped the development of cinema. These were economic, social, political and technical factors to name only a few. While studying the history of cinema, one must take into consideration the multiplicity of factor in order to understand why the films were made in a particular way and not in another way, what kind of films were made in a particular year and which factors co existed and helped the making of these films etc.

One may, for example, consider the economic factor that led the American cinema to become so powerful and enabled it to conquer the world which upto 1914 was the domain of the French cinema. It would be logical to study the French cinema first and then come to the American Cinema because American Cinema was the successor to the empire built by the French Cinema. Initially, the cinema was a kind of was a kind of wandering cinema, The stationary cinema almost did not exist. The first clientele of cinema consisted of peasants, farmers who came to a small village for the usual fair, or some catholic holiday and the celebration of local saints. There appeared the man with the projector. He built a tent and showed his film there. It was a fantastic pleasure for the public and this fantastic pleasure encouraged the exhibitors and producers of film to attack the cities. First of all, they attacked only the periphery of the cities where the poor people lived and then slowly they went to the center of the city and started to build the cinemas against the opposition of intellectual elites considered cinema as terribly vulgar. The cinema was vulgar in many places but it had the attraction as something that shows movement and something which gives fantasy, the films of excitement etc. The two people who first realized the situation were Pathe Brothers, who in 1898 itself had formed a film producing company. Later on, they switched to the so called artistic films. They engaged well known actors, looked into the books and tried to adapt well known stories. They thus appealed to better public better public means richer public with better tastes and they had an enormous success.

When **Pathe Brothers** formed their company in 1898, the capital of this company was twenty four thousand francs and in 1913 the same became thrity million. The jump from twenty four thousand to thirty million was rather amazing. The shareholders of the **Pathe Brothers** company probably were ideal shareholders in the then world. For in the year 1913, the dividend paid to the shareholders of the Pathe Company was 90% on any kind of shares. So this was the evolution of the French Cinema from peasants and workers living in the suburbs of Paris to the better public, in big cities, better cinemas and better products.

But, the number of cinemas was still limited in France, because Pathe Brothers and other filmmakers worked for the export of films. Out of the ten prints of a film made in French films were shown in America before 1914 to local residents, to immigrants. In the year 1907, one and a quarter million immigrants lived in America which was a land of promise. Every year a quarter or half million people went to America facing all kinds of difficulties. America was receiving everybody who came. These immigrants were illiterate people coming from Eastern Europe, from South of Italy where hunger and unemployment were always features of everyday life. They came to America not knowing the language, not having any rapport with the people who living there, except with those who were former immigrants. They were certainly happy finding some jobs and getting money. These immigrants did not go to schools or churches in their leisure but to cinema to the movies, for movies were silent and movies were simple. They were not required to know the language for enjoying the films.

Many movies were consequently made by the immigrants from Europe. They were mostly jew immigrants from Russia, Hungary and Poland. Hence, appearance of such names as Warners, Foxes in the history of American cinema. To begin with these immigrants were in the clothing trade manufacturing clothes, furs, and gloves. They later on thought that the production and exhibition of films was much better business and they were successful. They adopted some of the systems of the clothing trade. Twice a year they arranged shows of new models. They followed the examples of the great tailors and great masters of haute couture in Paris inviting people for the Spring collection or Autumn collection. Twice a year, they used to present exclusive exhibitions in different parts of the country. The number of cinemas consequently grew immensely. In 1915, there were 15,000 cinemas in America. There were probably eight hundred in France. So the social factor viz. appealing to the public which needed it was one of the reasons of the incessant growth of cinema.

Political factors also helped cinema to grow. The value of the cinema was discovered by the Big Powers in the Western World during the first world war. They realized that the cinema is a powerful medium of propaganda. They started to make films praising the soldiers of one army against another army or giving entertainment to the public. It was a very entertainment and people were attracted to cinema just to forget the world and to see fantasies. Then in 1919 came the nationalization of Soviet cinema and a new model of cinema serving not so much the entertainment but educational and political purposes was created.

Then there were technical changes that played a significant role in the growth of cinema. The technical changes such as elimination of the flickering that was one of the traits of the early cinema. Then there were changes in the length of the film from the short film of 10 to 12 minutes to the feature films. Then came colour films. In some countries colour

came before the sound. A good system of colour of technicolour sometime in three colours was introduced in 1934. Then came Television and now we have the video cassettes which are also probably changing the future of the cinema.

In the cinema and in making of films, there are certain tendencies. One tendency such as camera, sound recording and editing equipment and possibilities of various of photography as essential in the cinema for its development. It is in essence the convergent tendency where one tries to find in the instruments and also methods all the artistic and other possibilities of cinema. Towards the end of twenties and in the thirties this tendency was represented by the people who believed in pure cinema. They said, 'Let cinema break with all other arts, let not cinema be a parasite taking this from literature, this from theatre, from music and try to find essence in the cinema, in the moving photography.' There were experiments very interesting experiments like the introduction of absolute or abstract cinema which was very much similar to abstract painting.

But the general public, the spectators really rejected this idea and tended to accept the other tendency. This tendency consists in creating links between the cinema and various other arts and to have the cinema as spectacle, as a kind of continuation of other spectacles or other media of expression. It is certainly very difficult to imagine the present day cinema which doesn't take inspiration from the written word or from the theatre, borrowing the actors from the theatre, or the cinema which absolutely forgets the role of music, doesn't think at all about the great examples of the pictorial art paintings or architecture and set designing etc. It would be absolutely foolish to say that cinema can exist by itself, that cinema doesn't need the help of other arts. Not only would it be foolish but it would be untrue too. For willingly or unwillingly, we always look around us and this isolation of cinema is no more accepted. The filmmakers who claim that they are the only masters because they know how to make films and are not taking any interest in the theatre or other forms of human activity are fast disappearing.

It is interesting to know that when fresh students are selected at the Australian Film School and in the Polish Film School, the standard questions in the interview are 'What do you read? Do you go theatre? Do you like paintings? Are you interested in music? What do you know about the present situation in politics in the world? What are main issues in the newspapers that you read to you are interested in?' The candidates who cannot answer such questions or say 'I know how to move the camera' are rigidly and mercilessly dismissed. The reason for dismissal is that the management feels that this is not enough. First of all a would be filmmaker should ask 'What I am going to do and why I am going to do it?' 'How' comes later. The film school is there to teach 'How.' The school is to teach the craftsmanship. So, students with cultural and artistic ambitions, are preferred.

The topic of inter relationship of cinema and other arts can be concluded with quoting the example of **Jean Renoir**, the maker of film **The Rules of the Game** (La regle du Jeu). It is fantastic film before the war and is in true sense the forerunner of the New Wave (Nouvelle Vague) in France and of filmmakers like **Jean - Luc Godard** working in French cinema in the film came to me when I was listening to **Mozart's** music. **Mozart's** music gave me the first inspiration because I wanted to do something which in the visual art in the cinema should have the same melodiousness of discipline and the charm of **Mozart's** music.' This is the inspiration which came from without the microphone, the camera or the editing equipment. **Jean Renoir** further adds, that he was looking to the eminent French writer Beaumarchais of the 18th century who wrote The **Wedding of Figaro** as one of his models. **Musset's Les Caprices de Marianne** was another model. He wanted to make a film which repeated some of the ideas of these two masters. Particularly of **Beaumarchais** vis-á vis masters - servant relationship and the game played by each of them according to his own rules! Thus was the beginning of **The Rules of the Game**.

Sometimes it is not possible to know what is genuine cinema and what came to the cinema from other arts or what had some precedence elsewhere. The film Le Million by **Rene Clair**, is a story about the lost lottery ticket and is full of adventures of people trying to get this ticket. It is an adaptation of a very popular musical comedy in the French theatre, This vaudeville gave exactly the same story of the lottery ticket. There are two co owners of the ticket who both try to be dishonest with the other partner and grasp the money solely by himself, by getting the ticket. And the situation is that the ticket is in the pocket of a jacket and the jacket is worn by a trainer in the opera who bought this jacket from a second hand clothes shop. The two people who are trying for the ticket know this. They, therefore, try to catch this jacket which is tossed from man to man. Finally as they are battling for the ticket on the 1st floor of the Opera house and the window is open, the jacket is thrown out of window. It lands on the top of a taxi which is passing. A fantastic cinema situation! But it was very well in the play but the taxi and the open window could not be shown on the stage. The spectators knew that the taxi was running with the jacket on the top.

The invention of **Rena Clair** consisted in presenting this situation in the cinema medium. But it is not the invention of cinema. The situation existed already before. There are many other examples where this co existence of arts and mutual influence of arts are essential to the artistry and progress of the new invention in cinema or television for that matter.

AUTHOR: MURTY N.V.K.; **Source**: *Inner Images of Reality in the external World in the form of Cinema,* 1983, Hyderabad (A film historian)

Aesthetic In The Vedānta And The Samkhya Yoga

In the Vedānta yoga of Vaiṣṇava cult, the *svarūpa śakti* of Lord has been divided into three qualities.[1] There three Śaktis are united for the creation of the world. They are enumerated as *Hlādinī*, *Sandhinī* and Saṁvit. The Lord of the nature of *sattva* quality by the help of *Sandhinī śakti* becomes the manifestation of *sattva* and also makes other to shareit. This power has been pervaded in all spaces and all the times (astronomicals) in this phenomenal world: '*sarvadeśakāladrvyādiprāptikarī sandhinī.'*

By the *Saṁvit śakti*, Lord who is of the nature of Delight, becomes known to himself and makes others know Him by it. Same is case with the *Hlādini śakti* In the Indian aesthetics, we are only concerned with the *Saṁvit śakti* of the Lord for its epistemological purpose which is of the nature of *vāsanā*.

The *Saṁvit śakti* is inferior to *Hlādini śakti* but is superior to the *Sandhinī śakti*. Lord Kṛṣṇa, or any *Vaiṣṇava* deity possesses there Śaktis latent in the Primary *Śakti* known as *Svarūpa Śakti.* They are like self revealing *Vṛttis* Of the Lord. All these *Śaktis* have two fold functions manifest, know or please God Himself then manifest to others, known to others and gladden to others. These powers are present in microscopic and macroscopic both the worlds in the latent forms. As the *Saṁvit Śakti* is embodied with the knowledge and experiences which are latent and manifested, therefore, it can be named as *Mahāvāsanā* residing in the Lord and as vāsanāin in Jīva. It is positioned in the middle of *Sandhinī*

śakti and *Hlādini śakti*. Even in the West, corresponding to this view, ARISTOTLE in the *De Anima*, 426b, says that the organs of sense perception can only receive the middle states. The macroscopic senses of the Lord see whole world and phenomenal time and space. But microscopic senses of *Jīva* (an individual soul) are incapable of grasping the whole but they grasp whatever is restricted to their own respective limits. Thus, senses are divided in ratios, while the senses of the universal Lord are ubiquitous or ratio less. That's why when these ratios belonging to the senses are blended in the appropriate proportions, become pleasant or relishable. This blending like *Prapānaka rasa* is an effort toward the ratio less universal beauty. The universal character of a thing in the Sāmkhya has been called *Tanmātras* (they are five in number, *śabda sparśarūpa rasa gandha*). These *tanmātras* are not the objects of our sense knowledge but only Yogin and virtuous by acquiring certain powers, are capable to perceive them.

Interpretations Of The Tanmātras

The Sāṁkhya process of evolution means that at the advent of creation of *Akāśa* (space), there is only *Śabda tanmātra*. The creation of Vāyu (Cosmic Air) arises out of the mixing of *Śabda tanmātra* and the *Sparśa tanmātra* (sound and touch micro elements). The *Taijasa* Light or Fire results when the *rūpa tanmātra* mixes with the *Śabda* (sound) and *sparśa* (tactual) micro elements. These three tanmātras, along with the *rasa* (taste) *tanmatra* are the roots to produce water element (*ap*). These four *tanmātras* by getting mixed with the *gandha tanmātra* (element of smell) causes *Earth*. The *Guṇās* or *Guṇins*, quality or qualified are identified in the Śāṁkhya philosophy. In it, an object can never be dissociated from the form, smell and taste etc. At the same time, the *Sāṁkhya Yoga* systems also believed in evolution (*Parināma vāda*). In it, the subject and the object are different and non different at the same time. Beauty and the beautiful form are at once non different and different. There is *bheda* (Difference) and *abheda* (non difference) between beauty and the thing in which beauty resides. This relation is known as *Bhedābheda* or *Tadātmya.*

For the movements in the sense organs, Sāṁkhya explained like this: I-ness is *abhimāna*. A freshly awakened man from sleep would have a sense of I-hood. There will be a *sphuraṇa* (movements) in the senses if we would have *Abhimāna vṛtti*. So also objects of senses would be activated if they would be penetrated with *Abhimāna* (ego element). Therefore, the senses and their respective objects should be vibrated with *Abhimāna vṛtti* (*Sāṁkhya kārikā*, 24.)We can say that senses and their respective objects proceed from *Abhimāna. Abhimāna* or *ahamkāra* is one parts of the mind stuff (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is made of *citta*, *manas* and *buddhi*. In the mind stuff, ahaṁkāra operates the sense of certainty. Beside this, it should be noted that the *guṇās*, as *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are treated as *Śaktis*, and all manifestations, changes, and dis appearance are due to them. In the Vyāsa bhāṣya (II.18), it is said how the certain are *śaktis* are *tulya jātīya* (of the resembling nature) while other are *atulya jātīya* (non - resembling). Infinite varieties of *bhāvas* are due to the manifold manifestations of these three *śaktis*. One *śakti* in the worldly sentiments, will always be a mixture of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. But the rasa realsation is essentially an analysis of *sāttvika śakti*. This *Sāttvika śakti* is the *viśuddha sattva* as named by Mādhvācārya. The *sattva* is light and *tamas* is heavy. Progress depends upon lightness just as regression on heaviness (Bhagavadgītā, Urdhvaṁ gachanti sasttvasthāḥ adhogachanti tāmasāḥ)**.** Vedic literature is vibrant frequently of three world that is, *Svar* or *Dyuloka* is full of Sattva, an abode of *Adityas.* The heaven and sky constitute the world of bhuva which is full of action or *rajas*. The world of *Bhūḥ* is tāmasika. Dyuloka is the head of God, *Antarikṣa* like is his bosom and shoulders, while Bhūloka is his feet. Similarly, in human body seat of *sattva* is in head, which is *Dyuloka*. The trunk of human body is *Bhuvaloka*, full of action and seat of *rajas*. The feet is *buhloka* or Earth is the seat of *tamas*. The sattva vibrates in eyes and ears which reveals the world of senses of perception, Jñānendriyas: Yāskācārya also divides this visible world into three parts which characterize all the activities in the existent things.

The three qualities of the Sāṁkhya (SK 10.11.12) are always working against one another but they are always together and can never be separated from one another. The rise of one Guṇa marks the decline of the other two. These conflicting *guṇas,* when overcome, instead of being the obstacle, they become a help. For example, *rajas,* and *tamas,* when overcome stimulate the growth of sattva. But they destroy *sattva*, unless they are overcome and are kept in check. Though giving rise to one another, their nature is such are opposed to one another. Patañjali states that the *guṇas* are always on the move and are never stationery, (YS. IV.15) The Sāṁkhya kārikā accepts *Prakṛti Pariṇāma vāda.* For, it, is the result of *Śakti* inherent in it. Again, Sāṁkhya states that the *citta* is jaḍa and comes under the sway of *Prakṛti* and thence known as *Jaḍa śakti*. The *Pariṇāma śīlatā* or imbibed nature of transformation of *citta* belongs to Prakṛti Pariṇāma vāda of the *Sāṁkhya*. But the same citta is *Śakti svarūpa* in the Vedānta. It is *Brahmapariṇāma* vāda according to Rāmānuja, Mādhava, Vallabha and Nimbārka. This speculation of Prakṛti Pariṇāma vāda during the time of Bharata has met transitional change in the later period by the speculative discussions of **Abhinavagupta**, Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha where shift was found towards *Brahma pariṇāma vāda* of the Vedānta and its different branches as have been presented by the different sects of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism where Śakta and Śaiva becomes popular in the study of aesthetics in interpreting its different theories. All these systems have recognized the importance of *Cit śakti* in the enjoyment of *rasa.*

The *Prakṛti Pariṇāma vāda* in the *Yoga sūtra* and the Yoga bhāṣya on it, presuppose the existence of śakti It has been held by Patañjali (YS. II.3) that he *Kāryakāraṇabhāva* like *avyakta mahat ahmakāra* etc. are the result of this *Pariṇāma vāda*. In the *vyāsa bhāṣya*, (II.4), it is interpreted that the kleśas etc. or all the *Vṛttis*, *karmāśaya* or *vāsanā* are lying in the dormant stage in a latent form as *Śākti* in citta. The Vyāsa bhāṣya again repeats that the state of *saṁskāras* is *prasupti* which would bear the fruits in the future. Bharata's sthāyībhāvas are also the result of evolution of Prakṛtāni or Idanīntānt vāsanās issuing from saṁskāras. These *sthāyībhāvas* are stored up energy or prasupta kleśa. Rasa is realized when stored up energy in *sthāyībhāva* has been released. That's why Bharata has referred to *sthāyībhāva* as bīja or seed in his BNŚ (VI. 38, Baṇares ed.) which is nothing but the *prasupta saṁskās* or *Śaktimātra* in the YS. Bharata's *sthāyībhāvas* are born of *kliṣṭa saṁskāras* (springing from vāsanās). The *kliṣṭa saṁskāras* consequently spring from Sa bīja (*Vyutthāna*) *Saṁskāras*. This sabīja saṁskāra has a śakti or vibration culminated into *vāsanā* which leads to *rasa*.[2] In the Viśudhha sattva or Saṁvit is power incarnate which produces *rasa* enjoyment. (BNŚ VII. 93). There is no *rasa* without *sāttvika bhāvas*. *Sāttvika bhāvas* purify or over haul the mind where soul which is blissful (Anandamaya) is reflected. Only a pure mind can enjoy *rasa*. But absolute purity of the mind is unattainable. That's why, it is said that though material of the mind are *rajas* and *tamas*.[3] The intellectual condition of the mind without *rajas* and *tamas guṇas* means an absolute

purification which has been enumerated as the character of absolute soul (*Brahma*), tasyopādhiḥ prakṛṣṭaḥ sattvaḥ (*Ibid*.YS), that is, his attribute is *sattva* of pure quality. The word *Viśuddha Prakṛti*, *Viśuddha sattva* and sattva are synonymous to each other. But for our *rasa* relish state, we need *Citta saṁvit* state where matter and mind are associated. In this category, the consciousness is known as *citta saṁvit*. In this state, a subject has objective awareness of his internal being.[4] No external objectivity works here (*Bāhyavaimukhyapāda* Mammṭa). It is because of the even movement of Prāṇa, when a perfect equipoise is attained through *Prāṇāyāma* where complete renunciation of outward appearance becomes possible.

It is not self centeredness but here, man becomes self composed (*ātma viśrānti*). This rasa enjoyment is not all at once process, but with a definite sequence of rasa ingredients, that is, Vibhāvānubhāva Sāṁcārībhāvas' order should be there when the development of rasa is possible. It is like an experience of the shadow of Banyan tree which does not bring out all on a sudden stroke as a full grown tree. The tree comes out from the seed gradually with an ordered sequences. It is not that branch or fruit comes first but it is with the sequence of root, stem, leaves, branches, and trunk then flower and fruit, that a tree from a potential seed.[5]

Footnotes:

1) Viṣṇu Puraṇa I. 12.69. Vyāsa Bhāṣya on the Yoga Sūtra: Cetasi śakti mātra pratisṭhānāṁ bījabhāvopagama. (Potential tendency in the mind remains in the form of seed).
2) *Vyāsa bhāṣya* on the *Yoga sūtra*, II. 12.
3)*Ibid*, II.17.
4) YS. (*Citta samvit*) III.35.
5) *Vyāsas bhāṣya* II. 19. Vivṛddhikāsṭāmnubhavanti.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI; Source: *Aesthetic Theories of India*, Vol. III, New Delhi, 1990.

AESTHETIC CONTRIBUTION OF ŚAIVISM AND ARDHARNARIŚVARA

This *śakti* is *bhāva* which can not be described in the language. The undifferentiated *śabda Brahman* or Brahman as the immediate cause of the manifested *Śabda* and *Artha* is a unity of consciousness (*caitanya*) which expresses itself in the threefold functions as the three Śaktis, icchā, jñāna and kriyā.[1] the three guṇas, sattva, *rajas*, and *tamas*, the three bindus (*Kārya*) which are sun, moon, and fire. These are the product of the union of *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa śakti* This triangle of divine desire is the Kāmakalā or Creative Will and its first subtle manifestation, the cause of the universe is personified as the Great *Devī Tripruasundarī* the *Kāmeśvara* and Kāmeśvarī. This manifestation is the union of *Śiva* and *Śakti* the great 'I' (ahaṃ) which develops through the inherent power of its thought activity (*vimarśa śakti*) into the universe unknown as Jīva, its true nature and the secret of its growth through *Avidhyā Śakti*. Then there appears the quality of subject and object, of the mind and the matter. The physical manifestation of mystic power (*bhāva*) is known as *anubhāva.* There are three identical bhāvas of qualified Brahman sat, cit, ānanda. The anubhāvas or physical manifiestations of these three bhāvas are respectively, *sandhinī Śakti*, *saṁvit Śakti* and *āhlādinī Śakti*. In the universal consciousness three of them are existing in their perfectness, in an individual soul as their portions and in Māyā Śakti they exist in their modification.

Before the rise of the will, idea is the state identity with the absolute in the former, and with the limited subject in the latter casse. The will nothing but Vimarśa.[2] *Uptalācārya* states, that, if the absolute be without Vimarśa (freedom of will) and be only self luminous (Prakāśa), It would be insentient like quartz (sphaṭika-maṇi), Instead of using the word Vimarśa he uses the word *Camatkṛti.* This word later on with aesthetic implications has been used by many Sanskrit poeticians in the sense of *ānanda*.

The supreme Lord is free to be (Vimarśa) or *icchā śakti*. This freedom to be, technically called *Sattā*, *sphūrtta* and is inseparable from consciousness (*Vimarśa*) which refers to nothing else than this very freedom to be and, therefore, may be called 'action' (Kriyā). Action includes the activity of knowing also.[3] A knowledge and action has three powers of knowledge of action, obscuration and concretization (jñāna, Kriya, Māyā). These powers of the Absolute appear in the case of an individual subject as *sattva, rajas*, and *tama*

Synthesis Of All Philosophical Thoughts In The Aesethetic Experience

Theory Of Synthesis

Through Vimarśa or icchā, jñāna, kriyā or sat cit ānanda, world consciousness is born in the form of latent permanent mood. Individual world or the world of Māyā both in turn take birth into physical form (anubhāva) with three *bhāvas* of *sandhinī* icchā śakti or its permanent mood with the contact of Sandhinī anubhāva (physical manifestation) has created the *rasa* of the abode, form, and all the agency of consciousness of the Supreme being. The name, quality an īā, all belongs to the sandhinī anubhāva. Saṁvit anubhāva displays the divine affluence, tenderness and beauty while hlādinī anubhāva gives the divine experience of love bliss. Sandhinī anubhāva of an Individual soul gives the idea of the conscious existance of an indivudla with its name and place. Through saṁvit anubhāva an individual attains knowledge of Brahman and through hlādinī anubhāva, individual experiences the aesthetic delight. Even perfect state of Yoga and self realization of an individual is the manifestation of saṁvit sandhinī anubhāvas of Māyā śakti who creates whole cosmic world and limits the universal soul in its macrosocopic form and individual soul in its microscopic form.[4] Through this *Māyā śakti* conditioned individual soul, inherits name, form, quality and kind. Saṁvit anubhāva provides this individual soul with its feeling of care and anxieties, hope and imagination. Hlādinī anubhāva gives the physical pleasure of this physical world.

Through it, we conclude that the word śakti is implied to femininity of particularly. All the individual souls are basically feminine (because of this śakti). Puruṣa is only that who owns all these powers, or one who is powerful is masculine or particular. Eventually they both are same, as *Jīva* says Śaktiśaktimatoḥ abhedaḥ They are two inseparable entities. Self luminosity (*śakti* or *Vimarśa*). This is not pure indentity but indentity of opposites as represented in Ardhanārī Naṭeśvara. This identity is potential identity with the absolute, as impressions of the images of the dream of an individual do exist with him in the wakeful state, or as the creation that a yogin brings about is with him before he actually creates. As the dream from the dreaming subject or reflection from a mirror can not have their existence apart from their substrata, similarly, universal consciousiness is the permanent substratum of all that is objective. Why Will creates subjective and objective variety? Is this manifestation due to some cause? The cause itself is an inexplicable mystery. It is essential nature of the will to manifest. Śiva Vadāntic Brahman who is only self shining and inactive. In the *Purāṇas, Śiva* is nirvikalpa and savikalpa both. The Vedānta interprets Brahman as only indeterminate (*Nirvikalpa)*. Determinacy depends upon self consciousness which has cognition of 'this' and 'not this' or activity to untie something and separate another. Self luminousness (*nirvikalpa*) is identical with *savikalpa* or self consciousness as fire the capacity of burning.

IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN AND THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF THE SYNONYMS OF THE WORLD STRĪ AND THEIR AESTHETIC SIGNIFICANCE

The four aims of human life and the main aim of *dharma* can not be attained without a woman. Even in earning artha or money if woman does not care or protect the household, man does not get time to earn. In the expression of *kāma*, the main role is played by a woman in the experience of aesthetic pleasure by a man as erotic sentiment. Therefore, the woman has more qualitative characteristics than a man. From the point of view of mokṣa also, womanhood is an agency through which one attains it. As without detachment to a thing which fallacious one can not be privileged to attain mokṣa. Till one distastes the sense objects, one can not elevate himself towards knowledge. The woman is the true agent of bewitching pleasure. Realizing the false nature of this illusion woman can indirectly be the cause of mokṣa also.

The power of femininity is described as *vāma, menā, nārī* etc. in the Purānic literature. The word *strī* implies the sense of embrassment.[5] According to Patañjali all the senses of taste and their aggregate itself symbolies a woman.[6] When each of the taste is so enjoyable then how beautiful and charming could be its aggregate? This aggregate is known as menaḥ that's why woman is given the name of gnā also.[7] Ṟgevda takes the world from the root nṛ, one who leads but *Yāskācārya* took its etymology from the root nṛt, one whose beautiful activites make a man dancing, is known as nārī.[8] *Devībhāgavata Purāṇa* calls her *vāmā*, as she always speaks contradictory statements, that is for 'yes' she speaks 'no' and vice versa.[9] One who scatters beauty (*vayati Saundarya iti vāmā*) is also known as *vāmā*. As this feminine beauty is worshipped so it is known as *mahilā* also (*pūjārthe mahilā*). Her beauty is compared to the toxic effect of a flower so she is known as *pramadā* (*pramadā sampadau harşe ca*), she, who in her association makes other also intoxicated. This power of feminity resides like a musk in everyone which is mysteriously hidden. *Nārī* is that flower who spreads her perfume only in the house and not in the market place. The *Skanda Purāṇa* has echoed it repeatedly. The foundation stone of a house is a woman herself. If man does not bear any relationship with a woman his happiness would be null and void.[10] Without a woman nothing can be done by a man.[11] The Devī bhāgavata Purāṇa described the innumerable forms of power of female being.[12] Even *buddhi* is described as multiformed woman as it tastes all the sense objects and assumes the forms likewise. Because of the fundamental principles ṛta or religion, it remains mono form.[13] In the 12th Skandha of the Devībhāgavata Purāṇa, all pervading universal forms and names of the woman are described, which can be helpful in regulated a norm for the Indian feminine beauty and its universal applications. The feminine power is the agent and the end both there. The extant sculpture of that period depicts woman's beauty as the matriarchal power. This matriarchal form is unstained beauty and its chastity is compared to a pilgrimage, where a man takes shelter and transforms himself into a handsome fellow like a woman herself. The perfectness of mother is the highest state of aesthetic taste. She irradicates the misery and sorrow of men and fulfils their desires.[14] The mother is known by the name Śakti, Dhātri, Jananī, Ambā, and Vīrasū.[15] All the sixteen beauties of a woman are absorbed into one form of the mother.[16] Indian feminine beauty of a beloved wife, dancer or a musician all are culminated in one graceful beauty of the mother.[17] This world is not promoted only by the existence of the female but also. Before the pair of male and female were born, there existed only *Brahman,* he was the agent of the enjoyment and the enjoyer both. The *cit* or consciousness of Brahman was the enjoyer and ānanda of it was the enjoyed that is to say, knowledge (*cit)* experiences the aesthetic bliss (ānanda). But enjoyer cannot enjoy separated from the object of enjoyment. Therefore, *Brahman,* when has brooding thought of enjoying, he became dual form of half male and half female. He parted his form into two, henceforth were born husband and wife.[18] There is a narration in Devībhāgavata Purāṇa, where Brahman who asked Bhagavatī, was she the same Brahman who is said to be one without second? If she is Brahman then whether is she male or female? *Mahāśakti* answered that herself and Brahman were the same thing, there was no difference between both of them. What Brahman, is that 'I' am and vice versa. It is because of the delusion of *buddhi* where difference lies.[19] Everything of the creation was divided into male and female element till the end of deluge.

The Concept of Ardhanārīśvara Or Androgynous And its Importance in Aesthetical System

Every object of the ephemeral or created world is divided into two male or female. Brahman during creation manifests himself in the form of *Mahāśakti* and remains in two forms till the time of deluge. After that, he again assumes one form. The subtle seed does not grow itself into a gross form but is transformed into an absolutely newer form of a sprout and thus grows day by day till it becomes tree with leaves, flowers, and fruits. Similarly, from the seed in the form of Brahman there appear different twigs in the form of *Mahāśakti* and the creation starts henceforth. The qualities of tenderness, beauty, sweetness, love, cleanliness, delicacy are all related to feminine while quality of hardness, ugliness, harshness, heaviness and volume belong to masculine. Whole sentient and insentient world consists of these qualities. The majority of any of these categories of two qualities makes male and female accordingly. But sometimes reverse is the case, that is, a female possesses more of hardness and male possesses more of delicacy. Therefore, leaving aside the quantity in the quality, it is accepted that each man or a woman is a symbol of half male and half female combined. Woman is symbolised with Śakti and man Śiva.[20] Though *Śiva* is one, he devides himself into duality then in plurality.[21] Even in Koran, this *ardhanārīśvara* element of Purāṇas is recognised by saying that God has created everything into couple form.[22] There is a myth in *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* that, in the beginning of this creation, *Rudra* made a female from his half and male from the other half.[23] Which part of Rudra assumed the form of male and female? For that there is a story in *Devībhāgavata Purāṇa* which depicts that the supreme lord who is free will, Himself, created two forms through its own will. From His left was born woman and from the right, man took birth.[24] The viṣṇu Purāṇa admits two relities of *viṣṇu* and *Lakşmī* so it said that the male in Gods, birds and men is *Hari* himself, and feamale a counter parts of them is Lakşmī, After that there is nothing.[25] Śākta philosophy accepts two realities of Śiva and Tripura sundarī who created all the words and the things. When *śakti* assumes the form of sphūrtta (freedom to be) Śiva enters into it in the form of *tajas*, (self luminous) and a *bindu* is created. When *śakti* enters into *śiva* then woman elements of nāda is manifested. These two (nāda bindu) united together became *ardhanarīśvara* or androgynous. This is a kāma element, where white gem belongs to man and red to woman. The unity of both is responsible for producing *Kalā*. The nāda (ichoate sound and movement) and Kalā together with Bindu created the world. *Śiva* together with *śakti,* loses its unity in the process of concretisatrion of the universal. Concretisation means the rise of distinction, differentiation and limitation. It means splitting up of the ultimate unity into multiplicity. Universal

self consciousness begins to indemnify itself with the multiplicity of manifested worlds thus becomes limited. He begins to experience the pairs of opposites of the world. In this way, *śiva* itself becomes the individual consciousness, the real subject and the mind and body which it upholds. These are the forms of *śakti*. That is, *ātman* is male and mind and body are female. Śakti manifests herself in the objects which are required by Śiva in the form of Jīva to enjoy them.[26] Śiva can not move without *śakti* Again and again, it is repeated by the writer of Saundaryalaharī.[27] *Tantric* cult called *Śiva* as *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa* which has inseparable connection. Mind is self luminous entity and receives reflections independent of external illuminator and makes them shine as identical with itself. This is technically known as *Prakāśa*. Mind retains affection in the form of impressions at will (*sphūrtta*). It will take anything out of the stock of memory to reproduce its former state, as in the case pf remembrance, it can create altogether new constructs out of imagination. These modifications done by the mind are called *Vimarśa. Vimarśa* is freedom of will of willed *śiva* or *Prakāśa* who is conscious and luminous both. This freedom of will makes mind to create new ideas and imagination to project them into an art. Because of these *Vimarśa* and *Prakāśa*, all objects are seemed to be different and in a descending manner. Though it is a inseperable relation between *Vimarśa* and *Prakāśa*, yet its existence separate like mercury of thermometer, but *Vimarśa* unites totally with Prakāṣa and identifies itself with it. They both try to swallow each other's entity like the rays of the sun covers the round of the sun itself or the sparks of the fire covers its original fire, or the waves of the ocean by overpower their undercurrent. *Vimarśa* though possesses the inherent nature of Prakaśa, yet it covers *Prakāṣa* beautifully in its own charming veil. This state of equilibrium of Vimarśa and Prakāṣa is known as Kaula.[28] Country, house, man of the same caste, gotra and the body, are known as Kula.[29] There resists a state of equilibrium of Śiva and Śakti in the motherland, in parents' house, in a man of same caste, same *gotra* and one's own body thus these are the most beautiful objects for an individual. Beauty represents itself in the harmony, proportion and symmetry. These variant qualities are made of two paradoxical things or antithesis, as Śaiva and Tāntric say, these are iśvara and Śakti. Iśvara or Puruṣa can not get perfection in his physique till his half portion is counterposed or balanced by the presence of a woman or Śakti.[30] The erotic sentiment which signifies the importance of *kāma* in life is impossible without or without woman. The desire for unity is a essential nature of anyone who tries to make himself perfected by discovering half of his entity in a woman. The equal status with man is relished by woman.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI; **Source**: *Asethetic Theories of India,* Vol. I, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, 1983.

Footnotes:-

1) *Devībhāgavata* P., III.7.26; Siva P., Vāyu Samhitā, II. 7.8.

2) *Bṛhatī Vimarśini*; i.5.11.(Mss. Utpalācārya. Op. Cit. in K.C. PANDEY, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.)

3) *Iśvara Pratyabhijñā Vimarśini* Kasmir, Sanskrit Saries 1928. Vol. II Pp. 257-58.

4) Viṣṇu P., 1.12.69. hlādinī sandhinī sasmvitvacceke sarvasamśraye/hlādatāpakarī śrīstvayi no guṇavarjite/

5) Devibhagavata P., Chap. 46. strī styai, striyaḥ styāyateḥ apatrapaṇkarmaṇaḥ lajjārthe/

6) Patañjalī Mahābhāṣya, IV. 1.3 śabdasparśarūarasagandḥānāṃ guṇanaṃ styanam stri/

7)Nirukta III 21.2 mānyantyenāḥ purusaḥ

8) Ibid.,V.1.3 narāḥ manuṣyāḥ nrtyanti karmasu/

9) Devibhagavata *P*. Chap. 46 vāmam viruddharūpam tu viparītam tu mitaye/vāmena sukhada devi vāmā tena matā budhaiḥ/

10) Skanda. *P*., kāśī Khaṇḍa, IV. 67, bharya mulam grhasthasya bharya mulam sukhasya ca/bharya dharmaphalavāhye bhāryā santānavṛddhaye/

11)*Bhaviṣya P*., Chap.7.

12) *Devībhāgavata P*. VII. 31.44-53.

13) *Skanda* P. Mā. Ku. Khaṇḍa; III 274.

14) Ibid., IV.99

15) Ibid., 4.100-101.

16) Brahmavaivarta P. Birth of lord Kṛṣṇa I. 35.53-55. stanyadātrī
garbhadatri bhaksyaratri gurupriyaḥ/ abhiṣṭadevapatni ca pituh patni ca kanyaka/ sagarbhaja ca ya bhagini svamipatni priyā prasāḥ. /

17) Devibhagavata P. I. 57.17.

18) Brut. 1, 4.3.

19) Devībhāgavata P. 3.6.

20) Śiva P., Vāyavīya Sam IV.55. śankaraḥ purusāḥ sarve striyaḥ sarvā mahesvarī

21) Ibid., Rudra Sam. Pu. Kh. Ardhanārīśvaraṃ bhatu bhanukoṭiśataprabhaṃ/

22) Koran, khalaknā bhin kulle śayīn jaujaina.

23) Viṣṇu P., 1.4; 1.2.56 ardhanārīnaravapuḥ pracaṇḍo 'tiśarīravan/ vibhajatvāmānamityuktvā tam brahmāntardadhe tataḥ/ Brahamannārdīya P., 2.73.49; *Linga* P., II.73.49; 1.99.7-11, *Matsya* P., 269.1.10; *Mārkaṇdeya* P., 50.10.

24) Devibhāgavata P., II.29.2. strīnāmniśrīśca vijñeyā nānāyorvidyate paraṃ/

25) Vishnu P., 1.8.35. devatiryaṅgamnusyādau punnama bhagavan harih./

26) Saundaryalaharī, 35.

27) Ibid., 1.

28) Kulamava Tantra. Op. cit. in Śakti aṅka Gīta Press kulam saktiriti prokatamakulam siva ueyate/ kule' kulasya sambandhah kaulamityabhindhiyate/

29) Viśva Kośa. Janapade grhe sajatiyagane gotre dehe'pi kulam kathitam iti visvaḥ/

30) *Bhavi ya P*., Chap. 7 pumānardhapumānstāvadyvaḍbhāryam na vindati/

AESTHETICAL DEVOTIONAL THEORY OF ŚAIVISM AND VAIṢṆAVISM

The love has its recognition in the heart of any Sahrdaya, the man of taste, the connoisseur, who has a susceptibility for aesthetic enjoyment. To share the feeling of love with other's life, love flourishes the rich and prosperous traditions of values Sahṛdaya. According to Kavikarṇapūra, love is supreme value where all other *rasas* are prevailed upon.[1] One who enjoys with many and not with the particular, that sentiment bears spiritual outlook effectively. His is the knowledge, for each sentiment becomes efficiently profound. He can understand the truth through his feeling of universal appeal in its wide sense. Love in its sublimation, is the highest means of getting knowledge through feeling of universal beauty born of truth of the situation. Liberation from all physical bondages is the first and best condition of love feeling. The highest psychological state of freedom is attained only through love. There is no outward pressure of helplessness in the feeling of love. Love itself is an inherent power of the feeling mind. As it is free from ego, it becomes devotion and devotion can be identified with its object of love, spirit or its personal god. In different places of the Purāṇas, again and again, it is

emphasised that, "Sacrifice yourself to attain enjoyment (bhoga)." It is because of the magnificent concept of love into the background, they have said to liberate yourself from your ego and reveal the beauty of vast life for your delight.[2] Love tries to enjoy the aesthetic attitudes in each thing through its complete freedom, love cannot exist under the pressure. The more the love would be universal, there would be a freedom of universe which man would experience in his aesthetic delight. Opposite to it, the utmost hatred would lead to utmost salvary in the form of enemies who would surround an individual and obstruct his movements. Love feeling is so great and so intensive in the Purāṇa literature that it takes the shape of one pointed devotion as opposite to the feeling of hatred. Perhaps, subsequent classical literature is so highly impressed by it that it takes its themes and plots based on only love and devotion in the art forms of literature, painting and sculpture of the classical period. To show the consequences of harted, the poets of the classical period have inserted the subplots of villain to show the double strength of love in their art forms. Even they have taken story of Purāṇas attempted by the classical artists.

Bhakti is the itense stage of love to merge bhakta with the object of love as such. The devotional contemplation is divided into three process of the devotee. The commencement of stimulating state, (pravartaka avasthā) accomplishing state of a devotee, (sādhaka avasthā) and the last state of complete achievement of the goal (Siddhāvasthā).

The first consists in fully concentrating the mind on the deity and transforms oneself into the newer form or power of deity. It is done by the grace (Kṛpā) of the deity kṛṣṇa with his three powers: the internal which is intelligence, the external which generates appearance and the differentiation, which forms *Jīva* or individual soul. His chief power is that which creates dilation of the heart or joy (*hlādinī śakti*). When the love becomes settled in the heart of the dovotee, it constitutes *mahābhāva* or the best feeling. The *bhakti* based on love (*bhāva*) whether it is the highest means or highest objective of devotee, it is generated by *mahābhāva*. Jīva can do the deeds but it can not have the feeling of love, as it is an atom having intelligence. But the repetition of *karmas* towards uttering the name again and again can produce the feeling of love through constant practice. Kṛṣṇa as a deity is the Lord of the power of delusion or ignorance (*māyā*) and the *Jīva* is the slave of it. This world of ignorance (*māyā*) is not useful for the feeling to love. When the *Jiva* cuts off its shackles, it distinctly seems to have real nature and its true relation to God. It is attained by *bhakti* alone.[3] This bhāva is generated in the proper substratum. The substratum is nothing but *śuddha deha* which is transformed by nāma mantra; means an ordinary physical body (aśuddha deha) where māyā commands, after being unconscious to the physical world and free from ignorance, it attains *Śuddha deha* (where love only for God exists). Through śuddha deha, a devotee connects himself with the deity and this connection can never be destroyed. Through this power of love which creates dilation of the heart with joy, a devotee enters into the second stage, where he accomplishes total identify of himself with the deity through intense love.[4] Here, the relation between the two is of indentiy as well as of difference. Just as Kṛṣṇa as a deity is the support (Aśreya) and Jīva rests on him (Aśrita). This body of love (bhāva deha) is distinct from the physical body. That is, a person who is physically old, has shattered or deformed his bhāvadha or body of love for God, may reach adolescence with its tender, sweet and beautiful fragrance because of the appearance of *bhāva deha* again. So in the second stage, Jīva is distinct from the supreme soul. As the bee is distinct from the honey and hovers about it and when it drinks, it is full of it, that is, one with it similarly, in the third stage, a devotee seeks the supreme soul consistently and when through love he is full of supreme soul, he becomes unconscious of his individual existence and becomes as it were, absorbed in him. Herein, is described the ecstatic condition in which the individual soul becomes one with God, though they are really distinct. In his third stage, there remains inconstancy between the physical body of a devotee. The physical form attains the brilliance and harmonious beauty of the spritiual body of love (*bhāva deha*).

In the Bhakti Sūtra Narata, was is explained in the context of *bhakti,* that is repeated in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa also. As a matter of fact, love's nature, says Narada, is indescribable. As a dumb man who eats sugar cannot tell of its sweetness, so a man who enjoys the highest fruits can not describe in words their real nature. A devotee should in the first place, leave all the enjoyments, leave all contacts with objects of senses, incessantly mediate on god without wasting a single minute and always hear of god's qualities. He should pray in the second stage for the grace of god; and god will appear and bestow upon him spiritual experience. He should utilize his passions, anger and egoism after their transformation in the service of god. In fact, a divine transformation of all the natural emotions must take place in him. Complete peace and complete happiness are his characterstics. It ought to be permanent. The psycho physical characterstics of bhakti are: it should make the throat chocked with love, should make the hair stood on their ends, and should compel divine tears to flow from mediating eyes. It is bhakti alone which endows us with complete satisfaction. Bhakti drives away all the desires from us. As a devotee has no expectation in the form of Kuṇṭhā so he attains *vaikuṇṭha*.

There are two types of bhāvas, are manifested and then disappeared but permanent emotion stays till the intensity of love culminated into a *rasa.* This is only an inherent emotion. The permanent emotion for the deity is known as bhāva deha also. As this emotion blooms it enters into the heart. This heart is adorned with the eight petals of lotus, so the permanent mood also is manifested here into eight forms, and each petal symbolizes each permanent emotion. This bhāva of permanent emotion is transformed into mahābhāva which is the mystic devotion. Each devotee should awaken the eight permanent emotions (*Śṛñgāra*, *Vīra*, *Raudra* etc.) one by one. That's why he can express and enjoy all the eight aesthetic sentiments to their bliss. For the bloom of lotus, one needs a pond full of water and on the other hand, the rays of the sun and over and above a sky is needed. From beneath, a lotus needs its juice from water and above, the rays of the sun, Only the simultaneous requirement of these make a lotus to bloom into a flower. When the lotus of bhava is bloomed it elevates itself from the world, and it has connection with its root with the world. The nucleus of the eight petalled lotus is mahabhava, from where eight petals in the form of eight permanent moods are sprung. Every emotion is coherent commented that the aesthetic experience whether belongs to the physical world or the mystical spiritual world, is the experience of purposelessness of void of utility, which is a thing of pragmatic world of ignorance.

Bhakti is a particular tendency of the mind where mind through intense love fixes itself to the experience of trance state of aesthetic susceptibility.[5] A melting mind, absorbs itself incessantly in the object of its devotion, that is, in the deity with the total inclination of itself which is known as bhakti.[6] The continous influx of bhakti is compared in *Bhāgavata Puraṇa* to *Mandākinī* which purifies three world through its water.[7] *Bhakti* is an inherent tendency in a person in the form of *rati* which does nto have any particular reason for it.[8] Bhakti has no purpose so its experience of aesthetic

delight is alos purposeless. Love is not accomplished by an effort or reason. *Beauty is not imposed through outward efforts but it is inherent like the feeling of love.*

The kingdom of beauty and its summum bonum is: god exists in us in the form of eternal power, eternal wisdom and eternal love. But our desires, selfish motives attachment, avarice, ego and sense of possession which have sprung from our ignorance (*māyā*), they become the obstacles between us and the god. If we shatter the false nature of māyā, we can become purified and peaceful. In this placidity of our conduct, then we receive the reflection of the god as an aesthetic experience of joy. The gopīs of Vṛndābana were so much engrossed in kṛṣṇa that their eyes wanted to see only the vision of kṛṣṇa that their eyes wanted to see only the vision of kṛṣṇa, they wanted to listen to kṛṣṇa in every sound. The cosmic bewitching flute is the music of the call which seeks to transform the lower ignorant play of the mortal life and brings into it and established in its place divine ānanda of Goloka.[9] *Gopīs* are allegorically taken as senses which are devoted to the self or kṛṣṇa.Through music while talking, through dance while walking they concentrate of the self, they emerge into the blissful ocean of kṛṣṇa and become one with him by forgetting respectively their subjectivity.[10] Their love is dedicated to kṛṣṇa, so they become one with Kṛṣṇa.[11] Together with physical beauty, if the emotions, which belong to mental plane, don't reflect on the body as sāttvika bhāvas, then physical body remains deprived of the expressions of mental and spiritual beauty therein. Emotions are like wine, which give toxic effect to the physical beauty. Because of them, each limb of the body begins to pour *rasa* from itself. Love does not need anything of outside to be aroused and to be intensified. It is excited by its own music, dance and poetry and recreated within itself. This physical body becomes insignificant in tasting the aesthetic relish. This is the same beauty, where without ornamentation, physical body looks charming with the reflected emotions. Love does not need adornment. It is only a preliminary stage where lover and beloved try to beautify themselves outwardly. But in its ripe stage, the ornamentation itself becomes the bondage for love.[12] The aesthetic delight which is experienced through the feeling of love and devotion surpasses the physical beauty of the devotee and deity. There even no rule stands for it.[13] Śrī Rādhā is mentioned as the highest of the women kṛṣṇa loved and she is represented to have been formed by the Lord himself after becoming dual, one of which was Rādha.[14] Radha through surrenderism raised to the dignity of her eternal consort.[15] This surrendering is through complete devotion.[16] Kṛṣṇa told the mystic path of devotion which is not performed by the physical body. Physical existence does not give the experience of aesthetic beautitude. One has to resort in those eyes, ears and mind which don't require light of the sun or any other objectivity to be perceived[17] where all the expectations vanish and even the passionate erotic sentiment gets lost. Through his Rāsa īā, Lord Kṛṣṇa satisfied the senses of *Gopīs* to make all of them the conquerors of the senses. The outer instrumentation is not required to an absolute beauty.[18] Like a lotus, which is tickled by the bees and becomes heavier because of the bees, touches the water, yet it keeps its balance above the water and gives its pollen to all the bees. Indeed, lotus is the enjoyer which is beautiful itself, Lord kṛṣṇa behaves like a lotus enshrouded with the gopīs. *An enjoyer remains unattached within and without.* He has his own system. The outward torture and the strife of inside cannot make him tickled. The beauty like a balance scale has its own equilibrium. Lord kṛṣṇa remains *acyuta.* Kṛṣṇa in his cosmic play though remains attach to the great cosmic power (*yogamāyā*), yet he is called Yogīśvara.[19] He is absolutely free from paradoxes of life. A free or liberated man seeks the aesthetic joy in whole creation. Then the sense of equality prevails everywhere.

Our relations with him whether bears to the feeling of passion (*kāma*) or to anger (*krodha)* or to feeling of terror or affection or to the enemity of friendship; whatever tendency we apply for it, the same is transformed into the form of the Lord.[20] In a way, the theistic concept of the yoga (1.23) as narrated by the aphorism: Īśvarapraṇidhāṇadvā, had been accepted during that period.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI; **Source**: *Aesthetic Theory of India*, Vol.I, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, 1983.

Footnotes:

1. atha premarasaḥ atra cittadravaḥ sthāyī. Premaraso sarve rasāḥ antarbhavantī tyatra mahiyaneva prapañca/ Cf. Alamkararalaistinja of kavikarṇapūra, p. 148 cf. RAGHAVANA, V. in his *The number of rasas,* p. 145.
2) *Supra General introduction*, n.1.
3) See *Gourāṅgatattvaśḥ Gaurāngacarita* by PRASANNA KUMARA VIDYARATNA printed at Calcutta.
4) *Pāṇiṇi Aṣtādhayāyī* IV.3.95.
5) *Bhakti rasāyana*, MADHUSUDANA SARSVATI dravībhāvapūvikā hi manaso bhagavadakarata savikalpakavṛttirūpa bhaktiḥ/
6) *Ibid.*, drustasya bhagavaddharmadhārāvāhikatām gatā/ Sarveśe manasā vrttirbhaktirityabhidhīyate//
7) *Bhag*. P. XII manogatiravicchinnā yatha gangambhaso' mbudhau/ lakṣanam bhakti yogasya nirguṇasya hyudāhṛtaṃ//
8) *Bhag*. P., XI ahaitukyapratihatā yayātmā suprasīdati/
9) *Bhag.P*., XI 29.4.
10) *Ibid*., XI 30.3 gatismitaprekṣaṇā bhasanadisu priyaḥ priyasya pratirūpaamūrttyaḥ/
11) *Ibid*, III. 24.31. animittā bhagavatī bhaktih siddhergariyasī
12. Ibid., X.1.29.7. limpantyaḥ prabhṛjantyo'nyā añajantyaḥ kāśca locane/ vyatyastavastrābharaṇāḥ kāścit kṛṣṇātikam yayuḥ//
13. Ibid., X.l. 29.9. antargṛhagatāḥ kāścid gopyo labdavinirgamāḥ kṛṣṇam tadbhāvanayuktā dadhyunmīlitalocanāḥ//
14. Bhāgavata., P. ll. 3.24. añjantya kāśca locane/
15. Ibid., X.l. 29.14. nṛnām niḥśreyasārthāya vyaktirbhagavato nṛpa avyayasyāprameyasya nirguṇasya guṇātmanaḥ/
16. Ibid., X.l. 29.27. Śravaṇād darśanād dhyānānmayi bhāvo' nukìrtanāt/ na tathā sannikarṣeṇa pratiyata tato gṛhān/
17. Ibid.
18.Bhakti-rasāyana-Madhusudana sarasvati, śrīkṛṣṇaḥ saundaryasāra sarvasvaṃ/
19. Bhāg. P.X.l.29.42-13.
20. Ibid., X.l.29.14.

AESTHETICAL DYNAMIC THEORY OR SAKTA-SAUNDARYA

This qualified power of Brahman, enters into all the beings and matter, as soon Brahman desires to create this world. Matter is condensed energy, when scientists have explained this, they channalise their intellects to transform matter into the energy already existing in the matter. This condensed energy of science and Māyā of philosophical systems has been representing the effectual world. Due to the various objects it varies itself.[1] This Śakti or Māyā is the cause of sentient and insentient-beings.[2] The substratum and its object are identified. So Brahman and Māyā are one without second. Apparent difference lies on name only.[3] This

potency of Brahman is very beautiful. It is the great-will of Brahman. Only the will, if fulfilled, gives us pleasure of satisfaction and joy of beauty in its accomplishment. When our insignificant power of will or desire gives the experience of worldly aesthetic pleasure, the will of Brahman can be surpassed in that experience of mundane world.[4] Sakti or Māyā has narrated beautiful from of Brahman while enquiring about the God, she told that the absolute Brahman when qualified by her, he becomes manifested in the physical world of body and limbs.[5] If we correspond this concept of the Purāṇ as with the present day science, we find ourself quite close to the theory of *Thermo-dynamic* where its first principle is described as State of conservation of energy, where we have energy in common in the first principle of this cosmic-world. But we have conscious-energy and science is silent about the consciousness. This is the abosolute state in the beginning. But the state of interconversion of energy is the second-state of *Thermo-Dynamic-theory* which represents in correspondence with philosophical theory of qualified Brahman who together with his energy (māyā) has created the different forms of the world. Actually all the attributes, names and objectivities and subjectivities are the inter-conversion of Māyā, volitional potency of the absolute, otherwise the world is a vast void. This whole world is beautiful because of its changing geometry of circumflexion, cartography, topography and spiral forms. If the rotundity of heavenly bodies could not exist therein, could be a place of vacuum and voidance. These curves brought the gravity in the things. According to **EINSTEIN**, the four dimensions are the effect of the circling of time and space and their gravity is produced due to these circumflexions.[6]

The word Śakti with which we have come across in Padma, Kālikā, Mārkaṇḍeya, Vārāha and Brahma-Vaivarta Purāṇas, is etymologically explained in Devī Bhāgavata Purāṇa-Sa-supremacy, sovereignty and affluence and Kti – devotes the sense of valour, endevour and omnipresence, the one who bestows sovereignty and valour both, is known as Śakti.[7] This primordial nature, or primal power cauces the modifications in the form of this universe. How this modifications of the worlds is produced by this prakrti? That is hidden in the word Prakṛti itself. Pra gives the sense of excel and Kṛti devotes to the 'created one', one who excels in creation that is Prakṛti.[8] It is its restricted sense, while we can find more than this in the Prakṛti. Pra or excelling quality belongs to Sattva, Kṛ gives the sense of rajas and it denotes tamas. The integrated group of these three is Śakti.[9] The Sāṁkhya system has defined Prakṛti in the above manner.[10] For the good of the worlds, to manifest the ultimate soul, this sportive Mahasakti has created and presented herself in each object her consciousness. The word Śakti is synonym of the words bala and sāmarthya, capacity or force. The inherent power or might of each object is different according to different objects. Beauty in the nymphs, capacity of fulfilling the desire in Kalpadruma, the briskness in the bird, the light in the sun, the gleaming streak in the moon, the smell in the earth, the teste in the water, the velocity in the air, the brilliance in the fire, the pervasiveness in the space, the vitality in the body made of five gross-elements, the resuscitation in the nectar, tha luster in the planest, the steadiness in polar-star, crimson light in the dusk, slumber in the night, the splendour in the dawn, the enchantment in the dance, amusement in the musical instrument, infatuation in the music, the rasa in erotic emotion, the grage or charming words in the prose, the fathomlessness in the ocean, the ripples in the river, the placidity in the pond, aesthetic rhythm in the poetry, the softness in the lotus, the petrification in the mountain, perpetuation in the cascades, the restlessness in the fish, transparency in the gem, fruition in the tree, novelty in the leaves, fragrance in the flowers, delicacy in the creeper, foliage in the garden, elegance in the spring, radiant heat in the summer, surf of the clouds during rain thunder in lightning, clarity in the autumn, genius in the poet, penetrating intellect in the yogis , tenderness in the children etc are the inherent potentialities of these objects and the others. This power firstly functions in the nature and the world in its macroscopic form. Separately dealing with the guṇas, it covers rest of the creation with its integrated three guṇās with different ratios and proportions and assumes innumerable microscopic forms.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI; SOURCE: *Aesthetic Theory of Indian,* Vol. l, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, 1983.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Devībhāg. P. l. 13. 15. nūnam sarvaṣu deveṣu nānānāmadharā hyahaṃ / bhavāmi śakti rūpeṇa karomi ca parākramaṃ/ utpanneṣu samasteṣu kāryeṣu praviśāmica
2. Ibid., lll.3. eṣā bhagavatī devī sarveṣām kāraṇam hi naḥ mahāvidyā pūrṇa prakṛtiravyayā /
3. Ibid., lll.6. sadekatvam na bhedo'sti sarvadaiva mamāsys ca / yo'sau so'ham yo;sau bhedo'sti mativibharmāt /
4. Skanda P.lll. 1.2-3.
5. Devībhāgavata P., l.2.4.
6. Beauty resides in order and in the metaphysical elements included in order, namely, unity and multiplicity (harmony, proportion).Measure and proportion say, Plato, are the elements of Beauty of perfection – Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion.
7. Devībhāgavata. P., lX. 2.10. aiśvaryavacanaḥ śaśca ktiḥ parākrama eva ca / tatsvarūpā tayordātrī sā śaktiḥ parikīrtitā /
8. Ibid., lX. 1.5. prakṛṣṭa vācakaḥ praśca kṛtiśca sṛṣṭi vācakaḥ / sṛṣṭau prakṛṣṭā yā devī prakṛṭiḥ sā prakīrtitā /
9. Ibid., lX.2.6-7. gune sattve prakṛṣṭe ca praśabdo vartate śrutaḥ madhyame rajasi kṛśca tiśabdastamasi smṛtaḥ / trigunātmasvarupā yā sā ca śaktisamanvitā /
10. Mārkaṇḍeya P., ll. 79.56,63. tasya sarvasya yā saktih sā tvam kim stūyase mayā /

AESTHETIC AND ELIMINATION THEORY-NETI-NETI

We cannot have any criterion for determining the nature of aesthetice. As this experience is but another name for awakening consciousness, the more supersensitive would be the consciousness of a man, the more would he be enlightening in his aesthetic experience. If we consider consciousness as the criterion of aesthetic experience, there will be a fallacy of infinitum (ānantya-doṣa) because of the endless strata of consciousness, and if we take it for granted, that there is only one great consciousness existing in all the beings , then there will be a fallacy of extreme- limitedness (vyabhicara doṣa). More over, if we place aesthetic experience in the category of particular standard, then it will cease as an art and would becomes an obstacle in knowing the actual form of particular object. Therefore, we have to leave the resort of the standard as such for the experience of aesthetic measurement.

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI; SOURCE: *Aesthetice Theory of India,* Vol l. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, 1983.

AESTHETIC EMOTION

(An analysis)

In philosophy emotion is used in the sense of feeling, as distinguished from cognition and will, and is one of the three facets of the mind.

It is difficult to define emotion, and aesthetic emotion is the hallmark of poetry. Poetry always pleases irrespective of the nature of emotion depicted in actions that are represented in keeping with the requirement of art.

Recollected in tranquility, an aesthetic emotion is not a raw emotion, since it is purged of all egotism. Thus expressed in poem, it affects a number of persons alike.

According to Indian canons of literary criticism, the reader or spectator identifies himself with the situation presented in the poetic composition. **K.C.Pandey** observes. "This identification is an inner-state of the self and, such does not admit of being directly presented. Hence physical situation, mimetic changes and involuntary physical states are introduced." The result is the aesthetic arousal of emotion enabling the reader or spectator to enjoy Rasa.

AUTHOR: VIJAYAN K.; SOURCE: VIJ XV No.l, 1977.

Abbreviation:

Vishvesarananda Indological Journal, Hoshiarpur.

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE IN ABHIJNANA-DARSANA

Mare images or words as a symbol for particular thing do not give the experience of beauty but emotional-element or imagination should be superimposed on that particular thing which is symbolized by the word. Colour, stone or note, to experience aestyetic joy. **PROF. ALEXANDER** in the Dictionary of thoughts (universal Text Books Limited. London) explains 'though rose flower is beautiful absolutely but this absolute beauty without its observer is meaningless.' The presence of subject and object is inevitable in the aesthetic experience. To enjoy the aesthetic experience in the literature the equal inseparable status of word and the sense, as the conjugal-union of the couple is needed. People again, can say that the aesthetic experience of the poet springs from the surplus sexual-urge as suggested by the Westerners that the seeds of aesthetic has been sprouted from the fertility-rites. But merely an analogical explanation of Kālidāsa should not be misunderstood by any of the scholars of aesthetic. As with the great significance the conjugal –life of Sudaksiṇā with King Dilipa in the I and II cantos of Raghuvamśa is shown with its austerity. One should not associate only the sexual aspect in conjugal life. It is something ideal where sexual-drive is utilized for the biological need of preservation of life after the death of parents for pitṛṛṇa only. This inevitable unity between word and meaning is necessary to relish aesthetic enjoyment in the art of literature only. It is not necessary that this condition of word and its sense is essential for the common language of conversion. This identity is a necessary condition of only aesthetic experience. In the attainment of knowledge, the knowledge and the object of knowledge both are revealed simultaneously. Similarly, in experiencing beauty, the object of beauty is revealed as beautiful simultaneously. This object of beauty though may be the aggregation of our own emotions, or it may be the created art of the poet or sculpture, they would be beautiful only when our deep rooted vāsanā or sthāyībhāva would be stimulated in the contact of these objects, only then they would become our aesthetic experience. During our aesthetic experience, we recognize our stimulated Sthāyībhāva in the knowledge-from in one hand, and, on other hand, we experience state. It happens simultaneously. Something unmanifested when recognized through manifestation as beautiful, that is a Abhijñāna of beauty according to Kākidāsa. The simultaneity of the knowledge and object of knowledge to reveal the knowledge-form to the subject is denoted by the term 'Sampṛkta' by Kālidāsa. This simultaneity is the correspondence between subject and object and their unity as identical with each other in enjoying the beauty is shown as harmonious-state of two minds the creator and the admirer, of the sensitivity and the sensibility. The beauty exists in the mind of the admirer or creator and in the nature both, which is used as a medium in the art in displaying beautiful thoughts of the poet mind. The sympathy is born when there exists a thing of beauty together with the sensibility of an admirer, which connects the subject and the object together. Partially, beauty belongs to the subject and partially it belongs to its object. Things of beauty itself is not beautiful unless it stimulates its subject to experience the aesthetic-delight in it. That implies that beauty exists in the mind of the admirer or the creator in the hidden-form which is manifested by the thing of beauty. It means, beauty consists in reasoning and not in imagination. But there is not any antagonistic relation between reason and imagination. Actually imagination is based on those emotions which are based on reason and not beyond it. As we perceive the louter-world, we build the images accordingly. So beauty is expressive through our imaginations unmanifested beauty as revealed in the meditative state. As the thing of beauty is relatively related with the mind, so we experience relative beauty in it. This relation of relativity exists between word and in its sense. So we can conclude that beauty according to kāliāsa does not experience in subject or object but in the identity of both (samprkta). **Mr.H.S.LENGFELD** in his book titled Aesthetic is very close to the Indian concept of beauty as formulated by kālidāsa: "Beauty is neither totally dependent upon the person who experiences nor upon the thing experienced. It is neither subjective nor objective, neither the result purely intellectual activity nor a value inherent in the object, but a relation between two variables".

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI; SOURCE: *Aesthetic theory of India,* vol. l Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1983, Poona

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND CONTEMPLATION

We can equate this with an encaged parrot, which if is freed momentarily, gets the joy unknotted and unbiased. This is the experience belonging to the Manomaya- Kośa where one gets freed from good and evil of the world in the subtle world of dream, hypnotism or Yoga- nidrā, imaginations and Vāsanās. This free state can be compared with lighting where one gets vision but void of physical contact. To create beauty in the art- forms, is not the aim of an artist, as beauty is concerned with the philosophical speculation of the critic or sahṛdaya, where art yields multifarious meanings of aesthetic relish to them. The purpose of the work of art is to remove the state of wretchedness and leads one to the state of blessedness. This is what is projected at the end of the Saundrānanda of Aśvaghoṣa. For the critic or connoisseur, writer or an arist, Yoga-activity of contemplation is necessary. It gives twofold experiences: 1. Momentary 2.permanent. In the momentary experiences of Yoga-activity, an artist cerates the joy of the phenomenal world where romanticism, realism and expressionism etc. are the trends which flourish bin the art-forms, while in the permanent experiences of Yoga- activity, an artist is involved to the root of the subtle- mind (manomaya-kośa) he creates the joy of the metaphysical world, where, surrealism, symbolism, mysticism and esotericism etc. are the trends of art which have been flourished therein. The artist then becomes the saint- artist. This state in the Maitrī Upaniṣad is the exaltation of the contemplative state wich has been compared to the ascent of a spider on its thread; **CHUANG TZU** tells us that our life is suspended from God as if by a thread, cut off when we die. The same idea is symbolized in **WILLIAM BLAKES'**s 'An end of a golden spring' where

primordial image belong not to the subconscious mind but are of supper- conscious origin. In the mysticism, the religious mystic ecstasy is merged up with the artistic experiences. This has not been processed by the Yoga activity of an artist and philosopher-artist of India only, but even the Neo-Platonists like **GOETHE, BLAKE, SCHOPENHAUER, HSIEH HO** and **CROCE** also in the flashes of their self-revelation experienced these mystic experiences in their art-forms. The Brahma who is symbolized as creative of Indian art, similarly, Logos of the Greek-artists, Unio Mystica of **JAN VAN RUYSBROECK** (the father of Western Mysticism) of the netherland and the Urquelle of the German philosopher **ECKHAART, MEISTER** are symbolized as creative instincts of the art-forms.

We cannot restrict the study of aesthetic merely as a science for the theory of imagination as officially incepted by **ALEXAN DER GOTTLIEB BAUMGARTEN** (1714-1762). But in a later stage when life was too much alienated into individualists approach due to the industrialization and Capitalism and when Existentialism took birth in **KIERKEGAARD**, beauty has been identified with intelligibility along with the sensations and feelings of **BAUMGARTEN**. Intelligibility comes through realization, through the act contemplation (Śukranìtisāra, IV. 4.75 and 106). Beauty is the attractive power of perfection, depends upon objective truth and not upon personal opinions. One should have the knowledge of things and the objective world of feeling also. Without being a psychologist, one can not have intelligibility toward feelings which is the branch of Jñāna-yoga. There are three grades of human beings, the dull, buoyant, and, the wise (Tāmasika, Rājasika and Sāttvika). A loving heart and an enlightened understanding help to manifest innate divinity in the three grades of Jīvas (individual soul). Primal confusion and ignorance are symbolized in the apasmāra-Puruṣa who is dwarfish in personification in
the lconography of India.

At the higher state, just as science becomes philosophy and philosophy becomes metaphysics, similarly at the higher level of understanding, aesthetic experience are really dialects of the same spiritual language but with different words expressing the same ideas with the identical idioms. This spiritual language is universally intelligible language of aesthetic experience.

Yoga pertaining to Jñāna-yoga what is needed in the
aesthetic activity. The knowledge of the phenomenal world, Nature and then human-behavior and its reaction and consequently, the canons of the art –forms are necessary in the aesthetic experience. The observation of Natural aspects imparts intact knowledge which can correspond to any of the art-forms. *BNS* (XXXIV.4ff) gives one example of it like this: 'One day sage Svāti watched the sounds that torrential rains made on the Lotus leaves in a lake and the idea of making a drum'. Penance or Contemplation is another way to get knowledge. In the *Liṅgā-Purāṇa* (Uttara bhāga, ll.3.67-69), Lord Viṣṇu blessed Nārada with Music and made him honourable like Tumbaru. An incorporeal voice (*vāṇiṃ* divyā) asked Nārada in the midst of his penance to go to the northern slope of Mānasā and learn Music from that owl. Nārada followed the advice of Viṣṇu and became perfect in the science of Music. Yoga and Yogic activity are so the fine arts of India that we can not think the existence of any art-forms without the application of Yoga-activity. How the Serpent-Aśvatara was bestowed upon by the knowledge of sounds and notes by Goddess Sarasvatì after the vow of severe penance of the king-is another example from the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa (23-50) which shows the Yoga-activity of king Aśvatara in securing the art of music.

For different art-forms, the Yoga activity and its utility in the aesthetics, has been mentioned h-reading to trace the Yoga –activity in the Indian aein the different texts Sanskrit Literature which are wortsthetice. These are: MUSIC: Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa (23.49-69). Vāyu- Purāṇa (86.14ff and 87), Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa (lll.18-19) and Liṅga Purāṇa (ll.3), BNŚ (ll.28, 31.33), Samgītaratnākara (ll.4), Nāradīya-Śikṣā ll, Skanda-Purāṇa (Nāgara-Khaṇḍa, 254-61); Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa (Madhyama bhāga, Upodghāta, 61.31-34); Rāmāyaṇa (l.4-36). DANCE: VDP lll.34, Agni-Purāṇa 341-343, Abhinaya-darpaṇa BNŚ, Bhag. Purāṇa, Harivamśa ll, Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, Dhanañjaya`s Daśa-rūpaka and the samgīta ratnākara; t.a.g. RAO's Elements of hindu lconography, vol. 1part 1 and vol.-11.

ARCHITECTURE: Nine mahā-Purāṇas and the VDP.
SCULPTURE: Agni Purāṇa. VDP and Matsya-Purāṇa.
PAINTING: Citra-sūtra of the VDP and the Jīvajīvabhigama, a canonical book of Jainās and the Jaina-Kalpa-Sūtra.
LITERATURE: VDP, Agni P., BNŚ, Dhvanyāloka, Abhinava-Bhārati, Sāhitya, darpaṇa, Kāvya=Prakāśa, Rasagaṅgādhara etc.

It was the Lord of all Yogas (Yogeśvara) who commenced Ràsa-Līlā after stationing himself between every two of the damsels, (Bhāg P.Xl.33.2-19;X33.3).Viṣṇu was a great Yogī who by his Yogic power controlled Nāga and made him his bed, which is highly depictable topic in the painting and the iconography of India. With the analogy of Viṣṇu, Buddha and Pārśvanātha also saved mankind from death, which is symbolized in the art-forms as serpent. The serpent is known as Bhogī, and Yogī is the counter-balance of Bhogī.

In the first part of the Yoga-Sūtra, Patañjali states that ordinarily a man is his own confused thoughts and feelings. When the yoga is attained, his personal consciousness becomes stilled like a lamp in a windowless place, and then it is possible for the embodied soul to know itself as a part from the manifestation to which it is accustomed. At first, it is achieved periodically but after some time and with steady efforts, it becomes habitual. Then, there are different stages in this process. Such a state is attained by having a complete mastery over the mind and emotions. It is out of such a purified mind that a penetratingly critical and sharply discerning intelligence (Viveka) comes into being. It is this intelligence which has its roots in the existential situation, that can distinguish and discriminate between the eternal and ephemeral, the pure and the impure and happiness and sorrow. Because of such clear perception that never allows any scope for confusion, this newly born intelligence (Viveka) destroys the vision born of avidyā (ll.5) once for all. This Vīveka-khyāti opens up the possibility of new ways of life (YS.ll.29). Mind being devoid of any thought, movement acquires by itself a proficiency, a new-born capacity to remain in this motionless state without any effort (Ibid. ll.46) –this results in a disposition of vulnerable felicity which responds to everything within and without with an easy and beautiful gracefulness. It is found in this gracefulness the very vibration of life which it had never experienced before. There is now, a graceful response to every thing and reaction to nothing (Ibid. ll.47).

AUTHOR: PADMA SUDHI; SOURCE: *Aesthetic Theories of India,* Vol. lll, 1990, NewDelhi

Abbreviations:
BNŚBharata Nāṭya-śāstra
VDP: Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa

AESTHETIC, ITS FIVE CATEGORIES OF ITS EXPERIENCE

The division of five Kośās is nothing but five stages of experience as has been ascribed to the soul conditioned in the physical body, through which it mounts from beauty. In the first and third stages that is *Anna*, *Mana* and *Prāṇa*, the soul takes successively higher attitudes toward matter or object of senses. In the next two stages, that is, *Vijñāna* and *Ānanda*, it deals with itself before it approaches God, and then sides him. Thus, only three former stages are useful for discovering the aesthetic experiences in the yogic fields. There is a great relation and coordination among all these three stages of *annamaya, Manomaya* and *Prāṇamaya Kośas*. If the food (*Anna*) is pure the whole nature or behaviour of a person becomes pure (Ch. Up. Vll.26.2). When the nature becomes pure, memory becomes firm and after having a firm memory, all the bonds which tie a man down to the world, become loosened. Therefore, one must seek for purity of alimentation, which involves in its turn the purity of the mind. Likewise, mind for the purpose of its concentration and for the process of attention, always holds the breath, and, seems neither to breathe out to breathe in (Ch. Up. 1.3.3). Besides these relationships, there are various things of which mind (Mana) comprises. These are 'Will' (Saṁkalpa) and intellect (Manas). Firstly, it is stressed that Will is a primary. Through the 'Will' of heaven and Earth rain falls, through the will of rain food wills, through the food, vital Airs will. That's why one should meditate upon the 'Will' as Brahman (Ch. Up. Vll.42). What is 'will'? It is the same *Dingausich* of SCHOPENHAUFR which he described in his '*The world as will and idea*' (BK. 10. It is the impulse with which the waters hurry toward ocean and magnet turns ever to North-Pole and human desire is increased by obstacles. They all come under the name of 'will'. Whole world is filled with the force of will. What is known as motivation in the human-being, the same appears as stimulation in the vegetative life and as mechanical process in the inorganic world. Thus, what we call by the name of *motivation, stimulation* and *mechanical process,* they are the different manifestation of the same force of 'Will'.

After establishing the primacy of 'Will', which is known in the Tantra-Literature as *Icchā-Śakti,* the primacy of intellect is established in the next section of the same Upaniṣad. The intellect is better than 'Will', as what man thinks, he wills. Without thinking, if man wills, nobody plays heed to him. Consequently, intellect is the center of all the desires or wills or motivations. It is like a *I-Q* (Intelligent-Quotient) which man applies towards his motivation.If a man meditates upon his will as *Brahman* or absolute, he becomes master in achieving the higher intellectually (*Ch. Up.* VII.5.1). In fact, the activities of mind are varied as have been mentioned in the *Aitareya Upaniṣad (*III.2) like Samjñāna (recognition) Ājñānaṃ etc. But what we call *Manomaya-kośa*, it does not function separately but is induced by *Vijñānamaya-Kośa* known as *Devakośa* or *Ayodhyā purī* also (A. V. X. 2. 31). The two powers of thinking-faculty (Jñāna-śakti) and the feeling-faculty (Samveda-Sakti) are inseparable. If we call manomaya-kośa as the feeling-faculty then the intellectual or thinking faculty is Vijñānamaya-Kośa. They both are like milk and water (A.V.X.226). This Vijñānamaya-Kośa is said to be studded with triple ropes of Anna, prāṇa and mana, it secures all the experiences taking place in the manomaya-kośa for their future use. Because it is related to the past, future and the present, therefore, it is coherent (Saṁśliṣṭa, elevated Utkṛṣṭa) and perfect (Pūrṇa). As a sublime-power of thinking-faculty, it is known as medhā, ṣdṛṣti mati and Manīṣā and asa sublime-power of felling, it is known as Jūti and Kama (Ait. Up. lll.1). Mind and heart are one and the same things and stand for Antaḥkaraṇa (Mind-stuff) of Sāmkhya and Yoga Philosophy. In reality, all the kośas are an illusion projected by an ignorant soul on the substratum of the true – self. It is only in a relative sense that the self has been spoken of as the embodied self of another: Anyo'ntara ātmā manomayah (Taittirīya- Upaniṣad ll.3.) The Difference between manomaya and vijñānamaya- kośa is this; the word vijñānamaya has been used in the sence of jñānātman (katha-up. 1.3.9.10 and 13) while the *Manomaya* is of the form of Psychoses or the modifications of the mind. Vijñānānamaya is the owner of such states of modifications. To clarify more about the concept of manomaya and vijñānānamaya, I would like to refer to the sāṁkhya-kārikāin this respect. The mind is considered as the oragan of sense of perfection as well as oragn of action. Because it ponders over and determines and purposes the functions of both the sense therefore, it belongs to both. The oranges of sense- perceptions and the oranges of actions have been oraniginated along with the mind from the sāttavika ego. Because it has a common origin, henceforth, mind is also treated as the eleventh organ, they all are the result due to certain spontaneity from the specific varity of modification of attributes (Guṇā-pariṇāma) different senses and their respective sense-object are proceeded together with the mind (SK .27). The attributes are non-intellgent but they do act like the non-intellgent milk functions to nourish the calf (Guṇā-guṇeṣu vartante). The common function of the Manas-buddhi and Ahaṁkāra is the circulation of the five prāṇas while their specific functions are as follow: Buddhi = adhyavasāya or determination, Ahaṁkāra = abhimāna or individuation, while manas = saṁkalpa or explication (SK.29). The manomaya self is the basis of the functioning of prāṇamaya-kośa either through conscious impulses or through sub-conscious modifications call Saṁ skārās. But the Vijñānamaya-Self which is qualified with the faculty of discernment is synonymous of buddhi (Tait.Up. ll.4). Discernment is one of the functions of consciousness here; others are doubts, egoism, imagination-Manas, Ahaṁkāra and Citta. The sublime feeling-faculty and the sublime-thinking-faculty (Kāma or Jūti and manişā (Ait. Br. 1.3.2) and the sublime-power of volition-all belong to Vijñānamaya-Kośa (Ibid). It includes the subtle-body. The subtle-body exists in Ptrāṇa manas and Vijñāna Selfs. It is related to the dream-consciousness also. Vijñāna is really proximate to Brahman-Ātman reality as there is only thin veil separating it from Universal souls (Tait-Up. ll.5). This Vijñāna is the agent and enjoyer both (Ibid). The intellect in the fountain and source of all mental modifications whatsoever, Man, here, sees by the mind, hears by the mind and all what we call desire, will, doubt, belief, resolution, shame, thought or fear-all this is but mind itself (Mait Up. Vl.30). To prove the view point of the Maitrī Upaniṣad.Aitareya-Upaniṣad (lll.3) holds that all that exist in the phenomenal world – the five great elements Pañcamahābhūta, all who are born from the egg or embryo, perspiration from the germination from the Earth, all horses, cattle and men and finally every thing that breathes, moves files or is stationary – all are known by the intellect and all are based in the intellect (Vijñāna). By going from the Anna-self, vital-self and the mental-self, we now reach the intellectual self which is the root-principle of metaphysics, that is, the consciousness of Avyakta-Puruşa is firstly imparted to the intellect which is the bodily shape of a man. The same consciousness reflected on the intellect, being nearer to the mind, counter-reflects the mental-self (Manomaya) then from mental –self, it illuminates the vital-self then through vital-self at last it finds its resort in the food-self (annamaya). Therefore, the difference between the

intellect and the mind is a thin veil which affects the reflectivity of the consciousness falling on the mental-plane in lesser degree. But the food-self is most important together with vital and mental-self, as soul takes on a new body in inorganic or live matter according to their works and wisdom (kath Up. ll.5.7). Again, during the time of Kothopaniṣad, Sāmkhya philosophy has been modified where mind was merged in the Jāñnātman, Manomaya-Kośa and jñānātman in the Mahat-Ātman, and Mahat-Ātman in the Śānta-Ātman (Katha-Up. 1.3.13). In this way, mind constitutes Jñānātman also in the later Sāṁkhya of the classical period, after following parallel idea of kathopaniṣad. Through this merging of categories of early Sāṁkhya, we found that later Sāṁkhya accepted the sixteen categories of Lińga-Śarīra subtle-body of the (Praśnopaniṣad Vl.2) after adding one more category itself. Thus, the Lińga-Śarīra of the Classical Sāṁkhya consists of five elements, the five Prāṇas, the five senses and the mind with addition to the intellect. Consequently, we have found that Vijñānātmā or Vijñānamaya-kośa is included in the concept of Lińga-Śarīra borrowed by the later Sāṁkhya and by the later Vedāntic philosophy. Hence-after, it is now understood that the world of five senses comprises gross-body while vital-self, mental-self and intellectual-self comprise subtke-body. The principles of Yama-niyama are the requisition of this physical-body if Yoga is to be followed, and the Āsana-Prāṇāyāma-Pratyāhāra-Dhāraṇā-dhyāna are the exigencies or desideratum of the subtle-body, or the seventeen constituent of the Subtle-body, and lastly, the blissfulness (Ānandamaya-kośa), attainment of the state of Samādhi where Self remains as a conscious-principle only.

Though, Vijñānamaya-Kośa is proximate to the Real Ātman, but Ātman the pure spiritual essence, is not an agent. The ānandamaya self is the true self without the notion of agency, but conditioned by the internal-organ (Antaḥkaraṇa) modified as joy and only a joy, (Tait. Up. ll.5.) which are the fruits are the fruits of knowledge and action. Even here, the Self is not absolutely free from trappings because there is the thin Upādhi of the Intellect transformed as joy. Hence, Ānandamaya is too an effect, that is happiness resulting from thoughts and actions. This joy is not a local sensation; but the whole personality is pervaded by it, and so the Ānandamaya-Self is taken to pervade all the other Selves, one filling the other. Pain and suffering is the property of Manomaya-Kośa, whereas joy alone is the property of the Ānandamaya Self. Joy is the positive state where everything becomes beautiful whatever has been categorized as the God's creation with the sense of one without second. Pleasure is not the cessation of pain, it is felt even when there is no pain preceding it. One, all of a sudden, listening to the good music experiences joy. Like all positive experiences, pleasure too admits of degrees. The pleasure which is experienced by the individual a gent, is only a fraction of the Supreme bliss or Brahman. Even worldly joy is not entirely different from the bliss of Brahman. It is a reflection of bit of bliss of Reality. Ānanda is an entity in itself, as individual self is the dearest and highest object of love. All other objects have value only for the sake of this individual self. The individual self in its essence is intelligence-bliss. This is revealed when the mind is in a tranquil state which may be inferred from dispassion, patience, generosity and other similar virtues. Even though Self alone is the object, and so in truth bliss itself, by dwelling in every body, it becomes divided and limited. Hence, Ānandamaya Self is not Brahman it self whose bliss is not subject to any condition but it can be of Brahmasvādasahodarasacivaḥ of the Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammata. That's why it is understood that the support of Ānandamaya Self is Brahman itself.

The Ānandamaya Self is also of human shape because it fills the previous Kośās completely. The three distinctions in joy, noted here as love; delight and bliss, relate respectively to the perception, obtainment and enjoyment of a liked object. They are only the reflections of bliss in the Sāttvika state of the mind. It is only for the purpose of Yogic process to enlighten an individual gradually who is engrossed in sense-object inward, and again inward, until he realizes his innermost self, namely the non-dual Brahman, for that the five Kośās here, have been enumerated.

From the vedāntic point of view which is quite abstract, true- self of a man and nature is Brahman and these five different selves are illusory apparition. The vijñānamaya and Ānandamaya both together from the individual soul as the agent and enjoyer; while the other sheaths form merely its instruments (Brahma-s ūtraĀnadamayādhi karana i.1.) all the pleasures, gratification gusto, joy happiness, delight, delectation or beatitude or any kind of relish – when is derived from the different levels of existence, that is ,from anna or physical self, vital-self (prāṇa) mind- self (manomaya), intellect self – they all are glory of Ānadamaya-kośa which resides every where in the shape of an individual body.[1]

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Footnotes:

1. Tait. Up lll.1.4 (taittirīya upanisad)

AESTHETICS – AS GLEANED FROM SOME SANSKRIT TEXTS

Beauty is very controversial subject even in Indian philosophy. Both the east and west explain their theories in a different manner. The west believes in concrete and basic facts of every day life while the east has a romantic and spiritual concept of beauty. Beauty is neither effected by utility nor by futility,[1] nor by liberty nor by bondage.[2] beauty is not a superimposed quality either.[3] beauty is not that which simply tickles our senses or yields us a momentary pleasure. It is not that which merely comprises symmetry. Variety and colour. It is not a mere reconciliation of matter and sensation on the side with Intellect and spirit on the other. Nor is it a thing of intellectual content and aesthetic experience. Beauty includes all this and at the same time is above and beyond all of them.

It is truth which never changes in any condition or mood or loss. Beauty is a shorthand of our consciousness (in the form of soul) which is imprinted on the whole body of a possessor, while an amateur has only to recognize a beauty ready- made. The truth is identical with beauty. Truth is order or law with its permanence. That looks different because of its newness is beauty.[4]

Permanence and newness is truth. In this concept of newness we would like

To describe the point of view of India. Beauty is not a copy of we visualize in the external world. An artist does not aim so much at the imitation of the actual visual form of the original as at the imitation of the mental image of that form as grasped with emotion and brought in touch with the very life and soul of the artist.[5]This is also in consonance with certain lines of Indian epistemological thought. Thus one of the most well known theories of Indian epistemology holds that, our eyes being in contact with the visual objects, our mind becomes impressed with their and the mental images or emotions become enlivened by the reflection of the pure consciousness'[6] the universe that we have in our mind,

though connected with the external world is in every case a new creation. That newness is the very soul of beauty. Though this creation is in a creation sense, a copy of the external world, it is rich with the contributions of the mind and full of emotions and suggestions which substantially change and transform their original copies that had flow into the mind. This creation of beauty by the artist becomes transformed into its spiritual substance; and it is this reality or truth that the artist wants to represent and not a copy of the external object in detached form by way of imitation. Instead of trying to imitate the external object Indian artists try to represent faithfully the picture or the mental image that is grasped by them in their meditative vision which along is for them the most important thing. That new creation of the mind of the artist which together with emotions and personal suggestions, is a copy of the external word, brings generalization to the mind amateurs.[7] because of the harmony these suggestions, emotions and joy in the new creation of an artist appeal to all of us. The power of creation is a common beauty in the subject and object.[8] To realize this principle of creation we have to comprehend the difference between creation and destruction. The apprehension of has bearty has to come to us with a vigorous blow to awaken our consciousness from its primitive lethargy and it attains its object by the urgency of the contrast. The reaction of this blow comes in the form of joy and sorrow.[9] joy to see creation and sorrow to see destruction. So in a way, we can say that beauty is a creative power.

Beauty is concerned not only with knowledge or pleasure; it is an eternal and permanent intrinsic value which is concerned with the self consciousness) also. In the external world and internal world to behold beauty in The subject and the object we have to use our eyes. To see external beauty the eye passes from one point of the picture to another and during the transit something charge, something remains constant; a combination results. To contemplate internal beauty the eye closes and concentrates on the inner images; and it is seen as an object itself (consciousness) in its total integration where all the combinations are lost.

There is a maxim in the *Rgveda* which says that the expanding lord measured the worlds with his three steps (three dimensions) anointed with nectar:- yasya tripūrṇā madhunā padāni akṣīyamāṇā svadhayā madanti.[10] so he spread nectar everywhere, and all living beings are getting their respective nectar according to their relative existence. The bee enjoys nectar in the flowers while the camel gets it in the thorns. This nectar or beauty is present every-where, as truth is identical with beauty, therefore, truth is found everywhere.[11]when we say that beauty is everywhere we do not mean that the word ugliness should be abolished from our language, just as it be absurd to say that there is no such thing as untruth. Untruth there certainly is, not in the system of the universe, but in our power of comprehension, as its negative element. In the same manner there is ugliness in the distorted expression of beauty in our life and in our art which comes from our imperfect realization of truth.

Aesthetic emotion itself exists in the subject and object in every mind in latent impression (vāsanā VSD. 3.40). These latent impressions are mainly concerned with Indian psychology of transmigration of the soul and it's past, present and future karmans in the form of samskāras which follow the soul as potential memory during the time of its re-birth, or unity of soul and body (Ego). In western psychology what the word 'instinct' denotes is expressed in Indian psychology as samskāra. But samkāra has even a wider meaning than the word instinct. The particular instinct with its super in the past and present when stimulated even by suggestion of an object, that can be under the category of samskāra. In the case of instinct, it has nothing to do with the past or future, it is something inborn in a person. Beauty imbibes in the inherited instincts of the subject which is aroused by an object though generalization (sādhāraṇikaraṇa) – that is a common substratum which is essentially shared by he subject and object both. It is the pre-existence of that potential memory (samskāra) in the latent form in our sub- conscious mind which, when aroused, inakes us feel with aesthetic sensibility. This vāsāna exists and pre-exists; so it becomes a permanent mood of the subject of knowledge in tasting beauty in the object of knowledge which also pre-exists and yet exists. The word sat is explained as existence. That which exists with permanence is satya. The word satya is translated into English as 'truth' as the permanent moods exist in any of the astronomical times whatever truth exists in this time is experienced by a person through the then existing permanent moods. To a certain extent we can set our life against the law of truth which is in us and which is in all and likewise we can give rise to ugliness by going counter to the eternal law of harmony which is everywhere. Accepting this universal law of harmony, in India, even the initial address to a person will suggest the meaning of handsomeness. In place of Mr. and Mrs, we address a person - srīmān and srīmatī, the meaning of which is handsome and beautiful respectively. As spiritually it is admitted that every thing is beautiful, but the method of faith brings about the final meaning of it. Manifold are the manifestations of beauty through nature, though colour, sound, movement. Indeed, beauty is time and space, pervading the seen and unseen; it is the origin of the universe and the vital sustainer of the world. Nobody can live without it. Beauty is living condition for all relativity; because of relativity it becomes relative in pragmatic sense; otherwise it is absolute, immortal which makes mortal as immortal by its presence. That is what we call soul, self or consciousness. The inherent quality of heat; till it is alive there is heat and as it extinguishes there is no more heat. Is beauty an inherent quality of the body which we see and exclaim 'how beautiful she is! If it is so, the inherent quality of each organ of the body should also be beauty, as body is integrity of all organs. In case, any organ is deformed later on, beauty should not change into ugliness, but is does. Beauty is not an inherent quality of the body. Is beauty an inherent quality of a particular organ of the body then? For instance, because the black hair of a girl is beautiful, everybody in that girl. If the same hair was cut and scattered on the ground, they should be still beautiful, due to their inherent quality of the body nor of any of the organs. It is eliminated from the body and its particular organs as their inherent quality. Furthermore, if we admit that beauty lies in the senses of perception of the spectator, having senses, should consider the same thing beautiful in every space time. But all spectators perceive beauty differently, consequently, we have to eliminate our senses also from the realm of beauty.

The mind is the condensed form of the senses as ice is of water, and senses are the condensed form of external objects. Form external objects to the mind, everything is inter-related. Higher than the mind, we can think of our self or consciousness as beautiful. Vedānta believes in one highest reality Brahman, absolute, universal soul; who created māyā, a power of misconception, which has two aspects, a negative aspect of concealment and a positive aspect of projection. Māyā is a material cause of the world through the help of which many a self or Ātman of individuals is manifested. Brahman is an efficient cause like a potter who makes pot out of clay, the material cause. But māyā does not have separate existence from Brahman, as clay from a potter has . Brahman, like a spider, weaves the

web, after using its own silk and then expresses itself. So Brahman is material cause also. The theory of causation of vedānta shows that the ultimate reality, Brahman the universal soul, when entangles in māyā, becomes different individual souls and māyā scatters itself in the animate and inanimate both. Unity changes into diversity due to māyā or ignorance. This individual soul or Ātman or consciousness exists in the subject of knowledge, the object of knowledge and the means of knowledge. The whole world has this triad. The light of consciousness is reflecting in this triad like a flash- light inside the muslin cloth. The more dense is the veil the more obstruction will there be for light or reflect. Between magnet to attract matter will be lessened. Contrary to it, a non-intervening be lessened. Contrary to it, a non-intervening situation between both, can convert even matter into magnet as its induced effect. According to the same principle of science, consciousness acts like magnet in the inanimate and animate both. That embodied consciousness in the being has been regarded as the source of all value and of the supreme fulfillment of human life. The māyā or ignorance in its negative form is alienation from existence, in its positive form, it is false knowledge and dualistic thinking of sorrow and happiness. False knowledge takes the form of false knowledge of division, duality, separation and the knowledge wrong super-imposition. Each individual human being in his isolated Ege-

Consciousness (I-Self) lived a world of his own. He, there, looks at the universe through the distorted medium of his own being.[12] This subjectively coloured world springs from his primal ignorance (Māyā) which is unconsciously super-imposed upon being.[13] It is like the illusory super-imposition of the snake upon the rope in darkness or of water upon the sand of the desert in mirage. Owing to primal ignorance (Māyā) the true nature of the being (self or Atman) is concealed and a subjectively constructed world is projected. Māyā functions in the world through its two powers – the power of concealment and the power of projection. Māyā first conceals the real nature of an object as it conceals from the eyes of the spectator the form of rope in the darkness, then it projects another objectivity of snake on that object. The intellect or mind tries to penetrate the reality with the help of different thought-systems, but the intellect which unconsciously becomes the victim of the same Māyā can hardly penetrate through the fallacy of false-superimposition. The intellectually constructed system of ideas and essences which so often acts as so many barriers or veils interposed between man and the being (consciousness or Ātman) and absolute beauty becomes multi-forms and multidimensional due to this Māyā. So consciousness also has nature of Māyā or ignorance is beauty, if consciousness is reflected in Māyā.

Consciousness and matter – our existence is paradoxical. Consciousness is awareness quite opposite to matter which is without awareness. As this consciousness enters into the body, it undergoes three psychological conditions or three categories of experiences. All our relative experiences are included in the waking-state, the dream-state and the state of deep-sleep, the three psychological conditions of soul (Ātman). In the waking state, we experience through the gross-body and the sense-organs, the gross world. In the dream, we experience subtle objects through mind or the subtle-body.[14] The causal world we experience in dreamless sleep when the mind the sense-organs do not function. One used the gross body to experience the gross-world, the subtle-body to experience the subtle-world, and the causal-body to experience the causal-world. Corresponding to the three worlds – the gross, the subtle and the causal – three are three states namely, waking dreaming and deep sleep and also three bodies namely, the gross, the subtle and the causal. Consciousness (Ātman or self) is always present in the three states and forms their substratum by uniting with Māyā. This consciousness is one without second. When associated with these three bodies, it is known by different names; free from anybody, it is Brahman, absolute, the universal soul. When individual soul is separated from universal soul through Māyā and descends into material body, the five sheaths, arranged one inside another constitutes the three bodily frames and envelop the soul or Ātman. They are the sheath of food, where gross-body rests with the emotions of ordinary life, the sheath of the vital-breath of the mind and of the intellect – these three form the subtle body. The subtle-body constitutes the impressions of previous lives and gross body of present life which functions during dream-state. It is the kingdom of our unconscious and sub-conscious thought. One reveals mental beauty through subtle-body. In this subtle-body exist the two varieties of impressions of aesthetic emotions. Through rustic impressions the artist creates folk-art, which is too personal, still there exists individual idea of beauty for masses. And through refined impressions he creates classical arts or fine arts, which contain universal idea of beauty.

In this subtle body, the mind of previous life and sub-conscious and even unconscious mind of present life work. If we try to analyse our conscious mind, we find two types of operations; one based on perceptualforms and the other on logical activity. Both perception and logical analysis depend to a great extent on previous impressions. The subconscious store-house of impressions and memory are great assets in the building up of our inner personality. In case of recognition and memory, the subconscious impressions registered as the time of their experiences are roused up by a suitable stimulus and we say 'Oh, I remember it!' We collect the impresses along with the temporal and spatial characters. Sometimes these impresses, of objects or emotions, are stored up in a certain level of the mind, dissociated from any temporal or spatial characters. This generic impression is up whenever there is any similar experience and feeds the relevant emotions or cognitions and makes them stronger and clearer. The mind is always in a state of flow and the response that it receives from its own creations as objectively translated, stimulates the internal creative process through conscious ways and helps the projection of further artistic representations. Thus, whatever, is objectively projected in beauty is nothing else but this spontaneous activity of the mind. It is through the diversity of the mental-flow that there is a diversity of the creative attitude of the mind which alone is responsible for the variety of forms of objective beauty. Beauty is not something external, but it is spiritual and identical with the formative and creative spirit of the inner intuition.[15] It is this inner creation which we can primarily call the beautiful.[18] The term 'beautiful' can be applied to the external translations of this internal state only in a remote manner. secondly, the aesthetic state of mind may indeed induce joy at a later moment or even at the same moment, because beauty is realized in an indefinable way or rather recognized in a manner beyond time and space limitations. They were there in the mind and we get them over again. This renewal of acquaintance brings with it a thrill or a unique feeling of joy. Yet this is not memory nor recognition in the ordinary sense. This is known as the revelation of the beautiful and the joy of beauty. There may be some kind of desire or want also associated with the dellght of beauty. But this feeling of want is very much intemal. The satisfaction that one feels in aesthetic pleasure does not come out of the fulfillment of some particular

desire or need; but when it is there, there may come the desire for more.

Most of the people do not enjoy their subtle-body and are aware of only the world of their needs, that is, gross body. Subtle-body is activated through concentration of the mind, and stays in dream-state. That is why we call an artist a day-dreamer. It is by the contemplating function of an art-connoisseur that the artist can place himself objectively outside his art and behaves as a representative of the observer of the and ascertains whether it is possible to return to the spirit by the language of art and thereby determines whether the plastic language that he has used has been universally expressive or not.

The sheath of bliss forms the causal-body of a person in which he can achieve transcendental beauty of spirituality. Inside these five prisons and three bodies, Ātman or soul is roaming and experiencing in its three stats, the cycle of birth and death and it stored deeds of previous life which will bear fruit in every present life. Till our soul is imprisoned in different sheaths and undergoes different psychological states, the whole visible and invisible world is diversely and relatively beautiful according to our own instrument, the body and the soul, the matter and the consciousness – the great paradox of living organism. But as soul transcends that instrument, it unites with absolute beauty, the absolute pure consciousness or universal soul, and sees all space, all the times and all beauty in great silence. So beauty is indescribable, indefinable like a great cause. Each of us is a disintegrated personality. Vedānta stresses the need for man's reintegration with existence (Ātman). That reality is first desired, then learnt, then proved, then experienced and finally enjoyed. This reality is beauty and one can follow the same path to attain beauty also. An artist is an integrated personality. The perception of an artist differs so much from the perception of an ordinary man that, while the latter delights in the practical utility of the objects and obviously cares for nothing else, the former finds his pleasures in nothing and observing the reality behind the objects, their lineal and voluminal proportions, the symmetry of forms and the manifold relations in which the parts stand the whole. It is for this reason that the structure of the mind of the artist is more definite, more concrete, more alert to the realm of symmetry and harmony of the objects of nature:[17] The subjective and objective world both are unreal. As subject is separated even from its own real existence, that is why subject tends to create objectivity. If subject integrates itself with its real existence (soul or consciousness) through feeling, (devotion) willing (action) and knowing (knowledge) it becomes beautiful itself, then it takes every object as beautiful with the spirit of wholeness and perfection. The positive qualities, that is love, truth, goodness and beauty of the subject, with the help of its own light of consciousness, with its very existence, convert the hatred, falsehood and ugliness of the object – the negative qualities into their own positive forms. The subject begins to love itself as an object and thus spiritual evolution starts to create love and faith in all lives. One seems to oneself, transfigured, stronger, richer, beautiful, more complete; it is not the mercy that it changes, the feeling of values, the love is worth more beauty. Just as different trees and their flowers are culminated into honey by the bee similarly one, like a butterfly free from cocoon, surpasses all stares and all bodies and is culminated into one's absolute beauty and enjoys the bliss.[18]

The theory of psychology of beauty is described in Sāṁkhya believes that there are two realities – *puruṣa* and *pṛakrti.* Puruṣa is pure absolute consciousness and life-monad. Pṛakrti is primal virgin matter. It is composed of the equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas. Guṇa means substance or quality as there is no separate existence of quality, unit of quality is but a unit of substance. Things do not posses quality but quality signifies merely the manner in which substance reacts.

Sattva represents translucence, contemplative power or light or consciousness and is characterized by harmony. It is manifested in the human level in such spiritual virtues as tranquility, contentment and beauty. Rajas is responsible for primal flow of activity or energy or momentum and tamas is dullness, stupidity, inertia or mass or obstruction. Accordingly, we have three types of feeling substance: there is a class of feeling that we call the sorrowful, another class of feeling that we call pleasurable, there is till another class which is neither sorrowful nor pleasurable but is one of ignorance, depression or dullness. These are ultimate substances which make up all the diverse kinds of gross matter and thought (mind) by their verying modification. So pṛakrti consists of three feeling substances in the form of guṇas. Puruṣas are many. The whole world, external and internal is made of the combination of pṛakrti and puruṣa. Of these two primary principles one (pṛakrti) is quite insentient and inert, but can be activised by a glance from the other which is itself thoroughly inactive and indifferent. Puruṣa is, however, the consciousness element. Even the indifferent and disinterested observation by this neutral Puruṣa starts the process of evolution and pṛakrti begins to unfold her hidden secret. At this point what we call a consciousness or individual soul is produced. Just as nearness of two brilliant colours produces many intermediate shades of colours so also the mere proximity of pṛakrti and puruṣa produces a joint effect and that joint effect is the principle of intelligence, that is individual consciousness, mind or buddhi. When the equilibrium state of pṛakrti is disturbed by the glance of Puruṣa sattva or intelligence-stuff of Pṛakrti predominates and the first evolute of Pṛakrti is generated which we call mind. Two equal guṇas, rajas and tamas create the momentum and mass of mind what we call brain in physical sense.

All our thoughts and other emotional or volitional operations are really the non-intelligent transformation of the mind, or buddhi, having large sattva preponderance; but by virtue of the reflection of the puruṣa in the buddhi, or mind, these appear as if they Were intelligent. So not only the external things are material but the sense data and images of mind, the coming and going of which is called knowledge are also in some sense matter stuff. Though they are limited in their nature like the external things, the matter of which the sense data and images of mind are composed is the sublest. That means knowledge form or images of mind are different from external objects, though they both are made of matter. Three *guṇas* of *pṛakrti* are present in thousands of proportions and consequently, we have thousands of species in the world. Images of mind have preponderance of a special quality of translucence (consciousness) or sattva which resembles the light or *puruṣa* or self and thus are fit for reflecting and observing the light of *puruṣa*. Energy or momentum or *rajas guṇa* is common to both gross matter of external object and subtle thought or images of mind. But mass *tamas*) is at its lowest unit minimum in thought stuff or images of mind whereas the intelligent stuff (*sattva*) is at its highest in thought stuff. But this intelligence stuff of *sattva* which is so predominant in thought stuff is at its lowest unit of subordination in matter. If matter did not have the characteristic of intelligence (*sattva*) that thought stuff possesses, it could not make itself an object of thought. For, thought, transforms itself into the shapes, colour and other characterstics of matter stuff which has been made its object.

Thought could not have copied matter if it did not possess some of the essential substance of which the copy was made up. The translucent and plastic element of thought (*sattva*) in association with momentum (*rajas*) would have resulted in a stimultaneous revelation of all objects and we could have been all times and all spaces and all beauties simultaneously. It is on account of mass or tendency of obstruction (*tamas*) in our mind and objects that knowledge proceeds from images to images and discloses things in a successive manner.[19]

Our mental images of objects like negative photographs of external objects comes by the reflection of light *puruṣa* or self on our mind (which has the quality of translucence due to *sattva*) by the removal of darkness or *tamo guṇa*. Basically, beauty resides in the subject and object both. If the subject or the spectator sees the thing with more *tamas* and less *sattva* of his mind, things will be ugly and dull to him and if he sees the object with *sattva* of translucent quality of his mind, things will be copied accordingly and beauty will be perceptible. If the object which has more intelligent stuff (*sattva*) and less *tamas,* is copied by the mind, which has still greater degree of *sattva*, they both will illuminate each other's qualities and beauty will be doubled. The degree of *sattva* in the subject and object determines the degree two *guṇas*, existing in the mind or the object, while absolute beauty is self which illuminates part of the mind and then the mind in turn illuminates the *sattva* of the objects as feeling of bliss.

Now can we see the beautiful? If we eliminate the mass (*tamas*) or obstruction of our mind which is void of knowledge, if we have the largest degree of *sattva* in our mind, not like a temporary mood of happiness followed by sorrow again, but constant state of bliss, which has no antagonistic relation between sorrow and pleasure, then the highest degree of *sattva* of the mind will be reflected by the totality of *puruṣa*'s light, and will reveal to us beauty as absolute, not as relative.

Beauty is personified as *sattva* of the mind and the object through which the mind receives true knowledge of the object in addition to pragmatic knowledge. For absolute universal beauty, one needs universal emotions and absolute mind, untouched by personal emotion; but it is not essential that the beauty which is accepted by all should come under the category of absolute beauty. Generally, absolute entity invites controversy similar to relative beauty, of favourable and contrary ideas. Even absolute cannot be accepted by all without controversy. We don't have criterion even for absoluteness. Therefore, individual emotions are considered as beauty to the individual mind and the degree *sattva* in the mind determines the degree of sensitivity of beauty of an individual.

How can we get the highest degree of *sattva* in the mind, so that senses and thought can enjoy to the maximum other two *guṇas* existing in the mind or the object, while absolute beauty is self which illuminates part of mind with the mind in turn illuminates the *sattva* of the objects as the feeling of bliss?

How can we see the beautiful? We can do so if we eliminate the mass (*tamas*) or obstruction of our mind which is void of knowledge. If we have the largest degree of sattva in our mind, not like a temporary mood of happiness followed by sorrow again, but constant state of bliss, which has no antagonistic relation between sorrow and pleasure, then the highest degree of *sattva* of the mind will be reflected by the totality of *Puruṣa's* light, and will reveal to us beauty as absolute, not as relative.

Beauty is personified as *sattva* of the mind and the object through which the mind receives true knowledge of the object in addition to progamtic knowledge. For absolute universal beauty one need universal emotions and absolute mind, untouched by personal emotions; but it is not essential that the beauty which is accepted by all should come under the category of absolute beauty. Generally absolute entity invites controversy similar to relative beauty of favourable and contrary ideas. Even absolute cannot be accepted by all without controversy. We do not have criterion even for absoluteness. Therefore, individual emotions are considered as beauty to the individual mind, and the degree of *sattva* in the mind determines the degree of sattva in the mind determines the degree of sensitivity of beauty of an individual.

How can we get the highest degree of *sattva* in the mind so that senses and thought can enjoy the highest degree of beauty? Transformation of total personality into something different from what one is now, through the spiritual or dullness (*tamas*) and helps in increasing sattva (sensitivity of consciousness) of the mind and then the mind's only desire is to know the self which has the highest consciousness. According to the *śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* the precursors of perfection in Yoga lightness, healthiness of the body, absence of desire, clear complexion, pleasantness of voice, sweet odour, and slight excretions are beauty themselves.[20] It is said in the *Upaniṣad* that Supreme Lord entered into the warmth of mediation for creating the manifold. Meditation, one of the last practices of Yoga, is not only the secret of all artistic creation but also of the divine creation.[21] Thus it is exemplified that the spiritual flow in mediation or trance is the secret of all creativities. It is for this reason that Duṣyanta (in *Śākuntalasm*) in describing the portrait of Śakuntalā said that however he might try to represent in his painting his mental image of Śakuntalā, he failed to endow it with the grace and sweetness of inner apperception. The inner image was associated with emotions, longings and suggestions which could only be partially represented by the mingling of the lines in the portrait. Thus the imitation of the mental image falls short of the real intuitive image which alone is the real artistic creation. In translating this inner intuition, the artist, therefore, lays more emphasis on the delineation of the spiritual essence, the idealized contemplative vision, the mental creation, than on copying the physical features exactly as they are.

In describing the nature of contemplation and meditation, Patañjali, the founder of Yoga aphorisms says that mental state which becomes in form and character identical with the object of meditation is called *samādhi* or trance state. In this state, the mind does nto flicker, nor does it pass from one object to another, but it shows itself steadily as identified with the object which it was contemplating. No other content but that of meditation is present in the mind at the time. This content reveals itself so steadily that the whole truth about it shines forth as being one with the mind. For this reason, there is no self consciousness and no splitting up of consciousness between the knower, the known and knowledge; and this state in which the knower and the known merge, as it were, shines forth as knowledge. So knowledge, intuition, contemplation, truth and creativity of the being are responsible for comprehending beauty and the feeling of joy together. Through contemplation the artist arranges his mental images in their totality and then from trance state,[22] he comes down to the mingling state of dream and wakefulness to give external shape to his contemplative mental images. He triees not lose his concentration, resulting from contemplation during this process. Kālidāsa, in describing the king in Mālavikāgnimitra,[23] points out how the king criticizes his own painting, giving the reason that he had a lapse in his contemplative state and that is was this momentary lapse of meditation or contemplation that should

be regarded as responsible for the loss of grace and tenderness from the picture.

It is interesting that Kālidās became famous when treatises on poetics and philosophical speculations were being written during and after his time. His literature has provided the scholars with enough material for the concept of beauty in his time.

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Footnotes:-

1)*Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, X. 1.47.35.
2)*Abhinjñānaśākuntalam*, VI.22
3)*Kumārasambhava*, V.9
4) *kşaṇe ksane yan navatām upaiti tad eva rupam ramṇīyatāyāḥ Śiśupalavadha*, IV.17
5) Abhijñānaśākuntala, II.9.
6) *Pratibha* apūrvavastunirmāṇakşamā *prajña, tasya viśeşo rasaveśaviśadyasaundarya* kāvyanirmanak samatvam, Dhvanyāloka Locana, 11.
7) *sa eşā sarvo muninā sādharaṇībhāva siddha rasacarvaṇopayogitvena parikaro bandhaḥ, Abhinavabhāratī* Vol. I, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda, 1926, p.282.
8) *nāyakasya kaveḥ śŗtuḥ samāno' nubhavah, Bhaţţatauta as shown in Locana*, p.29.
9) *Abhijñānaśākuntala,* II.10.
10) I.154.4.
11) *Raja (Atmagatam) aho, sarvasv avasthāsu cārutā sobhantaram puşyate, Mālavikāgnimitra* Act II.
12) *Agnipurāṇa*, 339-10.
13) *Meghadūta,* II.46.
14) Ibid.39.
15) *Vikramorvaśīya*, V.24.
16) Vandemahi ca taṁ vāṇīm amŗtām ātmanaḥ kalāṁ, Uttararāmacarita, 1.1.
17) *Abhinavabhāratī* Vol. 1, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda, 1926, 278-9.
18) *Vedāntasāra*, comm.., 9-11.
19) *Īśvarpratyabhijñā Vimarśinī,* Vol.1, 72-6, Kashmir Sanskrit Series, 1928.
20) *Śvetāśvatara Upanişad*, II.11.
21) *Abhinavabhārati*, Vol.1, p.286.
22) *Abhijñānaśkuntala*, V.2.
23) *Mālavikāgnimitra*, II.3.

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AESTHETIC IN GURU GRANTHA SAHEB

Defying a straightforward, prosaic, logical mode, the expression of the understanding of the '1 Óamkar' in the Guru Grantha sāhib has been substantiated by the invincible force of poetry. I was inclined to adopt for the title **Philip Wheelwright's** term 'metapoetic' "an ontology not so much of concepts as of poetic sensitivity"[1]. But somehow I feel meta takes away the closeness, the sensuousness which 'aesthetics' retains. The conception of the ideal ide 1, ever Inconclusive, Intangible, Transcendent, Formless, Mysterious '1' is made possible by this very aesthetics. The wonderful theme in its union with beautiful poetry makes the Guru Grantha Sahib not only a great religious book but simultaneously a great work of art too. This present essay aims at perceiving and relishing its artistic expression under the ensuing headings: 1.Language 2. imagery 3 Rhythm

Language

Like its ever flowing, never terminating content, the '1' the language of the Guru Granth Sāhib is fluid and expansive. No geographical of provincial barriers limit it. Moreover, there is a rather long time lapse between writings. Consequently, literary critics have had a hard time labeling the language of the Guru Granth Sāhib for instance, of Gurū Nānak's language itself, three conflicting views are held: some adjudge it as Hindi, others as Punjabi and a third group as the language of a traditional period. **Professor Ram Chandra Shukla** and **Dr**.**P.D.Narthwal** belong to the first group, **Dr.Mohan Singh** and **Professor Puran Singh** to the second, and **Dr.Trumpp** to the third. Since the impetus behind Guru Nānak's language was to speak simply, use language to convey thoughts to the multitude rather than be restricted by a language and discourse with a learned few, the reader does find a mixture of Hindi, Braj, Arbic and Persian. Nevertheless *Guru Nānak's* language is essentially *Punjābī*. This generalization I think can be made for the entire Guru Granth Sāhib because *Guru Nānak's* successors sought to echo his style, his manner of communication. Thus even though there is an admixture of Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian and the various dialects which each contributor from a different period and locale brought, the overall language of the *Guru Granth Sāhib* is *Punjābī*. Its scripts is *Gurmukhī*. *Gurmukhī* characters were developed and standardized by *Guru Nānak Guru Aṅgad*. But from a more scopic persepective what is the language of the *Guru Granth Sahib*? According to **Santayana**, "the stuff of language is words "and the words of the Guru Granth Sāhib are poetic. **Geroge Santayana**: poetry breaks up the trite conceptions designated by current words into sensuous qualities Hence by the words of the Guru Granth termed 'poetic' is apprehened that their quality is full, dynamic, sensuous. Lowered from abstract, trite levels, their immediacy and power are felt. 'Poetic' words, then, are not (A) philosophic; *In A Threatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. Berkeley's objects was to in Santayana's language! "break up the trite conceptions designated by current words into their sensuous qualities." Therefore **Berkeley's** theory of language was in fact a detheorizing of it; he even went to the extreme of suggesting that we totally do without language. But that's not our concern. What is important is that **Berkeley** saw the road to truth blocked: "We have raised a dust complain we cannot see"[2] By 'dust' he referred to the products of language all the uncouth prradoxes, difficulties, absurdities, obsecurities which mutiply asnd grow as "humankind advances in the relam of philosophic speculation." And language indeed is the wheel upon which the philosophic speculation rotate. He criticized all the 'school men, those great masters of abstractions"[3] (plato Artistotle, Locke et,al.) for abstracting the particular; in other words, transforming the sensuous into "trite conceptions". An illustration of this philosophizing could be the understanding of the Philosophzing could be the understanding of the 'rose' in the Platonic current. As Socreates palying the role of the midwife in *Theatetus* explains, 'rose', is not something seen or smelt but is the absolute, immutable, infallible, eternal essence which is cognitively seen or felt, The isness of the rose is all that counts; the particular, physical hues and colours and

varieties are subsumed and lost to the 'trite conceptions". Such philosophic spelcaution of words has been rejected directly by **Berkeley** and indirectly by the authors of the *Guru Granth Sāhib*. Contrarily, the 'poetic' words maintain their concreteness, their vitality. For example, in the *Guru Granth Sahib* we very often read the word 'dhan'. However, each time it has its own use (USE!**Wittgenstein** comes to my mind: "you don't ask for the meaning, *you ask for the* use of word, "in the Blue and Brown Books), because sometimes it can be understood as a native bride and at others as an erotic beauty or a respected mother or a woman having given up spiritual quest, and so on. Not once is *dhan* tritely conceived or abstracted under a philosophic designation. And of course we are familiar with the innumerable words shifting, at times even opposing (opposition latent in dhan as well) "used" to grasp the 'I'! Through the 'poetic' use, the words of the Guru Granth Sāhib are constantly speaking freshly.

Sāhib merā nit navān….

-Guru Granth,1,660

My Lord is always fresh (*navān*), says the Guru. Freshness sought is via freshness of wordes projected. The congruence between the content and form of the *Guru Granth Sāhib* is fantastic.

(B) LOGICAL/SCIENTIFIC: Equating logical with scientific language, **Philp Wheelwright** writes that it aims at getting rid of ambiguity as far as possible. Due to the establishment of stipulation precision, logical language is closed by stipulation being a "deliberate steno language"[4] That by rigidly adhering to the law of identity logical language leaves no space for inconclusiveness is correct. On the other hand, the 'poetic' language of the Guru Granth Sāhib remains unconsummated. Nothing is lawfully indentifed with something else. Engulfed is an aura of mystery, the words of the *Guru Granth Sāhib* are always open: '1' could be the Gardener; could be the Garden. Paradoxical though it may seem, in the openness of the words is their capacity to conceal. Not **Hegel's** dialectic, but the **Heideggerian** strife between 'world' and 'earth' would being open, aerial, spacious flamboyant and earth being a grounding, closed, concealing, directing, cautious [5] pertains to the Gurus' words. What I mean is that the language of the *Guru Grantha Sāhib* is not constricted to a logical/ scientific finality. A synthesis in the Hegelian sense is never obtained. The words of the *Guru Granth Sāhib* and yet hide an incredible amount too? No wonder, ontological or moral or teleogical proofs based on the scientific logical language find no place in the *Guru Granth Sāhib*.

(C) PROSAIC: That the language of the *Guru Granth Sahib* is not prosaic is easy to see and hear and feel. Rather than be suavely displayed as in the case of good prose, the words of *Guru Granth Sāhib* come with their own speedy, starting metre and cadence. One might say they are 'poetically' energetic. This energy is derived mainly from their rhythm and from their turbulent alliteration assonance and consonance.

To conclude, poetic is neither philosophic language nor logical scientific nor prosaic; it is a language simple and plain, from our everyday plane with a tremendous momentum and vitality. Yet, through the negetation that were just mentioned, we mustn't assume that the poetic mode is polar to the philosophic, logical and prosaic. My point is poetic language takes in all these three together, and simultaneously, goes beyond them. An illustration of the poetic language of the *Guru Granth Sāhib*:

Morī ruṇjhuṇ lāiā bhaiṇe sāvaṇu āiā,
tere muṅdh katāre jevaḍā tini lobhi lobh lubhāiā,
tere darsan vitahu khannīaī vaṅjā,
tere nām vitahu kurbāṇo,
jā tū tā mai māṇn klā hai tudhu binu kehā merā māṇo.
Chūrā bhanu palaṅgh siu muṅdhe saṇu bāhi saṇu bāhā
ete eves kareṅdie mundle sahu rāto avarāhā.
nā maniāru na chūria na se vaṅguriāhā,
jo sah kaṅthi na laggia jalanu se bahariāhā.
Sasbhi sanīā sahu ravaṇi gatā hau dadhi kal dari jāvā,
ammālī hau khari suchajjī tai sah eki na bhāvā.
Māthi guṅdāl poṯṯlai bharlai māṅg saṅdhūre,
Aggai gat na marau visūre visūre,
Mai rovṅdī sabhu jagu runnā ruṅnare vaṇahu paṅkherū,
ikk nā runnā mere tan kā binhā jinni hau pirahu vichhorī.
supnai āiā bhi galā mai jalu bhariā roi,
ai na sakkā tujh kani piāre bhejj na sakkā koi,
ao sabhāgī nidarīal matu sahu dekhā soi…

Guru Granth, I, 557-8

Translating Guru Nānak's *passage from measure*

Vadhaṅs:
Peacocks are warabling sweetly, O sister mine!
Moonsoon is here!
Your intoxicating eyes stranglers of many a heart
Have enticingly enticed him.
May I be cut into shreds for a glimpse of Thee,
Unto *Thy nām* am I a sacrifice.
If Thou art on my side, I abide with pride.
Unrecognized do I remain without Thee.
Break the bangles against the bed,
Along with the arm, along with the post.
So bedecked you are, but
They Husband's love is not thine.
Neither the bangle seller nor the bangles do you possess.
Burnt be the arms that embrace not the Lord
All my frients have gone to meet Him
Scorched by the fire of separation, where do I go?
How am I good or virtuous when to my Lord I am not acceptable!
I got my hair parted, put vermilion in the parting.
But unreceived.
I remain
In pain.
I weep; the entire world weeps with me;
Even the birds and animals of the jungles weep,
But the invoker of my separation has shed not a tear
You came when I was in sleep.
But then you left,
And I wept with eyes flooded with water.
Now I can neither reach you, not send for you.
O' fortunate sleep,
-Come
May I have a glimpse of Him again!

Here, to keep up with Plato and the philosophic tradition, words are what they are. Take first the word tradition, words are what they are. Take first the word 'mor' as an example. It's a peacock, a bird of beauty. Yet in the syntax of this poetry, the word acquires a wider dimension. Morī ruṇihuṇ lāiā (I'm at a loss to translate ruṇjhuṇ 'beckoning' is the closest I could get which I admit lacks the vibrant music of the original.) Their (*morī*= plural of *mor***)** beckoning bespeaks of a phenomenon reverberating at various levels: one, biological peacocks call in *Sāwan*, the month of rain (july August) following the dry and scorching Asārh (mid june to mid july) and thus reveal a thrist for water; two, sexual it's a lovely time refreshing showers mingle with parched earth and the peacock wants a mate; three, spiritual the sound and sight of the peacocks beckoning fills the poet with an intense longing for his Divine Lover. In the same way, containing a logical scientific current, the passage also surpasses it. Although no word is confined to mean another, a logical scientific progression a perception of the external world inner self transcendent is apparent. Being open ended,

there is no spot where it becomes stationed as 'steno'. And this goes for prose, too. The language of the passage is such that it succinctly, interestingly delivers a message and is in this sense prosaic. That the Ultimate Lover can be received through love and not through an artifical route of "parting hair" or "putting vermilion" is what I grasp the message to be. However this may vary for another reader: *something* that can't happen in prose; *the* 'thing' in poetry! While **Mircea eliade** had to write page after page to elucidate the sacred and the profane.[6] Guru Nanak accomplishes it, poetically, in a few lines. Paradoxically, poetic language is a combination of philosophical, logical scientific and prosaic, surmounting them all almost protestantly.

Martin Heidegger; "Language itself is poetry in the essential sense."[7]

IMAGERY: Words from Punjābī, Hindi Arabic, Persian plus various vernaculars merge into one another presenting a kaleidoscope of images. Image after image suffuses the Guru Granth Sāhib. According to Heidegger, "the nature of image is to let something be seen". Copies and limitations which Plato acknowledge all art to be! form a contrast to images because copies and imitations are already mere variations on the genuine image which, as a sight a spectacle, lets the invisible be seen and so imagines the invisible something foreign to it. Instead images, poetic images as in the Guru Granth Sahib, are imaginings in a distinctive sense; not mere fancies and illusions, they are imaginings that are visible inclusions of the alien in the sight of the familiar.'[8] They seem to have an elastic force which impels the imagination to an infinite loftiness, providing, at the same time, strong foundations beneath. The images of the *Guru Granth Sāhib* come from many specific contexts: natural scenery, economics, politics domestic life… What I want to do is simply to see these extremely concrete images triumphing in their expression of the Unseen. And for a spontaneous and full recognition of the images of the *Guru Granth Sāhib* it might be useful to follow the fourfold axis of their usage:

1) as metaphors
2) as similes
3) as emblematic parallelisms
4) as symbols

Metaphor: The Guru's

Hari charan kaval makrańd lobhit
Mano andino mohī āhi plāsā

Guru Granth, 1.13

"My lord, for Thine lotus feet,
I am bumble- bee, aiways, always thirsty."

is a metaphorical exclamation. The test for essential metaphor is not any rule of grammatical form (i.e. 'as' or 'like', etc.,) but rather the quality of semantic transformation. Metaphor in the Punjabi Hindi lexicon is rūpak the beautifier; ier' indicating some kind of transmutation. In both eastern and western thought its lining is motion (phosa =motion!). When the Guru writes of himself as "bumble bee always always thirsty" his intense longing, a deep psychological phenomenon metamorphoses through the "cool heat of the imagination"[9] into projecting a wanting so beautiful, so beautifully. That the metamorphosis is not a distortion of the actual experience, but contraily, a vivification and enlivening of the Guru's thirst are clear. His sublime lust which no words can express is indeed expressed through the sight of a greedy, thirsty bumble bee sucking the lotus. The metaphor generates an energy which moves one faculty into another senses (sign: bumble bee over the lotus, taste: succulence of lotus) emotions (desire) imagination (perceiving the affiaity) never diminishing, only expanding them.

This (bumble bee) was a metaphor which has been echoed by Guru Nanak's successors as well. Besides Nature, the Guru Granth Sāhib contains metaphor based on farmer's, banker's, smith's merchant's and yogi's lives. Since the thrust throughtout is upon simple metaphors, i.e. those within the common man's reach, they have been rooted in familiar experiences. As a result, the entire life of rural Punjab is revealed. Two instances follow.

Ihu tanu dhartī bijja karmā koro
sail āpāu sariṅgpāl;
manu kirsānu hari ridai jamāi lai,
tu pāvasī padu nirbāṇī.
Guru Grantha, I, 23

Make body the field, good actions the seed,
And water the Truth.
Let the mind be the cultivator; love for Hari the irrigator.
Thus will you attain the state of *Nirvāṇā*.

Here we have an agrarian scenario metamorphosed into an ethical moral code with spiritual overtones. Elsewhere, in the same vein, '*hoe*' has been transformed into humility; 'contentment' into fence. Turning to a smithy:

jatu pāharā dhīraju suniāru,
chrani mati vedu hahlāru,
bhau khalla agni tap tāu
bhańda bhāu amritu titu dhali
Gharlai sabadu sachchi taksal
Guru Granth, I, 8

Make continence your furnace, fortitude your goldsmith.
Let reason be anvil, knowledge the hammer
Let fear of the Lord be the bellows,
Then kindle the fire of labour,
And in the crucible of love melt ambrosia.
There in the true smithy *sabad* shall be forged.

Most tight, most expansive are the metaphors. Incidentally, in both meta phors a movement growth: in the nurturing land and production: in the smithy is existent. Forging of *sabad* in the *Guru Granth* smithy resonates with joyce's Young Artist: " and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race"; religion and art have a common denominator.

Smile: There is a wide usage of smilies in the *Guru Granth Sāhib* One that I find outstanding is the Āratī. gagan mal thālu ravi chańu dipak, bane, tarikā mańdalu janak moti. dhūpu malianlo pavaṇu chavaro kare, sagal bańrāi phulańt, jotī. Kaisī aratī hoi; bhav Khaṅḍnā terī āratī;
anahatā sabad vajańt bherī…
Guru Granth, I, 13

The skies are the platter, sun and moon, lamps, stars the pearls. The breeze is the incense; entire verdure, a bouquet of flowers.
What an *ārati*!
Master, Sunderer of the circuit of life and death,
Thine splendid arati!
Primal music is playing motionlessly…

Ordinary mode of worship which constitutes going to the temple, decorating a platter of offerings with *dīpak* (little lights made of cotton dipped in oil in an earthen bowl) and encircling it around a sacred image while chanting is implicitly being denounced. What is sought is worship (*āratī*) like the cosmos wherein skies form the platter (*thāl*), sun and moon, lamps (*dīpak*) numerous stars, the pearls (*motī*) in the background plays the primal music motionlessly, silently, *annhada sabad*! Through the simile of the everyday, in a sense 'real' *āratī* and then an immediate surprassing of it, the cosmic, the ideal āratī has been portrayed. (If seen from the angle of cosmos: the cosmos is celebrating; worshipping the Ultimate Creator.) The images are so rich, so delicate, so light and beautiful! Along with the visual, aural permeate. The Guru himself is

wonder struck by their magnificence. But the images don't smother the theme. With its diaphanous texture, the simile seems to have acted as the catalyst fusing imagery into theme or vice versa, succeeding triumphantly.

Another example-

Nānak gurū na chetinī mani āpṇai suchet, chhutte til būār
jiu sunne aṅdarl khet.
Khetai aṅdari chhuttiā kahu Nānak sau nāh,
Phaliahī phulīahi bapure bhī tan vichi suāh.
Guru Grantha, I, 463

Sayeth Nanak, those who are oblivious of the Guru
And are in themselves immersed,
Are like weeds.
In fields they sprawl, ravished by all.
Outwardly bloom though they may, essentially sterile remain.

Back in the agrarian context, the above simile compares an egocentric, who is obvious of matters spiritual, to weeds. Like (*jiu* line two) the weeds, he she sprawls all over the fields, the world that is, without an ideal. Consequently, hundreds (*sahu*) of husbands (*nāh* line 3) not *the* One ravish it. The metaphor of the hundreds of husbands' (and of the 'I'Husband) has been interwoven into the main simile. Besides such novel ones, *Guru Grantha Sāhib* has lots of conventional similes. Ones that come to mind are of the lotus, deer, fish *chātrik* and milk. The lotus simile was in the *Gitā*. Here in the individual is asked to perform actions in the world, but not be attached to their consequences like the lotus which is in the water but remains unwetted by it. Man has been compared with deer who possessing the musk within, runs in the jungles in search of it. Like the fish for water and the *chātrik* for rain and water for milk, man has intrinsic urge for God.

Guru Nanak in *Sūhī*:

re man aisl hari siu prīti kari
jaisi machhull nir…
re man ais I harī siu prīti kari
jalsī chātrik meh.
Guru Granth, I 60

O! my soul, love the Lord,
Like the fish loves the water…
O! my soul, love the Lord,
like the chātrik loves the rain.

Guru Arjan in *Vār jaitsrī*:

Jiu machhali binu pāṇīai
kiu jivaṇu pāvaī;
būṅd vihūna chātriko
kiukarī triptāvai.
Guru Grantha, V. 708

Like the fish without doesn't survive,
Like the chātrik without the rain doesn't satiate.

The same similes are being used. Similes do say an immeasurable amount in very tiny and interesting measures!

Emblematic Parallelism: To supplement the three kinds of parallelism synonymous, antithetic and synthetic, discussed by Bishop Lowth in *Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews*, there more have been proposed. These are: emblematic, stairlike and interoverted. Prallelism is a specific kind of repetition for it includes an adding on. According to **Leonard Thompson**[10] Parallelism is a distinguishing trait of Biblical poetry." The Sikh Bible also has parallelisms emblematic amd stairlike; it might have some others also which I probably didn't recognize. This consonance of the artistic form between two religious literatures is highly thought provoking. While a view of the emblematic parallelism follows the stairlike parallelism, because of its rhythmatic stairs, could be discussed separately.

In emblematic parallelism, "one of the lines present as s simile is the thought in the other."[11] We encounter simile again. However, it seems to me that emblematic parallelism is different because here one line stands as a an emblem for the other; their juxtaposition is such that they maintain a gap. In fact the very term 'parallel' connotes a coming together but always keeping a distance mathematically, parallel lines never meet! *Mori ruṇjhun lāiā bhaṇe savaṇ āiā* is a good example of emblematic parallelism. For, the calling of peacock is juxtaposed to the coming of *Sāvaṇ*. Here the two lie parallel to each other becokoning peacocks being an emblem of the setting in of monsoon (*Sāvaṇ*). On the other hand, in a simile, an overlapping and interpentration (not mere parallelism) occurs: *āratī* in a temple and *āratī* of the cosmos are inherently united. In emblematic parallelism, it feels as if something is emanating and its overall effect is lovely. Guru Nanak made ample use of this form. In *Bārah Māhā Turkhārī*, he writes:

asaru bhali sūraju gagani tapaī,
dhartī dūkh sahai sokhai again bhakhai.
Sagani ia su sokhai marlai dhākhi bhīso kiratu na hare
Rathu phirai chhāiā dhan tākai tidu lavai mańghi nāre.
Avgan bādhi chalī dukhu āgai sukhu tisu sāchi samāle
Nānak jis no manu diā ma aṇu jivaṇ prabh nāle.
Guru Granth, I 1108

Welcome is the month of *Asārh*,
In the skies the blazing sun regins.
The earth bears its pain,
The sap is scorched, creatures are seared.
Yet the sun in its glory remains.
The maiden seeks for shade
As the sun's chariot moves on.
Cricket cries in the woods.
She, who carries from here the bundle of blame,
Suffering awaits her.
Bliss for her who merit accumulates.
Sayeth Nanak, those who are so disposed,
The Lord is with them in life and in death.

On the same theme, that is the month of *Asārh*, Guru Arjan says*asāru tapańida tisu lagai hari ṇāhu na jińnā pāsi.*
Jagjīvan purakhu tiāgi kai māṇas sańdi ās.
dujai bhāī viguchlai gali paisu jam ki phās
jeha bījai so lunai matthai jo likhāsu.
raini vihānī pachhotānī uthi challi gaī nirās.
Jin kau sādhū bhetiai so dargah hoi khalāsu.
Kari kirpā prabh āpanī tere darsan hoi piās.
Prabh tudh binu dujā ko nahi Nānak ki ardāsi.
Asāru suhandā tisu lagai jisu mani hari charaṇ nivās.
Guru Granth saheb

The month of *Asārh* is scorching for
Those who from their Beloved are parted.
Having forsaken the sublime Husband,
She is enthralled by the wordly one.
Having lost Him, she has entered thewheels of birth and death.
As one sows so does one reap, fulfilling the mark of destiny.
The night has passed by disappointment remains
. But if the Guru is found, liberty will be attained.
Impart thine blessing to the thirsty one.
Sayeth Nānak, there is none other than Thee.
Asārh's beauty is revealed
To him who is attached to Thy feet!

Guru Arjan in his own manner (longer lines, typical *Punjābī* words such as *luṇai*) is stating what Guru Nānak uttered decades before. Both Gurus are making a parallel between the pain incurred in the month of Asārh and the pain incurred in separation from Prabh (Guru Nānak) Hari (Guru Arjan). Neverthless, the difference in their parallelism is conspicuous. In Guru Nānak's passage there is a detailed

emblematic parallelism within the main parallelism itself, for, *Asārh*'s heat is depicted through many an emblem: the blazing sun, scorched sap, seared creatures, crying insects. Guru Arjan moves right into the human dimension; his passage is devoid of Guru Nānak's wealth parallel emblems'.

Symbols: The *Guru Granth Sāhib* begins with the '1' (I *Oaṅkār*). And I am faced with an intractable dilemma: is the '1' literal or is it symbolic? It is most literal for the '1' emphatically states the existance (*kār*)of the one God(*Oaṅ*) yet, the '1' is a mathematical symbols standing for a larger meaning which cannot be given or not freely given in perceptual experience. Grounded in literalism, it seems to that the '1' goes beyond, *ad infinitum*; both literalism and symbolism find their quintessence in it. Confining myself to letter, '1' take the liberty of replacing a Berkelian claim, *viz*., mathematics goes from infinitiesimals of infintesimals to nowhere[12] by that the mathematical '1' goes from infinitestimals of infinity of infinity! Although a mathematical symbol, the '1' is far from being exact or stipulated in any fashion. In fact the various symbols Father, Mother, Brother, Friend, Judge, Lover, Bridgroom, Gardener, Garden, Brahma, Viṣṇu, Siva… are completed in the symbols of the numeral '1' It is the most direct, embracing and unrestrictive symbols for the Metaphysical Being existent in the Sikh faith.

In his article on the "Meaning and justificiaction of Symbols", **Paul Tillich** says that symbols are the language or religion and are the only way in which religion can express itself directly.[13] Going beyond them, "the symbols participate in the reality of that which they represent". Signs, as opposed to symbols, says **Tillich**, don't. The following numerals used frequently in the *Guru Granth Sāhib*- Two (*dohiṅ*)- for God and matter
Three (*tine*)-for the three *lokas* (worlds):
ākāsh (upper), pātāl (nether)
and *dhartī* (earth) on the three guṇas: *rajas*, *satva* and *tamas*.
Four (*chāre*)-for the four elements or the four Vedas: *Rig*, *Yojur, Atharva* and *sāma*.
Five (panja)-for fives senses or the five lower passions: *kām* (lust), *krodh* (anger), *lobh* (greed), *moh* (desire) and *ahaṅkār* (egocentricity).
merely stand. They represent entities without participating in them and are, in a way 'steno'. We could therefore in the Tillichian term call them 'signs'. Symbols, as he points out *Systematic Theology*, enhance rather than diminish the reality and power of religious language.[13a] This Tillichian might one say, Christian? Understanding of symbols is in congruence with the Sikh.

The Bridgegroom symbol, a ramification of the '1' illustrates it quite well. Says the Guru in measure *Asā*:

Kari kirpā apani āiātā mili sakhtā kāju rachālā,
Khelu dekhi mani anadu bhāiā sahu viāhaṇ ālā.
Gavahu gavahu kāmṇi bibek bīchāru
hamāre ghari āiā jagjivanu bhatāru
guru duārai hamarā vī hu jī hoā jāṅ sah miltā taṅ jāniā
tihu lokā mahi sabadu raviā hai āpu gai manu manti
āpaṇā kāraju āpe savāre horanī kāroju na hoi
jitu kāraju satu saṅtokhu daiā dha amu hoi gurmukhi būjhai koi,
bhanati nānaku sabhnā kā pīri ako soi,
Jis no nadari kare sā sohāgaṇi hoi.
Guru Granth I, 351

When in benignancy He came unto me,
Then my friends gleefully arranged the ceremony.
The heart was loved to see this marvel.
The Bridgegroom has come to wed His bride
Sing, sing O, friends,
Sing songs full of the truth of life.
To my house has come the world Master,
Through the Guru I wedded Him,
Through Him I comprehended Him,
Through the three worlds His nām pervades
As ego vanishes, the mind is stilled.
Fulfilleth He His own task,
None else is capable of accomplishing it.
The offspring of Divine intercession-
Truth, contentment, compassion, duty are known to just a few.
Sayeth Nānak, He alone is the Lord of all
Only she upon whom He bestows favour,
Becomes the beautiful bride.

The symbol of the bridgreoom coming to wed. His bride (*sahu viāhaṇ āiā*) is central to the *Guru Granth Sāhib*. The "wholly other"[14] who completely eludes apprehension and comprehension is through the symbol of the Bridgegroom instantly, 'participatingly', represented as the 'wholly this'! The relation of the 'bridgegroom' is entirely from our physical world, but as symbol it has the capacity to evoke numerous religious emotions: along with the love, the sentiment for the Bridgegroom, is the "mysterium tremendum"[15] for *Punjābi* bride doesn't meet her grom till her wedding night. Symbols are truly, as says **Paul Tillich**, the language of religion. The theological as well as psychological completion that he in his conception of God found in the combination of symbols 'Lord' (fascination mystery authority) and Father'[16] (love sentimentality) is accomplished in the *Guru Granth* symbol of the Bridgegroom. That the atmosphere during the wedding is not wholly one of festivity but also one of contemplation "*bibek bichār*" (let us sing songs of the truth of life, line5), throws light upon the turst of the *Guru Granth Sāhib* the merging of physics and metaphysics. Joyous singing gāvahu gāvahu and thinking *bibek bīchar* go hand in hand. Furthermore, it is interesting to see how the Guru shifts so smoothly between symbolism and literalism. The offspring of the *symbolic marriage are literally*: *sat* (truth), *saṅtokh* (contentment), *dayā* (compassion) and *dharma* (duty).

Symbols like metaphors, similes and emblematic parallelisms flash forth beautiful images. I should have mentioned that the symbolic Bridgegroom is conjured up in highly aesthetic terms, for a reiteration of '*sundar*' (meaning beautiful) occurs three times in His description. And of course the bride whom He marries is beautiful. In *Rāg Asā, Guru Nānak* exclaims: *Merā pīru raliālā rām* my Lord is the most delicious inebriatiojn! Besides enriching the senses, the palpable images of *Guru Granth Sāhib* enrich the mind, for without ever stating or explaining, they stir the imagination to find the connection between palpable and the impalpable.

3. Rhythm

I wonder if **Byron** meant the rhythm of Italian when he said "I love the language, the soft bastard Latin which melts like kisses from a female mouth and sound as if it should be writ on satin."[17] Whatever the case may be, the flowing sensation produced by the mere sound, the repetition of words, their semantic aura[18] is what I understand rhythm to be.

In addition, **Rabindranath Tagore** says: "In perfect rhythm the art form becomes like the stars which in their seeming stillness are never still, like a motionless flame that is nothing but motion"…

And Eliot:

"Only by form, the pattern
Can words or music reach
The stillness as a Chinese jar still
Moves perpetually in its stillness".

From the overlapping of **Byron's** "melts" with my "flowing" which then overlaps with **Tagore's** "nothing but

motion" and **Eliot's** "moves perpetually", I infer the élan of rhythm to be flow or motion. To support my inference I quote **Elizabeth Drew:** "The Greek word from which rhythm is derived means 'flow' and when we speak of poetic rhythm we mean the whole movement communicated by the words of the poem."[19] The 'flow' or the rhythm of the *Guru Granth Sāhib* can be traced as

a. simply flowing
b.stairlike paralleling
c.somersaulting

(a) By 'simply flowing' I am referring to the tempo of the *Guru Granth* poetry to its rhythm so alive. The prosody in the *Guru Granth Sāhib* isn't very strict or tradition bound. Meters have been used to suit the changing mood or scene or to evoke a complex harmony. Since what the Gurus uttered was (and is) to be sung by all in unison rather than be scrutinized by the scholars, of prosody, they were (and it continues on) flexible about dropping a mātra (syllable) or picking up another. Meters have been indicated. Generally, the padās employ shorter meters, '*aṣṭpadī* slightly longer and *chhaṅts* still longer. In Guru Nanak's "*jaisī mai āve khasam kī bānī taisrā karī giān ve Lālo*",

As comes the Lord's Word,
That is how I deliver it, O, *Lālo*!

'How is the form in which Guru Nanak's poetry flowed out and as he maintains, it was from the Ultimate. The mode, then, of transmutation of feelings and thoughts coming from the Divine realm is not composition; instead, it is a natural flow. Nevertheless, it is quite fascination to find many poetic devices such as alliteration, assonance, consonance and rhyme in the *Guru Granth* passages! I point to Guru Nānak's verse

Choa chandan aṅkī charābvau.
Pat paṭaṅbar pahiri haḍāvau.
binu harināām kahā sukhū pāvau
kiā pahirau kiā uḍhi dikhāvau
binu jagdis kahā sukhu pāvau. (*rahāu*)
Guru Grantha, I. 225

And translating:

Scents and perfumes I may spray,
Satins and silks I may wear,
Without the Nām of Hari where shall happiness be?
Why be bedecked? Why display what I wear?
Without jagadis where shall happiness be?

Here the whole first line resonates with 'ch' sound (*choā, chaṅdan*, *charāvau*). **Santayana** in *poetry* and *Religion* cited a critic who said that the beauty of poetry consists entirely in the frequent sound of *j* and *sh* and the resulting flow of saliva in the mouth.[20] And *ch* is indeed close to *sh*! In the second line pa s alliterate: *pāṭ, patańbar, pahir*. The passage is full of the assonance of a; *chaṅdan*, *aṅk*, *charāvan*, *paṭ paṭaṅbar*, *pahir,haḍavau, Harī Nām kaha, pavau*, *pahirau,dikhaau, jagadīs kaha pavau,* illustrate it. Consonance is apparent between r-s in line two *paṭanbar* and *pahir* and h-s (besides the terminating word in every line) in *odh, sukh*. The rhyming of *chandanaṅk*, *paṭ paṭāṅbar* and *charāvau haḍāvau pāvau dikhavau, pavau* has a lovely chime. Even *rahau* (literally means a pause) which has been used by the Guru to indicate the central idea of the piece, rhymes with the rest! We can see that line five is a repetition of line three but why the one and only difference between the usage of *Hari* (line 3) and *jagadīs* (Line 5)?

Another passage, this time by Guru Arjan, exemplifies this natural momentum cum poetic art of the *Guru Granth Sāhib*. In measure *Bilāval*:

ati prītam manmohanā ghaṭ sohanā
prān adhārā rām
suṅdar sobhā lāl gopāl dailāl kī
apar apārā rām.
Guru Granth, V.542

O, Beloved, mind bedazzling, so good looking, life giving, Handsome, radiating care taking, compassionate, unfathomable, immeasureable Thou art.

In my translating of it, Guru Arjan's verse might sound like a string of adjectives. But it isn't Guru Arjan is struck by His magnificence and words without comas or fullstops flow out spontaneously. The energy with which they flow in their wonderful rhythm comes from the depth behind them which is a combination of spritiuality (longing coming from an for the Ineffable) plus sensuousness (allured by His resplendence *sobhā*, *suṅdar*, both qualities of being handsome; ghat and sohanā be speak of his physical beauty) plus intellectual (Guru's mind is bedazzled man *mohanā*) plus emotional (the Guru is being sentimental for his *prītam*, i.e. his Lover) plus imagination (perceives the 'I' to be unfathomable, infinite immeasureable). An essayed composition it just doesn't seem to be. Yet, as in Guru Nanak's passage, there is an immense assonance of a *ati, prītam, man, mohan, ghat, sohana, prān, adhāra, rām suṅdar, sobhā, lal, gopal, detāl, apār, aparā, rām.* Too, there is an alliteration of m (*man, mohana*), s (*suñdar, sobha*) and a (*ati, apar apāra*). Consonance between *man mohanā ghat sohanā* and *tāl gopāl daiāl* has a debonair daintiness. And, *prān adhārā rām* rhymes fine with *apār apārā rām.* If a distinction were to be made between Guru Nānak's and Guru Arjan's flow of words, I would say Guru Nānak's alliterate much more. In some of his verse the initial sound of words resonates in stanza after stanza for which *Asā kī Vār* provides good examples.

Such uncontrived poetic devices (I hesitatingly use the term) augment the natural 'flow' of the *Guru Granth* passages. The poetry of the *Guru Granth Sāhib* is like a river forceful, elemental, yet with a pattern, a pattern of its own. In a patternless pattern the *Guru Granth* words are simply flowing….

(b) *In introducing Biblical Literature*, **Leonard L. Thompson** writes that "in stairlike parallelism part of one line is repeated in the second but also developed further."[24] 'Stairlike' by itself presents us with the image of an ascending motion of things and is thus in the vein with what we have been discussing: the flow of things. The difference is that instead of being a rhythmic repetition of merely vowels and consonants there is not (also) a repetition of a "part of line" which in course of repetition is further developed. An example stairlike parallelism in the *Guru Granth Sāhib*:

Oaṅkāri brahmā utpati.
Oaṅkāri kīa jinni chiti.
Oaṅkāri Sali jug bhae.
Oañkāri bed nirmal.
Oaṇkāri sabadi udhāre.
Oaṇkāri gurmukhi tāre.
Guru Granth, I, 929-30

In each of these lines 'Oaṇkar' ('Oaṇkār forms approximately one third of a line) is repeated. But all along there is a constant development. The sequence being with 'Oaṇkār' creating *Brahmā* who then contemplating (*chiti*) upon 'Oaṇkār'receive high titles. After Brahmā's creation, 'Oaṇkar' brings forth mountains (*sail*) and aeons (*jug*) This stairlike parallelism depicting throughout 'Oaṇkar's power continues on with His producing the *Vedās* (*bed*) and reaches its climax with Oaṇkār liberating the one (*gurmukh*) who "*Oaṇkārī sabadi udhāre*". "*Oaṇkārī sabadi udhāre*" is remembering His Word, i.e. His power which as we see has so far been being "further developed." Therefore, this 'motif' of stairlike parallelism has succeeded in succinctly,

emphatically and rhythemically making the statement: 'Oaṇkār' the Omnipotent is the creator of all.

Stairlike parallelism has been used in *Guru Granth Sāhib* to portray the oneness of the Ultimate. Says Guru Nanak in Asa:

tun ape rasanā āpe basanā avaru na dūjā kahau māl.
Sāhib merā eko hai,
Eko hai bhār eko hai.

Guru Grantha, I. 350

Transalating just the last two lines-

My Lord is One
One is He,O, friend, One is He.

The triple repetition of *eko hai* accentuates the Oneness of the '1'. Herein a part of the lines has not only been repeated in the second (as **Leonard Thomson's** definition states) but also once again in the second line itself! We perceive a merging of delicate rhythm with a strong emphasis. Such stairlike parallelism spreads an aura of ineffable simplicity over the entire poetry of *Guru Granth Sahib*.

(c) Somesaulting is the circular movement that I perceive in many of the passages. The image I have in mind is of words and lines flowing and then making a rhythmic turn backwards. To differentiate 'somesaulting' from the former 'simply flowing' and stairlike paralleling' one could say that somerasaulting is cyclic and the other two tier linear. We could even go further to differentiate the 'simply flowing' wherein the movement is horizontal from 'stairlike paralleling' wherein the movement is vertical one of ascending, of a further developing. In somersaulting there is a flowing cum a reflowing. That words or lines have the ability or somersault is simply thrilling. A passage from Bhakta Namdev forms an outstanding illustration:

jal te tarańg tarāńg te hāi jalu,
kahan sunan kau dūja,
apahi gavai apahi nachai api bajavi tura,
kahat Namdev tun mero thakuru janu urā tū pūrā.
Guru Granth, Namdev, 1252

Let us foucus upon the top line. It is easy to see that it begins with '*jal* and ends with *jal*. In the middle comes 'tarańg, which is repeated but the repetition unlike a straight flowing or ascending straightlike, is one that reverses. By the juxtaposition of "*jal te tarańg"* te hai jalu" (from the wave is the water) a somersault is made. From *jal* to tarańg, *jal tarańg tarańg* to *jal*. This visual representation through the rhythm of words is indeed remarkable.

In consonance with the somersaulting form are the somersaulting images. '*āpahi gāvai āpahī nāchai āpi bajāvai tārā'*-Himself He sings, Himself He dances, Himself He plays tee instrument depicts the One rhythmically performing His various acts. One in reminded of Shiva's dance. With his four hands, braided, and jeweled hair of which the lower locks are twirling, Shiva is all whirl and twirt.[22]

And underlying the somersaulting form and the somersaulting theme. The One is all "*kahat Nāmdev tūn merā thākur janu ūrā tu purā". Thākur*, a Hindi word for God, is '*pūrā*' whole, perfect. Not only the singer, He is also the dancer as well as the player of instruments. And *altogether* He sings, dances and plays; Like Siva's dance, the combined performance is a manifestation of a Cosmic Rhythm. The Governor of Cosmos seems to be somersaulting and His somersaulting circumferences everything, everyone, **Hans von Bulow**, the famous conductor said: "In the beginning was rhythm;" In the Guru's words: *"jal te tarańg te hai jal*". The very words convey the somersaulting images and theme. What I recognize is that *somersaulting* is in fact *a simple flowing which when reversing then stairlike ascends* and *simply* flows back again. That the divisions of my section fail to divide and contrarily go to form a divisionless whole goes to say a great deal for the rhythm of *Guru Granth* poetry.

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Footnotes:

1.**Geroge Santayana,** *poetry and Religion* (New York:Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), p.180.

2**Geroge Berkeley,** *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human knowledge* (Edited by C.M. Turbayne, Library of Liberal Arts 1957), p.6.

3. *Ibid* p.16.

4. **Wheelwright,** *Metaphor and Reality,* p.38.

5. **Martin Heidegger**, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (Translated by **Albert Hofstadter**, New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p.p. 17-75.

6. **Micrea Eliade,** *Sācred and the Profane* (New York: A Harvest Book, 1957) Sacred life for Guru Nānak: Life with the Lord. Profane life for Guru Nānak: apart from Him.

7. **Heideggar**, *Poetry, Language, Thought,* p. 74.

8. **Heideggar**, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p.226.

9. *Ibid.*, p.71

10. **Leonard L Thomposn**, *Inıtroducing Biblical Literature A More Fantastic Country* (New jersey: Prentice Hall, 1978), pp. 18.19.

11. *Ibid*., p.19.

12. **Robert W.Hall,** *Studies in Religious Philosophy* (Vermont: American Book Company 1959), article by Paul Tillich, "Meaning and justification of Symbols", pp. 305-309.

13. Ibid.

13a **Paul Tillich**, *Systematic Theology*, Volume 1 (Chicago:1951), p.241.

14. **Rudolph Otto**. *The idea of the Holy* (Galaxy Book,1958), p.26.

15. *Ibid*., p.25.

16.*Tillich. Systemātic Theory*, p.288,

17.**Byron** has been quoted by **Santayana** in *Poetay and Religion*, p.177.

18.Something what mallarme said for the "cabbalistic" sensation in **Thomas A William**, *Mallarme and the Language of Mysticism* (Georgia Univesity, 1970), p.38.

19.**Elizabeth Drew,** *Discovering poetry* (New York: Nortan and company,1933), p.97.

20.**Santayana,** *Poetry and Religion,* p.177

21.**Leonard Thompson**, *Introducing Bibical Literature: a more fantastic country,* p.19.

22.**Ananda Coomaraswamy**, *Dance of Shiva (*Noonday Press.1957), p.72.